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Abstract 
The inception of Embodied Metaphor Approach (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) laid down the 
foundations of a theory which accounts for metaphor not merely as a linguistic 
phenomenon but as a conceptual tool that manifests itself cognitively through engaging 
directly and indirectly meaningful phenomena—source and target domains, respectively. 
Being directly and indirectly meaningful are intrinsically related to whether a given 
phenomenon is bodily-experienced or abstract (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2011; Gibbs and Matlock 
2008; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 
2010, 2011; Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; 
Szwedek 2011).  
Given that source domains are bodily experienced (therefore, they are directly 
meaningful), the experiential character of conceptual metaphor is fully attributed to source 
domains whose structures emerge as a result of the interaction of our body, mind, and 
environment (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999:278; Szwedek 2011:343). That is, the 
foundational assumption within this approach is that the constitutive nature of source 
domains plays a dominating role in conceptual metaphor insomuch that their topology is 
imposed on target domains (e.g. Szwedek 2011).  
The fact that it is widely accepted within the embodiment theory that metaphorical 
mapping is a homogeneous cognitive process—namely, it is based on one-way-meaning 
transfer—has yielded two overarching principles. First, conceptual metaphor is instantiated 
through one mapping typology—concrete-onto-abstract phenomena. Second, this typology 
is governed by the following set of tenets: uni-directionality (Lakoff 1987:268), invariance 
principle (Lakoff 1990), and partial mapping (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:52-55).   
xiv 
 
Based on these assumptions, we formulate the following hypotheses: because our 
interaction with the environment is carried out via different modalities (vision, audition, 
motor, sensory etc.) and conceptual metaphor exploits this heterogeneous bodily-based 
information to reason about target domains, the embodiment theory may have obscured 
potential patterns and principles of mapping. That is, we hypothesise that the source 
domains which are grounded in different modalities will lead to significant variations 
regarding the mechanisms that operate in conceptual metaphor. Second, we expect that 
scrutinizing the constitutive natures of target domains will reveal that conceptual metaphor 
is instantiated through different mapping typologies. Third, this may also cast target 
domains in an active role both in the construction and processing of metaphorical mapping.  
Taken together, these three hypotheses predict that (1) different mapping typologies 
will be underpinned by distinct cognitive operations and patterns of mapping. 
Consequently, (2) these typologies will posit a challenge to the tenets of the embodiment 
theory. We shall argue that the tenets of the embodiment theory (Gibbs 1994, 2011; Gibbs 
and Matlock 2008; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Johnson 1981, 1987; 
Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff 1993, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and 
Turner 1989; Ruiz de Mendoza 2005, 2011; Steen 2011; Szwedek 2011) particularly fit the 
mapping typology which engages bodily-experienced and non-bodily-experienced 
phenomena as source and target domains, respectively.  
Based on the data from Metalude1, we will test these hypotheses by exploring the 
constitutive natures of source and target domains to identify potentially different mapping 
                                                 
1 METALUDE (Metaphor at Lingnan University Department of English) was first accessed 
at, http://www.ln.edu.hk/lle/cwd/project01/web/internal/database.html on December 2th, 
2011. I am especially grateful to professor Michael White for recommending me this 
corpus and to professor Andrew Goatly for allowing me to have access to it.   
xv 
 
typologies. Then, it will be necessarily to assess whether these typologies draw on different 
cognitive operations and patterns of mapping. Therefore, the main goal of this thesis is to 
establish the first step toward a more complex classification of conceptual metaphor in 
terms of its typologies and their respective cognitive operations.  
Key words: Interaction, cognitive topology, motor topology, emergent structure, 
metaphorical mapping typologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Summary of this doctoral thesis in Spanish 
En la tesis actual tomamos como punto de partida y de contexto general, los trabajos de 
Bernárdez (2005, 2013), Pinker (e.g. 2007) y Rakova (2003) que argumentan que la teoría 
del Embodiment no es viable en tres aspectos. En el primer caso, por ejemplo, Bernárdez  
apunta que la teoría del Embodiment está basada en dos fundamentos erróneos: (1) el 
marco experimental, en el cual se escoge la lengua inglesa como único punto de referencia 
(Caballero y Díaz-Vera 2013:205). Y (2) el marco teórico que ignora el aspecto cultural de 
la proyección metafórica, asumiendo que los patrones y principios que gobiernan la 
metáfora conceptual, encontrados en la lengua inglesa, son universales (Bernárdez  2005, 
2013).  
En el segundo caso, Pinker (e.g. 2007) también se opone a la teoría del Embodiment 
ya que ésta sostiene que áreas de conocimiento tan abstractos como las matemáticas, 
filosofía, moralidad, etc. son propensas al uso de la metáfora conceptual. En particular, este 
autor sostiene que, aunque esta teoría aborda importantes aspectos de la cognición, la 
metáfora conceptual no opera en todos los procesos cognitivos (Pinker 2007:245-247).   
Por último en el tercer caso, Rakova (2003) demuestra que la teoría del 
Embodiment no puede abarcar el fenómeno de sinestesia puesto que este tipo de metáfora 
depende de dos fenómenos concretos. Así pues, los principios y patrones que 
presuntamente, y de forma absoluta, gobiernan la proyección metafórica no se pueden 
aplicar en algunos ejemplos de la metáfora conceptual. Por ejemplo, la unidireccionalidad 
de la proyección metafórica no se puede usar para explicar este tipo de metáfora ya que los 
dominios fuente y meta hacen referencia a dos fenómenos fisiológicos. Es importante 
17 
 
anotar aquí que este principio está intrínsecamente unido al hecho de que los dominios 
fuente y meta son concretos y abstractos, respectivamente.  
En conjunto, estos estudios sacan a la luz una tendencia generalizadora adoptada en 
la teoría del Embodiment  para explicar el lenguaje figurativo. En la misma línea de 
razonamiento, en la tesis actual hemos examinado cómo dicha tendencia está presente 
también en el desarrollo de los principios y patrones de la teoría. Esta tendencia se puede 
percibir en el hecho de que la metáfora conceptual ha sido tratada como un proceso 
cognitivo homogéneo y que se rige por un conjunto de principios y patrones invariables 
(Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Dicho proceso consiste en transferir datos 
semánticos en un solo sentido, desde fenómenos semánticamente independientes hacia 
otros dependientes (Lakoff y Turner 1989). 
La teoría del Embodiment presupone por lo tanto que la metáfora conceptual se 
manifiesta a través de una sola tipología: proyectar desde dominios experienciales (los 
denominados fuente) hacia  dominios abstractos (meta) (Kövecses 1988, 2011; Lakoff y 
Johnson 1980, 1999) y que existe un conjunto determinado de principios y patrones, como 
la unidireccionalidad y la proyección parcial, que caracterizan todas las metáforas 
conceptuales (e.g. Lakoff y Johnson 1980).  
1. Hipótesis general de la tesis 
El objetivo de la tesis es comprobar la veracidad de la hipótesis basada en el hecho de que 
nuestra interacción con el entorno se lleva a cabo mediante varias modalidades sensoriales 
(visión, audición, motor, olfato etc.) y que la metáfora conceptual explota dichas 
modalidades para razonar sobre los dominios meta, de modo que no se pueden capturar las 
proyecciones metafóricas bajo un solo tipo de proceso cognitivo. Es decir, que en la teoría 
18 
 
del Embodiment, la metáfora conceptual se concibe como una transferencia de significado 
en un solo sentido—desde los dominios fuente hacia los dominios meta (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980).  
Este fundamento también conlleva hacer una distinción radical entre los dominios 
fuente y meta. Por lo tanto, es importante primero verificar si la metáfora conceptual se 
manifiesta mediante varias tipologías y segundo ver si estas tipologías siguen diferentes 
mecanismos. En este sentido, formularemos la siguiente hipótesis: las distintas tipologías 
de la metáfora conceptual pueden suponer un problema para los principios y patrones de la 
teoría del Embodiment, los cuales han sido aceptados como operativos en todas las 
metáforas conceptuales.  
2. Metodología y corpus 
Con el fin de verificar nuestra hipótesis, hemos analizado las metáforas recogidas en 
METALUDE (Metaphor at Lingnan University Department of English- 
http://www.ln.edu.hk/lle/cwd/project01/web/internal/database.html), el 2 de diciembre de 
2011. Algunas de las ventajas de este corpus es que recoge una gran variedad de tipologías 
de la metáfora conceptual y así mismo ofrece una representación detallada de los dominios 
fuente y meta. Estas dos ventajas  han favorecido el estudio de la metáfora conceptual en 
términos tipológicos.  
Por lo tanto, nuestra metodología en la verificación de la hipótesis ha consistido en 
analizar las topologías de los dominios fuente y meta  permitiéndonos  identificar diferentes 
tipologías de la metáfora conceptual. A partir de ahí, nuestra labor ha consistido en 
desarrollar una representación esquemática de la proyección metafórica que facilita 
comprobar la aplicación de los principios y patrones de la teoría del Embodiment.  
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3. Resultados 
Nuestro estudio revela que, los dominios fuente están basados en varios tipos de 
experiencias. Al mismo tiempo, los dominios meta también admiten una clasificación más 
detallada de sus topologías. Estos dos factores indican que la metáfora conceptual se 
manifiesta a través de varias tipologías: 
1) Proyección metafórica entre fenómenos físicamente accesibles. Esta 
tipología a su vez muestra las siguientes sub-tipologías: 
a. Proyección metafórica entre fenómenos concretos  
b. Proyección metafórica entre modalidades sensoriales (sinestesia)  
c. Proyección metafórica entre dos fenómenos concurrentes  
d. Proyección metafórica de fenómenos que intercambian la función de 
meta y fuente  
2) Proyección metafórica desde fenómenos físicamente accesibles hacia 
otros abstractos: 
3) Proyección metafórica desde acciones físicas hacia acciones mentales 
4) Proyección metafórica entre fenómenos abstractos 
Y por tanto, estas tipologías no se pueden estudiar siguiendo el conjunto (invariable) de 
patrones y principios de la proyección metafórica establecido en la teoría del Embodiment. 
A continuación discutiremos estos resultados, los problemas que suponen para la teoría del 
Embodiment, y cuáles han sido nuestras propuestas para resolver estos problemas. 
20 
 
4. Discusión de los resultados 
4.1. Tipologías de la metáfora conceptual  
En el primer capítulo, nuestro principal objetivo ha sido sacar a la luz las diferentes 
experiencias que operan como dominios fuente. Hemos observado que estos dominios 
admiten una clasificación más precisa, la cual facilita identificar los mecanismos que 
operan en cada tipología. A esto se le añade el hecho de que los dominios meta también 
presentan una variedad substancial, que podría influir en la manera de cómo se lleva a cabo 
el proceso de la proyección metafórica.  
Basándonos en estos dos descubrimientos, proponemos que la metáfora se 
manifiesta en varias tipologías y, por consiguiente, examinarla en estos términos puede 
revelar que el conjunto de los principios y patrones desarrollados en la teoría del 
Embodiment no pueden abarcar todas las tipologías. 
Por lo tanto en este capítulo empezamos con la siguiente hipótesis: la experiencia 
corporal es tan variada que, al intentar incluirla en una sola categoría, se podrían pasar de 
largo ciertos factores que potencialmente operan en algunas tipologías. A modo de 
ilustración del hecho de que los fenómenos fuente admiten una clasificación más detallada. 
Por  lo tanto, se pueden clasificar los fenómenos que funcionan como dominios fuente en 
varias categorías según los mecanismos operativos de cada uno de ellos.  
A este factor se le podría añadir el hecho de que los dominios meta no son siempre 
abstractos como se concibe en la teoría del Embodiment (Lakoff y Johnson 1980, 1999) ya 
que presentan una variedad substancial, la cual podría influir significativamente en el 
proceso de la proyección metafórica. En este sentido, el corpus revela que estos dominios 
también pueden tener un fundamento en la experiencia corporal.  
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Así pues, hemos propuesto que la metáfora conceptual se manifiesta en varias 
tipologías. El hecho de que los dominios fuente se basan en varios tipos de experiencia y 
que los dominios meta no son siempre abstractos contradicen los principios y patrones de la 
teoría del Embodiment. Es decir, dado que esta teoría concibe la metáfora conceptual como 
un proceso cognitivo idéntico, ya que supuestamente consiste en proyectar el significado de 
un dominio concreto (fuente) hacia otro dominio abstracto (meta) (Lakoff y Johnson 1980, 
1999), esta teoría no puede explicar los ejemplos (1) y (2). 
Esta situación es debida a que los patrones y principios de la proyección metafórica 
fueron desarrollados basándose en la tipología que depende de fenómenos concretos y 
abstractos como dominios fuente y meta, respectivamente. Por esta razón, proponemos 
estudiar la metáfora como un proceso cognitivo que se manifiesta a través de distintas 
tipologías y que podría seguir diferentes mecanismos. Es importante destacar aquí que el 
intento de identificar las tipologías de la metáfora conceptual no desempeña un objetivo 
meramente clasificatorio; más bien, nuestro estudio puede revelar varios mecanismos que 
operan en las proyecciones metafóricas que no han sido considerados ya que la teoría del 
Embodiment da por sentado el hecho de que la metáfora conceptual sigue un conjunto de 
patrones y principios invariables.  
Así pues, hemos formulado la siguiente hipótesis: dado que la metáfora conceptual 
se manifiesta a través de varias tipologías, el conjunto de los principios y patrones de la  
proyección metafórica no puede abarcar diferentes tipologías. Para comprobar si la 
variedad tipológica de la metáfora conceptual merece un estudio detallado y si dicho 
estudio ayuda a tener una mayor comprensión de los mecanismos operativos en la 
construcción de la metáfora, hemos tratado de ver si estas tipologías presentan un problema 
para los patrones y principios de la teoría del Embodiment. Si es así, el siguiente paso sería 
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identificar cómo estas tipologías distorsionan dicha teoría. Este acercamiento requiere tener 
en cuenta también la variedad de los dominios meta.  
Como habíamos predicho, se observa que los mecanismos adoptados en el estudio 
de la metáfora desde la perspectiva del Embodiment operan en una tipología pero no en 
otras. En este sentido, hemos descubierto que, efectivamente, la metáfora conceptual se 
manifiesta a través de distintas tipologías tales como: 
 Proyección desde fenómenos corporales hacia otros fenómenos corporales. 
 Proyección desde fenómenos abstractos hacia otros fenómenos abstractos 
 Proyección desde fenómenos motor hacia otros fenómenos motor 
 Proyección desde fenómenos sensoriales hacia otros fenómenos sensoriales  
En este sentido, los dominios que hemos examinado proporcionan una base inicial para un 
mayor entendimiento de las tipologías de la metáfora conceptual y sus mecanismos. El 
estudiar la metáfora en términos tipológicos nos ha permitido identificar qué mecanismos 
operan en cada tipo de tipología. Así pues, hemos demostrado que el marco teórico del 
Embodiment no puede abordar todos los mecanismos que operan en estas tipologías.  
Dado la inmensa variedad de la base experiencial de los dominios fuente y el hecho 
de que los dominios meta muestran varios tipos de topología, podemos  investigar los 
mecanismos de la metáfora conceptual como un proceso cognitivo que se manifiesta en 
varias tipologías. Por ejemplo, hemos argumentado que, aunque la metáfora conceptual está 
basada en la experiencia corporal, dicha experiencia varía substancialmente requiriendo una 
clasificación más precisa de la tipología de la metáfora conceptual para lograr un mayor 
entendimiento de los mecanismos que operan en cada tipología. Por lo tanto, proponemos 
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estudiar la metáfora conceptual como un proceso heterogéneo que se manifiesta en 
diferentes tipologías.  
Después de identificar algunas tipologías que potencialmente presentan una 
variedad cuyos mecanismos no se pueden abordar en la teoría del Embodiment, hemos 
intentado analizar dichas tipologías utilizando los siguientes criterios: unidireccionalidad y 
proyección metafórica parcial en un solo sentido.  
Como resultado, estos criterios no parecen encajar en las tipologías identificadas en 
el corpus. En este sentido, el hecho de que los principios y patrones de la proyección 
metafórica encajan en algunos tipos de la metáfora conceptual pero no en otros, es una 
fuente de evidencia acerca de cómo la metáfora se manifiesta en distintas tipologías que 
requieren un análisis particular de cada una de ellas.  
También, hemos observado que la teoría de embodied simulation concibe la 
metáfora conceptual como un proceso de simulación que concierne íntegramente a las 
acciones físicas de los dominios fuentes en los dominios meta (Feldman 2006; Kintsch 
2008). A este respecto, observamos que las acciones físicas de los dominios fuente se 
pueden clasificar, al menos, en diferentes categorías. 
Por consiguiente, comprobamos que no todos los dominios fuente siguen el 
fundamento de la simulación para proyectar significados en los dominios meta. En este 
sentido, argumentamos que mientras que algunas metáforas conceptuales se basan en la 
simulación de la acción física del dominio fuente como She grasps the idea, otras no están 
motivadas por el proceso de la simulación. Este factor otorga más argumentos para sostener 
nuestra hipótesis sobre la variedad tipológica de la metáfora conceptual. 
Otro factor importante que hemos observado al analizar la metáfora conceptual que 
depende de acciones físicas como dominios fuente es que los principios y patrones de la 
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teoría del Embodiment no encajan con los principios de la teoría de Embodied Simulation. 
En especial, la proyección metafórica parcial presenta un problema teórico al intentar 
aplicar este criterio a algunas tipologías como More Is Up debido a que los dominios fuente 
y meta en esta tipología son acciones físicas que se activan en paralelo. En este sentido, 
comprobamos que la proyección metafórica parcial tampoco se observa en esta tipología. 
Por lo cual, concluimos que la teoría de la Embodied Simulation y la Embodied Metaphor 
no encajan para explicar algunas tipologías.   
4.2. La perspectiva de Proposicionalidad y Linealidad  
En el segundo capítulo hemos tratado de identificar los fundamentos de la tipología que 
depende de fenómenos concretos y abstractos como dominios fuente y meta, 
respectivamente. Es importante destacar aquí que la teoría del Embodiment  otorga a los 
dominios fuente un papel dominante en la construcción y procesamiento de la metáfora 
conceptual (Lakoff y Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011); de hecho, esta teoría define los 
dominios fuente y meta como fenómenos semánticamente independientes y dependientes, 
respectivamente (Kövecses 2011; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff y Turner 1989; Szwedek 2011). Es 
decir, los dominios fuente proporcionan una estructura conceptual (parcial) a los meta ya 
que estos últimos no están dotados de significado por sí mismos. Por lo tanto los 
fenómenos que funcionan como dominios meta requieren otros fenómenos que son 
procesados a través de los mecanismos del cuerpo (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; 
Kövecses 2011; Szwedek 2011). Por el contrario, los dominios meta desempeñan un papel 
menor al de los dominios fuente ya que de acuerdo con la teoría del Embodiment, estos 
dominios no aportan ningún cambio en el estructura de los dominios fuente.  
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Basándonos en estos principios de la proyección metafórica, hemos propuesto una 
hypotesis: Proposicionalidad y Linealidad de la proyección metafórica. Los objetivos de 
esta propuesta son: primero ver si la creación del significado mediante la metáfora 
conceptual en esta tipología es proposicional y lineal y, segundo, ver si los principios y 
patrones de la teoría del Embodiment encajan con la propuesta.  
A este fin, nos hemos centrado en la tipología que depende de fenómenos 
experienciales y abstractos como dominios fuente y meta, respectivamente. La perspectiva 
que hemos adoptado en este capítulo nos ha abierto una nueva línea de investigación que 
nos permite ver más de cerca los fundamentos de la tipología que se basa en los fenómenos 
concretos y abstractos como dominios fuente y meta, respectivamente.  
Dado que este criterio no descansa sobre una base sólida, ya que no se satisface 
cuando se trata de fenómenos que intercambian el papel de fuente y de meta en distintas 
metáforas (Human Is Plant y Plant Is Human), hemos optado por analizar la metáfora 
conceptual que sigue estrictamente los fundamentos de la teoría del Embodiment. Es decir, 
hemos analizado la tipología que toma los fenómenos concretos y abstractos como 
dominios fuente y meta, respectivamente (Love Relation Is Journey). Hemos podido así 
identificar cuáles son los patrones y principios que operan particularmente en esta tipología 
permitiéndonos ver en cuál encajaría la teoría del Embodiment y al mismo tiempo poner al 
descubierto los fundamentos de dicha teoría. 
Anteriormente, hemos argumentado que, de acuerdo con la teoría del Embodiment, 
el dominio fuente juega un papel dominante en la metáfora conceptual. Esto se deduce del 
hecho de que los dominios fuente y meta son respectivamente directa e indirectamente 
significativos. La creación del significado a través de la metáfora conceptual es a la vez 
proposicional y lineal. En el primer caso, hemos demostrado que los principios y patrones 
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de la proyección metafórica indican que la teoría del Embodiment concibe la metáfora 
como un proceso cognitivo que se desarrolla en el tiempo ya que sin la experiencia corporal 
del dominio fuente, el dominio meta carece de significado.  
Por otra parte, en el segundo caso, la proyección metafórica es proposicional porque 
el dominio meta adquiere su significado basándose en la topología del dominio fuente. 
Lakoff y Johnson (1980:56) sostienen que no se puede entender la metáfora sin su 
fundamento en la experiencia corporal. En este sentido el significado de los dominios meta 
se deriva de la experiencia de los dominios fuente.  
En este punto, es importante verificar si la Proposicionalidad y Linealidad encajan 
con los principios y patrones de la teoría del Embodiment. El objetivo de este 
planteamiento es llevar a cabo un análisis exhaustivo de los principios y patrones de la 
teoría del Embodiment con el fin de verificar si dicha teoría concibe la proyección 
metafórica como un proceso cognitivo proposicional y lineal.  
Como resultado, los fundamentos del Embodiment como la unidireccionalidad y la 
proyección metafórica parcial de un solo sentido encajan en la perspectiva de 
Proposicionalidad y Linealidad. Asimismo, hemos demostrado que dicha propuesta, junto 
con la teoría del Embodiment no suponen ningún problema para analizar la tipología que se 
basa en fenómenos experienciales y abstractos como dominios fuente y meta, 
respectivamente. En este sentido, también hemos demostrado que este estudio cubre 
exclusivamente la metáfora que incorpora dos tipos de fenómeno: concreto (como dominio 
fuente) y abstracto (como dominio meta).  
Sin embargo, en el corpus de otras tipologías como, por ejemplo, aquellas en las 
cuales los dominios tanto meta como fuente están basados en experiencias corporales 
suponen un problema potencial  para el Embodiment. Por lo cual, el siguiente punto a tratar 
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en la tesis es analizar esta tipología desde la perspectiva de Proposicionalidad y Linealidad 
de la proyección metafórica.  
4.3. La teoría del Embodiment y la necesidad de examinar la metáfora 
conceptual en términos tipológicos 
En el capítulo anterior, hemos centrado nuestra atención sobre la tipología que se desarrolla 
de forma proposicional y lineal. La teoría del Embodiment otorga un papel dominante a los 
dominios fuente en la proyección del significado a través del uso de la metáfora. Según esta 
teoría, dicha situación es debida al hecho de que estos dominios son experienciales, y por lo 
tanto, son semánticamente independientes.  
Por otra parte, los fenómenos que funcionan como dominio meta, dado que son 
físicamente inaccesibles, carecen de significado. Por esta razón, según la teoría del 
Embodiment, dichos fenómenos requieren de otros para adquirir significado.  
En este capítulo, analizamos  la tipología que depende de dos fenómenos experienciales. 
Una de las características de esta tipología es el hecho de que el fundamento experiencial 
de la metáfora conceptual puede ser compartido por los fenómenos fuente y meta. Hemos 
argumentado que este tipo de metáfora conceptual supone un problema para la teoría del 
Embodiment y para la teoría de Proposicionalidad y Linealidad. En particular, hemos 
demostrado que las características que otorgan a los dominios fuente un papel dominante en 
la metáfora también están presentes en los dominios meta. Es decir, los dominios meta en 
esta tipología son experienciales, son semánticamente independientes y, por lo tanto, son 
aptos para proyectar significado. Una prueba de que estos dominios son capaces de 
proyectar significado a otros fenómenos es el hecho de que también funcionan como 
dominios fuente en algunas metáforas. Esto indica que el criterio según el cual los dominios 
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fuente y meta están diferenciados no parece viable en esta tipología. El hecho de que los 
dominios meta también tienen un fundamento experiencial, pone en cuestión los principios 
y patrones de la proyección metafórica. Es decir, dado que los dominios meta también están 
sujetos a la experiencia corporal, hemos argumentado que el carácter experiencial de la 
metáfora conceptual en esta tipología no se debe solamente a los dominios fuente.  
Otro factor a tener en cuenta es el hecho de que el principio de la 
unidireccionalidad tampoco opera en los ejemplos anteriores. En este caso estos ejemplos 
demuestran que los dominios meta también tienen un fundamento experiencial y por lo 
tanto son semánticamente independientes  y también son aptos para transferir datos 
semánticos a otros fenómenos.  
Asimismo, otra tipología que hemos identificado en el corpus y que no sigue los 
criterios de la teoría del Embodiment es aquella que se basa en el fenómeno de sinestesia. 
Según Rakova (2003), la metáfora que se base en sinestesia combina dos fenómenos 
fisiológicos. Otra tipología de la metáfora conceptual que no sigue los principios y patrones 
de la proyección metafórica es aquella que combina dos fenómenos fisiológicos. En este 
sentido, la teoría del Embodiment no puede tratar esta tipología ya que ésta última presenta 
varios factores que no se contemplan en la teoría del Embodiment.  
Primero, la teoría del Embodiment sostiene que la razón del uso de la metáfora 
conceptual es siempre proveer de significado a los fenómenos semánticamente 
dependientes. Es decir, éstos últimos carecen de significado y la única manera de que lo 
tengan es combinarlos con otros fenómenos que son semánticamente independientes; por lo 
tanto, al contrario de los fenómenos meta, los que funcionan como fuente, según quedó 
reflejado anteriormente, desempeñan un papel dominante en la metáfora conceptual.  
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El problema en este caso es que la tipología que hemos examinado en este capítulo toma 
como dominios meta fenómenos que son físicamente accesibles y semánticamente 
independientes. Por consiguiente, esta tipología depende de dos fenómenos que son aptos 
para dar significado a otros fenómenos. De ahí hemos propuesto que esta tipología no 
encaja con los principios y patrones que gobiernan la proyección metafórica y que pueda 
necesitar otra perspectiva para examinarla detalladamente.  
4.4. La proyección metafórica en un solo sentido vs. interacción  
En el capítulo anterior habíamos demostrado que la tipología que depende de dos 
fenómenos experienciales presenta un problema para la teoría del Embodiment. Es 
importante señalar que el hecho de que los dominios fuente jueguen un papel dominante en 
la construcción y procesamiento de la metáfora conceptual es debido a que estos dominios 
son experienciales. En este sentido, hemos observado que esta característica también se 
observa en los dominios meta ya que tienen igualmente un fundamento experiencial en esta 
tipología. Por consiguiente, argumentamos que son semánticamente independientes. Como 
prueba de ello, señalamos el hecho de que los dominios meta funcionan como dominios 
fuente en otras metáforas, lo cual les hace aptos para transferir datos semánticos a otros 
fenómenos. Esto, a su vez, implica un papel más participativo de los dominios meta en la 
metáfora conceptual.  
Luego, en este capítulo hemos formulado la siguiente hipótesis: puesto que el 
fundamento experiencial de los dominios fuente les capacita para proyectar significado a 
otros fenómenos y este fundamento también se observa en los dominios meta de la 
tipología analizada en este capítulo, hemos propuesto que éstos últimos también proyectan 
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significado. Es decir, los dominios meta pueden desempeñar un papel más importante en la 
construcción y procesamiento de la metáfora conceptual.   
La teoría de Proposicionalidad y Linealidad y la teoría del Embodiment  no abarcan 
este tipo de metáfora conceptual puesto que los dominios meta presentan las mismas 
características que se observan en los dominios fuente. Basándose en estas características, 
la teoría del Embodiment otorga un papel dominante a los dominios fuente en la 
construcción y procesamiento de la metáfora conceptual. Dado que los dominios meta en 
esta tipología son también experienciales, hemos propuesto que la proyección metafórica en 
este caso sigue otros mecanismos.  
Esta tipología no consiste en establecer una correspondencia sistemática entre los 
componentes existentes por defecto en los dominios fuente y meta. Más bien esta tipología 
se basa en la interacción de dos fenómenos a través de datos semánticos, lo cual resulta en 
una estructura emergente (Fauconnier y Turner 2007:362; Turner 2011: 12-16; Coulson 
2008:181; Ruiz de Mendoza y Peña 2005).  
Es importante recordar aquí que esta estructura es dinámica ya que es variable 
dependiendo de cómo interactúan los dos fenómenos. En algunas metáforas la inferencia 
que se obtiene a través de la metáfora conceptual no pertenece a ninguno de los dos 
dominios. Por lo tanto, esta tipología no satisface los patrones y principios de la proyección 
metafórica adoptados en la teoría del Embodiment en dos importantes aspectos: (1) la 
metáfora conceptual en esta tipología no consiste en transferir significado desde un 
fenómeno hacia otro; y (2) el dominio meta en este caso muestra una participación activa 
ya que sus ficheros interactúan con los del dominio fuente. Así pues los dominios meta no 
son simplemente receptores de datos semánticos de los dominios fuente.  
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De esta forma, el hecho de que los dominios fuente y meta son capaces de proyectar 
significado nos ha permitido estudiar esta tipología desde la perspectiva de la Interacción. 
Por lo tanto, dicha perspectiva contradice drásticamente el principio de la proyección 
metafórica en un solo sentido; desde el dominio más concreto al más abstracto. Primero, la 
metáfora conceptual, en esta tipología en particular, no consiste en establecer una 
correspondencia sistemática estable de ficheros que previamente existen en los dominios 
fuente y meta. Segundo, el dominio meta adquiere un papel dinámico en la metáfora 
conceptual, el cual consiste en participar activamente en la construcción y procesamiento 
de la tipología que depende de dos fenómenos experienciales. 
Entonces, la afirmación más importante de este capítulo es que la tipología que 
depende de dos fenómenos experienciales demuestra que la metáfora conceptual recoge 
datos semánticos de los dos dominios.  
4.5. Interacción de dominios fuente y meta vs. proyección metafórica en un solo 
sentido 
Como hemos visto anteriormente, una de las características de la tipología que depende de 
la interacción de los dominios fuente y meta es la estructura cognitiva que emerge como 
resultado de ésta interacción. Por lo tanto, examinar la metáfora conceptual prestando 
atención a sus tipologías no es un proceso meramente clasificatorio; más bien, es un 
acercamiento revelador de los mecanismos que operan en diferentes tipologías. Así pues, 
hemos examinado en detalle los procesos subyacentes en la tipología que toma fenómenos 
experienciales como dominios fuente y meta. Es importante recordar que en el capítulo 
anterior, hemos argumentado que esta tipología está basada en la interacción de los 
dominios meta y fuente.  
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En el capítulo V, hemos observado que algunas metáforas conceptuales que encajan 
en ésta tipología están motivadas por mecanismos como concurrencia, correlación, 
causalidad y co-activación. Es importante señalar que la siguiente clasificación no es 
determinante. Es decir, se puede apreciar que varios mecanismos pueden operar en una 
misma metáfora. 
4.5.1. Concurrencia y Correlación  
Se presentan estos dos mecanismos cuando dos fenómenos se toman como un conjunto de 
dos experiencias que concurren. Por ejemplo, el fenómeno Up va acompañado del 
fenómeno More, tanto que no se puede concebir un fenómeno sin activar el otro. En este 
caso, sostenemos que los dos fenómenos están relacionados en el mundo exterior, por lo 
cual se puede deducir que la tipología de este tipo se construye inconscientemente.  
4.5.2. Causalidad y co-activación  
Hemos observado que la tipología que esta motivada por los dos mecanismos anteriores 
también depende de los de causalidad y co-activación. Uno de los casos donde se observa 
estos dos mecanismos es la metáfora conceptual que se basa en la sinestesia. En este caso, 
dos fenómenos se activan mutuamente. Por ejemplo, sharp taste, bright sounds, loud color, 
heavy smell etc. demuestran que este tipo de metáfora no consiste en una transferencia de 
datos en un sólo sentido ya que según Ramachandran y Hubbard (2003:54) la experiencia 
en una modalidad induce a efectos en la otra modalidad. Teniendo en cuenta, por ejemplo, 
bright sounds, loud color etc. se ve claramente que las dos modalidades-visión y audición- 
intercambian los papeles de fuente y meta en diferentes metáforas. Dado que este tipo de 
metáfora induce a experimentar efectos en una modalidad distinta a la del fenómeno meta, 
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se puede entender que esta tipología esta motivada por dos mecanismos: causalidad y co-
activación.   
La construcción y el procesamiento de la metáfora conceptual se llevan a cabo de 
forma inconsciente (Lakoff y Johnson 1980,1999; Ruiz de Mendoza 2011). Este argumento 
encaja con los mecanismos de la interacción que hemos identificado en la tipología ya 
analizada en este capítulo. En particular, la metáfora conceptual que está motivada por la 
sinestesia se construye y se procesa de forma automática. Esta característica abarca los 
mecanismos de la interacción como causalidad, co-activación, corelación etc.   
Después de identificar los mecanismos de la interacción, hemos intentado ver qué 
tipo de tipología no puede abarcar esta teoría. Anteriormente, habíamos notado que una de 
las recurrentes características en la tipología que depende de la interacción de los 
fenómenos fuente y meta es que los procesos de construcción y procesamiento de la 
metáfora conceptual se llevan a cabo de manera inconsciente (e.g. sinestesia). Así, 
queríamos comprobar si esta característica juega un papel primordial en la interacción de 
dos fenómenos en otras tipologías.  
Este tipo de metáfora no se construye ni se procesa de manera consciente ya que se 
puede elegir el dominio fuente para razonar sobre el dominio meta. Aunque, los dos 
dominios son semánticamente independientes, hemos demostrado que la interacción entre 
estos dos fenómenos sigue diferentes mecanismos. Como modo de ilustración, el sujeto 
construye esta metáfora de forma consciente. Mientras que cuando se trata de una tipología 
como la que vimos anteriormente (More Is Up), tanto la construcción como el 
procesamiento de esta metáfora son inconscientes.  
En este sentido, también hemos argumentado que otro factor que diferencia estas 
dos tipologías es el hecho de que More Is Up no admite otras posibilidades para la 
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construcción y el procesamiento de estos dos fenómenos en términos metafóricos. 
Siguiendo a  Gibson (1977), la teoría de affordances sostiene que nuestra interacción con el 
entorno esta gobernada por las posibles acciones que permiten los fenómenos para que un 
individuo interactúe con ellos.  
En términos metafóricos argumentamos que esta característica también juega un 
papel importante en la construcción de la metáfora conceptual. Por ejemplo, los fenómenos 
More y Up llevan a construir una metáfora conceptual única (More Is Up) ya que no admite 
variantes. Es decir, esta metáfora se puede interpretar sólo en un sentido. Sin embargo, 
otros fenómenos tales como Juliet y Sun  admiten varias posibilidades para construir la 
metáfora.   
Por lo cual, las metáforas literarias no siguen estrictamente los mecanismos de la 
interacción. Esto indica que la interacción no es homogénea, sino que también se manifiesta 
a través de varias tipologías. En este sentido, hemos tratado de ver cómo diferentes 
tipologías revelan varios modos de interacción entre los dominios fuente y meta. Aunque 
cada tipología depende de diferentes mecanismos de la interacción, se observa que los 
dominios fuente y meta se transforman y se adaptan en la metáfora conceptual. 
4.6. Un estudio bio-cognitivo de la metáfora conceptual 
En este capítulo, hemos propuesto que si los mecanismos de la interacción de los dominios 
fuente y meta se aprecian en otras tipologías, entonces, éstas últimas también se pueden 
estudiar desde la teoría de la Interacción. De esta forma, hemos observado en la literatura 
de la teoría de la Embodied Simulación muchos estudios indican que las acciones físicas 
que se utilizan para estructurar un fenómeno abstracto, mantienen activas sus topologías 
tanto en la construcción y como en el procesamiento de la metáfora conceptual que depende 
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respectivamente de acciones físicas y fenómenos abstractos (Feldman 2006; Feldman y 
Narayanan 2004; Gibbs y Matlock 2008; Kintsch 2008). Hemos de señalar aquí, que una de 
las características que nos ha permitido examinar la metáfora conceptual desde la 
perspectiva de la Interacción es el hecho de que los dominios fuente y meta son fenómenos 
experienciales. Sin embargo, la metáfora que hemos investigado en este capítulo, 
aparentemente, sigue los principios y patrones de la tipología que toma fenómenos 
experienciales y abstractos como dominios fuente y meta, respectivamente. Es decir, esta 
tipología supuestamente consiste en transferir significado (en un solo sentido, de ahí que la 
proyección metafórica es proposicional y lineal) a los dominios abstractos y 
semánticamente independientes.  
Hemos observado en el corpus que la tipología que se caracteriza por la proyección 
metafórica desde fenómenos experienciales hacia otros abstractos incorpora otra tipología 
que sigue algunos mecanismos de la interacción. Es aquella tipología que depende de 
acciones físicas y acciones mentales como fenómenos fuente y meta, respectivamente.  
A modo de ilustración de los mecanismos operativos en esta tipología, hemos enfocado 
nuestra atención sobre la siguiente metáfora: She grasps the idea (Understanding Is 
Grasping). Dado que existen varios estudios sobre la metáfora conceptual que depende de 
acciones físicas como dominios fuente y la mayoría de estos estudios coinciden en el hecho 
de que cuando se procesa un fenómeno abstracto mediante una acción física, la topología 
de dicha acción se activa (Gibbs and Matlock 2008:163).  
Probablemente, el descubrimiento más importante que soporta la teoría del Embodiment es 
el hecho de que la topología del dominio fuente (Grasp) se activa cuando se procesa el 
dominio meta (Understand) (Gibbs 2008).  
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 Primero hemos notado que el dominio meta en este caso es semánticamente 
independiente. Una prueba de ello es que se puede razonar sobre la acción mental 
Understanding sin recurrir a la metáfora conceptual. Esto indica que el dominio meta, 
aunque es abstracto, es semánticamente independiente ya que podemos entenderlo sin 
recurrir al uso de la metáfora conceptual.  Esto, a su vez, contradice los principios y 
patrones de la teoría del Embodiment. Por ejemplo, en esta teoría se argumenta que el 
motivo de entender un fenómeno en términos de otro es que el último es abstracto y 
semánticamente dependiente.  
Segundo, el dominio meta en este caso dispone de una topología propia: un sujeto 
entiende el concepto. Entonces hemos analizado detalladamente las topologías de los 
dominios fuente y meta para ver más de cerca los mecanismos operativos en cada una de 
ellas. En este sentido, la topología de la acción física  del dominio fuente consiste en tres 
elementos: un sujeto, la acción de coger, y un objeto. Esta topología, según la neurociencia 
cognitiva, se activa cuando su acción física es utilizada metafóricamente para designar una 
acción mental (Gibbs and Matlock 2008:163). Por ejemplo, la técnica de la imagen por 
resonancia magnética funcional (IRMf) demuestra que la zona cerebral responsable de la 
acción física se activa en tres casos: (1) cuando un sujeto realiza la acción de coger un 
objeto; (2) cuando la topología de esta acción se utiliza metafóricamente; y (3) cuando un 
sujeto observa a otro realizando la acción de coger un objeto (e.g. Coulson 2008).  
Por otro lado, como hemos argumentado antes, el dominio meta en este tipo de 
metáfora también se puede estructurar en términos de marcos conceptuales que se activan 
mediante el uso del léxico de dichos marcos. Es importante recordar aquí que el uso de los 
términos lingüísticos que describen dichas acciones físicas también activan la topología 
correspondiente (Guarddon 2003:56-57). 
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Por lo tanto, las dos topologías comparten el mismo sistema lingüístico. Por 
ejemplo, a través del uso de la metáfora Understanding Is Grasping, las dos topologías 
llegan a compartir el termino Grasp que activa la topología física (dominio fuente) y la 
topología cognitiva (dominio meta). 
4.6.1. Definición de las condiciones que nos han permitido estudiar esta 
tipología desde la teoría de la Interacción 
4.6.1.1. Los fenómenos fuente y meta comparten el mismo 
campo léxico y se activan en paralelo  
La metáfora conceptual es un recurso muy importante para el fenómeno de polisemia 
(Gibbs 1994; Lakoff 1978; Lehrer 1990; Miller 1993; Nunberg 1979; Rakova 2003; 
Sweetser 1990). Según Talmy (2000) una de esas metáforas es aquella que depende de 
acciones físicas y acciones mentales como dominios fuente y meta, respectivamente. En 
este sentido los dos fenómenos llegan a compartir el mismo léxico. Según Richards 
(1950:93) cuando utilizamos la metáfora, tenemos dos fenómenos activos y sostenidos con 
una sola palabra o frase.   
Este fenómeno de polisemia presenta un problema para la teoría del Embodiment 
porque en esta teoría, el fenómeno de polisemia se basa en la noción de que en las palabras 
que mantienen una relación polisémica hay una que es literal y los significados de las otras 
palabras son derivados de la que tiene el sentido literal (Gibbs 1994:9-10).  
En estos ejemplos, tanto el fenómeno Understand como el de Grasp, comparten los 
mismos términos lingüísticos, Grasp y get hold of.  Lo importante de esta observación es 
que las palabras que describen un acción física, cuando se procesan literal o 
metafóricamente, inducen a que la topología de este fenómeno se active (Feldman 2006; 
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Guarddon 2003:56-57). Dado que el fenómeno de Understand dispone de una topología 
propia que se activa mediante un sistema lingüístico y que la topología del dominio fuente 
también se activa, podemos deducir que ambas se activan en paralelo.  
4.6.1.2. Los fenómenos fuente y meta comparten la misma 
zona neurológica 
Probablemente, el aspecto más irrefutable de la teoría del Embodiment es su fundamento 
neurológico. Utilizando la imagen por resonancia magnética funcional (IRMf) y la 
tomografía por emisión de positrones (ERP), Roy and Sherrington (1890) fueron los 
primeros en documentar que hay una relación intrínseca entre los procesos cognitivos y el 
flujo sanguíneo en el cerebro ya que los dos funcionan en paralelo. Estudios más recientes 
en neurociencia afirman que las áreas motor y pre-córtex asociadas con algunas partes del 
cuerpo se activan cuando se procesa el léxico que designa dichas partes, lo cual indica que 
procesar acciones metales a través del uso de la metáfora conceptual también incorpora 
actividades neurales (Chang, Feldman and Narayanan 2005:4). 
Después de discutir cómo los dos fenómenos en la tipología, que depende de 
acciones físicas y acciones mentales como dominios fuente y dominios meta 
respectivamente, comparten varios sistemas tales como neurológico y lingüístico en la 
metáfora conceptual, el siguiente punto es identificar posibles puntos de interacción entre 
los dos fenómenos.  
Es importante recordar que, en el anterior capítulo ya hemos identificado los 
mecanismos de la interacción. Por lo tanto, nuestro objetivo es verificar si dichos 
mecanismos también operan en la tipología que hemos analizado en este capítulo. Dado que 
la interacción puede estar basada en diferentes mecanismos, hemos especulado que esta 
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tipología podría seguir otros mecanismos. Sin embargo, verificar si esta tipología esta 
basada en la interacción entre los dominios fuente y los dominios meta requerirá una 
exploración sobre cómo las topologías cognitivas y las topologías físicas se influencian 
mutuamente en la metáfora conceptual.   
5. Conclusión  
Como conclusión general de la tesis afirmamos que la metáfora conceptual se manifiesta a 
través de varias tipologías donde la proyección metafórica no se puede abordar siguiendo 
un determinado conjunto de principios y patrones. Una muestra de ello es que hacen falta 
varias teorías para examinar diferentes tipologías.  
Después de determinar las tipologías más frecuentes en el corpus, hemos tratado de 
ver los problemas que surgen al intentar examinar varios tipos de la metáfora conceptual 
siguiendo el mismo conjunto de principios y patrones.  Así pues, hemos encontrado una 
forma de empezar a identificar detalladamente qué tipologías sostienen la metáfora 
conceptual y qué problemas presentan a la teoría del Embodiment. Es importante recordar 
aquí que en el primer capítulo, hemos argumentado que la metáfora conceptual permite una 
clasificación más detallada en términos tipológicos. 
Para resolver estos problemas proponemos diferentes soluciones para tratar las 
diferentes tipologías. Por ejemplo, hemos adoptado la perspectiva de Proposicionalidad y 
Linealidad para examinar la tipología que depende de fenómenos concretos y abstractos 
como dominios fuente y meta, respectivamente. Por otro lado, hemos sostenido que la 
tipología que depende de dos fenómenos físicamente accesibles es más viable tratarla desde 
la perspectiva de la Interacción.  
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Así, hemos demostrado que este estudio no es meramente clasificatorio, más bien, 
revela que la metáfora conceptual se fundamenta en distintos mecanismos de la proyección 
metafórica. Como habíamos predicho, estudiar la metáfora conceptual como un proceso 
cognitivo homogéneo nos lleva a pasar por alto los mecanismos de la proyección 
metafórica que varían dependiendo de la tipología en cuestión.  
Por lo tanto, el fundamento de la teoría del Embodiment, el cual toma la metáfora 
conceptual como un proceso cognitivo esencialmente idéntico, es falso. Esta situación es 
debida a que, al estudiar la metáfora enfatizando sobre sus distintas tipologías, pone al 
descubierto varios problemas teóricos, los cuales no podrían salir a la luz sin llevar a cabo 
un estudio exhaustivo de las tipologías metafóricas. Esto a su vez implica que es necesario 
tratarlas en la teoría del Embodiment abandonando la generalización sobre el hecho de que 
se puede analizar todas las metáforas conceptuales siguiendo un conjunto de principios y 
patrones invariables.  
Así pues, deducimos que la teoría del Embodiment está basada en una 
generalización sobre los mecanismos operantes en la metáfora conceptual, lo cual 
obstaculiza un posible estudio sobre las manifestaciones tipológicas del lenguaje figurativo. 
Ahora bien, al estudiar este lenguaje más detalladamente se pone de manifiesto la 
complejidad de las tipologías de la metáfora conceptual. Probablemente, está 
generalización es la que motiva la generalización sobre la aplicación de la metáfora 
conceptual.  
Tal como apuntamos en el primer capítulo, la metáfora conceptual está mejor 
examinada en términos tipológicos ya que revela varios mecanismos sobre los cuales se 
lleva a cabo la proyección metafórica. En este sentido, hemos propuesto que diferentes 
tipologías requieren diferentes análisis.  
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5.1. Contribución del presente estudio 
Basándonos en el estudio que hemos realizado en esta tesis, formulamos nuestra teoría 
sobre la metáfora conceptual. La metáfora conceptual es un proceso cognitivo heterogéneo 
que se manifiesta a través de varias tipologías. Por lo tanto, al examinarla se necesita 
incorporar varias teorías para capturar los diferentes mecanismos que operan en la misma. 
En la tesis, hemos identificado algunas topologías y hemos examinado sus mecanismos. 
Así pues, el hecho de estudiar la metáfora conceptual asumiendo que ésta se manifiesta 
mediante una sola tipología obscurece los mecanismos operativos en varias tipologías.  
5.2. Futuras líneas de investigación 
Sería conveniente ver otras tipologías y sus correspondientes mecanismos que operen en la 
proyección metafórica. En esta línea de investigación también sería interesante ver cómo la 
variedad cultural de la experiencia corporal puede conllevar  una variedad en los 
mecanismos operativos en diferentes tipologías.  
5.3. Limitación del estudio  
Al estudiar las tipologías de la metáfora conceptual y las topologías de los dominios fuente 
y meta no hemos cubierto el aspecto cultural que pensamos juega un papel primordial en la 
construcción del lenguaje figurativo. En la tesis nos hemos limitado a investigar los 
mecanismos que gobiernan la proyección metafórica en sus diferentes tipologías. Los 
mecanismos identificados en la tesis no son absolutos ya que creemos que están sujetos al 
factor cultural.  
Otra limitación es aquella que hemos encontrado en el último capítulo al tratar de 
examinar cómo se lleva a cabo la proyección metafórica en el caso de la metáfora 
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conceptual que depende de acciones físicas y cognitivas como dominios fuente y meta, 
respectivamente, ya que no se ha demostrado cómo la representación neuronal de la 
metáfora puede diferir dependiendo del tipo de tipología. 
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Chapter 0: Introduction  
The notion of representing abstract concepts has been torn between two opposing 
approaches: the embodiment theory (Gibbs 1994, 2011; Grady 2005a, 2005b; Johnson 
1981, 1987, 2008;  Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 
2011; Lakoff 1990, 1993, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Núñez 2000; 
Lakoff and Turner 1989; Reddy 1993; Ruiz de Mendoza 2005, 2011; Steen 2011; Szwedek 
2011) and the Disembodied cognition theory (Chomsky 1975; Fodor 1975; Murphy 1988). 
According to the first approach, cognitive processing is rooted in bodily-
experienced phenomena (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). 
Furthermore, this theory stands on two enterprises: Embodied Metaphor, which holds that 
conceptual metaphor is a feature-mapping process (e.g. Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 
2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). Embodied Simulation, on the other hand, 
points to the central role of simulating the physical action of the source domain in the 
embodied approach to metaphor (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, and Wilson 2008; Feldman 
2006; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Kintsch  2008; Mahon and Caramazza 2008; Narayanan 
and Feldman 2004). In contrast, the disembodied approach advocates an abstract symbol-
based process to reason about concepts (e.g., Chomsky 1975; Fodor 1975).  
Accordingly, conceptual metaphor has been treated in two different ways. On one 
extreme, metaphor is an unconventional combination of symbols (Black 1962, 1981; 
Chomsky 1975; Fodor 1975; Searle 1975). On the other extreme, conceptual metaphor is 
strictly embodied and a far-reaching cognitive process characterizing major aspects of 
cognition (Johnson 1981, 1987, 2008; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Núñez 2000). 
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Though the embodied metaphor and embodied simulation approaches have 
proposed new insights as to how cognition and, in particular, conceptual metaphor depend 
on body properties, these approaches still need to go through a refinement process (e.g. 
Bernárdez 2005, 2013; Kristiansen, Dirven, and Ruiz de Mendoza 2006; Ruiz de Mendoza 
2011; White 2004) which in some cases would mean constraining the realm of the 
application of the theory of embodiment (see Chapter III). For instance, Pinker (2006:2), 
argues against the absolutely far-reaching ambition within embodiment to explain all 
human cognition in terms of the tenets of this approach. He (2005, 2007) argues against 
reducing cognition and metaphor to sensorimotor experience. Because this approach 
intends to address a wide range of human fields such as morality, science, philosophy, 
politics etc., Pinker (2005, 2006, 2007) suggests that though metaphor is used to reason 
about a considerable number of abstract concepts, it is not ubiquitous in our reasoning 
system modes. 
Similarly, based on recent discoveries in Neurophysiology, Rakova (2003) 
conducted a research on polysemy and words meanings. She identified a type of metaphor 
–synaesthetic metaphor- that can hardly fit into the framework of Embodiment Theory. She 
explains how the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor fail to account for cross-
modalities mapping. She observes that a polysemous adjective does not include one literal 
meaning and all the other meanings are metaphorically derivative. Rather, some 
polysemous adjectives reveal synaesthetic metaphors where the linguistic terms of a 
semantic field are based on meanings that are directly grounded in sensory modalities 
(Rakova 2003:139). That is, Synaesthesia represents a phenomenon that when we 
experience sensations in one modality, a second modality is stimulated (Rakova 2003:49-
53).  
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Accordingly, she argues that there is no transfer of conceptual structures across 
domains in the case of synaesthetic metaphor and double function adjectives. To illustrate, 
the adjective ‘hot’ is not metaphorically derivative from the adjective ‘spicy’. But, 
according to Rakova (2003:45), it is a “literal concept” that associates two experiences: that 
of spicy food and that of high temperatures. That is, certain metaphors can draw on a literal 
concept that recruits literal meaning from both source and target (sensory) modalities 
(Rakova 2003:46). Following these assumptions, the cognitive structures of source and 
target domains in certain metaphors are literal; hence, there is more literalness in metaphors 
than what is being suggested in Cognitive Linguistics (Rakova 2003:172). 
Since this type of metaphorical mapping is based on two sensory domains, Rakova 
assures that it is at odds with the tenets of the embodiment theory—namely, because source 
and target domains in this case2 derive from two "literal phenomena" (Rakova 2003:48). 
She further claims that this kind of metaphor is physiologically motivated and engages two 
bodily-experienced domains (2003:48). In this setting, the concrete-abstract criterion does 
not fit Synaesthesia-based metaphor where the mapping draws on sensory modalities as 
source and target domains.   
In addition, Bernárdez (2005, 2013) claims for a deep consideration of the cultural 
aspect of the cognitive processing that underlies metaphorical mapping (see also Geeraerts, 
Kristiansen, and Peirsman 2010:3-10; Caballero and Díaz-Vera 2013; Ibarretxe-Antuñano 
2013). In this respect, he points out that there are mistaken theoretical and experimental 
foundations within the framework of Embodiment theory. According to him, in the 
                                                 
2 At this point, following Rakova (2003), at least, synaesthetic metaphor draws on a literal concept which 
associates two different sensory experiences. The fact that source and target domains are sensory may confirm 
that certain target domains are semantically independent. If such domains have their own cognitive structures, 
then, a closer examination of the way they are mapped with other domains is crucial towards a more complex 
classification of metaphorical mapping. Later, we will analyze the current data to explore how other 
conceptual metaphors may (or may not) draw on a “literal concept”  that associates two experiences. 
46 
 
experimental realm, this wrong assumption is obvious in the fact that the investigation 
within the embodied approach takes the English language as the only source of evidence for 
the operating patterns and principles in metaphorical mappings (Bernárdez 2013). For 
instance, he argues that “…in order to reach valuable generalizations about human 
language […], we have to study the variety of human languages—in plural.” (Bernárdez 
2005:192).  
Similarly, in the theoretical framework, this wrong assumption is observed in that 
those patterns and principles are claimed to be universal (Bernárdez 2013). Furthermore, 
Correa-Beningfield, Kristiansen, Navarro-Ferrando, and Vandeloise (2005:344-345) 
recommend to “take no specific language—English included—as the model against which 
the other languages are to be compared,…”.  Accordingly, Bernárdez (2005, 2013) assures 
that the embodied approach to metaphor mistakenly takes its findings concerning the 
English language to be universal, ignoring in this way potential cultural factors that may 
variably operate in cognitive processing across cultures.  In this respect, the "cultural 
construal" of bodily-experienced phenomena potentially results in a significant variation on 
both the construction and processing of conceptual metaphor (Bernárdez 2013). 
 In this setting, he further claims that it is inadequate to draw conclusions on 
metaphorical mapping focusing only on the experience of the body. Instead, he calls for a 
cross-cultural study of metaphor to show where conceptual metaphor differs. In this 
respect, he argues that studying conceptual metaphor needs to take into consideration also 
the cultural aspect of conceptual metaphor (Bernárdez 2013; Geeraerts, Kristiansen, and 
Peirsman 2010:3-10). 
Taken together, these findings point out to an overgeneralization widely adopted 
within the embodied approach to explain all instances of conceptual metaphor as a 
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homogeneous cognitive process. Accordingly, these scholars argue that the theoretical and 
experimental frameworks of the theory lead to dangerous flaws regarding human cognition 
(e.g., Bernárdez 2005, 2013; Pinker 2006, 2007; Rakova 2003).  
In this thesis, we shall assess how this overgeneralization might also be echoed in 
other aspects of the application of the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor. More 
specifically, though certain patterns and principles of mapping cover a broad range of 
conceptual metaphors, they may not be observed in others. To examine how conceptual 
metaphors differ in terms of patterns and principles of mapping, we shall not seek one 
single theory to cover all the metaphor instances. Rather, we shall need to construct a 
family of theories to enable the embodiment theory to deal with metaphors which are based 
on different mapping typologies. That is, while the embodied approach has gained more 
terrain against the disembodied approach, in our thesis we shall attempt to show that though 
conceptual metaphor is based on bodily-experienced phenomena, it is not a homogeneous 
cognitive process.  
In addition, it is widely accepted within the theory of the embodied approach that 
metaphorical mappings are based on projecting features of source onto target domains (e.g. 
Gibbs 1994, 2011; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 
2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1993, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and 
Turner 1989; Ruiz de Mendoza 2005, 2011; Steen 2011; Szwedek 2011). In this respect, 
though certain mapping typologies that may be undelied by an active role of target domains 
(such as co-occurrence and co-relation based metaphors, see e.g. Grady 1997b) a heavy 
emphasis is still placed on source domains in the sense that their characteristics ‘constrain’ 
metaphorical mapping (e.g. Szwedek 2011). This overgeneralization is obvious because 
within Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Science (e.g. Feldman 2006; Feldman and 
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Narayanan 2004; Narayanan 1999), this excessive focus on source domains has led scholars 
to analyze metaphorical mappings in terms of the characteristics of source domains, hence 
embodied metaphor (e.g. Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Szwedek 2011).  
Being bodily-experienced, a phenomenon has the following characteristics: being 
semantically independent and adequate to be used to give conceptual structure to other 
phenomena. In contrast, target domains presumably lack these two characteristics in that 
they are semantically dependent and, consequently, have a passive role3 in metaphorical 
mapping (at least less active than source domains) (e.g. Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and 
Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). This has had significant 
impact on the way research is being done to explore how we reason about abstract concepts 
through the use of metaphorical mapping.  
To test the hypotheses put forward in this thesis, we shall start Chapter I by asking 
how a generalization over the tenets which operate on metaphor can be made in Cognitive 
Linguistics, given that metaphorical mappings draw on different kinds of bodily 
experience. We shall have a closer look at the embodiment theory to address the principles 
and patterns of mapping and argue that this theory dwells on two core approaches: 
Embodied metaphor (Gibbs 1994, 2011; Johnson 1981,1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; 
Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1993, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Ruiz de Mendoza 2011; Ruiz de Mendoza and Peña 
2005; Steen 2011; Szwedek 2011) and Embodied Simulation (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, 
                                                 
3 By “a passive role” we mean that in a metaphorical mapping, only the target domain is the one that is 
structured and conceptualized in terms of the cognitive topology of the source. Indeed, Lakoff (1993) assures 
that target domains determine what (source) components we need to carry out the mapping. However, target 
domains are influenced when they are mapped.  
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and Wilson 2008; Feldman 2006; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Kintsch  2008; Narayanan and 
Feldman 2004).  
Based on empirical evidence, we shall hypothesize that (1) though conceptual 
metaphor can be traced back to sensory and motor experiences, it is misleading to classify it 
in one group; and (2) the Concrete-Abstract criterion -while it is viable to explain some 
cases of metaphorical mapping- it is not fully applicable to the current data. In particular, a 
deep analysis of certain tenets, such as partial mapping and embodied simulation process, 
will show that Embodied Simulation theory is at odds with Embodied metaphor. 
Particularly, in certain mapping typologies we cannot reconcile partial mapping and 
simulating entirely the physical action of source into target domains.  
These findings are of deep interest for Cognitive Linguistics because they will 
reveal a greater variability and complexity4 of conceptual metaphor. Hence, Embodiment 
theory might need further exploration for a more complex classification of metaphor types 
based on their different patterns and principles. This means that there may not be a core 
process governing all types of conceptual metaphor. 
To assess whether the embodiment theory can be looked at from a different 
perspective, in Chapter II, we shall propose a new perspective to look at metaphorical 
mapping—Propositionality-and-Linearity based metaphor. We shall hypothesize that the 
tenets of embodied approach of metaphor fit perfectly well this perspective because the 
theoretical framework of this approach rests on the assumption that meaning construction 
via metaphor takes always more concrete phenomena as source domains and  more abstract 
                                                 
4 There have been attempts to classify metaphor as ontological, structural, and orientational (e.g. Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980). Other attempts concern the primitiveness and complexity of metaphors (Grady 1998; Grady, 
Taub, and Morgan 1996; Kintsch 2008:130). However, this classification still submits to the general 
assumption that conceptual metaphor is a homogeneous cognitive process in that there is always semantic 
features transfer from a more concrete to a more abstract domain. 
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ones as target. We shall test this hypothesis by identifying which type of metaphorical 
mapping the two theories can account for. Our goal of proposing this new perspective is to 
identify certain incongruities which particularly emerge in attempting to deal with 
metaphorical mapping as a homogeneous figurative process (see Chapter III). 
To show that the embodied approach needs to avoid this over-generalizing 
theoretical standpoint, in Chapter III, we shall focus our attention on the metaphorical 
mapping typology which involves bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target 
domains. We shall assess whether source and target domains show common features—
namely, those bodily based features that are held, within Embodied Metaphor theory, to be 
circumscribed to source domains and which are believed to constrain metaphorical 
mappings. This finding may induce to a different analysis of this type of metaphorical 
mapping.  
We shall further hypothesize that since in this type of conceptual metaphor target 
domains are also experienced through the body, there is no reason to believe that the 
features of source are imposed onto target domains. In this respect, we shall show that 
target domains can be at the same level as source domains in terms of the experiential basis 
of metaphor; this is the case of metaphorical mapping which engages bodily experience in 
its source and target domains. In cognitive linguistics, this experiential basis is claimed to 
be exclusive to source domains.  
Given that in this mapping typology, source and target domains are grounded in 
bodily-experienced phenomena, the idea of projecting features of source domains onto 
target domains will not stand on a solid foundation. Accordingly, we shall show that while 
one-way-features transfer can be applied to a certain type of metaphorical mapping—
namely, the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily and non-bodily-experienced 
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phenomena as source and target domains, respectively; it falls short when it comes to 
metaphorical mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena. This finding reveals a more 
participating role of target domains. The following step will be to show that target domains 
actively participate in both constructing and processing metaphorical mapping. 
We saw how the tenets of Embodied approach to metaphor and Propositionality-
Linearity of metaphorical mapping do not fit the data. A major finding in this chapter is the 
fact that target domains in this type of metaphorical mapping share the same characteristics 
of source domains which are held to be circumscribed to the latter. These features include 
being concrete, primitive, and bodily-experienced. In contrast, within embodiment theory, 
source domains have been claimed to be more active in metaphorical mappings because 
their features characterize the nature of metaphor, target domains should be given a more 
dynamic role in metaphorical mapping.  
In Chapter IV we shall demonstrate that target domains fulfill a more participating 
role in metaphorical mappings. This finding posits a challenge to the embodiment theory in 
two ways: (1) target domains in this type of mapping are neither abstract nor semantically 
dependent; and (2) the assumption that all metaphors are characterized by one single core 
process is false. In this respect, we show that one metaphor type cannot be analyzed in 
terms of the tenets of the embodied approach. This means that we are in need of a more 
complex classification of metaphor to capture potential differences in the process of 
constructing metaphorical mappings.  
Given that target domains in the mapping which engages bodily-experienced 
phenomena in source and target domains take on a more participating role in this type of 
metaphor, in Chapter V we shall propose to look at this mapping typology from an 
interactionist point of view. In this chapter, we hypothesize that the interaction process 
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between source and target domains originates in three main conditions: co-occurrence, co-
relation, and causality-and-co-activation. We shall also assess whether the interaction 
process is homogeneous in this type of metaphorical mapping. More importantly, we shall 
show how target domains take on a more participating role in this type of metaphorical 
mapping, in that source and target domains are engaged in a mutual influence. 
In contrast, within the embodiment theory, source domains have been claimed to be 
more active in metaphorical mappings because their features characterize the nature of 
metaphor, target domains should be given a more dynamic role in metaphorical mapping. 
We shall outline the mechanisms and typologies that characterize this type of metaphorical 
mapping. We shall claim for an interactionist nature of source and target domains instead 
of meaning transfer (or projecting features) from one domain onto another. Since source 
and target domains have a more dynamic participation in metaphorical mapping, we 
hypothesize that they influence each other in metaphorical mapping. We shall test this 
hypothesis by exploring the cognitive topologies of source and target domains and assess 
how they are engaged in a mutual influence. 
In the previous chapters VI and V, we demonstrated that (1) the mechanisms of 
interaction operate in the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced 
phenomena; and (2) this interaction follows different typologies within this type of 
metaphor. Accordingly, in Chapter VI we hypothesized that if the mechanisms of 
interaction-such as co-activation, causality, and automaticity- operate in other metaphorical 
mapping typologies, then it is possible to analyze these types of mapping from the 
interactionist point of view. In line with the findings in the first chapter, namely the wrong 
assumption that metaphorical mapping is a homogeneous cognitive process, the interaction 
process might differ.  
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The interaction between motor actions and cognitive processes as source and target 
domains, respectively, is triggered by the linguistic system of source domain. Linguistic 
labels that are inherently associated with source domain, though they are used 
metaphorically, they still activate physical actions. Then source and target domains are 
engaged in mutual influence.  
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Chapter I: Embodied Metaphor, Embodied Simulation, and 
Mapping Typologies 
1. Introduction and Hypothesis 
Embodiment Theory suggests that indirectly meaningful concepts borrow their structures 
from directly meaningful concepts (e.g. Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Johnson 1981, 
1987; Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). This assumption lies at 
the heart of (1) Embodied metaphor (Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; 
Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1987, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 1999) and (2) Embodied Simulation (e.g. Feldman 2006; Feldman and Narayanan, 
2004; Gibbs and Matlock 2008).  
These two approaches explain conceptual metaphor based on different, though 
related, principles and patterns. For instance, Embodied Metaphor Theory accounts for 
conceptual metaphor as meaning transfer via drawing semantic correspondences from 
source to target domains (e.g. Grady 1998; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; 
Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Reddy 1993). This transfer concerns topological 
properties such as image schemas (Grady 2005a; Lakoff 1990:53) and follows a set of 
principles that governs metaphorical mapping: invariance principle (Lakoff 1990), 
concreteness-abstractness criterion (Gibbs 2011; Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 
1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; 
Szwedek 2011), and partial mapping (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  
Embodied Simulation, while fitting into the embodiment theory, argues that 
metaphor follows different patterns and principles, which can be summarized as follows:  
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(1) physical actions in source domains are simulated in target domains and (2) the 
simulation process has its origin in the more concrete domain (Gibbs and Matlock 
2008:163). Interestingly, the two approaches coincide in the fact that there is one core 
process that underlies all metaphorical mappings—transferring features from more concrete 
onto more abstract domains (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2011; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson and 
Lakoff 2002; Lakoff 1990; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011).  
In this chapter we shall discuss the tenets of the two approaches to show whether 
they could account for different mapping typologies. We hypothesize that since 
metaphorical mappings draw on different kinds of bodily experience, these tenets may not 
permeate all mapping typologies. By the same token, it might not be safe to draw an 
overgeneralization of metaphorical mappings. Instead, we shall argue that these patterns 
and principles vary significantly.  
Accordingly, we claim that this generalization stems from the fact that the analysis 
of the data within the framework of Embodiment Theory is not taken at an adequate level 
because the topology of source domains could afford a deeper classification in terms of its 
constitutive nature (see Table 1). And in terms of the way they contribute to the 
construction and processing of conceptual metaphor. To illustrate, some source domains are 
sensory (touch, taste...) (see page 66); others are motor experiences (grip, grasp, fall...) (see 
page 68). Accordingly, conceptual metaphor might expose a large variety of experience 
whose participation in mapping construction and processing may not be captured under a 
single core cognitive process.  
That is, when source domains are grounded in different kinds of experience, 
conceptual metaphor might be based on different patterns and principles. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that it is a misleading conception to take all metaphors to follow the same 
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patterns and principles of mapping. Accordingly, metaphorical mapping typologies need 
further analysis for a more complex classification.  
In this setting, we predict that exploring such patterns and principles will raise 
important issues that have not been addressed within the embodiment theory. These may 
include, for instance, how to refine this theory to make it flexible enough to account for 
different mapping typologies. In this respect, the data might reflect the variety of patterns 
and principles of mapping.  
Our primary concern in this chapter is to analyze the principles and patterns of 
Embodied metaphor and Embodied simulation to show whether they fit into the data put 
forward. Our hypothesis concerns whether metaphorical mappings which dwell on different 
kinds of experience follow different patterns and principles. In the following section we 
shall review the tenets of Embodied metaphor and Embodied simulation.  
2. Background 
2.1. Embodied Metaphor 
In Chomskian and post-Chomskian Linguistics, it is believed that cognitive 
operations consist of manipulating abstract symbols (Chomsky 1984). This affirmation 
yields two important implications: (1) the mind is an abstract formal system which innately 
consists of a set of rules (Universal Grammar) which governs the process of symbols 
combination (Chomsky 1984). Following this approach, metaphor breaks such set of rules 
because it draws on an “unconventional” symbol manipulation process. Thereby, it is 
claimed that metaphor operates exclusively in literary discourse (e.g. Chomsky 1984). 
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Given that the mind fulfills its function through manipulating symbols, this theory 
failed to explain why some grammatically correct utterances are unacceptable. A typical 
example to show this inadequacy was the following statement: 
Colorless green ideas sleep furiously (Chomsky 1957: 15). 
This utterance is not semantically acceptable though it is grammatically correct. This 
inadequacy has led cognitive linguists to follow a different line of investigation. For 
instance, Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999), focused on everyday language to see whether 
metaphor operates in our cognition and, if so, how it carries out its function. They 
concentrate their inquiry on examples such as the following (Lakoff and Johnson 1980): 
Did you see the race?  
Halfway into the race, I ran out of energy. 
In washing the window, I splashed water all over the floor.  
How did Jerry get out of washing the windows? (31) 
I look forward to the arrival of Christmas. 
Coming up in the weeks ahead... 
The time will come when …. (42) 
Look how far we’ve come. 
It’s been a long, bumpy road.  
We can’t turn back now.  
We’re at a crossroads.  
We may have to go our separate ways.  
The relationship isn’t going anywhere. We’re spinning our wheels. 
Our relationship is off the track. 
The marriage is on the rocks.  
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We may have to bail out of this relationship. 
Prices rose, stocks sky-rocketed (44). 
These scholars observed that these everyday-language expressions reveal how 
metaphorical mapping across phenomena plays a central role in our cognition. They argue 
that metaphor, as the examples above indicate, captures our interaction with the 
environment, shapes our cognitive processing of abstract phenomena, and plays a crucial 
role in our reasoning system (e.g. Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980:7; 
see also Lakoff and Johnson 1999).  
Moreover, they established a set of patterns and principles that governs 
metaphorical mapping. This includes, for instance, the rules that determine how source and 
target domains should be mapped (1980:40; see the following section for an elaborate 
discussion of such rules). For instance, one of the most important generalizations made 
about this study is the fact that all these metaphors exploit bodily experience as their source 
domains (Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; 
Lakoff and Turner 1989). This notion constrains metaphorical mapping in that it, by-
default, engages more concrete and more abstract domains as source and target domains, 
respectively.  
Equally important is the fact that these domains are directly meaningful (source 
domains) indirectly meaningful (target domains). Importantly, the notion of metaphor as 
based on mapping more concrete domains onto more abstract carries with it another 
important entailment: the conceptual structure of a given metaphorical mapping is 
derivative from source domains (e.g. Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; 
Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 
1999).  
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The result of these studies was the inception of Embodied cognition and particularly 
Embodied Metaphor (Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1990, 1993; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Reddy 1993).  Within this framework, the above 
mentioned inadequacy has been used to argue against the idea that the mind is a formal 
system (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:8).  
However, this notion could also serve as evidence against the idea that metaphor is 
an (unconventional) symbols-manipulation-based process in that the inadequacy of the 
aforementioned statement reveals why metaphor is not a matter of symbols-manipulation 
process. That is, we cannot map a given source domain onto any target domain however 
grammatical the statement is. This is because metaphor is not merely a symbol-
combination-based process: but also a meaning-transfer process. Equally important, 
metaphor proves crucial to our cognitive system as it shapes our way of thinking (e.g. 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). 
These remarkable insights about conceptual metaphor have led cognitive linguists to 
argue that the mind acquires its conceptual structure from body properties and that our 
cognitive system is grounded in everyday experience (e.g. Johnson 1981,1987; Johnson  
and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff 2008:18-19; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 
1989). 
2.1.1. Patterns and principles of mapping in conceptual 
metaphor 
In the previous section, we explained how the embodied approach to metaphor 
emerged and how a new conceptualization of mind and cognition took place. Possibly, the 
most influential approach in Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Science which provides 
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insights into the underlying mechanisms that lead to metaphorical mapping is the 
embodiment theory (Boroditsky and Ramscar  2002; Feldman 2006; Gibbs 201; Glenberg 
and Kaschak 2002; Grady 1998; Johnson 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 2011; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  
In this section, we will overview patterns and principles of mapping. The above 
mentioned studies (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) demonstrate that the mind is not 
abstract as is held within the disembodied mind theory (Chomsky 1984). Instead, it is 
embodied (e.g. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005; Gibbs 1996, 2005, 2011; Grady 1998, 
1996; Kövecses 1988, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). In this setting, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) outline the following characteristics which are presumably inherent to any 
metaphorical mapping: 
(1) Meaning transfer from one domain onto another (48). 
(2)This transfer is always partial (7). 
(3) Invariance principle (Lakoff 1990; Lakoff and Turner 1989:82).  
(4)Uni-directionality of meaning transfer: this transfer takes always one direction: 
from concrete to abstract domains and, (Lakoff 1987:268). 
In some cases5, this transfer includes transferring primary image schemas 6onto 
target domains (Lakoff and Turner 1989:97-100) (see also Grady 2005a and Lakoff 
1990:53). 
                                                 
5  Typical examples of this are 
 The last clause leaves the door open for extending the contract.  
 After his teenage years he began to come out of his shell. 
6  Within Embodied Approach to metaphor an Image Schema includes bodily-experienced 
phenomena, which we use to give structure to abstract phenomena such as when we 
conceptualize Time in terms of Space (Time Is Space). As we go further into the 1980s... 
We’re approaching the end of the year (1980:44).  
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Accordingly, conceptual metaphor also shows three main patterns that, together 
with the above mentioned principles, constrain metaphorical mapping construction: 
(1) Properties of bodily experiences are imposed on target phenomena. 
(2) Source and target domains are by default concrete and abstract, respectively. 
(3) Brain does not have any other way to access abstract domains, except through 
conceptual metaphor (Lakoff 1987:303; Lakoff and Johnson 1980:3-4). 
(4) There are two kinds of metaphor: complex and primary (Grady, Taub, and 
Morgan 1996; Lakoff and Johnson 1999).  
(5) Source domains are primitive, physical, and concrete (e.g. Johnson 1981, 1987; 
Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). 
These intrinsically related patterns and principles of mapping construction have led 
scholars within the embodiment theory of metaphor to affirm that abstract domains are 
understood in terms of bodily-experienced domains (e.g. Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and 
Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 
1999; Szwedek 2011). On that view, concepts concerning target domains are shaped by the 
bodily-based experience of source domains.  
In contrast, primitive phenomena that characterize source domains cannot be 
understood in terms of other phenomena (Feldman 2006; Grady, Taub, and Morgan, 1996; 
Lakoff 1990; 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999).That is, they do not allow further 
structures in their internal composition (Lakoff and Turner 1989; Szwedek 2011). These 
primitive concepts emerge from the interaction between the sensorimotor system and the 
environment (see also Roldán-Riejos and Úbeda Mansilla 2013:109). Furthermore, these 
primitive concepts, according to Grady, Taub, and Morgan, give rise to “more basic, 
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independently motivated metaphors (“primary” or “primitive” metaphors) which combine 
into complex (or “compound”) metaphors” (Grady 1998:210; see also Grady, Taub, and 
Morgan 1996). 
From our discussion above, we can conclude the following points, which are crucial 
to our thesis: 
(1) conceptual metaphor is ubiquitous in abstract phenomena; 
(2) we resort to metaphor to reason about physically inaccessible phenomena; 
(3) metaphorical mapping is constrained by the above mentioned patterns and 
principles; 
(4) it follows from this that metaphorical mapping is a homogeneous cognitive 
process—one-way-meaning transfer (from more concrete onto more abstract 
phenomena).  
(5) and the domains that are mapped are classified in terms of two different (directly 
and indirectly meaningful) phenomena.  
2.2. Embodied Simulation 
Neuro-imaging studies which Embodied Simulation is based on focus on action 
domains such as grasp, kick, grip etc. to assess whether the neural network which is 
responsible for motor domain is activated in the case of metaphorical meaning (Gallese and 
Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008). In experiments concerning brain imaging, subjects were 
exposed to different stimuli while tracking their brain activities. First, the subjects were 
shown pictures of phenomena such as someone carrying out the action of grasping a paper. 
Later, those participants were asked to read the following statement: 
Grasp an idea (Feldman 2006; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008).  
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Interestingly, brain imaging confirmed that the same brain area(s) fire in the two cases 
(Coulson 2008:189; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008). These experimental results 
indicate that the neural network which is responsible for the motor task involved in 
grasping activates also when the metaphorical meaning of the term grasp is processed. This 
finding reveals that both metaphorical and literal meanings elicit the same response from 
the brain.  
Consequently, scholars supporting this theoretical framework take a new line of 
investigation on metaphor: focusing on the motor system to explore how metaphorical 
mappings are built when they engage in physical actions as source domains (e.g. Barsalou 
2005, 2007, 2008; Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, and Wilson 2008; Boroditsky and Ramscar 
2002; Kintsch 2008).  
Following the embodied simulation approach, the overall-operating mechanism in 
constructing and processing conceptual metaphor is simulating the physical action of 
source domains onto target domains (e.g. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005; Kintsch, 
2008). For instance, Richardson, Spivey, McRae, and Barsalou (2003:772) state that, 
“…comprehending a verb […] can activate a spatial representation that […] resembles the 
image schema associated with the meaning of that verb.”  Proponents of this theory further 
assure that this simulation concerns all the components of the physical action that function 
as source domain (Kintsch 2008; Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Gibbs and Matlock 2008). 
For instance, expressions such as grasp an idea and She finds even the easy concepts 
difficult to get hold of are good examples to assess how the embodied simulation process is 
carried out in metaphorical mapping (e.g. Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008). In this 
respect, metaphorical mapping is constructed by simulating entirely the physical action of 
source domains in target domains (see pages 90-95).  
64 
 
However, this criterion has been claimed to cover other instances of metaphorical 
mapping insomuch that all the metaphorical mappings that draw on physical actions as 
source domains are based on simulation (e.g. Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Gibbs and 
Matlock 2008; see page 86; Gibbs and Matlock 2008) for how this assumption is not 
observed in certain metaphorical mappings).  
More importantly, the major contribution of this theory is the fact that it puts a 
special emphasis on the automaticity of metaphorical mapping construction and processing. 
In this respect, simulating motor topologies of source domains requires activating certain 
brain areas during the construction and processing of metaphorical mapping which engages 
motor actions as source domains (Feldman 2006; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008). It 
is worth noting here, that within this framework, metaphorical mappings are not 
propositionally but motorically motivated. To illustrate, both literal and metaphorical 
meanings of action verbs are active regardless of which meaning is involved (Feldman 
2006; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; for contrasting views, see Giora 2002, 2008). 
So far we have been outlining the patterns and principles of metaphorical mapping. 
We have observed a generalization within the theoretical framework of Embodied 
Metaphor that is evident mainly in three aspects: 
(1) in terms of mapping typology, namely there is one mapping typology—from 
concrete onto abstract domains; 
(2) in terms of the tenets of the embodied approach: within the theoretical 
framework of embodied metaphor, the tenets which govern metaphorical mapping are 
claimed to be ubiquitous in conceptual metaphors;  
 (3) another overgeneralization is observed in the role conceptual metaphor fulfills. 
That is, all abstract concepts are metaphorically represented, including abstract domains 
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such as mathematics (Lakoff and Núñez 2000), reason (Johnson and Lakoff 2002), 
philosophy (Lakoff and Johnson 1999), and morality (Lakoff 2002: 41-42; for a contrasting 
view on this issue see Pinker 2007:245-278).  
The embodiment theory of metaphor has been criticized mainly for the above 
mentioned assumptions. With regards to the mapping typology of conceptual metaphor 
(mapping concrete onto abstract), Rakova (2003:48) assures that a certain metaphorical 
mapping is based on two physiological phenomena, wherein literal meaning transcends 
both source and target domains.  
Another criticism which concerns the very nature of metaphor is the one which 
comes from Evolutionary Psychology (e.g. Pinker 1997, 2003, 2006, 2007). While the 
Embodied Approach to cognition advocates a far-reaching realm for the theory of 
Embodied Metaphor –playing a crucial role in reasoning about a wide range of human 
fields of knowledge (see (3) above), Pinker (2007: 245-278) calls into question the 
generally accepted view that all abstract concepts are accessed metaphorically. Instead, he 
proposes that though metaphor is an intrinsic parcel of our reasoning system, it is by no 
means as such in more abstract fields such as mathematics, philosophy etc.  
Furthermore, he (2006:3) sustains that “…the ubiquity of metaphor in language 
does not imply that all thinking is concrete”. This notion, in particular, goes strongly 
against Lakoff and Núñez (2000) and Lakoff (2002). These two approaches (Pinker 2007 
and Rakova 2003) point out a strikingly important issue which needs to be addressed within 
the theoretical framework of the embodied approach to metaphor.   
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3. Data Analysis  
We shall divide this section into two main subsections: Embodied metaphor and 
Embodied Simulation. In the Embodied metaphor section, we shall analyze instances of 
metaphor to assess (1) whether the bodily experience which functions as source domain can 
be further classified into subgroups; (2) whether the patterns of mapping within this 
framework are viable to analyze the current data; and (3) how our analysis could enhance 
our understanding of metaphorical mapping.  
In the second section, we shall assess the Embodied Simulation approach bearing in 
mind the following questions: (1) could the simulation process be used to explain all 
metaphors? (2) Does partial mapping fit into Embodied Simulation, given that the process 
of simulation is claimed to engage entirely the physical action of source domain? (3) Does 
this process operate in all metaphorical mappings which draw on physical actions as source 
domains? And if so, (4) is the simulation process identical in this mapping typology? 
3.1. Embodied Metaphor: Principles of Mapping 
3.1.1. Sensory Phenomena as Source Domains 
Source domains in the data show that they are accessed via the sensorimotor system. 
Let us consider the following examples: 
 (1) I have never had  a taste of the outdoor life in Florida. 
 (2) The argument with my mother-in-law left a nasty taste. 
 (3) Stay in touch and maybe we can meet up sometime. 
 (4) She's been in hot water at school twice this year.  
 (5) I've never edited a book before, so I'm partly just feeling my way. 
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 (6) My wife is very good at smelling out bargains. 
 (7) Journalists are keen to sniff out scandals.  
(8) The murder was preceded by a blazing row we could hear through the    
wall. 
 (9) She saw red when she caught him stealing.  
 (10) It was not until I met Mother Teresa that I saw the light. 
            (11) Ask your mother for money—she's a soft touch. 
 (12) Social Studies is viewed by economists as a soft option at university. 
 (13) He shook my hand with great warmth. 
 (14) As they entered the narrow pass the sheriff smelt danger smell. 
 (15) You’re too soft with your kids—You’ll spoil them.  
 (16) “‘don’t contradict your father,’ was the sharp reprimand” 
 
Metaphor Sensory domain 
(1) (2) Gustatory modality 
(3) (11) (12) (15) (16) Tactile modality 
(4) (5) (13) Sensory modality 
(6) (7) (14) Olfactory modality 
(8) Auditory modality 
(9) (10) Visual modality   
 Table 1 Subcategories of experience-based-domains.
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As the table above indicates, the phenomena which function as source domains can 
be further classified into subgroups of sensory experiences. There are domains which are 
accessed via auditory, visual, olfactory, gustatory, and somato-sensory modalities. 
As will be seen later, this classification will provide new insights into how different 
mapping typologies may follow different patterns and principles of mapping. For now, it 
suffices it to outline the different types of experience on which source domains draw on and 
to identify potential mapping typologies. 
3.1.2. Motor Phenomena as Source Domains 
Other source domains in the data show that they are accessed via the motor system. 
These domains are known in Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Science as image 
schemas (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 97-100). Let us consider the following examples: 
(1) He wanted safety, a home, and the opportunity to get ahead.  
(2) Uganda will have to push ahead with destructive World Bank policies. 
(3) I do not understand the attraction of the Beatles. 
(4) He trotted out all the old arguments against GM foods.  
(5) I was pressured into marriage by my wife's parents.  
(6) I've been appointed as headmaster to raise standards. 
(7) Since he once loved her passionately, she still has a hold on him. 
 
Table 2 Subcategories of motor-experience-based domains. 
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The table above shows that source domains in certain conceptual metaphors are grounded 
in different motor activities. For instance in (1), (2), and (4) the motor experience in 
question is movement. On the other hand, (3), (5), and (6) implies force. Thus, it is not safe 
to group all motor experiences in the same way because it may be the case that different 
motor activities contribute distinctly to metaphorical mapping construction and processing. 
If these domains draw on different motor experiences, metaphorical mapping may follow 
different patterns and, consequently, it may need a more complex classification (see 
Chapter III).  
Accordingly, though all source domains draw on sensorimotor experiences, it is 
misleading to cluster them into a homogeneous group because these experiences fall at least 
into two groups which could be further classified into subgroups7: they are sensory and 
motor experiences. It should be noted that the main concern here is not merely pursuing 
another classification of metaphor. Rather, we advance our hypothesis that probably 
different types of source domain may draw on different mapping mechanisms. Since 
sensorimotor experiences can be classified into different categories, it is safe to argue that 
their operating mechanisms may not be homogeneous to all metaphors.  
3.2. Patterns of Mapping in Conceptual Metaphor 
3.2.1. Primitive and Complex phenomena 
Following Grady (2007), the phenomena which function as source domains are 
primitive in that they are processed by the sensorimotor system and do not afford further 
                                                 
7 As seen in the data, sensorimotor experience could be divided into other subgroups such 
as orientation, spatial etc. 
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conceptual structuring. Accordingly, experiencing such phenomena leads to the 
construction of primitive concepts, which cannot be cognitively processed in terms of other 
concepts. Grady (1998:213) argues that conceptual metaphors are based on “basic 
perceptual factors [...]”  
On the other hand, complex phenomena are considered indirectly meaningful 
because they require other directly meaningful phenomena to be mapped onto (Lakoff and 
Turner 1989; Szwedek 2011).  
It turns out that certain conceptual metaphors in the data are rooted in co-occurrence 
of phenomena in the external world (Grady 2007). A case in point is when we 
conceptualize Quantity in terms of Verticality (Lakoff 1990:53; Valenzuela 2009:239). 
Consider the following examples: 
More Is Up 
(1)The number of books printed each year keeps going up. 
(2) My income rose last year (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 16). 
Less Is Down 
(3) The amount of artistic activity in this state has gone down in the past year. 
(4) The number of errors he made is incredibly low (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:16). 
Other examples which are found in the data include, 
Less Is Low 
(5) He greeted me in a low voice. 
Loud Is High 
(6) He spoke in such a low voice I could not hear what he said.  
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These instances of metaphor engage two primitive phenomena8—Verticality and 
Quantity as source and target domains, respectively. Our judgment is based on the fact that 
the two phenomena are bodily experienced (Grady, Taub, and Morgan 1996). In this 
respect, the data above fails to meet the complex-primitive criterion. To start with, the 
general assumption within the embodied approach to metaphor that primitive phenomena 
are used metaphorically to give conceptual structure to complex concepts (e.g. Kövecses 
2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) requires that Verticality and Quantity in these 
examples should be considered primitive and complex, respectively. That is, in order to 
explain this metaphorical mapping typology within this framework, we need to differentiate 
these source and target domains in terms of primitiveness and complexity, respectively.  
This assumption yields two theoretical problems: first, why are Verticality and 
Quantity treated differently (in terms of primitiveness and complexity) within the embodied 
approach to metaphor when they are engaged in metaphorical mapping, given that they are 
bodily experienced? Accordingly, to differentiate them, cognitive linguists subscribing to 
the embodied approach to metaphor argue that the phenomenon which is more literal takes 
on the role of the source domain, whereas the more abstract functions as target (1980:61). 
Furthermore, within this approach, co-occurrence of two experiences such as Quantity and 
Verticality leads to a metaphorical mapping where some properties of source domains are 
transferred onto the target domains (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:10). This mapping must also 
result in highlighting some aspects of the target and hiding others (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 
1980:10-13). In turn, these metaphorical mappings later form the basis for more complex 
metaphorical mappings (Grady 1998) where partial mapping criterion is also operating 
                                                 
8 Within the embodied approach to metaphor, the term primitive phenomena refers to those 
phenomena which are bodily experienced and whose cognitive topology does not allow 
further structuring (e.g. Grady 1998; Grady, Taub, and Morgan1996).  
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(Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999). 
Therefore, sticking to this criterion to analyze the data, a second theoretical problem 
emerges. Because metaphorical mapping in this case is based on co-occurrence of two 
phenomena, this mapping typology fails to satisfy the partial mapping criterion.  
To illustrate, the conceptual metaphor which engages Verticality and Quantity is 
causality-based mapping in that the increase and decrease in the domain Quantity cause 
changes in our conceptualization of Verticality (see pages 251, 259). More importantly, this 
causal relationship is bodily-experienced in both source and target domains—increase and 
decrease in Quantity often leads to up and down in Verticality. Accordingly, the partial 
mapping criterion does not fit this mapping typology because the phenomena of Verticality 
and Quantity are active in parallel. Consequently, we suggest that this criterion is not a 
common feature to all metaphorical mappings. It is obvious that in some instances of 
metaphor the partial mapping criterion is recurring but this does not mean that it is an 
absolute feature to all metaphorical mapping typologies (see page 90).  
3.2.2. Metaphorical mapping typologies 
So far we have shown that source domains draw on different kinds of experience 
and target domains in certain conceptual metaphors are bodily experienced (e.g. More Is 
Up). Though the embodiment theory claims that the two domains are different in terms of 
primitiveness and complexity, we have not observed any substantial difference to support 
the notion that source domains are bodily experienced and target are abstract. Hence, 
theoretical problems arise when we tested the patterns and principles of mapping against 
the data.  
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This situation hints at the fact that conceptual metaphor is instantiated through 
different mapping typologies which cannot be account for using the same patterns and 
principles of mapping. 
In the following sections we shall outline metaphorical mapping typologies and 
assess whether the tenets of the embodiment theory can account for them. 
3.2.2.1. Concrete-onto-Concrete-mapping typology 
Within the embodiment theory, the Concrete-Abstract criterion, which lies at the 
heart of such theory, is assumed to govern all conceptual metaphors (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2011; 
Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1993; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Steen 2011; Szwedek 2011). 
This view is rooted in the foundational assumption that conceptual metaphor is instantiated 
through one mapping typology—concrete-onto-abstract mapping (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 1999). Let us consider the following examples:   
Human Is Animal, Human Is Bird 
(1) a. My husband turned out to be an animal. 
     b. He picked up this bird at a downtown disco. 
Human Is Army 
(2)When she opened the door there was an army of journalists waiting for her. 
Human Is Liquid 
(3)Crowds spilled out of the train over the platform. 
Human Is Building 
(4)Animo acids are the building blocks of the proteins and these building blocks of 
muscles. 
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Human Is Plant 
(5)The FBI planted informers in the Mafia. 
Human Is Fruit 
(6)For a month or so I was the apple of the head’s eye. 
Human Is Animal 
(7)Every education reform makes pupils guinea pigs.  
Words/Language Is Human 
(8)The introduction is too long and the body is too short. 
Money Is Liquid/Blood 
(9)Most of my money is in stocks and shares not liquid assets. 
Money Is Food 
(10)He earned his daily bread as a music teacher.  
Vehicle Is Animal/Human 
(11)The torn body of the aircraft was finally found 
In these examples, bodily-experienced phenomena are understood in terms of other 
bodily-experienced phenomena (see Chapter III, for an in-depth analysis of this mapping 
typology and how it posits a challenge to the embodiment theory). More precisely, both 
source and target domains draw on sensorimotor experiences. For instance, in (1)-(6) the 
domain Human Being is mapped onto other bodily-experienced domains such as Bird, 
Building, Animal, Ship etc.). This finding jars with the very essence of the cognitive 
function of conceptual metaphor in that its use is circumscribed to mapping concrete 
(directly meaningful phenomena) onto abstract (indirectly meaningful phenomena). For 
instance, Szwedek (2011:344) stresses that “Without the metonymic derivation, the 
metaphor [Captain Thelwal is a perfect iceberg] would have the form AN OBJECT IS AN 
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OBJECT, which is not only in no way metaphorical, but also impossible, because, literally, 
one object cannot be another object. This leads to yet another assumption that does not 
characterize the data—that the domain of “objects” cannot fulfill the role of a target 
domain”. 
However, the data above shows that bodily-experienced phenomena can equally 
fulfill the role of target domain. Therefore, in order for the theory of embodiment to 
account for this mapping typology, we need to consider the domain, Human more abstract 
than the domains, Bird, Army, Building, Plant, Animal, and Ship. That is, in order for the 
concrete-abstract criterion to be applied to explain the patterns of mapping in these 
instances of metaphor, we have to assume that the characteristics of the domain Human are 
more abstract than those of the domains Animal, Building, Ship, Bird etc. In addition, we 
have to suppose that the characteristics of the domains Animal, Ship, Bird, and Building are 
more primitive than those of Human. This standpoint has a conflicting entailment because it 
implies that the characteristics of Animal, Ship, Bird are bodily experienced whereas the 
characteristics of Human are not. More interestingly, we have to assume that the domains 
of Ship, Bird, Animal etc., are directly meaningful; hence, they are used as source domains. 
On the other hand, the domain Human is indirectly meaningful since it is accessed via other 
bodily-experienced domains.  Furthermore, the domain Human Being functions as source 
in (10) and target as in the other examples (see page 73 for a deep analysis of this 
metaphorical mapping typology).  
These findings are also pointed out by Caballero (2009:78), who stresses that 
“…although helping our understanding of the most abstract via the most concrete is one of 
the most salient properties of metaphor, this does not rule out the concreteness of both the 
source and target in certain metaphors”.  
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3.2.2.2. Metaphorical mappings across sensorimotor 
experiences 
In the previous section we demonstrated that concrete-onto-concrete mapping 
typology cannot be explained in terms of the concrete-abstract criterion. Another mapping 
typology that cannot be accounted for within the embodiment theory is the typology which 
engages sensorimotor phenomena as source and target domains. Let us consider the 
following examples: 
Sight Is Touch 
(1) a. A good teacher must always maintain eye contact with her pupils. 
     b. The dog fastened her eyes on my every movement as soon as she knew I had 
food for her.  
Sound Frequency Is Height 
(2)The melody falls suddenly to indicate despair. 
Loud Is High 
(3)He spoke in such a low voice I could not hear what he said. 
Listening/Reading Is Eating/Drinking 
(4)He drank in the praise I gave him. 
Bad Is Low 
(5)The governor’s popularity is at its lowest ebb.  
Steal Is Lift 
(6)He lifted whole sections from Beethoven. 
Since our aim in this chapter is to sketch out how conceptual metaphor may be 
based on different metaphorical mapping typologies, we are not going to deeply address 
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potential patterns and mechanisms of each mapping typology. As the examples above 
indicate, conceptual metaphor may engage sensorimotor modalities as source and target 
domains. For instance, in the example (1) Sight Is Touch, the mapping is based on two 
somatosensory modalities: Sight and Touch. Similarly, examples (2) and (3) visual and 
auditory are mapped as source and target, respectively. Also, in (4) a somatosensory 
activity (drinking and eating) are mapped onto the auditory modality. Furthermore, (5) 
Quality is viewed in terms of Height. And finally, number (6) engages two motor 
modalities: Lifting and Stealing. Again, the notion of mapping source domains onto target 
domains based on Concrete-Abstract- criterion does not seem to encompass these mapping 
typologies.  
3.2.2.3. Abstract-onto-abstract-mapping typology 
In the view of metaphor as based on the notion that to construct a metaphorical 
mapping there must be bodily-based information to be projected onto other phenomena, 
significant theoretical problems arise. To illustrate this point, let us consider the following 
metaphor: 
Thinking/Considering Is Calculating 
I have been spending ages trying to work out why he did what he did. 
This example includes two conceptual metaphors: Time Is Commodity and 
Thinking Is Calculating, which are represented in this case respectively by the expressions I 
have been spending ages, and trying to work out why he did what he did. It is worth noting 
that the two metaphors are instantiated through different mapping typologies. In the first 
case, the mapping engages concrete (Commodity) and abstract (Time) phenomena and in 
the second case, the mapping draws on two abstract domains: Calculating and Thinking as 
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source and target domains, respectively. Lakoff and Núñez (2000) sustain that Calculating 
is an abstract phenomenon which is grounded in the experience of the body. However, in 
attempting to account for the metaphorical mapping which engages two abstract 
phenomena from the embodied approach to metaphor, we need to solve two theoretical 
problems. 
First, given that abstract phenomena do not have the necessary bodily-based 
information to be projected onto other phenomena, the metaphorical mapping between 
abstract phenomena would not be possible. For instance, metaphors such as Love is the 
wisdom of the fool and the folly of the wise (Szwedek 2011: 345), would be inconceivable. 
Our judgment is based on the fact that the embodied approach is based on the assumption 
that the bodily-based information of source domains is absolutely necessary to project 
semantic features onto target domains. The problem to account for Thinking Is Calculating 
from the embodied approach to metaphor is that Calculating (as an abstract phenomenon) 
functions as source domain. Therefore, this mapping typology lacks the experiential basis 
that source domains presumably provide to conceptual metaphor to make possible meaning 
transfer across phenomena (see also White and Herrera Soler 2003:140-141). Put 
differently, this metaphorical mapping typology lacks the bodily-based information which 
presumably (1) serves as the conceptual basis for conceptual metaphor and (2) fulfills the 
conceptual structuring role of conceptual metaphor. By the same token, the metaphorical 
mapping which draws on abstract phenomena as source and target domains also posits a 
theoretical problem to Embodied Simulation because this approach takes as the 
foundational assumption that there must be bodily-based information to be simulated in 
target domains (Feldman 2006; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Kintsch 2008).  
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More importantly, abstract onto abstract mapping seems to characterize other 
metaphorical mappings that have been taken as concrete-onto-abstract typology. According 
to Szwedek (2011:345-346), this pattern characterizes also Life Is Journey and Argument Is 
War because source domains in these metaphors are not physical objects though they 
include physical components. Moreover, there is a case where subjects do not have access 
to the bodily-experienced phenomena of source domains; yet, they use them to construct 
metaphorical mappings (Szwedek 2011: 346). Accordingly, the phenomena which function 
as source domains are not embodied in the same way for all subjects because we do not 
experience certain phenomena in the same way. For instance, subjects may have a direct 
experience of phenomena but others lack this direct interaction (Steen 2011:30-31). For 
instance, for someone who has never been involved actively in hunting, such experience 
should be an abstract experience for them. Yet, the domain of hunting would be assumed to 
be experienced bodily in order to fit the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor. In 
addition, a subject—even without being actively involved in the experience of hunting—
needs to simulate the physical action of the source domain in the target domain. 
Moreover, this approach assumes that this experience is embodied to all subjects in 
the same way. It follows from this that if for instance a subject is actively involved in a 
given experience, the mapping of such experience is based on simulating this experience in 
target domains. This observation seems to contradict the Embodied Simulation approach to 
metaphor in that simulation is based on a direct engagement with a given motor experience 
as source domain and its simulation in target domains (Gibbs 2005: 225-226).  
3.2.2.4. Uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping 
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Uni-directionality within the embodied approach to metaphor is claimed to assure 
that if a phenomenon is understood in terms of another phenomenon, then the process 
cannot be reversed (e.g. Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 
2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). Given that within Embodiment, the process 
maps more concrete onto more abstract phenomena, then the process of metaphorical 
mapping should yield two entailments: (1) meaning transfer always takes place from more 
concrete to more abstract domains; and (2) source and target domains of a given 
metaphorical mapping cannot be engaged in other metaphorical mappings otherwise. 
Specifically, given the strict notion of the principle of uni-directionality, phenomena which 
are mapped in metaphorical mapping are always mapped in one way. The source domain is 
always more concrete than the target. In the following sections we shall gauge this tenet 
against the data to see how uni-directionality principle may not characterize certain 
metaphorical mapping typologies. 
3.2.2.4.1. Can the same domain be abstract (target) 
and concrete (source)?  
In this section we shall assess how certain types of metaphor posit a theoretical 
problem to the embodied approach to metaphor in that a given phenomenon needs to be 
considered as concrete or abstract depending on whether it is bodily-experienced and which 
role it takes on in metaphorical mapping. Let us consider the following examples: 
Human Is Army 
(1)When she opened the door there was an army of journalists waiting for her.  
Human Is Animal  
(2) My husband turned out to be an animal. 
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Human Is Bird 
(3)He picked up this bird at a downtown disco.  
Human Is Fish 
 (4)He was a cold fish--I never really got to know him. 
Human Is Machine (see also Johnson 1987:134) 
(5)The Labour Party machine is running smoothly 
Machine Is Human 
(6)He drove, or tried to drive, a clapped-out mini. 
Animal Is Human 
(7)Blue whales are the largest of the animal kingdom  
Body Part Is Human 
(8)Democracy involves the whole body politic in decisions. 
Liquid Is Human 
(9)The Aral Sea was once a large body of water. 
Human Is Plant 
(10)He planted his feet firmly on the surfboard and waited for the next wave. 
Plant Is Human 
(11)No one realized that James was a KGB plant.  
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Analyzing this set of metaphors sticking to the tenets of Embodiment theory, we 
encounter the following problem: the domains Animal/Machine/Human function as source 
domains in some metaphorical mappings and target in others. So, if we are to accept the 
concrete-abstract criterion, we have to consider the domains Human, Machine, and Animal, 
as abstract phenomena when they are the target of the mapping but more concrete when 
they carry out the function of source domains.  
More importantly, as the table above shows, Animal, Machine, and Human function 
as source and target domains in different metaphorical mappings. The embodiment 
approach to metaphor would suggest that the domains Animal and Machine are more 
concrete than the domain Human. However, the theory does not explain why we should 
consider these three domains (Animal, Machine, Human) differently in terms of 
concreteness-abstractness. Our judgment is based on the fact that since they are not 
inherently source or target domains. 
Table 3 Bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains. 
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Another instance of mapping which is problematic to be analyzed in terms of the 
Concrete-Abstract criterion is the domain Disease. This domain appears to be as source 
domain (more concrete than the target one), and as target domain (more abstract than the 
source domain). Consider the following examples: 
Problem/Difficulty Is Disease  
We suffer from the crippling disease of privatization. 
The health of the project depends on all participants working co-operatively. 
The health of the economy will suffer from inflation. 
Disease Is War/Invasion 
White cells attack the invading bacteria. 
They were fighting a losing battle trying to save my father from cancer. 
or Emotion/Idea Is Disease 
The growing pains of adolescence often leave teenagers depressed.  
Again, Problem, Difficulty, Disease, and Idea function as source and target domains 
in different metaphorical mappings. From here, it is clear that the concrete-abstract criterion 
is not absolute in this type of metaphorical mapping because we cannot differentiate source 
and target domains based on such criterion. 
3.2.2.4.2. Reversal Mappings  
In the previous section we showed that certain phenomena in some instances of 
metaphorical mapping are not inherently source or target domains. Equally interesting is 
the fact that these domains can be mapped onto each other in different ways to form 
different conceptual metaphors. Grady (2005b:330-331) argues that uni-directionality is not 
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absolute to all conceptual metaphors, stressing that, “Metaphors of the GENERIC-IS-
SPECIFIC type also seem to be symmetrical, allowing projection in either direction…”  
For instance, the domain of Animal can be used to give conceptual structure to the 
domain of Machine; 
Machine Is Animal 
(1)The murder weapon appears to have been a monkey wrench—shades of the Rue 
Morgue.  
Similarly, the domain of Human can be structured in terms of Animal; 
Human Is Animal 
(2)She’s never at home—she’s a real party animal. 
Also, the domain of Animal can be understood in terms of Human; 
Animal Is Human 
(3)Property developers in Hong Kong are a bunch of fat cats. 
the domain of Machine is understood in terms of Human; 
Machine Is Human 
(4)These sports utility vehicles are real gas guzzlers. 
and the domain of Machine is understood in terms of Human 
Human Is Machine 
(6) a. It was a high octane performance that left the audience stunned.  
     b. I could never discover what makes Ann tick. 
Liquid Is Crowd/Human 
(7)The Aral Sea was once a large body of water.  
Human Is Liquid 
(8)Crowds spilled out of the train over the platform. 
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As the data shows, source and target domains in the examples above have in 
common the fact that they are experienced by the perceptual mechanisms of the body 
(Human, Liquid, Machine, and Animal). It is worth noticing here that these domains 
equally fulfill the roles of source and target domains in different conceptual metaphors. 
This finding entails that (1) target domains also can be accessible via perceptual 
mechanisms; and (2) the concrete-abstract criterion, which presumably helps to distinguish 
source from target domains, does not stand on a solid basis.  
This means also that the “uni-directionality” criterion cannot fit the data to explain 
this metaphorical mapping typology. We argue that this uni-directionality cannot hold 
always from more concrete to more abstract domains. 
These findings show that in this type of metaphorical mapping, being abstract or 
concrete is a relative characteristic of source and target domains (see page 80). That is, 
analyzing this type of metaphorical mapping following the tenets of the embodied approach 
to metaphor rightfully claims for a conceptual change of certain phenomena when they 
function as source and target domains in different metaphorical mappings.  
To sum up, the polarized belief that a given phenomenon is either concrete or 
abstract cannot hold because certain phenomena can function as source and target in 
different metaphorical mappings. Notice that, athough in this section we have shown that 
uni-directionality does not hold in all metaphorical mappings because in some cases, 
certain domains can exchange the roles they play in conceptual metaphor. However, we 
need to point out that if we understand Human in terms of Liquid and Liquid in terms of 
Human, we do not get the same inferences in both metaphorical mappings (see examples 
(7) and (8) above). The two cases of metaphorical mapping are instances of different 
metaphors.  
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Another possible account of the mismatch between the tenets of the embodiment 
theory and the present data is the fact that the concrete-abstract criterion creates a 
“unidirectional” interdependence between source and target domains. This interdependence 
is obvious insomuch as our understanding of target phenomena depends on our experience 
of source phenomena (see Chapter II).  
3.3. Embodied Simulation 
In the previous sections, we demonstrated that source domains draw on different 
bodily-experienced phenomena. In addition, target domains also draw on different types of 
phenomenon. Henceforth, we proposed that conceptual metaphor is instantiated through 
distinct mapping typologies. Accordingly, we analyzed the data paying special attention to 
these mapping typologies and argued that different typologies may draw on different 
mechanisms. In the following sections, we shall focus on the source domains which are 
based on spatial, orientation, state and location experience to assess how these kinds of 
experience particularly posit a significant theoretical problem to the embodied simulation 
approach.  
3.3.1. Different Bodily Experiences in Source Domains 
Embodied Simulation is based on the assumption that in order to construct a 
metaphorical mapping, the physical action of the source domain needs to be simulated in 
the target (e.g. Glenberg and Kaschak 2002; Kintsch 2008). So far in this chapter, we have 
explored mapping typologies based on the constitutive natures of source and target 
domains. We have also shown that the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor cannot 
account for certain conceptual metaphors (see page 73). We took this finding as a piece of 
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evidence that conceptual metaphor is instantiated through different mapping typologies. In 
this section, we will address the mapping typology which draws on physical actions as 
source domains from the embodied simulation approach. Our purpose is to assess whether 
this mapping typology follows the same patterns of mapping. It is worth noting here that 
the embodied simulation approach resides in the assumption that metaphorical mapping 
consists of simulating entirely such actions in the target domains. In this section we shall 
gauge this tenet against the data to assess whether source domains which consist of physical 
actions are simulated in target domains in the same way. To carry out this task, first we will 
consider this example: 
Human Is Plant 
The FBI planted informers in the Mafia. 
According to the embodied simulation approach, to process the meaning of this 
metaphor, a given subject needs to entirely simulate the action of planting in the target 
domain. The question here is whether processing this metaphor requires simulating the 
whole physical action of planting. Following Giora (2002, 2008), not all conceptual 
metaphors consist of activating the literal meaning of source domains. 
Second, as stated before, source domains draw on different kinds of bodily-
experienced phenomena. Accordingly, we suggest that source domains which are grounded 
in physical actions may afford further classification and may lead to different patterns of 
mapping. To illustrate this point, let us consider the following table:  
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As the table above shows, source domains can draw on different kinds of physical 
phenomenon—these domains are not circumscribed to one type of physical action. Instead, 
they can also include other kinds of phenomenon such as space-location, orientation, and 
state. For instance, in the first column we deployed source domains which are grounded in 
spatial experience. Given that this experience draws on different topologies (location and 
space) and the fact that it is mapped onto different kinds of target domain (see the table 
above), we suggest that the mechanisms of mapping differ substantially across these 
mapping typologies. For instance, spatial experience is mapped onto Quality/Morality (1); 
onto Unknown (2); onto Success; onto Race (3); onto Quality (4) and (5); and onto Time 
Table 4 Subcategories of source domains.
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(6). Similarly, in the Orientation column, source domains are mapped onto different types 
of target domain. In these cases, target domains include Future, Purpose, and Justice. 
Meanwhile, in the third column, target domains concern Quality and Organization.  
To argue that metaphorical mapping consists of simulating the physically-based 
experience of the source domains onto target domains, it would necessarily entail that the 
physical topologies of such domains are activated while processing their metaphorical 
meanings (Feldman 2006; Glenberg and Kaschak 2002; Kintsch 2008). That is, sentences 
such as, She is head and shoulders above all the other actors and She's still trying to put the 
death of the twins behind her, would necessarily activate the corresponding physical 
topology. While the simulation theory lends a significant support to the embodied approach 
to cognition demonstrating that action words such as grasp, grip, hold etc., when they are 
used metaphorically, they recruit their corresponding motor topology (e.g. Glenberg and 
Kaschak 2002), it is not clear whether the conceptual metaphors shown in the table above 
follow the same pattern. That is, one cannot clearly identify which spatial topology is 
involved in (1-6). Given that simulation requires simulating the physical actions of source 
domains to process the meaning of abstract phenomena, this pattern does not seem to 
characterize the examples above. Giora (2002, 2008) for instance, argues that the literal 
meaning of source domains is not always active during metaphorical mapping. Therefore, 
the embodied simulation theory needs to deal with metaphorical mapping not as based on 
one single cognitive operation—namely, simulating entirely the physical action of source 
domains. As the examples above show, source and target domains may draw on different 
kinds of phenomenon, enough so that it is difficult to capture their cognitive operations 
under one single pattern. 
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3.3.2. Partial Mapping and Embodied Simulation 
In the previous section, we demonstrated that certain conceptual metaphors are 
instantiated through different mapping typologies. This is due to the fact that the data 
indicates that not all physical actions are simulated entirely in the target domains. Taken 
together with the fact that source domains are not always based on physical actions that 
need to be activated when processing metaphorical mappings (e.g. Giora 2002), we argued 
that there cannot be a single pattern characterizing all the mapping typologies that engage 
physical actions as source domains. It has thus been suggested that the embodied 
simulation needs to account for metaphorical mapping as involving different cognitive 
operations. In this section we will assess the partial mapping principle taking into account 
the embodied simulation. 
This principle is claimed to characterize all types of metaphorical mapping (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980:54). This pattern is at odds with the tenet of the Embodied Simulation 
approach in that this theory resides in the fact that physical actions of source domains are 
entirely mapped onto target domains. Gibbs and Matlock (2008:163), for instance, sustain 
that the metaphorical mapping which engages a physical action in its source domain 
involves simulating entirely this action onto the target domain. A typical instance of this 
mapping typology is instantiated through expressions such as, 
(1)She grasped the idea  
(2)I managed to grasp the main points of the lecture. 
(3)After the interview, he thought the job was within his grasp (see Chapter VI for 
in an-depth analysis of the mechanisms underlying this mapping typology). These 
metaphorical mappings could be graphically represented as follows: 
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As figures 1 and 2 show, metaphors (1), (2), and (3) can be represented by the same 
physical topology in the source domain. To illustrate, the three examples draw on a 
physical action which includes an agent fulfilling the action of grasping an object. This 
finding is particularly interesting to support the notion that the simulation process of the 
physical action of the source domain Grasping is carried out entirely. As observed in the 
two figures, the physical topology of the source domain Grasping is invariable though the 
target domain is not identical. For instance, in (3) the target domain falls on Job. However, 
in these examples all the physical components of the topology of the source domain 
Grasping are simulated in the target domains (an agent, the action of grasping, and an 
object).  
Nonetheless, this finding is not observed in certain metaphorical mappings which 
engage a physical action as source domain:  
Thinking/Believing Is Walking/Traveling 
Figure 1 Physical components of the motor actions Grasping. 
Figure 2 The physical components involved in Control Is Handle/Own. 
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(1)My thoughts wandered off on to memories of my last holidays. 
Activity Is Boat Travel 
(2)After the Wall Street crash, the American economy moved into uncharted waters. 
Love Relation Is Traveling 
(3)We arrived at a crossroads and had to split up (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 
1980:44-45). 
Verbal Communication Is Travel/Movement 
(4)Could you please give way to the next speaker? 
Examples (1-4) indicate that though source domains in these cases draw on the 
physical action Traveling. Though at a general level, the mapping typologies lead virtually 
to the same inferences, namely an Agent Moving through a Path toward a Destination, not 
all the physical components of such phenomena are simulated in the target domains in the 
examples above. First, whereas the physical topology of the example (3) includes by 
default two different “agents” moving together toward a common destination, in (1), (2), 
and (4) only one agent is involved.  
These metaphors are different from the one analyzed in Figure 1 in that the latter 
includes always the same components of the source domain. Therefore, this finding 
supports the notion that when a metaphorical mapping draws on a physical action as source 
domain, this action is simulated entirely onto the target domain. That is, whenever the 
action grasping functions as source domain the simulation process includes the same 
physical components an agent grasping an object.  
So far, we have attempted to outline that certain physical actions include determined 
physical components that are mapped whenever these actions are involved metaphorical 
mappings (e.g. Grasping). However, certain metaphorical mapping typologies do not 
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necessarily involve the same physical components of the source domains (see the examples 
above). 
Another way to test the assumption that the simulation process concerns all the 
components of the physical actions of source domains is to assess whether the mapping 
typology which depends on a physical action as source domain activates all of its 
components. To address this issue, let us consider the following example: 
 Activity Is Boat Travel:  
(1)We went full steam ahead in buying the house. 
(2)He made heavy weather of ordering just 20 books. 
 
 
According to the tenets of the Embodied Simulation theory, this metaphor would be 
a result of simulating entirely Boat Travel onto the activity of Buying the house. The 
question which arises here is why the entire domain of Travel is not activated in this 
metaphorical mapping. That is, this example does not show that all the physical 
components of the source domain are mapped onto the target domain. To further explore 
this theoretical problem, let us consider the following examples,  
Love Is Journey  
Figure 3 Partial simulation process in metaphorical mapping.
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(1)We arrived at a crossroads and had to split up (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 
1980:44-45). 
Competition Is War 
(2) The two leading brands have been engaged in a price war.  
The two examples do not support the embodied simulation theory as based on the 
notion of simulating entirely the physical actions of source domains in target domains 
because not all the components of the source domains Journey and War are mapped. For 
instance, example (1) shows that the mapping between the two domains (Love Relationship 
and Journey) is partial because not all the physical components of the source domain 
Journey are mapped onto the target domain. To illustrate, components such as tickets and 
luggage etc. are not included in the mapping. Hence, the mapping is partial. Therefore, 
simulating entirely the physical action of the source domain Journey is not observed in this 
mapping typology. If we argue that the simulation process is being carried out entirely 
while processing these metaphorical mappings, then the “partial mapping” principle would 
not fit their analysis. Similarly, in (2) we conceptualize Competition in terms of War, in 
which not all the components of the physical action of the source domain are mapped. That 
is, if we simulate entirely such physical actions, then it would be possible for us to 
conceptualize Competition in terms of an army uniform, bungalow etc.  
Therefore, based on the data analysis, it becomes obvious that the embodied 
simulation does not explain how simulating (entirely) physical actions onto target domains 
could fit the partial mapping principle. Though certain mapping typologies are based on 
simulation, it does not follow from this that all mapping typologies that engage physical 
actions as source domains follow the same pattern—simulating entirely the physical action 
of source domains. 
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3.3.3. Partial mapping and the neural instantiation of 
simulation 
As shown before, the metaphorical mapping which engages physical actions as 
source domains cannot be looked at as a homogeneous cognitive operation. In this respect, 
we demonstrated that while certain physical actions maintain their components regardless 
of which phenomena these actions are mapped onto (e.g. Grasping), other physical actions 
vary depending on the target domain (see the examples above). This means that certain 
mapping typologies are based on partial mapping because not all the components of such 
physical actions are mapped but others consist of simulating entirely the physical action of 
the source domain (e.g. Grasping). However, there is still an important theoretical problem 
we need to address here: how is the simulation process instantiated neutrally given that this 
process in certain mapping typologies is carried out entirely and in others varies or is 
partial? 
To handle this issue, we propose to consider the following expressions: grasp a 
paper vs. grasp the idea (Feldman 2006; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008). Studies 
show that these two expressions activate the same neural network in three conditions: (1) 
when a subject executes the action of grasping; (2) when a subject observes an agent 
carrying out such action; and (3) when this action is used metaphorically (Gallese and 
Lakoff 2005). An important finding of such studies that is particularly relevant to our 
discussion here is that both literal and metaphorical meanings are neurally instantiated in 
the same brain area (Barsalou 2007, 2003a, 2003b; Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005; 
Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Coulson 2008; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008; see 
also Chapter VI for an in-depth analysis of this type of metaphorical mapping). In other 
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words, given that metaphorical mapping is always partial (Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 
2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989), 
the action of grasping would be mapped partially onto the target domain Understanding. 
However, as Figure 1 indicates, the components of the physical action grasping are 
invariable—whenever the action is mapped, the physical components of such action are an 
agent, the action of grasping, and an object. Therefore, claiming that the simulation process 
is neurally instantiated seems to fit this mapping typology (Grasping Is Understanding) 
with certain constrains on the application of the tenet of the embodied simulation, which 
resides in the principle that the simulation process concerns the whole physical action of the 
source domain. For instance, according to Feldman (2006:216-217) the difference between 
the metaphorical meaning and the actual execution of the action Grasping depends on the 
neural distribution in a given brain area. Nonetheless, if conceptual metaphor has a neural 
basis, the partial mapping between the literal and abstract phenomena might present some 
variations in the neural network responsible for the literal meaning of other mapping 
typologies (see examples 1-4 above). Our judgment is based on the finding above that not 
all the physical actions which function as source domains include an invariable set of 
features that are mapped whenever the corresponding domain is engaged in metaphorical 
mappings (see the examples above). 
3.3.4. Uni-directionality and Embodied Simulation 
We saw before that there are different types of metaphorical mapping. This 
difference should be carefully dealt with within the embodied approach to metaphor since it 
is difficult to identify a specific pattern that may govern all metaphorical mappings. 
Particularly, we saw that uni-directionality is not applicable to all instances of metaphorical 
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mapping (see page 83). In this section we shall test this criterion within the Embodied 
Simulation perspective and assess whether it can be used to explain the data. This criterion 
seems to apply to certain types of metaphorical mapping such as Understand Is Grasp/Hold 
(see also Feldman 2006; Gallese and Lakoff 2005). 
She finds even the easy concepts difficult to get hold of.  
Uni-directionality entails that if we simulate the action of grasping in the domain 
Understanding, the process cannot be reversed. In this metaphorical mapping, we do not 
reason about the domain Grasping in terms of Understanding. In addition, the constitutive 
nature of the two domains seems to be in line with the principles of this tenet. For instance, 
uni-directionality principle requires that source and target domains be concrete and 
abstract, respectively. 
However, trying to apply uni-directionality to the metaphorical mapping which 
draws on two bodily-experienced phenomena such as More Is Up raises the following 
theoretical problems. First, as we saw before, this criterion is based on differentiating 
source and target domains in terms of concreteness and abstractness. However, More Is Up 
involves two concrete phenomena: Verticality and Quantity. In this respect, the two 
phenomena are semantically independent—we do not need simulation to understand the 
target domain. 
Second, this criterion is also based on the fact that if we understand Quantity in 
terms of Verticality, the simulation process could not be reversed. That is, if we simulate 
the increase or decrease of Quantity in terms of going up or down, the simulation process 
cannot take Verticality as source domain. This notion runs counter to the data because there 
are examples where Verticality is understood in terms of Quantity (see page 69).  
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3.3.5. Co-occurrence-based-mapping typology and Embodied 
Simulation 
In the previous section, we showed how the un-directionality principle does not 
characterize certain metaphorical mapping typologies. For this reason, we argued that this 
principle is not an absolute feature to all mapping typologies. One such typology includes 
the mapping which draws on two phenomena that co-occur. In particular, we focused our 
attention on the metaphorical mapping typology which engages a motor action and an 
abstract phenomenon as source and target domains, respectively. That is, the expressions 
grasp a paper and grasp an idea do not satisfy the uni-directionality criterion. In this 
section, we shall compare this metaphorical mapping typology to another one which is 
based on two primitive phenomena—More Is Up. 
First, in More Is Up, there is no transfer of meaning from one domain onto another 
because our experience of one of the two phenomena goes in parallel with the other one. 
That is, whenever we experience, for instance, Up, we also experience the phenomenon 
More.  According to Gibbs and Matlock (2008:162) embodied metaphors are constructed 
due to the brain's ability to imagine a physical action in the target knowledge. Based on this 
evidence, metaphorical mapping typologies such as More Is Up cannot be accounted for by 
Embodied Simulation. Our judgment is based on the fact that the two domains in this 
metaphor are semantically independent and do not require imagination of a given subject to 
reason about the target domain because he or she could map the two phenomena based on 
his or her experience of two co-occurring phenomena. 
 In contrast, metaphorical mapping typologies, such as the one which is involved in 
Understanding Is Grasping, present major differences in the constitutive nature of source 
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and target domains. For example, the source domain in this metaphorical mapping typology 
is grounded in the physical action—grasping. Mapping this domain onto Understanding 
may require the simulation of the physical action of the source domain to construct such 
mapping (Gibbs and Matlock 2008:162). In addition, the two phenomena in this 
metaphorical mapping do not co-occur. The question which arises here is how we could 
reconcile “simulation” and “mapping” to explain metaphorical mappings such as the one 
involved in Understanding Is Grasping and More Is Up. 
The two notions here are mutually exclusive in the sense that conceptual metaphors 
cannot depend on mapping and simulation. Our judgment is based on the fact that 
metaphorical mappings mean drawing systematic correspondences between constituents of 
source and target domains (e.g. Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Valenzuela 2009:311-312), whereas 
Simulation Theory assumes that we understand abstract knowledge in metaphorical 
mappings in the same way as when we experience source phenomena in that simulation 
recruits neuronal features that are also necessary for the execution of the physical action of 
the source domain (e.g. Gibbs and Matlock 2008: 162-165; Lakoff 2008). In addition, 
according to Steen (2011) whether we have experienced a given phenomenon bodily or not 
does not matter since the basis of metaphorical mapping is simulation.  
To sum up, while the tenets of Embodied Simulation covers a certain metaphorical 
mapping typology—physical actions and abstract phenomena—it does not cover other 
metaphorical mapping typologies such as the one which is based on co-occurring 
phenomena.  
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Conclusion 
We started this chapter by asking how a generalization over the underlying 
mechanisms of conceptual metaphor can be made in Cognitive Linguistics, given that 
metaphorical mappings draw on different kinds of bodily experience. In this setting, we 
sketched out different experiences on which source domains dwell on (motor, sensory, 
space, location etc.). Interestingly, we also observed that target domains are grounded in 
different kinds of phenomenon. Therefore, we suggested that conceptual metaphor is 
instantiated through various mapping typologies that differ in terms of their underlying 
mechanisms. 
To show that this is indeed the case we proceeded to test the tenets of the 
embodiment approach to different mapping typologies. Consequently, major problems 
arose—certain mapping typologies do not neatly fit into this approach. Accordingly, the 
data shows that conceptual metaphor is not instantiated through a single mapping typology. 
In this respect, we noticed that (1) some phenomena function as source and target in 
different mapping typologies; (2) some abstract domains fulfill the role of source domains; 
and (3) certain domains are engaged on reversal mapping.   
In this setting, first, partial mapping and uni-directionality operate in certain 
mapping typologies but do not fit others such as reversal mapping (see page 83) and 
multimodal-based mapping (see page 76), and co-occurrence based mapping (see page 98).  
Second, the Concrete-Abstract criterion –while it is viable to explain some 
metaphorical mappings- it is not applicable to the current data (see page 73). In this respect, 
we observed that the mapping typology which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena 
such as More Is Up does not satisfy the partial mapping principle (see page 90). 
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Accordingly, we argued that the concrete-abstract, uni-directionality and partial mapping 
criteria are not absolute to all metaphorical mapping typologies.  
Third, with a view to setting further evidence that conceptual metaphor is 
instantiated through different mapping typologies and follows distinct mechanisms, we 
attempted to analyze the mapping typology which engages physical action as source 
domain paying special attention to the embodied simulation approach. As a result, we 
noticed that this approach is at odds with the Embodied metaphor theory in that we cannot 
reconcile partial mapping and simulating entirely the physical action of source domains in 
target domains, on the one hand, and co-occurrence-based mapping on the other hand. To 
illustrate, co-occurrence-based mapping does not draw on simulating the physical action of 
this source domain in the target as both experiences go in parallel in the external world. 
These findings are of deep interest for Cognitive Linguistics because they point to a 
greater variability and complexity of metaphorical mapping—they show that there cannot 
be a core process governing all conceptual metaphors. Accordingly, we have suggested that 
while conceptual metaphors in the data are embodied, it is misleading to classify them into 
one group.  
As the data indicates, source domains draw on different kinds of bodily-experienced 
phenomena and target domains are not always abstract as it is claimed within the 
embodiment theory (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980,1999; Szwedek 2011). Hence, this 
theory needs to account for conceptual metaphor as being instantiated through different 
mapping typologies. To show that this theory needs to avoid this theoretical standpoint, in 
the next chapter we are going to focus our attention on the mapping typology which 
engages bodily-experienced and abstract phenomena as source and target domains, 
respectively. Our goal will be to enhance our understanding of this typology by sketching 
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out its potential mechanisms. By getting a deeper understanding of such mechanisms, we 
will be in a better position to differentiate the mapping typologies through which 
conceptual metaphor is instantiated. 
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Chapter II: Propositionality and Linearity of Metaphor: an 
Asymmetrical Mapping of Source and Target Phenomena 
1. Introduction and Hypothesis 
Our goal in the previous chapter was to test the general assumption within the 
embodiment theory that conceptual metaphor is instantiated through a single mapping 
typology (meaning transfer from more concrete to more abstract phenomena) which is 
governed by an invariable set of tenets (see Chapter I). However, we demonstrated that 
conceptual metaphor is manifested through different mapping typologies. A piece of 
evidence for the existence of such variety of mapping typologies is the fact that the tenets 
of the embodiment theory do not cover all the data. A general observation that we can make 
here is that uni-directionality, one-way-meaning transfer, and partial mapping fit the 
conceptual metaphor that draws on bodily-experienced and abstract phenomena as source 
and target domains, respectively. In this respect, we noticed that meaning construction via 
metaphorical mapping always stems from source domains. Therefore, we further observed 
that meaning construction in this mapping typology is propositional in that the topology of 
bodily-experienced phenomena is transferred to the target. Accordingly, the inference 
which we build in target domains follows the logic of the semantic topology of the source. 
Besides, this meaning construction is based on an asymmetrical mapping between source 
and target domains insomuch that without our experience of the source domain, we do not 
have the necessary bodily-based features to give structure to the target (see pages 109-113).   
Therefore, in this chapter, we shall put forward a new perspective to closely look at 
the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced and abstract phenomena as 
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source and target domains, respectively: Propositionality and Linearity of meaning 
construction.  
We suggest that this step is crucial towards understanding exactly which type of 
metaphorical mapping neatly fits into the tenets of Embodiment. We hypothesize that 
analyzing conceptual metaphor within this theory is based on the assumption that meaning 
construction and processing via metaphorical mapping are carried out propositionally and 
lineally. By this, we mean that within the embodied approach to metaphor (e.g. Johnson 
and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff  and Turner 1989), reasoning about 
target domains is an off-line cognitive process (see Chapter I). It is propositional as the 
conceptual structure of the target domain is exclusively rooted in the source. In particular, 
according to the embodied approach to metaphor the cognitive topology of the source 
domain is extended to abstract phenomena which lack such topology (e.g. Johnson and 
Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Ruiz de Mendoza 2005, 2011). 
Propositionality also denotes that mapping source onto target domains does not 
include only elements of the former as separate units, but they are mapped alongside the 
relation that these elements maintain in the source domains. Additionally, reasoning about 
target domains also is lineal—without a prior experience of the source domain, the target is 
meaningless (e.g. Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 
2011). This linearity manifests itself in three ways: in time, in meaning construction, and in 
meaning retrieval.  
First, metaphorical mapping is built fitting into a chronological order where the 
source domain precedes its counterpart (the target) in that, without experiencing the former, 
the latter is meaningless. Also, this linearity can be tracked by analyzing how the 
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conceptual structure of the target domain is shaped through the filter of the source (e.g. 
Szwedek 2011; see also Chapter I). That is, meaning construction via conceptual metaphor 
is lineal because first, the cognitive topology that we use in mapping source and target 
domains is previously built while processing sensory and motor experiences. In this setting, 
our understanding of the target domain is lineal because it starts when we activate the 
cognitive topology of the source domain. 
Taken together, these views establish a basis to distinguish source and target 
domains in the sense that our reasoning about source and target domains is on-line and off-
line, respectively. 
In this chapter, we shall explain how a Propositionality-Linearity perspective fits a 
certain type of metaphorical mapping—the mapping which engages bodily-experienced and 
abstract phenomena, respectively. Then, we shall test this perspective against the theoretical 
framework of embodied metaphor. In this step, we shall attempt to see which data our 
perspective and Embodied approach to metaphor may fit. We shall focus on three main 
tenets of this approach, which are claimed to be operating in metaphor: “meaning transfer”, 
“uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping”, and “mapping bodily experienced onto non-
bodily-experienced phenomena”.  
We mentioned before that the assumption concerning metaphorical mapping 
processing is not made at an adequate level. For instance, we saw in the previous chapter 
that metaphorical mapping is not based on a single metaphorical mapping typology where 
principles and patterns of mapping are identical. In this chapter we propose a wider 
perspective for the tenets of Embodied Metaphor and see whether these tenets fit into our 
perspective. If our interpretation of this account is correct, we should also be able to single 
out different types of metaphorical mapping.  
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2. Background 
The Embodied approach to metaphor has arisen as a strong opposing theoretical 
stream to the traditional view of language and cognition as a symbol-manipulation based 
process (Chomsky 1984; Fodor 1975). Thus, instead of looking at cognition as a highly 
abstract process, scholars within the embodied approach propose that cognition (including 
conceptual metaphor) is based on bodily experience (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2011; Gibbs and 
Matlock 2008; Kintsch, 2008; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Johnson 
1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). While the 
first approach rests on the notion that cognition is symbol manipulation (Chomsky 1984), 
the embodied approach to metaphor points out that all cognitive processes are rooted in 
bodily experience (e.g. Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 1999). In particular, this approach stands on two basic tenets: “meaning transfer 
based on the experiential basis of source domains” and “uni-directionality of metaphorical 
mapping”. In the following two sections we shall introduce and discuss these patterns. 
2.1. Uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping 
A particularly influential sense of Embodiment stems from Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1980: 112) early formulation of the embodiment hypothesis as being a constraint on the 
directionality of metaphorical mappings. In this strong directionality constraint, they claim 
that we normally project the bodily-experienced phenomena uni-directionally from the 
source domain onto a less well understood target domain. Similar findings have been 
reported in (Steen 2011:30), that metaphorical mappings are “...constructed from concrete 
domains…to abstract domains… ”.   
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That is, if we understand a given phenomenon in terms of another, the metaphorical 
mapping cannot be reversed (e.g. Johnson 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 
2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989). 
In this respect, these scholars sustain that conceptual metaphor must be looked at as a uni-
directional mapping. For instance, to support this claim they analyzed conceptual 
metaphors such as Love Relation Is Journey. Accordingly, if we conceptualize the domain 
Love Relation in terms of Journey, then the mapping cannot be reversed (see page 83 for 
contrasting views). From a cognitive point of view, it is impossible to map Love Relation 
as source onto the domain Journey as target (see page 79). 
2.2. Meaning-transfer based on the experiential character of source 
domains 
It is widely accepted within the theory of Embodied metaphor that metaphorical 
mappings are based on projecting bodily-based features of source domains onto target 
domains. Therefore, for a domain to be eligible to consist of a conceptual structure and to 
project it onto other domains, it needs to be accessible to the sense organ (e.g. Johnson 
1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). Since 
conceptual metaphor is mainly viewed as meaning transfer among domains, and only those 
domains which are experienced bodily are the ones eligible to instigate the mapping 
process, a heavy emphasis has been put on source domains in the sense that their 
characteristics ‘constrain’ metaphorical mappings. It follows from this that tracing back 
how the conceptual metaphor is built consists of identifying which aspects of the source 
domains are transferred to the target. These aspects may range from Image Schemas (Grady 
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2005a; Lakoff 1990; Lakoff and Turner 1989), motor action (Feldman 2006; Feldman and 
Narayanan 2004; Talmy 1988, 2000) to Cognitive Models (Lakoff 1987). 
However, in the previous chapter we demonstrated that neither Uni-directionality 
nor mapping concrete-onto-abstract-phenomena is observed in certain types of 
metaphorical mapping (see page 83).  
To solve this problem we suggest that these two tenets fit a certain type of 
metaphorical mapping—the one which engages bodily-experienced phenomena and non-
bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively.  
In this chapter, we shall focus our attention on this type of metaphorical mapping 
from the embodied approach perspective and assess whether its tenets fit the 
Propositionality-Linearity perspective.  
3. Data Analysis 
The tenets of Embodied Metaphor (e.g. Johnson 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; 
Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) and Embodied 
Simulation (e.g. Barsalou 2003b; Feldman 2006; Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Gallese 
and Lakoff 2005; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Kintsch 2008) are based on the assumption that 
metaphorical mapping includes transferring bodily experience onto target ones. In the 
previous chapter, we demonstrated how the patterns and principles of mapping within the 
theoretical framework of embodiment do not fit the data. More importantly, the two 
approaches are not at accordance in handling some cases of metaphorical mappings (see 
Chapter I, for more details).  
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3.1. Metaphors as Propositions 
The Embodied Metaphor theory has been proposed to argue against the idea that 
cognition (including metaphor) is a formal system which is monitored exclusively by the 
mind and which consists of manipulating abstract symbols (e.g. Chomsky 1984; Fodor 
1975). In this setting, the embodied approach to metaphor claims for an embodied 
metaphorical mapping, giving a crucial role to the properties of the body, environment, and 
the brain to shape cognition (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Johnson 1987; Johnson 
and Lakoff 2002). Furthermore, this embodied aspect of metaphorical mapping exclusively 
resides in the experiential character of source domains. In this respect, the bodily-
experienced phenomena of source domains play a dominating role in understanding 
abstract phenomena. This depends on the process of embodying target domains through the 
filter of the bodily-experienced phenomena of source domains (Szwedek 2011). The tenets 
of this theory are claimed to be observed in all metaphorical mappings.  
However, in the previous chapter, we demonstrated that this pattern is observed in a 
certain type of metaphor—in particular, the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-
experienced and non-bodily-experienced phenomena (see the previous chapter for more 
details). Accordingly, we put forward another theory to closely analyze this type of 
metaphor—Propositionality and Linearity of metaphorical mapping. 
It is worth noting here that one of the challenges that the theory has to face is to 
explain why the concrete-abstract criterion is absolutely decisive to engage source and 
target phenomena in metaphorical mapping given that certain metaphors do not follow this 
pattern (see Chapter III). That is, within the embodied approach to metaphor, whether a 
phenomenon takes on the role of source or target domain hinges on this criterion. 
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This view is also adopted to explain conceptual metaphor within the theoretical 
framework of Embodied Simulation (Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Kintsch 2008; Lakoff 
2008). Accordingly, the physical action of source domains is simulated in target 
phenomena (Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Gibbs and Matlock 2008). Either via mapping 
correspondence between source and target domains, or via simulating the physical action in 
the target, both approaches subscribe to the belief that target domains acquire the embodied 
character of the source (e.g. Johnson 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 
2000, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). To illustrate, let us 
consider the following examples of Time Is Money (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:7-8) 
You are wasting my time. 
This gadget will save you hours. 
I do not have the time to give you. 
How do you spend your time these days? 
That flat time cost me an hour. 
I have invested a lot of time in her. 
I do not have enough time to spare for that. 
You are running out of time. 
You need to budget your time. 
Put aside some time for ping pong. 
Is that worth your while? 
Do you have much time left? 
He is living on borrowed time. 
You do not use your time profitably. 
I lost a lot of time when I got sick. 
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Thank you for your time. 
Features transfer across domains is based on the fact that we need two kinds of 
phenomenon in metaphorical mapping—namely, concrete and abstract (Johnson 1987; 
Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). 
These domains are also substantially different in terms of the way we conceptualize them in 
that, source and target domains consist of directly and indirectly meaningful phenomena. 
More precisely, to construct a metaphorical mapping, we need a bodily-experienced 
phenomenon whose bodily-based semantic features are imposed on the abstract 
phenomena. To illustrate, in the examples above, we understand Time in terms of Money. 
In this respect, the bodily-based semantic features are proposed to reason about Time. Our 
experience of the domain Money encompasses semantic features such as waste, save, give, 
take etc., then via metaphorical projection of these features onto the domain Time, the latter 
gets to fit into the cognitive topology the domain Money.  
To look at metaphorical mapping from the Propositionality-Linearity perspective is 
to analyze how the bodily-based features are proposed to shape the conceptual structure of 
abstract domains. According to the embodied approach to metaphor, the only way to reason 
about abstract phenomena is to embody them (Feldman 2006). However, apart from stating 
that the embodying process includes transferring the image schemas (Grady 2005a; Lakoff 
1990; Lakoff and Turner 1989), cognitive models of the source domains (Lakoff 1987), the 
embodied approach to metaphor needs to further identify which metaphorical mapping 
typology this process is observed. To illustrate, the embodying process might be needed to 
construct only the type of metaphorical mapping which engages abstract phenomena as 
target domains (see Chapter III). Furthermore, this process always means that 
understanding abstract phenomena is a proposition-based metaphorical mapping. For 
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instance, in the examples above, all these metaphorical expressions fit into the proposition 
Time Is Money. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), such propositions were drawn 
after studying linguistic metaphors. That is, all the expressions above manifest a 
metaphorical mapping which is propositionally based (Time Is Money). This means that 
the bodily-based semantic features are proposed to reason about Time. 
More interestingly, however, this pattern has not been observed in all the types of 
metaphorical mapping which have been covered in the previous chapter. In particular, a 
certain mapping typlogy seems to neatly follow this criterion—namely, the metaphor which 
engages bodily-experienced and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target 
domains, respectively (see Chapter I). This entails that metaphorical mapping does not, by 
default, follow the proposition which is based on the mapping from more concrete domains 
onto more abstract ones (see Chapter III). As the data indicates, in certain types of 
metaphorical mapping, source and target domains are bodily experienced, which might 
require a different approach.   
So far, we have analyzed the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily and non-
bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively, to see how the 
Propositionality perspective can account for this type of mapping. In this setting, meaning 
transfer across domains could be analyzed in terms of a proposition such as Time Is Money. 
However, within the embodied approach to metaphor, meaning transfer is constrained 
mainly by two principles: meaning transfer is based on the experiential character of the 
source domain and on the uni-directionality principle. In the following two sections we 
shall dig more into these tenets to assess whether they fit into the theoretical framework of 
Propositionality. 
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3.1.1. Metaphorical Propositions as Meaning transfer based on 
the experiential character of the source domain 
The meanings of target domains are derivative from the literal meanings of source 
domains (e.g. Bowdle and Gentner 1999: 92). This sense is also similar to that stated in 
Lakoff and Turner’s grounding hypothesis, in which they argued that the meaning of 
abstract phenomena is grounded in terms of semantically autonomous domains (Lakoff and 
Turner 1989: 113-120). Our reasoning of source domains is extended to the cognitive 
topology of the target domain, in that this reasoning process is identical to both domains. In 
this respect, engaging two phenomena in metaphorical mapping does not consist only of 
drawing a systematic correspondence between the elements of source and target domains, 
but also the cognitive topologies, which unify the elements of source domains as domains 
of experience, are transferred. For instance, the components of the source domain Journey, 
(travelers, vehicle, path, goal) are mapped onto their counterparts in the target domains 
Love (lovers, love relationship, goal) together with the cognitive topology that maintains 
travelers, vehicle, path, and goal as a determined domain of experience. This cognitive 
topology within the source domain leads to inferences such as difficulties, easiness, and 
changing or maintaining the direction of the trip. Similarly, from a propositional point of 
view, this cognitive topology also operates in the target domain, Love. Therefore, the 
difficulty or easiness of movement, changing or maintaining the direction of the trip are 
also applicable to Love. This is evident in the following expressions (Lakoff 1993:206): 
Look how far we've come.  
It's been a long, bumpy road. 
We can't turn back now. 
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We're at a crossroads. 
The assumption here is that without grounding the abstract phenomenon Love in 
our bodily-experienced phenomenon, Journey, our reasoning system would be unable to 
process the former. Accordingly, the cognitive topology of the source domain is transferred 
to the target.  
Cognitive scientists and Cognitive Linguists supporting this theory draw their 
assumption concerning metaphor based on the topology of source domains (e.g. Feldman 
2006; Johnson 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 2000, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1990, 
1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). There are three main entailments of 
this assumption:  
(1) all metaphorical mappings engage bodily-experienced phenomena (as source domains) 
and  non-bodily-experienced phenomena (as target domains); 
(2) meaning construction in metaphorical mapping  is shaped  through the experiential 
character of source domains; and   
(3) metaphorical mapping is always unidirectional (e.g. Lakoff 1990; Szwedek 2011).  
The Embodied approach to metaphor suggests that metaphorical mapping is based 
on projecting bodily-experienced domains onto abstract ones.  
In the following two sections we shall assess whether this projection can be looked 
at from two key aspects: Propositionality and Uni-directionality. Recall that these two 
aspects are claimed to range over all cross-domain mappings. Propositionality in 
metaphorical mapping is evident in meaning transfer from source onto target domains in 
the sense that features of bodily-experienced domains are transferred onto target domains. 
Accordingly, bodily-experienced phenomena, which function as source domains, consist of 
bodily features that govern metaphorical mapping. These features are transferred onto 
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target phenomena to impose on them the embodied character of source phenomena. In this 
way, bodily-experienced phenomena and their features give rise to metaphorical mappings. 
The process of projecting these features onto other phenomena implies transferring also the 
embodied character of source phenomena onto target ones. Via this metaphorical 
projection, these target phenomena receive and adopt the embodied character of source 
phenomena.  
The second aspect, Uni-directionality (see the following section), is observed in that 
there is a one-way transfer of features across domains (see Love Relation Is Journey, 
above). That is, metaphorical mapping involves features projection which is carried out 
always from bodily-experienced onto abstract phenomena. However, as will be seen in 
Chapter III, not all conceptual metaphors satisfy this pattern. We will argue that to account 
for different conceptual metaphors, the embodiment theory may require significant 
modification of its tenets. 
3.1.2. Metaphors as Uni-directional propositions 
The second aspect of the propositional character of conceptual metaphor resides in 
the fact that there is a one-way transfer of features across domains. That is, metaphorical 
mapping involves features transfer always from bodily-experienced onto abstract 
phenomena.  
The other idea that is intrinsically related to this pattern is that if we understand a 
phenomenon in terms of another one, then the mapping cannot be reversed (e.g. Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999). The examples above seem to follow this pattern in that if we 
understand Time in terms of Money, then the proposition cannot be reversed. That is, we do 
not understand Money in terms of Time. 
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However, the data shows that certain phenomena can exchange the roles of source 
and target domains in different metaphorical mappings (see Chapter I). Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that if this pattern does not hold in these instances of metaphor, then probably 
the entailments of one-way-meaning transfer criterion may not hold either. Namely, we are 
referring here to the fact that there is no reason why we should assume that all metaphorical 
mappings include Uni-directionality and concrete-abstract mapping principles. In fact, 
conceptual metaphor has been examined as based on one mapping typology: a 
unidirectional meaning transfer from more concrete onto more abstract domains (e.g. 
Ungerer and Schmid 1996). 
In the previous chapter, we demonstrated that some instances of metaphor do not 
consist of mapping bodily-experienced phenomena (as source domains) and non-bodily-
experienced phenomena (as target domains). Instead, metaphorical mapping has a hybrid 
nature (see Chapter I). A particular type of metaphorical mapping which may be a fruitful 
setting for a challenge to the Embodied Metaphor theory is the one that engages pairs of 
bodily-experienced phenomena (Chapter III). Our assumption is based on the fact that since 
the tenets of this theory are shaped based on the bodily characteristics of source domains 
(e.g. Szwedek 2011), the theory needs to analyze differently the metaphorical mapping 
where source and target domains are bodily-experienced.  
3.1.3. Predictability of the cognitive topology of the target 
domains 
Propositionality of conceptual metaphor is also evident in the fact that its inference 
is predictable. When we map, let us say, Journey onto Love, we predict the cognitive 
topology of the target domain. As seen before, the domain Journey consists of travelers 
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who make a trip toward a destination following a certain path. Accordingly, when these 
two domains are mapped, we assume that the domain Love will include subjects who are 
engaged in a love relation who intend to reach a certain goal such as having a family etc. 
Because there are certain attributes which are intrinsically associated with the components 
of the source domain Journey, we predict that these attributes will also arise in the target. 
For instance, certain characteristics of path in the source domain Journey (bumpy road) 
induce semantic features describing love relation in the target domain: It's been a long, 
bumpy road. 
Taken together, these elements allow us to predict the inferences of the target 
domain Love. In particular, we expect that Lovers may face difficulties during the trip; they 
might need to change their goal; they might encounter an obstacle that impedes them from 
continuing in the same path and rhythm. For instance, path in the source domain can be 
difficult (bumpy road) or it may be a wrong path (a dead-end street) etc. These attributes 
are predictable in the domain Love, when the two phenomena are mapped. That is, 
understanding the cognitive topology of the source domain allows us to predict the 
inference of the target.  
Still, another piece of evidence for predictability in metaphor which is based on 
bodily-experienced and abstract phenomena is the case where the cognitive topology of the 
source domain is extended in the target domain. This can be observed in Time Is Money 
(see page 120). For instance, when we map Money onto Time, we expect that Time 
acquires the property of being valuable. We argue that the cognitive topology of the source 
domain in this metaphorical mapping is extended in the target domain in the sense that if it 
is valuable, then we can take advantage of it or waste it, give it to others or receive it from 
them etc. In this respect, perhaps, initially the reason why Money is mapped onto Time is 
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its high value but not the property of being transferable (see page 120). However, this 
predictability is not observed in all metaphorical mappings. To illustrate this point, let us 
consider the following metaphor: 
Juliet is the sun.  
This conceptual metaphor engages Juliet and Sun. That this type of proposition is 
different from Time Is Money in the sense that in the former we cannot predict the 
cognitive topology of the target domain. Perhaps, the lack of predictability is due to the fact 
that Juliet is the sun is constructed deliberately (see page 275).  
3.1.4. Propositions are based on Mapping Concrete onto 
abstract domains 
We saw in the previous chapter how some tenets of the Embodied metaphor theory 
do not fit the data. Conceptual metaphor within this approach is studied in terms of 
primitive and complex concepts as source and target domains, respectively. By the use of 
the term primitive, source domains do not allow further structuring of their conceptual 
topology. Conversely, complex domains which function as target do have a decomposable 
structure (Szwedek 2011).  
The way these patterns do not fit certain mapping typologies seems to reflect a 
certain incongruity within the theory when it comes to the dichotomy of physical and 
abstract phenomena, being inherently source and target domains, respectively.  
Our next step in this chapter is to have a closer look at Propositionality in 
metaphorical mapping within the theoretical framework of embodied metaphor. This 
Propositionality arises from the premise that target domains are understood in terms of the 
cognitive topologies of source domains. Our judgment is based on the fact that the theory of 
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embodiment claims that the inferences of conceptual metaphor are built in terms of the 
bodily-based features of source domains (e.g. Johnson 1987; Kövecses 2000, 2010, 2011; 
Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). As seen before, 
within embodiment theory of metaphor, target phenomena are held to be abstract and 
complex. A question which arises here is whether there is a strict criterion that we can 
adopt to differentiate source and target phenomena in terms of this complexity. In 
Cognitive Linguistics, it is claimed that conceptual metaphor depends on imposing 
conceptual structures of source onto target domains. Furthermore, bodily experiences and 
the brain lend their structures to target domains (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980). 
Accordingly, concrete and abstract phenomena are engaged in metaphorical mappings 
whose aim is to semantically structure target domains.  
Propositionality of metaphorical mapping is also evident in the way conceptual 
mapping depends on two different phenomena: Autonomous and subordinate phenomena as 
source and target domains, respectively. In this respect, our understanding of target 
domains is shaped through our experience and understanding of semantically independent 
domains (see Chapter III). This means that the brain processes target phenomena via 
domains which are bodily-experienced phenomena and are semantically autonomous 
(Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989). That is, the 
experiential basis of conceptual metaphor stems from the fact that it makes use of bodily-
experienced phenomena as source domains. A major point that has been made in the 
previous chapter is that not all conceptual metaphors follow the same patterns and 
principles of mapping.  
According to the embodied approach to metaphor, target phenomena do not have 
structures of their own. Hence, we require transferring the embodied structures of source 
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domains onto target domains because through this process we manage to understand 
abstract phenomena. For instance, the above mentioned metaphors are constructed via 
mapping constituents from source phenomena onto target phenomena alongside the internal 
relation between those constituents in each domain. Notice that within the embodiment 
theoretical framework it is assumed that the components of source phenomena are physical 
but the ones in target phenomena are more abstract (Szwedek 2011). 
3.2. Linearity of Metaphorical Mapping 
If we assume that metaphorical mapping is lineal, then we also need to accept that it 
evolves through time and meaning. It is worth noting here that when we assume that 
metaphorical mapping evolves through time course and meaning development, we are not 
necessarily adopting the ‘metaphor career’ (Bowdle and Gentner 1995, 2005) in either case. 
Because by being lineal we are referring to the process of metaphorical mapping, but not 
metaphor per se.  
3.2.1. Linearity in Time of Metaphorical Mapping 
Conceptual metaphor within the embodied approach can be looked at in terms of 
Linearity in time. In particular, in the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-
experienced and abstract phenomena as source and target domains, respectively, these 
phenomena fit into a chronological order. In the theoretical framework of embodied 
metaphor, it is widely accepted that metaphorical mappings require a priori experience of 
source domains and later (Kövecses 2011) the perceptual properties of these domains such 
as image schemas are mapped onto target domains (e.g., Grady 1998, 2005a; Johnson 1987; 
Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). 
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Importantly, source domains, according to this approach, encompass immediate bodily-
based features which capture our interaction with the environment and which are used to 
give conceptual structures to the phenomena which are not accessible by the sense organ.  
To illustrate, let us reconsider Time Is Money. We saw before, that this conceptual 
metaphor is based on two different phenomena: concrete and abstract as source and target 
domains, respectively. This assumption is intrinsically related to the fact that since human 
experience is getting more and more complex, new needs for organizing these new domains 
of experience emerge (e.g. Mouton 2012; White 2003:132). In this respect, bodily-
experienced phenomena are used to reason about newly emergent domains of experience 
(Tejada Caller and Guzmán Guerra 2012:30).  
Within the embodied approach to metaphor, this notion seems to include also 
metaphorical mappings that are based on 'correlation of source and target phenomena' such 
as More Is Up and Less Is Down (e.g., Grady 2005b). That is, each metaphorical mapping 
is an instance of mapping a previously experienced phenomenon onto a new and abstract 
one. Based on this assumption, phenomena which do not meet this condition are not 
engaged in metaphorical mapping. This, in turn, indicates that metaphorical mapping 
always dwells on two phenomena that can be situated in a chronological order where our 
understanding of source domains precedes that of target domains. In this respect, it is safe 
to argue that concepts such as democracy, economy, politics, freedom, morality etc. are 
structured in terms of previously experienced (and primitive) phenomena. This notion has 
two main entailments: (1) in metaphorical mappings, bodily experiences are previous to 
abstract phenomena. And subsequently (2) source domains are prior to target domains. 
However, this is not a clear-cut criterion if we compare abstract domains such as Love and 
its source domain Journey in the following examples (Lakoff 1993:206): 
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Look how far we've come.  
It's been a long, bumpy road. 
We can't turn back now. 
We're at a crossroads. 
In order for the tenets of Embodied Theory to fit the examples above, we need to 
assume that experiencing the phenomenon Journey took place before experiencing Love. 
More importantly, the concept Love is subordinate to the concept Journey. Furthermore, the 
phenomenon of Love is meaningless before it is engaged in metaphorical mapping with its 
correspondent, Journey. This assumption is based on the basic premise that source 
phenomena are presumably experienced previously to target ones. For instance, Feldman 
(2006:8) assures that, “…abstract thought grows out of concrete embodied experiences, 
typically sensorimotor experiences” (our emphasis). 
Here, it becomes clear that the core of embodiment theory is that without bodily-
experienced phenomena, there would be no access to target phenomena. And without such 
bodily-experienced phenomena and potential target domains there would be no 
metaphorical mappings. For instance, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002:558) stress that, “…the 
abstract symbols of language must be grounded, or mapped, to the world if they are to 
convey meaning…if one has only abstract symbols at one’s disposal, determination of the 
correct mapping is impossible”. Also, without abstract concepts there would be no need for 
cross-domain mapping. This means that the Embodied theory of metaphor attributes certain 
characteristics to domains and the role they take on in metaphorical mappings. These 
characteristics determine the role which a given phenomenon has to take on in metaphorical 
mappings. Namely, phenomena which are bodily experienced function by default as source 
domains but non-bodily-experienced phenomena carry out always the function of target 
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domains. For instance, Gibbs (1994:6) states that, “Conceptual metaphors arise when we 
try to understand difficult, complex, abstract, or less delineated concepts, such as love, in 
terms of familiar ideas, such as different kinds of nutrients”. The question which arises here 
is to what extent metaphorical mappings which engage bodily experiences in source and 
target domains may break the tenets of Embodied Theory of metaphor.  
Based on our analysis in the previous section, we conclude that another criterion 
which characterizes metaphorical mapping within the theoretical framework of 
embodiment is Linearity in time. This linearity puts a time-interdependence relationship 
between source and target domains in that (1) we need a given bodily-experienced 
phenomenon and (2) a more recent phenomenon whose semanticity is shaped through 
another concept. This condition is also argued to cover instances of metaphor that shows a 
correlation of phenomena: 
More is Up 
Less is Down 
As we can see here, not only does the embodiment theory constrain the mapping in 
terms of concrete/abstract criterion but also in terms of a chronological order. In this 
respect, our understanding of target domains is shaped by our experience of source 
domains. Given that all concepts are embodied (e.g. Feldman 2006; Johnson 1987; Johnson 
and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011), all source phenomena 
are limited to our bodily experiences which take place before our understanding of target 
domains. 
From here, it becomes clear that the embodiment theory of metaphor is based on the 
fact that we experience and process information concerning source phenomena and then we 
experience target phenomena by projecting onto them the information of the former. That 
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is, even when two phenomena tend to co-occur, source domains are the dominant ones. 
They are dominant in the sense that they impose their characteristics on target domains. 
This means that metaphorical mapping is lineal because source phenomena are processed 
before the target ones. In addition, source domains in this type of metaphorical mapping are 
meaningful outside metaphorical mapping. In contrast, target domains are meaningless 
before being involved in a given metaphorical mapping. As seen before, this assumption 
leads to an overgeneralization regarding metaphorical mappings, namely that they are lineal 
in time: bodily experiences are previous to target phenomena.  
This linearity in time of metaphorical mapping is based on the assumption that 
mapping always engages bodily experiences as source domains and abstract phenomena as 
target domains. While it is a compromising issue to affirm that the domain of Journey takes 
place before the concept of Love, the question which arises here is whether this linearity 
can be applied to other instances of the metaphorical mapping typology where source and 
target phenomena are grounded in bodily experience (see Chapter III). For instance, 
Machine Is Human 
These sports utility vehicles are real gas guzzlers. 
Human Is Machine 
I could never discover what makes Ann tick. 
I started well, but later I ran out of steam.  
Human Is Plant 
The FBI planted informers in the Mafia. 
Human Is Animal 
Every education reform makes pupils guinea pigs.  
Words/Language Is Human 
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The introduction is too long and the body is too short. 
Human Is Ship 
She was rigged out in ballerina. 
These instances of metaphor indicate that metaphorical mapping can also engage 
bodily-experienced phenomena as target domains, but not only in source domains as it is 
claimed in Embodied theory of metaphor (e.g. Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 1999). To start with, these instances of metaphor are based on mapping Human onto 
Plant, Words onto Human, and Human onto Machine. This type of metaphorical mapping 
excludes the assumption that Human (as abstract and indirectly meaningful target domain) 
is embodied via Machine (as a bodily-experienced and directly meaningful source domain). 
If these phenomena, in source and target domains, are bodily experienced, then we cannot 
explain metaphorical mapping in terms of embodying one phenomenon in terms of another.  
Again, this requires a chronological order of source and target domains. As 
observed here, since these instances of metaphor do not meet the concrete-abstract 
criterion, this linearity in time that is claimed to characterize cross-domain mapping would 
not hold either. In this setting, Rakova (2003) calls into question this chronological order of 
source and target phenomena, “Does it [mapping bodily experiences onto non-bodily 
experience] mean that without the concept of journey the concept of love would be 
meaningless?”(28).  
Another piece of evidence for this incongruity is proposed by Steen (2011:30-31) 
where he asks why it is assumed within the Embodied Theory of metaphor that children 
acquire the literal meaning of terms such as defend, attack, win...and then project these 
meanings figuratively onto abstract phenomena such as Argument, given that there are 
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some cases where those children are exposed to the metaphorical meaning of these terms 
without having been exposed to their literal meaning.  
In line with this argument, Gibbs (1994:19) argues that “…it is not necessarily the 
case that people automatically activate their preexisting metaphorical knowledge that 
ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER each time they read or hear the 
expressions He almost exploded with anger…” 
As noted before, there is no cogent evidence for the assumption that the experience 
of source domain should be first and then our understanding of the phenomena which are 
mapped as target domain takes place by metaphorically projecting the cognitive topology of 
the former. To illustrate, whereas the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily and non-
bodily-experienced phenomena may include source and target phenomena which fit into 
this chronological order, it does not follow from this that all metaphorical mappings fit into 
this chronological order. To the contrary, we do have evidence to assume that this 
chronological order standpoint is weak in the case of mapping across bodily-experienced 
phenomena because the process can be reversed (se page 83). That is, since source and 
target phenomena are grounded in bodily experience, there is no evidence for this 
chronological order in this metaphorical mapping typology.  
3.2.2. Linearity of meaning construction 
The meaning which we construct via metaphorical mapping is a lineally-based 
process. First, we process the meaning of the phenomena in source domains and afterwards 
through this knowledge we proceed to understand the phenomena in target domains 
(Feldman 2006:8). Similar findings have been reported by Pinker (2007:243), who assures 
that the theory of embodiment is based on a system of “Combinotorics [which] allows a 
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finite set of simple ideas to give rise to an infinite set of complex ones”. This assumption 
puts metaphorical mapping in two sequenced cognitive processes. Without processing the 
meaning of the phenomena in source domains, presumably we cannot process the ones in 
target domains. In this respect, the semanticity of the phenomena in the target domains 
depends exclusively on the semanticity of the phenomena in source domains. This means 
that the inference that we get out of metaphorical mappings is also lineally based.  
We saw in the previous section that meaning-transfer principle puts source and 
target domains on a lineal scale. That is, we cannot understand target domains without a 
priori experience of a given phenomenon which, by default, functions as source domain, 
and which can allow us to give a conceptual structure to target phenomena. This linearity is 
determined by the fact that first we experience source domains and then we map our 
knowledge of such domains onto the target. A basic feature of this linearity is that more 
concrete domains function always as source domains (e.g. Johnson 1987; Johnson and 
Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 
1999; Szwedek 2011). However, later we shall see how this notion is not inherent to 
conceptual metaphor since target domains in some metaphorical mappings are concrete, 
physical, and bodily experienced (see page 164). 
Knowledge representation via metaphorical mapping is lineal in that it starts from 
one point and ends in another. It takes one direction, hence uni-directionality principle. 
Within the embodied approach to metaphor this principle has been adopted to explain all 
conceptual metaphorical mappings (see pages 79-83). 
Another observation which is relevant to our discussion here is that there is no 
interference from other experiences when we map a given phenomenon onto another one. 
Put differently, we do not include our experience of other phenomena when we understand 
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one domain in terms of another. At this level the influence of culture is disregarded while 
putting a particular emphasis on the bodily (individual) experience (Bernárdez 2013). That 
is, the information which we need to construct metaphorical mapping to reason about target 
domains is not grounded exclusively in bodily-experienced phenomena. Here we are not 
going to discuss whether some metaphors depend on this direct bodily experience. Rather, 
our aim is to show how the tenets of Embodied approach to metaphor point to the general 
assumption that metaphorical mapping is lineal and propositional. 
Mapping is not an isolated cognitive process where two phenomena are mapped. It 
is difficult to find a single mapping between source and target domains which is not shaped 
through other factors such as culture (Bernárdez 2013). That is, if A is mapped onto B, this 
does not mean that this mapping does not take features from other domains of experience. 
There are two pieces of evidence that corroborate this notion. First, Barsalou (2007:219) 
claims that no single phenomenon is a single experience. He (1999:219) further assures 
that, “As the brain captures modality-specific content about a category from experience, it 
stores content on all the relevant modalities. Not only is visual content captured for chairs, 
but motor, somatosensory, auditory, motivational, and emotional content is captured as well 
by the respective neural systems”. 
Rather, whenever we process information about a given phenomenon, we are not 
doing this in terms of one modality. For instance, our experience of the source domain 
Journey would recruit features from different modalities. One further implication that 
follows from this situation is that analyzing conceptual metaphor may need to account for 
such features to have a deeper appreciation of the mechanisms of metaphorical mapping.    
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3.2.3. Linearity of projection based on uni-directionality 
So far we have approached linearity of metaphorical mapping from two angles: 
linearity in time and linearity in meaning construction. In this section we shall assess how 
these two assumptions bear on the premise that such linearity is uni-directional and 
depends on autonomous and subordinate phenomena as source and target domains, 
respectively. Uni-directionality is one of the core characteristics of conceptual metaphor 
(see Chapter II). This criterion constrains metaphorical mapping in that if we understand 
one domain in terms of another, the metaphorical mapping cannot be reversed (e.g. Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989). Accordingly, if we understand Time in 
terms of Money, then we cannot understand Money in terms of Time. However, as we 
demonstrated before, conceptual metaphors such as Machine Is Human, Human Is 
Machine, Human Is Plant, Human Is Animal etc., are based on bi-directionality. This 
entails that, though this criterion neatly fits into some conceptual metaphors such as Juliet 
Is the Sun, certain mapping typologies do not (see Chapter III).   
Another important feature which is associated with Linearity is the fact that it is 
manifested through time and knowledge construction. In the first case, our experience of 
source domains always takes place before our experience of target domains. Nonetheless, 
source and target domains, in certain types of metaphorical mapping, do not fit into this 
chronological order in the strict meaning of the term. That is, it may be the case that we are 
exposed to target domains before source domains (Steen 2011). Still, the mapping cannot 
take place without the experience of source domain and building the respective cognitive 
topology. In contrast, this case is not straightforward in certain metaphors. For instance, 
Fauconnier and Turner (2007:362) suggest that metaphorical mapping is an online 
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cognitive processing. In contrast, cross-domain mapping assures that in metaphor there is a 
fixed systematic correspondence between source and target domains (e.g. Johnson 1987; 
Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1987, 
1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; for contrasting views see Mouton 2012). 
3.2.4. Extended Linearity 
In this section, we shall assess whether Linearity differs across metaphorical 
mappings. For this purpose, we shall focus our attention on two metaphors: Juliet Is the Sun 
and Time Is Money. In the first example, linearity is limited in that the inference which is 
obtained via the metaphorical mapping is a “single inference”—namely, the aspect of 
shining. According to Lakoff and Turner (1989: 91) metaphors such as this one is known as 
“one-shot mapping” (see also Lakoff 1990:67-68). On the other hand, in Time is Money, 
Linearity can be traced in different lines of inference. To illustrate, let us consider the 
following graph:    
 Figure 4 Extended linearity in Time Is Commodity
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In this graph, the source (Commodity) and target (Time) domains are represented by 
the symbols A and B, respectively. The Generic Level at which the metaphorical mapping 
is constructed is represented by the verb have and its semantic features. Also, a1, a2, a3, b1, 
b2, and b3 stand for different semantic levels of source and target domains. In this respect, 
a1, a2, and a3 represent different elements of the source domain Commodity—that is, they 
are features which are mapped onto their counterparts b1, b2, and b3 in the target domain. 
Notice that b1, b2, and b3 emerge as a result of an extension process that operates on the 
cognitive topology of the target domain Time. 
As the graph indicates, this type of metaphorical mapping is based on extended 
linearity. For instance, if we conceive of Time in terms of Money, the main inference is 
that it is a valuable Commodity. Based on the analysis of the data above, we argued that 
certain metaphorical mappings are constructed lineally (see also Mouton 2012; Tejada 
Caller and Guzmán Guerra 2012). To illustrate, the mapping from a3 onto b3 cannot be built 
without having constructed the mapping from a2 onto b2. Likewise, the mapping between a2 
and b2 cannot be constructed without including a metaphorical mapping between a1 and b2. 
To illustrate, mapping Money onto Time, a metaphorical proposition emerges. As Figure 4 
indicates, this proposition includes variables which are represented by a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, and 
b3 alongside their semantic relations at different levels of constructing conceptual mapping 
between the two phenomena. This idea could be represented as follows:  
a1: the semantic property of give; 
a2: the semantic property of receive; 
a3: the semantic property of waste; 
b1: the semantic property of give being transferred onto an aspect of Time. 
b2: the semantic property of receive being transferred onto an aspect of Time. 
132 
 
b3: the semantic property of waste being transferred onto an aspect of Time. 
This graph shows that the proposition Time Is Commodity could be captured at 
three levels of meaning construction. However, these levels are suggestive rather than 
mandatory. For instance, at level1, we find the verb to give (a bodily feature of 
Commodity) whose property arises from the fact that Time is conceived of in terms of 
Commodity. Then, if we can give it to someone else, it means that we can receive it, hold it 
etc.  
Similarly, at level 2, the conceptual metaphor focuses on another aspect of the 
proposition. Again, at this level the terms receive, save, own, spend etc. are indicative of 
the fact that meaning construction in this type of metaphorical mapping is lineal. Notice 
that in the proposition Time Is Commodity, we cannot move from the Generic Level 
directly to, let us say, level 2 or level 3. Our judgment is based on the fact that without 
having the knowledge of the previous level represented by give, it is hard to understand 
Time in terms of the concept receive. That is, we cannot conceive of Time as a commodity 
that can be wasted without having first understood it as a Commodity. Similarly, we cannot 
reason about a certain aspect of Time in terms of the action of receiving an object without 
having previously reasoned about it in terms of a transferable object. 
One further implication that follows from this situation is that linearity can be 
captured in terms of meaning construction within the target domain Time. That is, the 
cognitive topology of this domain is made up of immediate and emerging constituents. The 
Immediate constituents in the target domain is the verb have and its semantic features. 
Other verbs such as gie, borrow, lend, receive, lose, spend etc. are emergent constituents in 
the target domain Time in that they intrinsically related to the immediate constituent have. 
A piece of evidence for this claim is that the basic feature of a commodity is that it can be 
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possessed. Henceforth, the semantic features represented by give, borrow, lend, receive, 
invest, spare, waste, allocate, lose, save cannot become constituents of the cognitive 
topology of target domains without having conceptualized Time as a commodity that can 
be owned. 
Similarly, when this domain is mapped onto Time, we observe that the latter adopts 
the same pattern of meaning construction. This pattern also characterizes our 
conceptualization of Time because the semantic features of have become immediate 
constituents to the latter. In contrast, the verbs borrow, spend, lose, spare etc. emerge after 
the semantic features of the verb have are mapped onto the target domain Time—
henceforth, linearity of meaning construction.  
This finding might explain the underlying mechanisms of partial mapping. For 
instance, we argue that this partiality concerns certain levels of meaning construction 
within a conceptual metaphor. Though within the embodied approach to metaphor, partial 
mapping is meant to explain how the constituents of the source domains are mapped and 
how some of the constituents of the target are highlighted while others are hidden (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980:53-56), this principle does not explain the underlying mechanisms of 
such partiality. In this respect, examining conceptual metaphor from propositionality-
linearity perspective allows us to see how constructing conceptual metaphor can concerns 
different levels of mapping. 
Finally, notice that the emergence of constituents in a given domain might differ 
depending on the metaphorical mapping typology (see page 226). In this case, we have seen 
that certain semantic features emerge within the same domain. That is, since the semantic 
features of have are mapped onto the target domain Time, then we could conceptualize the 
latter as being saved, wasted, received etc. However, in the following chapter, we will see 
134 
 
that emergent structure could occur based on the interaction between constituents from 
source and target domains.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have proposed the Propositionality-Linearity perspective to 
closely look at the data with a view to assessing which metaphorical mapping typology fits 
into the tenets of the Embodied Approach to metaphor. Interestingly, these tenets and our 
proposed perspective fit perfectly well the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily and 
non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domain, respectively. 
Accordingly, we argued that the embodied approach to metaphor dwells on the assumption 
that metaphorical mapping is propositional and lineal.  
In the first case, we have shown how meaning transfer particularly sustains that 
conceptual metaphor is propositional in that we understand a given phenomenon in terms of 
another without any significant participation on the part of the target domain. That is, the 
inference which is drawn from the conceptual metaphor is fully attributed to the bodily-
experienced phenomena of the source domain.  
In the second case, linearity of metaphorical mapping can be captured in how 
meaning construction takes place. In this respect, we have shown that linearity is evident 
within the embodied approach in two ways: linearity in time and linearity of meaning 
transfer. This linearity could be extended (see Time Is Commodity) or “constrained” (see 
Juliet Is The Sun). 
More importantly, the data indicates that mapping bodily-experienced onto non-
bodily-experienced phenomena fits perfectly well into the proposed perspective. In this 
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setting, we also saw that certain types of metaphorical mapping may not fit either the 
proposed perspective or the embodied approach to metaphor.  
To further explore these types of metaphorical mapping and to show the theoretical 
problems that may arise in dealing with conceptual metaphor as a homogeneous cognitive 
process within the embodied approach, in the following chapter we shall focus on the 
metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena. We shall 
hypothesize that, given the fact that the Propositionality-Linearity perspective is based on 
uni-directionality and concrete-abstract principles, the theory of embodiment needs to face 
the challenge of explaining different mapping typologies sticking to a set of tenets which 
are mostly observed in one mapping typology—the one which engages bodily-experienced 
and abstract phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. We will hypothesize 
that approaching conceptual metaphor as a homogeneous cognitive process will raise major 
theoretical problems within the theory of embodiment. 
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Chapter III: Mapping across Bodily-experienced 
Phenomena: A Challenge to the Embodied Metaphor Theory 
1. Introduction and Hypothesis 
We saw in the previous chapter that analyzing metaphor from the Propositionality-
Linearity perspective is in line with the embodied approach to metaphor. A major finding in 
this respect is that metaphorical mapping is propositional and lineal. In particular, we 
observed that Propositionality-Linearity and the embodied approach to metaphor 
perspectives fit the mapping typology which employs bodily-experienced and non-bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. Nonetheless, based on 
the data, we observed that this is not the case of all mapping typologies (see Chapters I and 
II).  
In this chapter, we hypothesize that while Propositionality-Linearity seems to be 
applicable to some types of metaphor (see Chapter II), it may not cover all. Our aim in this 
chapter is to identify the problems derived from attempting to analyze metaphor as 
involving only one mapping typology: mapping bodily-experienced-onto-non-bodily-
experienced phenomena.  
In this setting, this typology creates theoretical incongruities to the embodiment 
theory in that this mapping typology draws on two bodily-experienced phenomena (see 
pages 155-164). Since, in this case, source and target are bodily experienced, the 
Embodiment and Propositionality-Linearity theories may not apply to this mapping 
typology.  
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One way to assess whether this typology fits into these theories is to examine 
whether this type of conceptual metaphor is constructed lineally and propositionally. In this 
respect, we need to test the tenets of Embodied metaphor from the proposed perspective, 
but this time we shall focus our attention on mapping across bodily-experienced 
phenomena. When this characteristic (being bodily-experienced) is also observed in target 
domains, it is plausible to hypothesize that Propositionality and Linearity may not hold 
since this perspective requires target domains to be abstract. This potential incongruity may 
indicate that at least three tenets of Embodied metaphor theory will not hold up: 
(1) Bodily-onto-non-bodily mapping principle; 
(2) Meaning transfer based on the experiential basis of source domains; 
(3) Uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping principle. 
We hypothesize that these tenets may not be applicable to the metaphorical mapping 
we are concerned with in this chapter because they have been elaborated based on one 
metaphorical mapping typology: bodily-experienced-onto-non-bodily-experienced mapping 
(see Chapter II). It is worth noting here that one of the core assumptions in the cognitive 
approach to metaphor is not observed in the data; namely, the abstractness of target 
domains.  
Therefore, if the tenets of the two theories are not applicable, then it follows that 
mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena may differ substantially from the one 
which engages bodily-experienced and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source and 
target domains, respectively (see Chapter II). For this purpose, we shall need to test the 
tenets of the Embodied metaphor theory against the data and assess whether they also 
characterize this type of metaphorical mapping.  If we are able to show that those tenets 
cannot be applied, therefore our perspective (Propositionality-Linearity) cannot be used to 
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cover the metaphor wherein source and target domains are grounded in bodily-experienced 
phenomena. Consequently, this metaphorical mapping could not be explained in terms of 
the tenets of the Embodied Metaphor theory either. More importantly, we shall also be in 
the position to claim for a more complex classification of metaphor in terms of its 
typologies and consequently in terms of its structuring and processing.  
2. Background 
Our task in Chapter II was to propose a new perspective to better understand the 
tenets of the Embodied metaphor theory and to assess which metaphorical mapping 
typology they fit into. We claimed that Propositionality and Linearity of metaphorical 
mapping fits perfectly well into the theoretical framework of the embodied approach to 
metaphor.  
So far in the thesis we have shown that these tenets cover the typology which draws 
on bodily and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains, 
respectively. In this respect, we proved that metaphorical mapping could be looked at from 
a different perspective and while (still) sticking to the tenets of the Embodied Metaphor 
theory. Based on the data, these tenets seem to indicate that metaphorical mapping is 
propositionally and lineally constructed. Within Cognitive Linguistics (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 
2011; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 
1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011) and 
Cognitive Science (e.g. Feldman 2006; Feldman and Narayanan 2004), the tenets of the 
Embodied Metaphor theory are based on the core assumption that conceptual metaphor 
employs more concrete (that is, physical phenomena) as source domains and more abstract 
phenomena as target.  
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This view seems to be based on the fact that within the Embodied metaphor theory, 
it is assumed that there is “…a single type of representation [that] underlies knowledge.” 
(Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, and Wilson 2008:246).  
Similarly, we demonstrated in Chapter I that since metaphor is based on a large 
variety of experience, it is not plausible to claim that figurative language follows a single 
set of patterns of mapping. As pointed out before, the only type of mapping which has been 
claimed to be operating in metaphor is the one which involves bodily and non-bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. Accordingly, 
conceptual metaphor is viewed in terms of three main tenets:  
i. Meaning transfer based on the experiential character of source domains,  
ii. Uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping, and  
iii. mapping bodily onto non-bodily-experienced phenomena. In what follows 
we shall discuss these tenets. 
2.1. Three Main Tenets Characterizing Metaphorical Mapping 
which fit Propositionality-Linearity perspective 
2.1.1. Meaning transfer based on the experiential character of 
source domains 
Within the theoretical framework of the embodied approach to metaphor, mapping 
across domains is based on the experiential basis of source domains. For instance Ungerer 
and Schmid (1996:121) argue that, “…people rely on models of the concrete world in order 
to understand abstract phenomena”.  
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In this regard, since source domains are bodily experienced, they are meaningful. In 
contrast, target domains lack conceptual structures because they are inaccessible to the 
sense organ. Accordingly, target domains are used metaphorically (Gibbs 1996:310). It 
follows from this that source and target phenomena are directly and indirectly meaningful 
domains, respectively (e.g. Lakoff and Turner 1989; Rakova 2003:19-21). In this respect, 
the experiential character of source domain is a double-edged component. First, it grants 
source domains with a conceptual structure. And second, it permeates meaning to target 
domain. In this setting, the conceptual structure (semantic topology) of source domains is 
imposed on target domains. The claim here is that the phenomena which take on the role of 
target domains are meaningless without being mapped in conceptual metaphor (e.g. 
Feldman 2006). 
2.1.2. Uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping 
Since being meaningful is attributed to being bodily-experienced, metaphorical 
mapping takes a given bodily-experienced phenomenon as source domain (e.g. Ungerer and 
Schmid 1996). In this respect, meaning transfer always goes “…from the concrete to the 
abstract and not the other way round” (e.g. Kövecses 2002:6).  
A key question that arises here is why a bodily-experienced phenomenon cannot 
function as target domain. Is it that conceptual metaphor cannot engage two semantically 
independent phenomena, or it is because the experiential character of this type of domain 
does not allow acquiring the experiential character of other domains?  
These questions, which touch upon the very foundations of the embodied approach 
to metaphor, have not been covered by scholars supporting this theory unless we consider 
some attempts which still need to be refined. For instance, Gibbs (1996:311) states that 
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“…the reason for this directionality in metaphorical mappings is that target domains tend to 
be more vague and incomplete than source domains.” 
2.1.3. Mapping Bodily onto non-bodily experience phenomena 
As stated before, only one pattern of mapping has been claimed to characterize 
conceptual metaphor (e.g. Gibbs 1996; Szwedek 2011). In this setting, bodily properties of 
source domains have been assigned the prime role in constructing and processing figurative 
meaning (e.g. Gibbs 2008, 2011; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 
1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). It is 
even held that these properties are the only operating constraints over metaphorical 
mapping. For instance, Szwedek (2011:360) assures that “…the object is the fundamental, 
ultimate source domain…” 
In addition, these characteristics have been argued to be circumscribed to source 
domains. Accordingly, since the phenomena which belong to source domains are argued to 
be inherently primitive and concrete, then they should inherently fulfill the function of 
source domains (for contrasting views see Rakova 2003:27). These characteristics are 
assured to distinguish source from target domains (e.g. Szwedek 2011). The problem which 
arises here is how to classify source and target domains in terms of concreteness-
abstractness –as inherent features- given that the metaphorical mapping that concerns us in 
this chapter engages two bodily-experienced phenomena. 
Based on our discussion here, the embodied approach to metaphor has to rise to the 
challenge of applying these tenets to different metaphorical mapping typology such as the 
one which engages bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains. Since this 
approach relies heavily on the aforementioned tenets to explain conceptual metaphor (as a 
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homogeneous cognitive process), the main challenge is to fit them into different 
metaphorical mapping typologies. 
Therefore, far from examining conceptual metaphor as a homogeneous cognitive 
process triggered by a closed set of mechanisms, we shall claim for a more complex 
classification of mapping typologies and their corresponding operating systems. In this 
chapter we are going to handle one metaphor type to demonstrate that a certain typology—
the one which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains—may 
need a different analysis. On this account, we shall demonstrate how this particular 
typology does not fit into the framework of the theory of embodiment. In particular, we 
shall show how the tenets of this theory are not viable in handling this mapping typology. 
This may invite a new direction in the approach of conceptual metaphor. In this respect, for 
this theory to encompass this particular mapping typology, we suggest a new consideration 
of the traditional view that metaphorical mappings (1) depend, by default, on bodily-
experienced phenomena as source domains and abstract phenomena as target domains. And 
(2) our understanding of abstract phenomena is carried out through embodying target 
domains. 
3. Data Analysis 
In this section we shall explore the characteristics of metaphorical mapping which 
draws on bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains and assess whether 
our finding can fit into the Propositionality-Linearity perspective. While analyzing this type 
of metaphor, we shall be paying special attention to three main features that are argued to 
characterize metaphorical mapping; (1) Uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping; (2) 
Meaning transfer based on the experiential character of source domains; and (3) mapping 
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bodily-onto-bodily-experienced phenomena. Our primary purpose is to show how these 
tenets may not fit the current data.  
3.1. Propositionality based on the experiential character of source 
domains  
Two questions have yet to be addressed within the theoretical framework of 
Embodied Metaphor. The first one is whether all source domains are experienced in the 
same way. We addressed this question in Chapter I and demonstrated that source domains 
draw on different kinds of experience (see Table 1). As will be shown later, this 
differentiation will reveal that different mapping typologies follow different patterns and 
principles. Furthermore, Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, and Wilson (2008:219) argue that no 
single phenomenon is experienced via one mode. These findings might have strong impact 
on our understanding of the mechanisms that operate in different mapping typologies. In 
this respect, we might need to abandon the assumption that the principle of mapping 
concrete onto abstract phenomena is broad enough to underpin all the mechanisms that 
operate in metaphorical mapping.  
The second question is whether there is any metaphor type where target domain 
may share (some of) the characteristics of source domains. Given that some domains 
function as source and target in different metaphorical mappings, the answer seems to be 
positive (see page 83). This entails that in certain mapping typologies, target domains could 
show the same characteristics of source domains. Importantly this could show that 
conceptual metaphor does not play a crucial role just in giving conceptual structures to 
target domains. In this setting, the propositional character of metaphorical mapping, which 
we outlined in Chapter II, may not be applied to some instances of metaphor. This is 
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particularly evident in the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced 
phenomena in source and target domains. This is due to the fact that the propositional 
aspect of cross-domain mapping is based on the general belief that source and target 
domains are based on bodily-experienced and non-bodily-experienced phenomena, 
respectively. Within this theory, bodily-experienced phenomena and non-bodily-
experienced phenomena are indispensable to metaphorical mapping (e.g. Gibbs 1996; 
Lakoff and Turner 1989). While source domains are claimed to be inherently embodied and 
target domains are by default abstract, the data indicates that target domains may show 
some of the characteristics of source domains. 
3.1.1. The Problem of Meaning Transfer Principle 
3.1.1.1. Propositionality across domains 
Metaphorical mapping is claimed to be based on transferring semantic features from 
source onto target domains (e.g. Gibbs 2008, 2011; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson  and 
Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 
1999; Szwedek 2011). Within this theory, this projection concerns certain elements of 
source domains; hence, this projection is partial (e.g. Tendahl and Gibbs 2008:1827; Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980:10-13; Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 70-71; see also Figure 4 on how 
partiality functions in conceptual metaphor from Propositionality-linearity perspective). 
This principle seems to fit the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced 
phenomena as source domains and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as target domains 
such as when we understand Justice, Love, or Democracy in terms of bodily-experienced 
phenomena (see Chapter II).  
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However, major theoretical problems arise when we try to apply this tenet to the 
metaphorical mapping typology where source and target domains are bodily experienced. 
This particular typology indicates that metaphor could also engage bodily-experienced 
phenomena as target domains. For instance,  
Human Is Plant 
The FBI planted informers in the Mafia. 
Human Is Animal 
Every education reform makes pupils guinea pigs.  
Words/Language Is Human 
The introduction is too long and the body is too short. 
In order for this notion to be applied to these three examples, we need to assume 
that our understanding of target domains is exclusively grounded in our experience of 
source domains. That is, our understanding of target domains (Human and 
Words/Language) is rooted in our experience of source domains (Plant, Animal, and 
Human). That is, the propositional knowledge in this metaphorical mapping is acquired 
through experiencing the source domain Plant. In the second example, the propositional 
knowledge of Animal is extended to cover Human. In the third example, the propositional 
knowledge of Human is extended to, let us say, a piece of writing.  
On the contrary, the embodiment theory holds that target phenomena have three 
inherent characteristics: abstract, complex, and, by the same token, they are indirectly 
accessed. Accordingly, the phenomena  which function as target domain (Plant, Animal, 
and Human) would be complex, abstract and indirectly accessed; whereas, the phenomena 
which fulfill the role of source domain (Human and Language) would be concrete, literal, 
and bodily experienced. In addition, Human and Words/Language would not function as 
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target domains. This notion stems from the general assumption that the core process that 
governs all instances of metaphor is the fact that there is no other way to understand target 
phenomena except via this propositional process (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:19). This 
entails that all conceptual metaphors are based on combining two different phenomena in 
terms of bodily and non-bodily experienced features. 
 It turns out that none of these features characterizes the target domains in the three 
examples above. That is, though these domains function as target, they are neither abstract 
nor indirectly accessed. A piece of evidence for this claim is the fact that these domains are 
accessed (thus meaningful) independently of metaphorical mapping. Furthermore, we do 
reason about them without resorting to metaphorical mapping. Therefore, we assume that 
these characteristics are not inherent to target domains. Similarly, source domains are not 
inherently bodily-experienced because as the examples above shows Human takes on the 
role of source and target in different metaphorical mappings.  
These findings indicate that being abstract and complex are not prerequisite 
conditions for phenomena to be engaged in metaphorical mappings as target domains. To 
illustrate, there is no reason why we should assume that the domain Human is more abstract 
than Plant when these domains are involved in metaphorical mappings. It is worth noting 
here that being complex means that target domains can afford further structuring in their 
organization (e.g. Szwedek 2011:341). In other words, they are eligible to incorporate the 
(propositional) knowledge of bodily-experienced phenomena.  
Based on the data, being more abstract, more complex, and indirectly accessed seem 
to be irrelevant features to differentiate source from target domains in the metaphorical 
mapping that engages two bodily-experienced phenomena. Similar findings have been 
reported by Szwedek (2011:342-343), who points to this shortcoming within the theoretical 
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framework of the embodiment theory. For instance, he states that the distinction criterion 
lies at the number of physical components a domain has. He suggests that source domains 
have more “physical” participants than target domains (Szwedek 2011:342-343). He 
reached his judgment based on the analysis of Life Is Journey metaphor. His claim is that 
these two domains are abstract but the source domain (Journey) has more physical 
components than the target domain (Life) (for more details see Szwedek 2011:342-343). 
However, neither does this approach seem to be solid enough to be taken as a distinction 
criterion between source and target domains (see also Barcelona 2003:32-33). To illustrate, 
Human and Building do not show distinctive features to be viewed differently (see also 
page 73). It seems clear that we cannot attribute to a domain, in certain metaphorical 
mappings, the role of source or target based on the number of its physical components.  
Another case where this criterion seems to be weak is that in some cases each 
component of the source domain has its counterpart in the target. To illustrate, let us 
consider the following metaphor. 
Politics Is (chess) Game 
Bush and Saddam play a chess game. 
 
In order to assess this metaphor based on Szwedek’s criterion (2011:342), we need 
to assume that chess game has more “physical participants” than the political interaction 
Figure 5 Physical components of source and target domains.
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that engages Bush and Saddam in this metaphor. In contrast, in this metaphor we identify 4 
main elements in each domain. This entails that having more or fewer physical participants 
is not a distinctive criterion which allows a given phenomenon to take on the role of source 
or target domain. As this figure shows, each physical component of the source domain has 
its counterpart in the target. In this setting, it becomes hard to justify why one of these 
domains is considered more abstract or more concrete (see also Rakova 2003:177). 
From our discussion above, it becomes evident that since this criterion does not 
characterize this metaphorical mapping typology, the Embodied Metaphor theory has to 
explain why Propositionality does not fit the data while being in accordance with the tenets 
of the embodiment theory. In other words, being complex, abstract, and indirectly accessed 
are not inherent features to target domains. This is obvious because target domains in the 
present data share the same characteristics of source domains. Let us reconsider the 
following example:  
Surgery Is Butchery 
(1)My surgeon was a butcher. 
Butchery Is Surgery 
(2)My butcher was a surgeon (Lakoff 2008:33). 
Again, to account for this metaphorical mapping typology from the embodied 
approach perspective is to assume that the elements of source domains correspond to their 
counterparts in the target (e.g. Gibbs 2011; Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). 
Recall that the “elements” of source domains, following the embodiment theory, are 
different from their counterparts in target domains in the sense that the former are 
primitive, concrete, and directly meaningful whereas the latter are complex, abstract, and 
indirectly meaningful (see Chapter II).  
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However, this assumption is mistaken if we analyze this metaphor in terms of 
correspondence between elements of source and target domains. This is due to the fact that 
this “correspondences” between these elements presumably follows these tenets:   
i. Source domains are always bodily-experienced phenomena.  
ii. Target domains are always abstract phenomena. 
iii. There is Uni-directionality of metaphorical correspondence. 
As pointed out previously, none of these characteristics are observed in the metaphorical 
mapping typology which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target 
domains. Sticking to these tenets, this would mean that in (1), Butchery is bodily 
experienced but Surgery is abstract. The Embodied approach to metaphor has not explained 
why we should assume that Butchery is bodily experienced but Surgery is a non-bodily-
experienced phenomenon. Consequently, based on this distinction, Butchery and Surgery 
presumably take the roles of source and target domains, respectively. In (2), the 
metaphorical mapping is reversed in the sense that the phenomenon which takes on the role 
of source domain in (1) now fulfills the role of target. And the phenomenon which performs 
the role of target domain in (1) now functions as source domain. In order to account for this 
metaphor, we have to assume that Surgery now is bodily-experienced and Butchery is a 
non-bodily-experienced phenomenon. A direct conclusion that one can draw from this 
analysis is that being bodily experienced and non-bodily experienced are not inherent to 
domains in metaphorical mapping. In this respect, the data shows that source and target 
domains are not inherently bodily-experienced and non-bodily-experienced phenomena, 
respectively. 
3.1.1.2. Mapping across Bodily-experienced phenomena 
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In the previous section, we focused our attention on the characteristics of source and 
target domains. We showed that meaning-transfer principle cannot be applied when the 
same domain functions as source and target in different metaphorical mappings. We 
observed that in mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena, source and target domains 
share the experiential character. Recall that within the Embodied metaphor theory, this 
character, which has been exclusively attributed to source domains, has major entailments 
for both constructing and processing metaphorical mapping.  
One of such entailments is that the experiential character of source domains is 
imposed on target domains; hence, the “Objectification” process (Szwedek 2011:346). In 
this respect, most of the explanation of metaphor is built around this assumption—that is, 
paying special attention to the constitutive nature of source domains.  
Thereby, we are faced with another controversial assumption trying to apply the 
tenets of the embodiment theory to the data. For instance, if source phenomena are 
primitive and, by the same token, they are assumed to have conceptual structures, then 
target domains need a different treatment within this theory. In other words, to handle this 
issue, we need to bear in mind two distinctive features of source domains:  
i. the fact that being primitive legitimizes source domains to having conceptual 
structure (Lakoff and Turner 1989); and accordingly,  
ii. these domains do not allow further (re)structuring or –using Szwedek’s term- 
“metaphorization” (2011:341). That is, the domains that are bodily experienced 
cannot be understood in terms of other phenomena because they have “a pre-
existing structure of their own” (Szwedek 2011:344).  
Consistent with this affirmation, Lakoff and Turner (1989:59) states that, “Things that we 
think of being straightforwardly physical –rocks and trees and arms and legs—are usually 
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things that we have conceptualized not metaphorically but rather in terms of what we take 
to be our bodily experience.”  
So far we have demonstrated that being bodily-experienced is not a feature that is 
circumscribed to source domains, as it is claimed in the embodied approach to metaphor. In 
the following section, we shall address the issue of how the components of source and 
target domains are viewed within the Propositionality-Linearity theory and how this 
situation may not characterize the mapping typology which draws on two bodily-
experienced phenomena. 
3.1.1.3. Propositionality and components of source and 
target domains 
We showed in the previous section that the notion of differentiating source and 
target domains in terms of concreteness and abstractness does not stand on a solid basis. 
This finding is particularly noticed in the mapping typology which depends on bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. As shown before (see 
Figure 5.), target domains also share some of the presumably inherent characteristics of 
source domains.  
In this section we shall consider the components of source and target domains to see 
whether the entailments of the Propositionality-Linearity theory fit the data. In order words, 
to examine metaphorical mapping from this perspective, we need to assume that the 
components of source and target domains are of two different natures: primitive and 
complex, respectively (for an in-depth analysis of this issue see the previous chapter).  
A particularly important entailment of this notion is that while primitive 
components cannot be understood in terms of other components, complex components are 
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reasoned about in terms of those primitive components. Let us analyze the following 
metaphors: 
Human Is Animal 
(1)My husband turned out to be an animal. 
 
 
Money Is Food 
(2)The new car took a large bite out of our savings. 
 
 
Human Is Army 
(3)When she opened the door there was an army of journalists waiting for her. 
 
 
Figure 6 Components of source and target domains Human Is Animal
Figure 8 Components of source and target domains for Human Is Army.
Figure 7 Components of source and target domains for Money Is Food
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To analyze the data in accordance with the Propositionality-Linearity perspective 
taking into account the tenets of the Embodied metaphor theory, we need to assume that the 
components of source domains are primitive whereas those of target domains are complex. 
More precisely, in (1), (2), and (3) the components of the domains Animal, Food, and 
Human are primitive as compared to their counterparts in the target domains Money, 
Building, and Human, which need to be considered as complex.  
This metaphorical mapping typology reveals a theoretical problem within the 
embodied approach to metaphor. We notice in this set of metaphors that (1) source and 
target domains are bodily-experienced phenomena; and (2) the domain Human functions as 
source and target in different metaphorical mappings. In this respect, the embodiment 
theory needs to distinguish the components of the domain Human when it functions as 
source and when it functions as target domain. That is, if we assume that certain 
characteristics allow a given domain to perform the role of source or target, then, the 
challenge is to explain why a given domain can have the role of source and target in 
different metaphorical mappings. This means that we cannot rely on the complexity-
primitiveness of components to assign domains the function they take on in metaphorical 
mappings. 
In addition distinguishing the components of source from those of target domains in 
terms of primitiveness and complexity requires identifying how the elements of the domain 
Army and their counterparts in the domain Human differ. To do that, we need to assume 
that a given target domain takes on the characteristics of a bodily-experienced 
phenomenon, which functions as source. Similarly, these very characteristics are 
considered abstract and complex when the same domain functions as target. It seems 
implausible to make this differentiation since the components of Army are essentially 
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equivalent to the components of the target domain Human (see Figure 8). More 
specifically, Army may be considered as a subcategory of the domain Human, and 
consequently, some elements are common to both domains.  
Mapping these two phenomena is based on these shared features. Due to the fact 
that conceptual metaphor hinges on the differentiation between components of source and 
target domains, a potential challenge to the Embodied metaphor theory is to explain why 
the components of Army should be considered different from their counterparts in Human. 
As stated before, Szwedek (2011:342) suggests that the domain which has more physical 
participants functions as source but the one which has less physical components functions 
as target. However, looking closely at the data, this criterion cannot explain why Army is 
considered to have more physical components than Human.  
Another problem with this standpoint is how to reconcile the notion that elements 
from source domains have their corresponding elements in target domains and the notion 
that source domains have more physical participants, given that in some instances of 
metaphorical mapping, the same domain takes on the role of source and target domains. Let 
us consider Human Is Animal and Animal Is Human to illustrate this point. 
In order for this criterion to hold, we need to assume that Animal in (1) has more 
physical participants than the domain Human but in (2) it has less physical participants. 
More importantly, we need to assume that Animal in (1) has more physical participants 
than in (2). Again, it seems that this criterion is not reliable to analyze this metaphorical 
mapping typology. As a result, the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-
experienced phenomena in source and target domains does not satisfy this criterion.  
In order to address these contrasting assumptions within the theoretical framework 
of the embodiment theory, we suggest that source and target domains in this metaphorical 
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mapping typology are physical and by the same token, their constituents are experienced 
bodily. In this respect, we can draw two conclusions about this mapping typology: first, 
being primitive or complex is not inherent to the components of source and target domains. 
These features are irrelevant in that they do not seem to be operating in this type of 
metaphorical mapping because they do not constrain the role a given phenomenon takes on 
the role in conceptual metaphor. It is clear, then, from the data that this is not the level of 
analysis where we should build our generalization about the features that allow a given 
phenomenon to take on the role of source or target domain.  
3.1.2. Is Literal-onto-Literal Mapping an Instance of 
Metaphor?  
3.1.2.1. The Problem of Applying Uni-directionality 
Principle to this Type of Metaphorical Mapping 
In the previous section we showed how the metaphorical mapping which engages 
bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains does not satisfy the basic 
tenets of the theory of embodiment. Because of its heavy reliance on the notion that source 
and target domains are primitive and complex, respectively; the principle of Uni-
directionality presumably applies to all conceptual metaphors. It is worth noting here that in 
Chapter II, we observed that this principle particularly underlies the mapping typology 
which engages abstract phenomena as target domains (see pages 115,129). In this section, 
we shall pay special attention to this principle to assess whether it fits different mapping 
typologies. 
In the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced phenomena in 
source and target domains, the entailments of Uni-directionality may reveal theoretical 
156 
 
problems within the Embodied Approach. This is due to the fact that, within this approach, 
the reason why source domains are mapped onto target domains is that the former are 
bodily experienced and, by the same token, they are eligible to have conceptual structures 
of their own (that is, they are directly meaningful domains).  
One of the main characteristics of these domains, in this respect, is that they are 
“directly tied to structural aspects of experience” (Lakoff 1987:268). On the other hand, 
target domains are by default abstract and do not have conceptual structures; hence, they 
are indirectly meaningful. 
It turns out that these characteristics are not observed in the metaphorical mapping 
which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena. The question which arises here is 
whether we are still dealing with cases of metaphor when source and target domains are 
bodily experienced. The answer seems to be positive according to Lakoff and Turner 
(1989), in that the only case where a concept is non-metaphorical is when it is 
“…understood and structured on its own terms without making use of structure imported 
from a completely different domain”(57).  
Though in the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced 
phenomena we still understand one domain in terms of another, the tenets of the embodied 
approach to metaphor do not fit. To illustrate, let us consider these examples: 
Human Is Animal 
(1)Every education reform makes pupils guinea pigs.  
Human Is Liquid 
(2)Crowds spilled out of the train over the platform. 
Human functions as target in metaphors (1) and (2). On the other hand, Animal in 
(1) and Liquid in (2) take on the role of source. What is relevant to our discussion here is 
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that in this set of examples, target domains are also bodily-experienced. A direct conclusion 
that we can draw from this observation is that target domains in this mapping typology do 
have conceptual structures of their own (for a contrasting analysis of this type of metaphor, 
see Szwedek 2011:345-346). For this reason, source domains are claimed to be directly 
meaningful, both inside and outside metaphorical mapping. Our judgment here is based on 
the entailments of one of the tenets of the Embodied theory of metaphor which holds that if 
a phenomenon is bodily experienced, then it inherently has a conceptual structure. This 
means that source domains, being bodily-experienced, are eligible for including conceptual 
structures. In contrast, target domains do not show a pre-existing conceptual structure in 
metaphorical mapping, neither do they have one independently of it. Nonetheless, target 
domains in (1) and (2) do have conceptual structures because they function as source 
domains in other metaphorical mappings.  
Again, in this type of metaphorical mapping, being directly and indirectly 
meaningful are not inherent features. These examples show that target domains are also 
directly meaningful. Therefore, the view that target domains lack conceptual structures 
contradicts the data. Our judgment is based on the fact that if these domains function as 
source in other metaphorical mappings, then they do have conceptual structures.  
In order to solve this theoretical problem sticking to these assumptions, we need to 
assume that these phenomena–outside metaphorical mapping—do have conceptual 
structures of their own but when they are mapped they lose such conceptual structures. 
Another way to treat this problem is to accept that the conceptual structures of target 
domains in this particular metaphorical mapping typology are inhibited to allow the 
imposition of the conceptual structures of source domains.  
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At this point, we are faced with the following problem: the embodied approach to 
metaphor suggests that the need for metaphorical mapping is that target domains do not 
have conceptual structures of their own because they are inaccessible to our senses (Gibbs 
1994, 1996; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011). From this, it 
follows that our understanding of target domains depends on imposing on them conceptual 
structures of bodily-experienced phenomena.  
Similarly, Embodied Simulation conjectures that target domains are endowed with 
meaning through simulating the physical action of source domains (Gibbs and Matlock 
2008:162-165). Proponents of this approach argue that all conceptual metaphors show this 
characteristic (Feldman and Narayanan 2004:1-2). This means that having a conceptual 
structure is intrinsically related to the eligibility of phenomena for being experienced 
through the mechanisms of the body. On the account of Embodied Simulation, a physical 
action is needed to conceptually unify the two (source and target) phenomena (Barsalou 
2003b; Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005; Gibbs and Matlock 2008). Henceforth, we 
always resort to bodily-experienced phenomena to understand and reason about target 
domains.  
The question which arises here is that the phenomena of source and target domains 
are bodily experienced, and being so, target domains do have conceptual structures of their 
own because they are accessed through the senses. A piece of evidence for this claim is that 
target domains in this metaphorical mapping typology do have conceptual structures 
because they function as source in other metaphorical mappings.  
However, following the tenets of Embodied theory of metaphor, Embodied 
Simulation, and the Propositionality-Linearity perspectives, there would be no need for 
conceptual metaphor to reason about these phenomena. This situation is due mainly to the 
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fact that target domains in this mapping typology are bodily experienced and, consequently, 
they do have conceptual structures. That is, we do not metaphorically understand bodily-
experienced phenomena as they are not eligible to carry out the function of target 
domains—it is not necessary to embody these target domains using bodily-experienced 
phenomena as a prerequisite condition for them to be meaningful.  
It is worth noting here that these findings run counter to the core assumption of 
Embodied Metaphor and Embodied Simulation because these approaches are based on the 
notion that conceptual structures of bodily-experienced phenomena are imposed onto the 
phenomena which lack these structures outside metaphorical mapping (Lakoff and Turner 
1989:83). This view leads us to conclude that metaphorical mappings are not by default 
based on bodily-experienced phenomena, as source; and abstract phenomena, as target 
domains. The data is especially indicative of this point (see pages 73, 164).  
So far we have shown how mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena does not 
satisfy the principle of Uni-directionality. We argued that this mapping typology target 
domains are bodily experienced and semantically independent. We further argued that the 
principle of mapping concrete onto abstract phenomena does not hold either. This finding 
may entail that the experiential basis of metaphor should not be drawn based only on the 
characteristics of source domains because in certain metaphorical mappings target domains 
also are bodily experienced.  
3.1.2.2. Uni-directionality principle and cross-modalities 
mapping, the case of synaesthesia 
We observed in the previous sections that some of the foundational assumptions of 
the embodied approach to metaphor and Embodied Simulation such as uni-directionality 
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and concreteness-abstractness criteria do not fit the data. In this section we shall focus our 
attention on another type of cross bodily-experienced mapping, synaesthesia metaphor (e.g. 
Caballero 2009; Marks 1974, 1975, 1978; Rakova 2003; Ramachandran and Hubbard 
2001). Perhaps Galton (1880) was the first to report cases where numerals are understood 
in terms of visual imagery. His pioneering experiments indicate that some subjects 
conceptualize numerals in terms of shapes and colors (1880:89-92). Accordingly, he (1880) 
concluded that these subjects experience sensations within modalities in response to 
stimulation to other modalities. It is worth noting here that numerals and shapes are 
perceptual which means that conceptualizing phenomena in terms of others could concern 
two bodily-experienced phenomena (see page 155 for the entailments of this finding).  
In metaphorical terms, Rakova (2003:48) argues that synaesthetic metaphor occurs 
when the perception of a stimulus from one sensory modality is accompanied by the 
perceptual experience from some other modality.  
 
More recent experiments on synaesthetic metaphor have shown that this 
phenomenon is more common than it was believed to be previously (Caballero 2009; 
Cacciari 2008; Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001; Yu 2001). As the following table 
indicates, the phenomenon of synaesthesia reveals a different typology of mapping. 
 Table 5 Mapping across sensory modalities.
161 
 
As this table shows, the mapping typology which characterizes synaesthetic 
metaphor may posit a potential challenge to the theory of the Embodied metaphor in that 
the tenets of this theory cannot account for the metaphorical mapping typology which is 
based on a sensory-modality in source and target domains. This metaphorical mapping 
typology engages two domains which are physiologically instantiated (Ramachandran and 
Hubbard 2001). Accordingly, synaesthetic metaphor is especially indicative of the wrong 
assumption that conceptual metaphor is based on a homogeneous cognitive process—
engaging bodily-experienced and abstract phenomena as source and target domains, 
respectively. In this respect, Table 5 shows that the mapping typology which engages 
bodily-experienced phenomena may make use of sensory experience in source and target 
domains. For instance, this mapping typology includes ‘bright sounds’, ‘loud colors’, 
‘sharp tastes’ and ‘heavy smells’.  
Based on this type of conceptual metaphor, Rakova (2003) argues that the type of 
cognitive process which underlies these expressions cannot be analyzed within the 
theoretical framework of Embodiment. This is due to the fact that target domains in this 
kind of metaphorical mapping are bodily-experienced. For instance, she states that, “...there 
is more literalness in metaphor” (2003: 172-3). 
In line with this quote, Table 5 indicates that the main feature which characterizes 
target domains and which is relevant to our analysis here is that they are accessed by our 
sensory system. It is worth noting that this metaphorical mapping typology (mapping 
physiological-onto-physiological phenomena) cannot be covered by the tenets of the 
embodied approach to metaphor. To illustrate, whereas all the tenets of this approach are 
based on one core assumption: mapping bodily-experienced onto abstract phenomena, in 
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synaesthesia-based metaphor, source and target domains make use of sensory modalities 
(see Table 5).  
Analyzing this metaphorical mapping typology within the perspective of 
Propositionality and Linearity taking into account Uni-directionality principle, we observe 
that the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor contradict the data. For instance, 
according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999), all source domains are experienced through 
sensorimotor mechanisms. While this affirmation seems to account for the data—source 
domains in the examples above are grounded in bodily experience—we also notice that 
target domains draw on bodily-experienced phenomena.  
To illustrate, in example (1), the metaphorical mapping engages visual and auditory 
modalities as source and target domains, respectively. In (2), auditory modality functions as 
source domain, and visual modality, as target domain. In (3) the modality of somatosensory 
(Tactile) functions as source domain, while the Gustatory modality as target domain. And 
in (4), the modality of somatosensory (Force) functions as source domain whereas the 
modality of Olfaction carries out the role of the target domain. It is worth noting here that 
the first two pairings ('bright sounds' and 'loud colors') show that a given modality can 
function as source and target domains in different metaphorical mappings. This finding is 
particularly important because it indicates that bodily-experienced phenomena and 
sensorimotor modalities can function as source and target domains in different 
metaphorical mappings (see page 184).  
Again, here we are faced with another problem regarding the tenets of the embodied 
approach to metaphor viewed from the perspective of Propositionality-Linearity. As 
pointed out before, scholars within the theoretical framework of Embodied metaphor claim 
that in metaphorical mapping there is always a projection of features from concrete 
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domains onto more abstract domains. It is obvious that the metaphorical mapping typology 
that draw on sensory modalities in source and target domains cannot be taken as an 
example of conceptual metaphor while sticking to the tenets of the embodiment theory (see 
also Rakova 2003).  
An alternative explanation to this situation is that not all types of metaphor show a 
homogeneous mapping, namely concrete-onto-abstract mapping. Rather, the tenet which is 
ubiquitous in conceptual metaphor is that we reason about one phenomenon in terms of 
another. Whether conceptual metaphor engages bodily-experienced phenomena and non-
bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains respectively may not be 
relevant to determine to disregard certain cognitive processes as cases of conceptual 
metaphor (for a contrasting analysis of this type of mapping see Rakova 2003:30). In fact, 
this type of metaphorical mapping has led some scholars, within other disciplines to call 
into question the embodiment theory of metaphor (e.g. Pinker 2003).  
Thus, in order for the theory of embodiment to account for this metaphorical 
mapping typology, we need to assume that the experience within the modality which 
functions as source domain is bodily experienced, but the modality which fulfills the role of 
target is abstract. In other words, sensory modalities take on a by-default role in 
metaphorical mapping. As seen before, this differentiation between source and target 
domains also creates dependency of the phenomena which function as target domains on 
those which function as source domains (see pages 120-129). Applying this finding to the 
mapping typology which engages sensory modalities as source and target domains would 
entail that the modality which functions as target domain is dependent on its counterpart in 
source domain. This dependency is clearly noticed within the theory of embodiment in that 
our experience of target modalities is assumed to be shaped through source modalities.  
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In this respect, our data shows that this differentiation is rendered impossible (see 
Table 5). Therefore, we need to deal with certain kinds of metaphorical mapping in 
different ways. That is, one cannot draw a viable distinction between source and target 
modalities sticking to the premises of the Embodied metaphor theory. Yet, this approach 
can account for the conceptual metaphor which engages sensory-modalities as source and 
target domains (see Chapter IV; for contrasting views on this matter see e.g. Rakova 2003). 
In this setting, we propose that the Embodied metaphor theory needs to refine its tenets to 
address different mapping typologies (see chapters I and II). This is an extremely important 
step into making use of recent discoveries within other disciplines for adjusting the tenets 
of the theory to potentially different metaphorical mapping typologies. 
3.1.2.3. The problem of Concreteness-Abstractness 
Principle 
The concrete-abstract criterion is not satisfied by the mapping typology which we 
are concerned with in this chapter. Let us consider the following examples to illustrate this 
point: 
Human Is Animal, Human Is Bird 
(1) a. My husband turned out to be an animal. 
     b. He picked up this bird at a downtown disco. 
Human Is Army 
(2)When she opened the door there was an army of journalists waiting for her. 
Human Is Liquid 
(3) Crowds spilled out of the train over the platform. 
Human Is Building 
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(4) Animo acids are the building blocks of the proteins and these building blocks of 
muscles. 
Human Is Plant 
(5) a. The FBI planted informers in the Mafia. 
      b. We've finally rooted out all the traitors from the party.  
Human Is Animal 
(6) a. Every education reform makes pupils guinea pigs.  
     b. On holiday I pigged out and put on 3 kilos. 
Words/Language Is Human 
(7) The introduction is too long and the body is too short. 
Money Is Liquid/Blood 
 (8) Most of my money is in stocks and shares not liquid assets. 
Money Is Food 
(9) He earned his daily bread as a music teacher.  
Vehicle Is Animal/Human 
(10) The torn body of the aircraft was finally found. 
Quantity Is Size 
(11) His complaints were out of all proportion. 
Quantity Is Water (Flow) 
(12) Microsoft has been pumping out many new products lately.  
It is worth noting here that in this set of examples, source and target domains are 
bodily experienced. More importantly, some domains function as source and target in 
different metaphorical mappings (see pages 80, 83, 222). Based on these examples it 
becomes clear that conceptual metaphor can draw on bodily-experienced phenomena as 
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source and target domains. This finding is especially problematic for the tenets of the 
embodied approach to metaphor as they are based on the assumption that metaphorical 
mapping engages two different phenomena, namely, bodily-experienced and non-bodily-
experienced phenomena. 
To illustrate, one can hardly explain the present data following the tenets of the 
embodiment theory because target phenomena (as well as source phenomena) are bodily 
experienced (Table 3). In this respect, there is no reason to assume that concrete domains 
such as Human, Animal, Machine, Money, Food, and Plant should be considered 
differently in terms the experiential character conceptual metaphor. The domains which are 
engaged in the mapping typology which draws on bodily-experienced phenomena in source 
and target domains expose common characteristics. However, as argued before, the 
embodied approach to metaphor stands on a strict distinction between source and target 
domains in that being bodily and non-bodily experienced are inherent features to source 
and target domains, respectively.  
More importantly, the data shows that apart from taking on the role of source, 
certain phenomena also function as target in different metaphorical mappings (see 
examples (1)-(12). This data is especially supportive of the fact that source and target 
domains have common features. Furthermore, it shows that the reason for constructing 
metaphorical mapping between two phenomena is not the fact that we need metaphor as a 
sine-qua-non cognitive process to have access to abstract phenomena. This is because 
metaphorical mappings in (1)-(12) are based on phenomena which are concrete and bodily 
experienced. 
Nonetheless, analyzing this typology within the framework of the embodiment 
theory potentially leads to the following assumptions. First, in order for the tenets of this 
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theory to encompass this mapping typology, we are required to assume that mapping 
bodily-experienced onto non-bodily-experienced phenomena is ubiquitous in conceptual 
metaphor. Notice that the bodily-based information that operates in conceptual metaphor is 
exclusively attributed to source domains (e.g. Johnson 1987; Szwedek 2011). In this 
respect, the fact that metaphorical mapping can engage two bodily-experienced phenomena 
casts serious doubt over the generally accepted assumption that we map one phenomenon 
onto another because target domains are abstract and meaningless. For instance, the 
metaphorical mapping in (1) engages Human and Animal/Bird. The question that arises 
here is whether we should assume that Animal is bodily experienced but Human is abstract, 
complex, and semantically dependent. That is, we map Human as an abstract phenomenon 
onto Animal as a bodily-experienced phenomenon since there is no other way to 
conceptualize the former. Accordingly, our understanding of Human depends on another 
domain which is (more) concrete and bodily experienced. 
Another example which lends significant support to the claim that source and target 
domains expose identical features in the mapping typology which draws on bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains is example (2). The fact that Human 
fulfills the role of the target domain in this example would entail that it is complex, 
abstract, and semantically dependent on the domain Army. Accordingly, being complex, 
abstract, and semantically dependent are irrelevant features to the mapping typology which 
engages two bodily-experienced phenomena.  
Thereby, we structure, for instance, Human in terms of other bodily-experienced 
domains such as Animal, Bird, Army, Plant and Vehicle; and Money in terms of Food and 
Blood not because the target domains in this case are abstract, complex, and semantically 
dependent. As argued before, target domains in certain metaphorical mappings are accessed 
168 
 
via the sensorimotor system (see Table 3). For instance, Blood, Food, Animal, Vehicle, 
Plant, and Liquid are all bodily experienced.  
Following the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor, this characteristic is 
inherent to source domains. On the other hand, target domains are abstract and do not have 
any conceptual structure of their own (e.g. Lakoff and Turner 1989:58). 
To sum up, based on the data analysis, target phenomena in metaphorical mappings 
are not always abstract, complex, and semantically dependent. In contrast, the embodied 
approach to metaphor is based on the general assumption that cross-domain mapping 
engages two different domains in terms of bodily-experienced and non-bodily-experienced 
phenomena. In this setting, this approach limits the functionality of conceptual metaphor, as 
a cognitive tool, to transferring bodily-based features from semantically independent 
domains onto dependent domains (see Chapter II).   
The problem here is that source and target domains in the mapping typology which 
we are concerned with in this chapter draw on bodily-experienced phenomena. Following 
the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor, these domains show conceptual 
structures. This is another important feature that seems to match the tenets of the 
embodiment theory and the Propositionality-Linearity perspective but does not comport 
with the data. To illustrate this point, let us reconsider examples (4) and (11):  
Human Is Building 
(4) Animo acids are the building blocks of the proteins and these building blocks of 
muscles. 
Vehicle Is Animal/Human 
(11) The torn body of the aircraft was finally found. 
169 
 
It is widely accepted that all source domains in metaphorical mappings are primitive 
experiences, as opposed to target domains which are complex. This notion has two 
subsequent assumptions: (1) source domains have conceptual structures and (2) these 
conceptual structures cannot allow further (re-)categorization (Lakoff and Johnson 
1989:111-112). That is, they cannot be understood in terms of other phenomena. On the 
other hand, target domains are abstract, complex, indirectly meaningful, and, as a result, 
they are dependent on other domains for acquiring meaning (Lakoff and Turner 1989:111-
112; Ungerer and Schmid, 1996).  
Accordingly, target domains have to meet at least three conditions: being abstract, 
complex, and meaningless. Being so, our reasoning about them requires the use of other 
embodied concepts; henceforth, the embodying process via conceptual metaphor is a sine-
qua-non process for understanding these domains.  
As stated before, the metaphorical mapping typology which is based on two bodily-
experienced phenomena posits a challenge to the tenets of the embodied approach to 
metaphor. In particular, no significant difference has been observed among source and 
target domains in terms of these features. Indeed, in this mapping typology, source and 
target domains are concrete and bodily experienced.  
In order for this notion to apply to the present data, we have to assume that a 
domain should be considered primitive or complex depending on whether the phenomenon 
in question functions as source or target domain. Since certain domains function as source 
and target in different metaphorical mappings (see page 80), being abstract or concrete 
depends on the role those domains fulfill in metaphor. In contrast, the data shows that 
primitiveness and abstractness seem to reside in a functional basis rather than being 
inherent features. 
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A general conclusion that can be made from our analysis of this set of metaphors is 
that the characteristics which have been taken to be exclusive to source domains are also 
observed in target domains. This finding stands in opposition to the main assumptions 
which are widely held within the theoretical framework of embodied metaphor; namely, 
attributing the embodied and abstract natures, as inherent features to source and target 
domains, respectively. Here, for example, we have shown that target domains in some 
metaphorical mappings have the same characteristics as source domains—they are bodily 
experienced and semantically independent. Yet, by no means do we intend to extend our 
conclusion to all metaphorical mapping typologies.  
3.2. Lineal construction of Metaphorical Mapping 
3.2.1. Linearity of projection based on uni-directionality 
As shown before, the subordination of target domains to source domains can be 
observed in two aspects: time and meaning construction (see pages 120-130). In the 
following sections, we shall see how this notion is an immediate conclusion of the Uni-
directionality principle and how it does not fit the mapping typology which we are 
concerned with in this chapter.  
3.2.1.1. Linearity in Time of Metaphorical Mapping 
Based on the analysis of the data in the previous chapter, we concluded that another 
criterion which characterizes metaphorical mapping within the theoretical framework of 
embodiment is Linearity in time (see also Ahrens 2002:275; Mouton 2012:55-62). In this 
respect, it is widely accepted that metaphorical mappings require a prior experience of 
source domains which, later, it is mapped onto target domains (e.g. Gibbs 1996: 310; 
171 
 
Johnson 1987: XV; Kovecses 2002:6; Ungerer and Schmid 1996:21). That is, each 
conceptual metaphor is an instance of mapping a previously experienced phenomenon onto 
a recently (and indirectly) experienced phenomenon.  
Similar observations have been made by Ahrens (2002:275), who claims that, 
“…inferring information from a conceptual structure (such as journeys) is a process that 
can only occur after one has accessed that conceptual structure.” This means that our 
conceptualization of target domains is highly determined by our experience of source 
domains. 
Additionally, (Mouton 2012) suggests a “historically situated approach” which 
shows how our experience of certain domains such as DNA evolves through newly 
acquired knowledge and leads to significant modification of metaphorical mapping. A 
similar line of argumentation has been adopted by Tejada Caller and Guzmán Guerra 
(2012:38), who show that cognitive and cultural frames are not stable, rather they are 
evolving through history (see also Trim 2011).   
Contrary to the embodiment theory of metaphor, these scholars have not suggested 
that this pattern is ubiquitous in all metaphorical mappings. Instead, they argue that 
conceptual metaphors in the context of biology, economy, and business are dynamic 
because these phenomena are all-time changing domains (Herrera Soler and White 2012: 3-
4; White 2003: 133-134; White and Herrera Soler 2003). 
Turning back to the tenets of the embodiment theory, the phenomena which do not 
meet this condition (linearity in time) are not engaged in metaphorical mapping. This 
means that metaphorical mapping always follows the same chronological order—mapping 
features from an older phenomenon onto a more recent one. For instance, Johnson (1987: 
xv) observed that, “…through metaphor, we make use of patterns that obtain in our 
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physical experience to organize our more abstract understanding. Understanding via 
metaphorical projection from the concrete to the abstract makes use of physical experience 
in two ways”. 
This affirmation has two main entailments: (1) in metaphorical mappings, bodily 
experiences are previous to abstract phenomena. And subsequently (2) source domains are 
prior to target domains. Also, without abstract concepts there would be no need for 
metaphorical mappings.  
This situation posits a problem to the theory in the sense that our reasoning about 
target domains cannot take place unless one has previously experienced source domain (for 
a detailed analysis of this point, see Yucha 2002:275-276).  The question which arises here 
is to what extent the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced phenomena 
in source and target domains may break the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor.  
Let us consider Love is Journey (Lakoff 1993:206) 
Look how far we've come.  
It's been a long, bumpy road. 
We can't turn back now. 
We're at a crossroads. 
In order for the tenets of Embodied Theory to hold, we need to assume that our 
experience of the phenomenon Journey took place before our understanding of Love. This 
assumption is based on the basic premise that source phenomena are presumably 
experienced previously to target ones. In this regard, Feldman (2006:8) assures that, 
“…abstract thought grows out of concrete embodied experiences, typically sensorimotor 
experiences. Much of abstract thought makes use of reasoning based on the underlying 
experience”.  
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In this setting, the embodiment theory is based on the assumption that without bodily-
experienced phenomena there would be no access to target domains. In addition, source and 
target phenomena have to fit into a chronological order in which source domains are 
experienced previously to target domains.  
Under these assumptions, this chronological order seems to determine the role 
certain phenomena take on in metaphorical mappings. This characteristic, together with 
other features (see pages 59), are claimed to determine the role which a phenomenon has to 
carry out in metaphorical mappings. That is, not only does the embodiment theory constrain 
the mapping in terms of concrete-abstract distinction but also it implies that the two 
phenomena which are engaged in metaphorical mapping are experienced in a chronological 
order. Namely, the phenomenon which is bodily experienced is experienced first and 
functions by default as source domain; but the non-bodily experienced phenomenon always 
takes on the role of target domain and our reasoning about it comes afterwards. 
As seen in Chapter II, this Linearity creates an interdependence relationship 
between source and target domains in that (1) we need a bodily experience of a given 
phenomenon and (2) a more recent phenomenon whose semanticity is shaped via another 
concept. This notion is assumed to include also metaphorical mappings that are based on 
“correlation” of source and target phenomena such as  
More Is Up 
Less Is Down (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1989:83-84).  
That is, even when two phenomena tend to co-occur, we should assume that source 
domains are experienced previously to target ones. This means that metaphorical mapping 
is lineal because source phenomena are processed before the target ones (see Chapter II).  
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According to the embodiment theory, all concepts are embodied (e.g. Feldman 
2006; Johnson 1981, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; 
Szwedek 2011), all source phenomena are grounded in our bodily experiences which take 
place before our experience of target domains. From here, it becomes clear that this 
approach suggests that we experience and process information concerning source 
phenomena and then we reason about target phenomena by projecting onto them the 
bodily-based information of the former. This, in turn, will lead us to another 
overgeneralization regarding metaphorical mapping—namely that it is lineal in time: source 
phenomena are previous to target phenomena.  
This linearity is based on the assumption that mapping always engages bodily 
experiences as source domains and abstract phenomena as target domains. Notice that it is 
not plausible to affirm that our understanding of the domain Journey takes place before our 
understanding of the domain Love. 
The question which arises here is whether this linearity of metaphorical mapping 
can be applied to conceptual metaphors where source and target domains are grounded in 
bodily-experienced phenomena. For instance, 
Machine Is Human 
(1)These sports utility vehicles are real gas guzzlers. 
Human Is Machine 
(2) a. I could never discover what makes Ann tick. 
     b. I started well, but later I ran out of steam.  
Human Is Plant 
(3) The FBI planted informers in the Mafia. 
Human Is Animal 
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(5) Every education reform makes pupils guinea pigs.  
Words/Language Is Human 
(6) The introduction is too long and the body is too short. 
Human Is Ship 
(7) She was rigged out in ballerina. 
A general conclusion that can be made here is that the characteristics which have been 
claimed to be exclusive to source domains are also evident in target domains. Target 
domains are, therefore, meaningful without being mapped. Again, this requires a 
chronological order in which, presumably, our experience of source and target domains can 
be captured. Since these instances of metaphor do not meet the concrete-abstract criterion, 
this linearity in time would not hold either in this particular metaphorical mapping 
typology. Indeed, Rakova (2003: 28) calls into question the chronological order of source 
and target phenomena, “Does it [metaphorical mapping] mean that without the concept of 
journey the concept of love would be meaningless?” (see also Guarddon Anelo 2005:303-
4).  
In contrast, the chronological order of metaphorical mapping seems to fit the tenets 
of the Embodied metaphor theory. For instance, Szwedek (2011:364) assures that, “…at the 
earliest stage of the development of mankind, communication must have concerned mainly, 
if not exclusively, the physical world”. 
Another piece of evidence for this incongruity is reported by Steen (2011) where he 
asks why it is assumed within the embodied approach to metaphor that children first 
acquire the literal meaning of terms such as defend, attack, win etc. and then they 
figuratively project these meanings. In other words, why is it assumed that understanding 
the phenomena of source domains takes place first and then this understanding is extended 
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to target domains, given that there are cases where one may be exposed to target 
phenomena without having previously experienced source phenomena?  
In this respect, Steen (2011:30-31) points out that we can reason about abstract concepts 
independently of our sensorimotor system. Based on Giora (2003, 2008), he further sustains 
that, “The metaphorical sense of many words may have become the most salient sense to 
the contemporary language user, so that the basic sense is not involved in the stage of 
concept activation” (Steen 2011: 50). 
Additionally, there may be (an)other case(s) of metaphorical mapping where our experience 
of target phenomena may take place before source phenomena. This could be an interesting 
line of investigation to shed more light on linearity of metaphorical mapping.  
To sum up, there is no cogent evidence that our experience of source domain should 
be first and our experience of target domain takes place later. On the contrary, we do have 
evidence to assume that this ‘chronological order’ standpoint is not suitable to account for 
the mapping typology which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target 
domains. This is due to the fact that since source and target domains are grounded in 
bodily-experienced phenomena, there is no evidence for this chronological order. If these 
phenomena, in source and target domains, are bodily experienced, then the process of 
embodying is not crucial to our understanding of target domains. This seems to contradict 
the embodiment theory because, following Lakoff and Johnson (1980:19), “[...] no 
metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its 
experiential basis [...]”.  It is worth noting here that the experiential basis of conceptual 
metaphor is fully attributed to source domains.  
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3.2.1.2. Linearity of metaphorical mapping based on 
meaning construction  
The meaning which we achieve via metaphorical mapping is a lineally-based 
process. First, we process the meaning of the phenomena in source domains and afterwards, 
through this knowledge, we understand target phenomena. That is, source domains fulfill 
the chief role in both constructing and processing metaphorical mapping in that they 
impose their characteristics on target domains (e.g. Szwedek 2011). On this account, our 
reasoning about target domains is shaped by our understanding of source domains. For 
instance, Lakoff (2008:18-19) sustains that, “…if you cannot imagine someone picking up 
a glass, you cannot understand someone picking up a glass”. 
This assumption puts metaphorical mapping in two sequenced, though intrinsically 
linked, cognitive processes. Without processing the meaning of the phenomena in source 
domains, it is hard to process the ones in target domains. In this respect, the cognitive 
topology of target phenomena depends exclusively on the physical topology of source 
phenomena. Accordingly, the inference that we get out of metaphorical mappings is also 
lineally based. 
3.2.2. Linearity of projection based on meaning transfer  
3.2.2.1. Autonomous (source) domains and subordinate 
(target) domains  
Within the embodied approach to metaphor, target domains are viewed as abstract, 
complex, and dependent on other domains for acquiring their meaning—that is, they are 
indirectly meaningful (Lakoff and Turner 1989:111). Any phenomenon which fulfills the 
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function of target domain has to meet at least two conditions: it has to be abstract and 
complex. Being so, our reasoning about it requires accessing it through the use of other 
embodied concepts (e.g. Feldman 2006). Consequently, embodying process –or using 
Szwedek’s “objectification” process (2011:346; see also Szwedek 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007a, 
2010) is crucial to understanding abstract phenomena. 
Metaphorical mapping, in this respect, has been argued to be indispensable to assign 
meaning to (meaningless) target phenomena. In this setting, source domains convey 
meaning to target domains via projecting into them bodily-based features alongside their 
semantic features. That is, target domains acquire those features only through being 
engaged in metaphorical mapping. Accordingly, the role of metaphorical mapping is to 
endow target phenomena, which are not accessible to the sense organ, with conceptual 
structures. For instance, Szwedek (2011:350) argues that, “The dependency of 
conceptualization of space and structure on concrete objects means that the fundamental, 
ultimate experiential basis is our experience of physical objects, the only entities directly 
accessible to our senses.” 
This notion does not seem to characterize the case where metaphorical mapping 
engages two bodily-experienced phenomena. That is, if bodily-experienced domains are 
semantically independent because they have their own conceptual structures, then we can 
reason about them outside metaphorical mapping. Hence, there is no need for mapping 
them onto other phenomena. Again, this indicates that if the two domains are experienced 
via the sensorimotor system, there is no need for engaging them in metaphorical mapping 
since the objective of the latter is to access the phenomena which are not accessed 
otherwise.  
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The operating mechanisms of this metaphorical mapping typology may run counter 
to the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor in that the two domains do have pre-
existing conceptual structures outside the metaphorical mapping. If it is so, then conceptual 
metaphor would be merely a process of mapping the two domains without adding anything 
new to our understanding of target phenomena. Murphy (1988), for instance, embraces this 
view suggesting that metaphorical mapping is a pragmatic use of language, having nothing 
to do with conceptualizing and reasoning about phenomena in terms of others. In close 
connection to this notion, Rakova (2003) casts doubt over the inexistence of concepts 
regarding target domains outside metaphorical mapping. For instance, she (2003:27) 
sustains that we do have the concept of Love Relation before mapping it onto Journey but 
what we get after the metaphorical mapping which engages these two phenomena is a new 
grasp of the target domain, Love Relation.  
However, Murphy’s (1988) approach stands in opposition to our findings in the 
previous chapter because a certain mapping typology can be looked at from the 
Propositionality-Linearity perspective (see Chapter II). That is, metaphor is not merely a 
matter of pragmatics. Rather, it consists of transferring bodily-based features from source 
onto target domains alongside the semantic relation that these features maintain in the 
source domain. This means that metaphor is a matter of concepts construal (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999).  
On the other hand, Rakova’s (2003:28) standpoint seems to fit the data. For 
instance, source and target phenomena are meaningful independently of metaphorical 
mapping. Interestingly, the embodiment theory argues that metaphorical mapping consists 
of drawing systematic correspondences between constituents of source and target domains 
(e.g. Johnson 1981, 1987; Lakoff 1987, 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Based on 
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this affirmation, Murphy (1996:177) states that source and target domains, then, do have 
conceptual structures independently of metaphorical mapping. He (1996:179) further 
suggests that conceptual metaphor “…arise out of the similarity of pre-existing conceptual 
structures…” 
These affirmations are particularly supportive of our hypothesis that target domains 
in certain typologies are semantically independent. Though this notion actually fits the data, 
it runs counter to the general assumption within the theory of Embodied metaphor, which is 
based on the fact that metaphor is used to reason about certain phenomena which are not 
reasoned about otherwise.  
In this setting, the phenomena that show pre-existing conceptual structures, 
following the embodied approach to metaphor, would not be engaged in metaphorical 
mapping as target domains (see Chapter II). Put differently, if these phenomena are 
semantically independent, then it would not be necessary to map them as target domains in 
order to reason about them. Furthermore, if these domains have their own constituents and 
inferences before the mapping is construed (Murphy 1996:179), then, following the 
embodied approach to metaphor (Lakoff and Turner 1989:111), metaphorical mapping 
would add nothing substantial to our conceptualization of target phenomena.  
However, when cross-domain mapping involves two bodily-experienced 
phenomena, a theoretical problem arises within this approach. In the previous section we 
identified the reason why linearity of metaphorical mapping in time does not fit the data. As 
stated before, since source and target domains can equally be experienced bodily; there is 
no reason as to claim that our experience of source phenomena is prior to target 
phenomena. 
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In this section, we shall see that linearity across domains in terms of 'source 
components' and 'target components' does not fit either. Moreover, from the Linearity 
standpoint (see pages 120-130), source and target domains can be classified into two 
groups: semantically autonomous phenomena (source domain) and subordinate phenomena 
(target domains). This sense is also similar to that stated in Lakoff and Turner’s (1989: 113-
120) grounding hypothesis, in which they argue that the meaning of abstract phenomena is 
grounded in semantically autonomous domains. This autonomy-subordination-based 
metaphorical mapping becomes even clearer in the following statement: “Abstract thought 
grows out of concrete embodied experiences, typically sensorimotor experiences (Feldman 
2006:7).” In order to address this issue we suggest a further analysis of the mapping 
typology which draws on bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains, for 
instance: 
Machine Is Human 
(1)These sports utility vehicles are real gas guzzlers. 
(2)The air raid knocked out the enemy radar.  
Human Is Machine 
(3)I could never discover what makes Ann tick. 
Within the theoretical framework of embodiment theory of metaphor, the notion that 
bodily-based features of source domains are transferred onto target domains is based on the 
experiential basis of source domains (see Chapter II). Since these domains are bodily-
experienced, our cognitive system has a 'direct' access to them; henceforth, they are 
semantically autonomous (Lakoff and Turner 1989:113-120). On the other hand, target 
domains are abstract and their meaning is acquired indirectly via imposing bodily-based 
features of source domains onto them (Szwedek 2011:344). That is, they are by default 
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indirectly meaningful because they are not eligible for direct experience, which means that 
target domains are subordinate to source domains. In this setting, our understanding of 
source domains comes first and that of target domains is regarded as derivative of the 
former. For instance, Kövecses (2000:82) states that,"...The target domain inherits the main 
meaning focus (or foci) of the source." 
Nonetheless, in the instances of metaphor where both phenomena are bodily experienced, 
such as (1), (2), and (3), the conditions that have led cognitive linguists to argue that we 
transfer features of bodily-experienced domains onto abstract phenomena are not observed. 
One such conditions is the principle of mapping concrete and abstract phenomena in 
metaphorical mapping. To illustrate, (1), (2), and (3) engage bodily-experienced 
phenomena as source and target domains. In this setting, we understand Machine in terms 
of Human and Human in terms of Machine, respectively. 
Therefore, analyzing these metaphors taking into account the tenets of the 
embodiment theory, we would be required to assume that the phenomena which function as 
target domains are semantically subordinate to source domains; whereas the latter are 
semantically autonomous. Again, applying this notion to (1), (2), and (3) would mean that 
in example (1), Human would be semantically autonomous both inside and outside 
metaphorical mapping. Being so, it is used as source domain. On the contrary, Machine 
would be semantically subordinate to Human and meaningless outside metaphorical 
mapping. Being so, it is indirectly meaningful. This implies that Human and Machine are 
directly meaningful domains, that is why they fulfill the role of source domains in the data. 
Nonetheless, this seems not to be the case in (3), where Human now performs the 
function of source domain. In this example the aforementioned characteristics of source 
domains need to be reversed inasmuch as Machine now becomes semantically autonomous 
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(directly meaningful). Consequently, its features are transferred to the target domain 
Human. In contrast, Human now is semantically subordinate (indirectly meaningful) and so 
it receives features of the bodily-experienced domain, Human. However, this mapping 
typology excludes the assumption that Human (as target and as indirectly meaningful 
domain) is embodied via Machine (as bodily-experienced and directly meaningful domain). 
Additionally, another aspect of this autonomy-subordinate relation between source 
and target domains, which needs further exploration is that the idea that being autonomous 
or subordinate entails that while the source domain Human imposes its features on target 
domain Machine, the former remains semantically autonomous in metaphorical mapping. 
To illustrate, the cognitive topology of the source domain does not undergo any semantic 
change when it is mapped (see page 264 on how source domains are also influenced in 
metaphorical mapping). Interestingly, this observation dismisses the assumption that there 
is a-one-way-meaning transfer of features across domains based on bodily-experienced 
phenomena as (directly meaningful) source domains and non-bodily-experienced 
phenomena (indirectly meaningful) as abstract domains. The examples above do not reveal 
any substantial difference worth considering in terms of the characteristics (see Chapter I 
and II) that are believed to be unique to source domains.  
To sum up, the assumption that one-way-meaning projection based on semantically 
independent and dependent phenomena is misleading when taken as an absolute pattern to 
all metaphorical mapping typologies. Thereby, the data suggests that the mapping typology 
which draws on two bodily-experienced phenomena cannot be accounted for as one-way-
meaning transfer of features because target domains also are grounded in sensorimotor 
experience. Thereby, the notion that metaphorical mapping draws on semantically 
independent phenomena (as source domains) and semantically dependent phenomena (as 
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target domains) does not characterize the mapping typology which engages two bodily-
experienced phenomena.  
3.2.3. Linearity of Metaphorical Mappings vs. Synaesthesia-
based mapping typology  
As shown in the previous section, metaphorical mapping within the embodiment 
theory is based on a chronological order which characterizes source and target domains. We 
also noticed that this notion in particular reveals major theoretical problems within the 
embodied approach to metaphor if we take into account the metaphorical mapping typology 
where source and target domains are bodily-experienced. 
In this section, we will assess whether this assumption also proves problematic in 
the case of synaesthetic metaphor. As this mapping typology engages sensory modalities as 
source and target domains, we are faced again with the problem of analyzing it in terms of 
the concrete-abstract distinction and linearity of mapping across domains perspective. We 
showed before how these two tenets do not match the data when source and target domains 
are bodily experienced (see pages 170-177).  
In the following sections we shall show how the entailments of these tenets may not 
cover this metaphorical mapping typology. For this purpose, we shall focus our attention on 
the mapping that underpins synaesthetic metaphor and see whether the Linearity-
Propositionality perspective fits this kind of mapping. 
3.2.3.1.  Mapping across sensory modalities and the 
chronological order of source and target domains 
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As shown before, the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor implies that the 
two phenomena which are engaged in metaphorical mapping are processed in chronological 
order. Applying this assumption to synaesthesia-based metaphor would mean that the 
sensory experience which performs the function of source is prior to the sensory experience 
which takes on the role of target domain. Notice that we proved in the previous chapter that 
Linearity is based on the fact that source domains are experienced before target domains 
(see page 120). In synaesthetic metaphor, this would mean that source modality is 
experienced before target modality. Therefore, analyzing this mapping typology sticking to 
the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor might show important incongruities 
within the theory which need further exploration. To illustrate this point, let us consider the 
following table: 
 
According to the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor, the modality of 
vision should be assumed to be experienced before the auditory modality. The experience 
of source modality is prior to the target. Also, we are required to accept that the modality of 
somatosensory is experienced before the gustatory and olfactory modalities. A piece of 
evidence for the fact that this notion cannot be held to explain this mapping typology is that 
the visual modality is mapped onto the auditory modality in (1), but this mapping is 
reversed in (2). This makes it hard to argue that source modalities are prior to target 
Table 6 Mapping Across Sensory Modalities
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modalities. To our knowledge, there has been no study to address whether certain 
modalities are experienced before others and how our synaesthetic metaphor could fit into 
the chronological order which we explored in Chapter II.  
3.2.3.2. Mapping across sensory modalities and lineal 
meaning transfer principle 
In this section, we shall examine cross-modality mapping to assess whether 
Linearity in meaning construction can be applied to this typology. For this purpose, we 
need to reconsider Table 6 above. Our task here is to check whether source and target 
modalities can be differentiated in terms of the tenets of the embodied approach to 
metaphor (see 155). This time, however, we shall pay special attention on meaning transfer 
principle.   
In order to explain this metaphorical mapping typology within the embodied 
approach to metaphor, auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory modalities should 
be classified according to the tenets of this approach. This means that we should 
differentiate them in terms of the following criteria: 
i. In terms of Uni-directionality: Mapping across these modalities would be 
unidirectional because if a modality functions as source domain, it cannot take on 
the role of target in other metaphorical mappings, given the inherent features that 
are attributed to source and target domains (see pages 116,118). Indeed, as the table 
above shows, there is a multi-directional mapping among these modalities. For 
instance, auditory, visual and gustatory modalities function as source and target 
domains in different metaphorical mappings. 
187 
 
ii. In terms of subordination-autonomy relation between source and target domains: In 
metaphorical mapping, source modalities are autonomous in the sense that they are 
semantically independent. In contrast, the phenomena which are processed as target 
modalities are semantically dependent on source modalities. This incongruity is 
obvious in the fact that the experience of source modality would be semantically 
autonomous whereas the modality in the target domain is semantically subordinate. 
That is, following the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor, target modality 
would be more complex and presumably another ‘bodily-experienced’ modality is 
required to cognitively access such modality.  
iii. In terms of concrete-abstract distinction: Based on our analysis of the metaphors in 
the table above, the tenets of the Embodied metaphor approach do not fit this 
criterion. Metaphors (1) and (2) above are especially indicative of this point in that 
we need to view certain modalities as concrete and abstract phenomena. In contrast, 
there is no reason why we should believe that source and target modalities are 
different in terms of this criterion.  
iv. In terms of chronological order: we observed how this criterion does not fit the 
mapping typology which draws on bodily-experienced phenomena (see page 184). 
That is, the mapping typology which draws on a sensory modality as source and 
target domain cannot be put in a chronological order.  
To sum up, the metaphorical mapping typology which we have been concerned with 
in this chapter does not fit the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor. This situation 
is due mainly to three key facts. First, this type of metaphorical mapping does not follow a 
chronological order of occurrence among source and target domains. Second, the concrete-
abstract criterion cannot account for this mapping typology as source and target domains 
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are bodily experienced. Third, source and target domains cannot be differentiated in terms 
of dependent and autonomous domains.   
Conclusion 
The tenets of the embodiment theory cover a broad aspect of metaphorical mapping. 
However, the assumption that conceptual metaphor is instantiated in one mapping typology 
contradicts the data. In particular, adopting the view that all metaphorical mappings engage 
bodily-experienced phenomena (as source domains) and non-bodily-experienced 
phenomena (as target domains) raises major theoretical problems. 
In this chapter, we have confirmed that while the assumptions of this approach can 
be applied to a certain metaphorical mapping typology (see Chapter II), the task becomes 
difficult when one tries to examine different mapping typologies sticking to the tenets of 
the theory of embodiment.  
In this respect, the theory needs to be refined to be able to account for different 
mapping typologies. For instance, mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena has 
shown that most of the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor fail to account for this 
typology. This refinement process requires the theory to start out with accepting that 
metaphorical mapping is not instantiated through a single mapping typology—namely, 
mapping concrete onto abstract phenomena. This is due to the fact that different 
metaphorical mapping typologies follow different operating mechanisms (see the following 
chapter).  
In this chapter we have also shown that metaphorical mapping has a wider scope 
because it does not only engage bodily and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source 
and target domains, respectively. Instead, the data indicates that metaphor operates also on 
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bodily-experienced phenomena as target. Importantly, in this case, metaphorical mapping 
may follow different patterns and processing. In this respect, we have shown that the 
metaphorical mapping typology which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena 
substantially differentiates from other typologies.  
In line with this finding, our proposed perspective –Linearity and Propositionality 
of metaphorical mapping—does fit the data put forward in this chapter. Recall that this 
perspective fits perfectly well the tenets of the theory of embodiment (see Chapter II). 
Since not all metaphorical mapping typologies engage non-bodily-experienced phenomena 
(as target domains), we hypothesized that a certain type of metaphorical mapping would 
show potential incongruities within the embodiment theory—namely, the mapping 
typology which involves bodily-experienced phenomena in its source and target domains. 
Accordingly, we tested the entailments of the tenets of this theory and showed that 
they cannot account for this type of metaphorical mapping. This is due to the fact that the 
theoretical framework of Embodied metaphor is based on the general assumption that 
bodily-experienced and abstract phenomena are inherently source and target domains, 
respectively. Conversely, the data indicates that source and target domains do not prove to 
have inherent features to perform a by-default function in metaphorical mappings. To 
illustrate, so far in this chapter we have demonstrated that target domains show some of the 
characteristics which are believed to be inherent to source domains. 
One of those common features is that source and target domains are concrete and 
bodily-experienced. This means that target domains are not devoid of bodily-based 
information that were held—within the embodied approach to metaphor—to be 
circumscribed to source domains, and which are believed to be the only operating features 
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in metaphorical mappings. That is, within this approach, the experiential character of 
metaphor has been exclusively attributed to source domains.  
Possibly, this notion is rooted in the fact that the analysis of conceptual metaphor 
has been carried out through the filter of the constitutive nature of source domains.  
In contrast, since target domains in the typology we have been concerned with in 
this chapter are also bodily-experienced, there is no reason to believe that the features of 
source domains are the only operating features in metaphorical mapping. This is because in 
this typology both phenomena are concrete and bodily-experienced.  
Taken together, these findings reveal two main entailments: first, target domains 
might be put at the same level as source domains in terms of their contribution to the 
experiential basis of metaphor. Second, metaphorical mapping also operate on bodily-
experienced phenomena. In this respect, we have paid scant attention to the characteristics 
of target domains and their relation to source domains in terms of the “experiential basis” 
of conceptual metaphor. The characteristics that have been believed to be common to only 
source domains seem to be operating in target domains too.  
Obviously, we did not intend to cover all the characteristics of target domains (see 
the following chapter). Rather, we only highlighted those that have been previously 
believed to be exclusive to source domains and which conceptual metaphor has been 
argued to endow conceptual metaphor with an experiential basis.  
Of particular interest also is that the primitive-complex distinction does not prove 
reliable to assign phenomena the roles they take on in metaphorical mapping. Indeed, our 
analysis of the data shows that there is no cogent criterion to differentiate them because the 
two are shown to be grounded in bodily-experienced phenomena.  
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These findings open a new direction in our investigation regarding conceptual 
metaphor. Namely, if the phenomena which carry out the function of target domains can 
fulfill the role of source domains in certain mapping typologies, then they do not have 
inherent features that allow them to take on the role of source or target. It is worth noting 
here that since our focus falls only on mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena, 
some of our conclusions that have been drawn here may not be applied to other instances of 
metaphor (see Chapter II).  
Based on these findings, target domains may well fulfill a vital function in 
metaphorical mapping than have been previously believed. The following step is to assess 
whether target domains carry out the same role as source domains in the sense that they 
also shape metaphorical mappings. This might mean that target phenomena are not 
‘passive’ as it is held within the embodiment theory.  
In this chapter, we demonstrated how mapping across bodily-experienced 
phenomena suggests a challenge to the theory. Accordingly, the embodiment theory might 
need to take into account also the characteristics of target domains which may be specific to 
some metaphorical mapping typologies. When a given metaphorical mapping engages 
bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains, the experiential basis of 
conceptual metaphor may not be fully attributed to source domains.  
Interestingly, once source and target domains are put at the same level in terms of 
their experiential character, it possible to make a hypothesis on the basis of the 
aforementioned findings that target domains also contribute to the embodied character of 
conceptual metaphor. This will lead us in the following chapter to suggest another way of 
looking at metaphor. That is, rather than imposing “recorded” experiences of source onto 
target domains, we shall hypothesize that the mapping typology wherein source and target 
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domains are grounded in bodily-experienced phenomena there is interaction between such 
domains. In this respect, we put forward another theory–domains interaction—to deal with 
this type of metaphorical mapping.  
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Chapter IV: From Projection to Interaction: a Further Step 
towards a more Embodied Approach to Metaphor 
1. Introduction and Hypothesis 
There is a vast amount of metaphor research in cognitive linguistics that has 
adopted the assumption that conceptual domains inherently include some features that 
legitimize them for taking on the role of source or target (see Chapter II). This theoretical 
framework assures that all the bodily-based information that we need to establish a 
metaphorical mapping between two phenomena exists in the source domain (e.g. Szwedek 
2011).  
It follows from this that proponents of this approach draw their assumptions 
concerning metaphor based exclusively on the experiential character of source domains. 
Consequently, the embodiment theory has dealt with metaphor primarily as a mechanism of 
representing abstract phenomena—which are not accessed otherwise (see pages 56-59).  
As a result, research within this theory has been limited to identifying patterns and 
principles of representing abstract phenomena through the filter of the embodied character 
of source domains. By focusing on how we reason about abstract phenomena, this 
theoretical framework limits the scope of the investigation on metaphorical mapping. 
Recall that, in the previous chapter, we demonstrated that one of such constrains is that 
conceptual metaphor operates only on abstract phenomena (see pages 177-184).  
In this setting, ascribing conceptual metaphor a (unique) role—that of bridging our 
reasoning system to abstract phenomena—also limits the methodology of doing research 
within Cognitive Linguistics. This focus has major impact on the theory insomuch that 
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metaphorical mapping is examined in terms of the mechanisms which operate in source 
domains. In particular, metaphorical mapping has been studied in terms of the conceptual 
structures such as image schemas (Grady 2005a; Lakoff 1990; Lakoff and Turner 1989) 
and Idealized Cognitive Models (1987); and Conceptual Frames (e.g. Feldman 2006).  
In this respect, this theoretical framework classifies the two phenomena which are 
engaged in metaphorical mapping into two groups: abstract (and complex) target domains, 
which are not subjected to direct experience. The second group includes source domains, 
which are bodily-experienced phenomena and are subjected to direct experience (e.g. 
Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 
2011; Lakoff 1987, 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; 
Szwedek 2011).  
However, we demonstrated in Chapter III that these assumptions are at variance 
with the current data. We showed that the mapping typology which engages bodily-
experienced phenomena in source and target domains posits a challenge to the theoretical 
framework of the embodied approach to metaphor in two ways: first, target domains in this 
type of metaphorical mapping are bodily experienced. Second, certain domains function as 
source and target in different metaphorical mappings.  
Based on these findings, we argued that source and target domains do not show any 
substantial difference in terms of their constitutive nature (see page 164). Indeed, the data 
indicates that the constitutive nature of these domains is virtually identical in that source 
and target domains are grounded in bodily-experienced phenomena.  
These findings unveil an incongruity regarding the theoretical position within the 
embodied approach to metaphor in that source and target domains are strictly delimited in 
the sense that they are directly and indirectly meaningful phenomena, respectively. This 
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criterion, according to which source and target domains are distinguished, does not prove 
reliable (see Chapters I and III). On such view, we claimed that while these tenets are 
applicable to some types of metaphor (see Chapter II), they cannot be used to cover others 
(see Chapter III).  
It is worth noting here that meaning projection has been attributed to the domains 
which are bodily experienced (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2011; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Johnson 
1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1992, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Szwedek 2011). 
Interestingly, target domains in a certain metaphorical mapping typology are also 
bodily-experienced. This means that apart from the fact that the concrete-abstract 
distinction does not hold in the metaphorical mapping typology which is based on bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains, meaning projection may not be 
characterized by a-one-way transfer. 
Taken together, these findings point to a more participating role of target domains in 
the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and 
target domains. Given that target domains in this typology are bodily experienced, we 
hypothesize that target domains also project their conceptual structure onto source domains 
insomuch that their features also contribute actively in the construal of metaphorical 
mapping.  
Accordingly, we further hypothesize that this kind of metaphor has different 
mechanisms for mapping. In this respect, we put forward the following hypothesis: rather 
than attributing source domains a dominating role, we claim that target domains also might 
share with source domains the embodied character of metaphorical mapping. On this view, 
metaphorical mapping is not just setting correspondences between source and target 
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domains based on the experiential basis of the former. Instead, we hypothesize that in 
certain mapping typologies there might be an interface between two bodily-experienced 
phenomena which coordinate in shaping conceptual metaphor. Therefore, in such mapping 
typologies there might be an interactive process between source and target domains rather 
than one-way-meaning transfer. 
To assess whether this type of metaphorical mapping is fundamentally different 
from other types, we need to show that target domains are more dynamic. By doing so, we 
shall be able to uphold our claim against the homogeneity of conceptual metaphor typology 
and its presumable closed set of tenets. That is, if conceptual metaphor does follow 
different principles and patterns, distinct mapping typologies may not satisfy certain tenets 
of the theory of embodiment.  
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to assess (1) whether the experiential basis of 
metaphor is due to bodily features of source and target domains and (2) whether there is 
interaction between source and target domains in mapping across bodily-experienced 
phenomena. In this respect, we propose that metaphorical mapping involves bodily features 
from both domains.  
The approach to metaphor which we propose to analyze this metaphorical mapping 
typology is a dynamic process which encompasses: 
i. Attributing a more participating role to target domains; 
ii. Metaphorical mapping is interaction between source and target domains; and 
iii. This interaction is testable at three levels; language, cognition, and neural system.  
Thereby, rather than being passive, target domains will be attributed a dynamic role 
in metaphorical mapping. Then we can call into question the notion of projecting features 
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of source onto target domains based exclusively on the bodily characteristics (and their 
entailments) of the former.  
These hypotheses reside in the fact that source and target domains share the same 
characteristics that are believed to be inherent to source domains (see Chapter III). Notice 
that the embodiment theory draws its conclusions about metaphor putting major emphasis 
on two characteristics of source domains: being bodily-experienced and being semantically 
autonomous. It is worth noting here that all the patterns and principles of mapping are 
derived from these characteristics. More importantly, engaging semantically autonomous 
phenomena and semantically dependent phenomena is based on the assumption that there is 
features-transfer from source onto target domains. Henceforth, meaning transfer, 
invariance principle, and mapping concrete-onto-abstract patterns.  
In contrast, no clear-cut distinction between source and target domains has been 
observed in the metaphorical mapping that engages two bodily-experienced phenomena 
(see Chapter III). In particular, we did not observe any substantial difference between 
source and target domains in terms of their constitutive nature. However, we do not claim 
that the metaphorical mapping which draws on bodily-experienced phenomena as source 
and target domains is rooted in literal similarity between such phenomena (for contrasting 
views, see e.g. Marks, Hammeal, and Bornstein 1987; McGlone 2003; Miller 1993; 
Murphy 1996).  
In contrast, in Chapter III, we showed how target domains in some instances of 
metaphor are concrete and bodily experienced. This particular finding has led us to question 
some criteria that are proposed within the embodiment theory to explain all conceptual 
metaphors. One such criterion is that metaphorical mapping always engages more concrete 
and abstract phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. Since this pattern has 
198 
 
not been observed in a certain type of metaphorical mapping (see Chapter III), we 
suggested that in this case, metaphor is not analyzed at an adequate level within the 
embodiment theory given that target domains are concrete. Therefore, it is safe to argue that 
target domains also contribute to metaphorical mapping because they are bodily-
experienced and directly meaningful.  
Accordingly, our primary concerns were to show the incongruity that emerges from 
conceiving conceptual metaphor as based on a single mapping typology and to highlight the 
fundamental necessity of refining the tenets of the embodiment theory to cover the 
typology which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains, 
respectively. Furthermore, we demonstrated that in this case source and target domains do 
not present any substantial difference in terms of how they are experienced (see page 164).  
Based on these findings, we put forward the following hypotheses: since source and 
target domains are bodily-experienced in certain types of metaphor, the embodied character 
of conceptual metaphor should not be attributed exclusively to source domains. This could 
mean that one-way-meaning transfer might not characterize this metaphorical mapping 
typology. In this respect, we propose that the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains might draw on the exchange of 
semantic features of these domains.  
Thereby, our tasks in this chapter are (1) to show that source and target domains are 
not substantially different when it comes to their embodied character. This might entail that 
the same mechanisms of experience operate in source and target domains. And (2) we 
suggest that there might be an interaction between source and target domains leading to 
their co-operation in metaphorical mapping.  
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2. Background 
2.1. Interaction Theory (Richards 1936; Black 1962, 1981, 1993; 
Forceville 1996, 2006)  
Interaction Theory (IT) was first brought forward by Richards (1936) to explain 
metaphorical statements. According to him, metaphor is a result of a system which is based 
on three principles: 
i. verbal interaction (Richards: 91-2); 
ii. borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts; and 
iii. a transaction between contexts (Richards: 94). 
Based on these affirmations, IT rests on three aspects of domains of experience 
when they are engaged in metaphorical mapping: linguistic structure, as a manifestation of 
lexical interaction; cognitive structure, as interchange of concepts between semantic fields; 
and contextual relation, as transaction between experiences.  
Notice that in number (i) Richards (1936) puts major focus on the “verbal 
interaction” of metaphor. However, this interaction acquires a deeper dimension in 
surpassing the linguistic level by claiming that, “In asking how language works we ask 
about how thought and feeling and all other modes of the mind’s activity proceed, about 
how we are to learn to live and how that ‘greatest thing of all,’ a command of metaphor…”. 
(Richards: 1936:95).   
Interestingly, a more recent version of the Interaction approach to metaphor puts a 
special emphasis on the fact that in metaphorical statements we identify two different 
subjects: the principal; which is the focus of the metaphor; and the subsidiary. These two 
subjects interplay in metaphor in that,  
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“…the two subjects ‘interact’ in the following ways: (a) the presence of the primary 
subject incites the hearer to select some of the secondary subject’s properties; and 
(b) invites him to construct a parallel implication-complex that can fit the primary 
subject; and (c) reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject” 
(Black 1993:28).  
Accordingly, rather than putting emphasis on how target domains are those which are 
changed, restructured, and partially understood; the two domains are claimed to be involved 
in a process of mutual influence. For instance, Richards (1936:93) argues that, “In the 
simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things 
active together…whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction…(and) depends on what 
the two ideas do to one another. ” 
In addition, Kittay (1987:189) describes metaphorical mapping as a process of 
“adaptation” and “transformation” of domains of experience. A particular feature which 
characterizes this process is that it is based on pre-existing features that the two phenomena 
share (Forceville 1996:11; see also Murphy 1996).  
These arguments seem to comport with our findings in the previous chapter in that 
target domains also include semantic features without being mapped onto other phenomena. 
That is, they are semantically independent because they do not need to be mapped as a sine-
qua-non process to be understood and reasoned about. Thus, the cognitive topology of 
target domains in certain mapping typologies pre-exist the mapping (see page 177 for more 
details).   
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2.2. Conceptual Metaphor and Interaction Theory 
The interaction theory has been claimed to be inadequate to analyze metaphor 
namely because conceptual metaphor is (1) a one-way-meaning transfer; and (2) concrete 
domains are mapped onto abstract domains (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). Johnson and 
Lakoff (2002: 245) further insist that,  
“…meaning is grounded in our sensorimotor experience and that this embodied 
meaning was extended, via imaginative mechanisms such as conceptual metaphor, 
metonymy, radial categories, and various forms of conceptual blending, to shape 
abstract conceptualization and reasoning.”  
There is a strong consensus within Cognitive Linguistics that target domains are by default 
far or initially isolated from the body and source domains fulfill the role of projecting 
semantic features onto them.  
In this respect, a heavy emphasis has been put on source domains in the sense that 
their characteristics ‘constrain’ metaphorical mapping. This excessive focus on source 
domains (and their cognitive topology) has led scholars within this approach to analyze 
metaphorical mappings through the filter of the constitutive nature of source domains, 
hence, embodied metaphor (e.g. Feldman 2006; Gibbs 2011; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson 
and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1987, 1990, 1993; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Szwedek 2011).  
Furthermore, being bodily experienced, a phenomenon has the following 
characteristics: being semantically independent and adequate to project conceptual structure 
onto other phenomena (e.g. Feldman 2006; Lakoff 1993; Szwedek 2011). On the contrary, 
target domains lack these two characteristics in that they are semantically dependent and, 
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consequently, have a passive role in metaphorical mapping—being the repository of the 
cognitive topology of source domains.  
Proceeding on these assumptions, to be eligible for projecting semantic features in 
metaphorical mapping (that is, to function as a source domain), a given phenomenon needs 
to be bodily experienced. In other words, the bodily-based information which is required to 
carry out metaphorical mapping belongs exclusively to source domains (e.g. Feldman 2006; 
Szwedek 2011).  
One of the major problems trying to accommodate the tenets of the embodiment 
theory in the data is that target domains in certain metaphorical mapping typologies are 
bodily experienced. This finding yields at least two important entailments: 
First, following the tenets of the this theory—namely, if a given phenomenon is 
bodily-experienced, it is eligible for projecting semantic features onto other domains—
thereby, these target domains may project semantic features in metaphorical mapping as 
well. For this reason, we postulate that in this type of the metaphorical mapping both source 
and target domains project onto each other bodily-based features, leading to semantic 
changes in both domains. That is, they interact (Black 1993). 
2.3. Blending Theory 
Approaching metaphorical mapping from an interactionist perspective stands in 
opposition to the cross-domain-mapping approach but not strictly so to Blending theory 
(Fauconnier and Turner 1996, 2002, 2007; Turner and Fauconnier 1995, 2000). This theory 
emerged as complementary to the conceptual metaphor theory whose mechanisms cannot 
cope with certain metaphors (Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 2007:422; Valenzuela, 
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2009:311-312). In this respect, it does not look at metaphor as cross-domain mapping. 
Instead, metaphor within this approach is based on conceptual integration. 
According to Ruiz de Mendoza and Peña (2005:250-252), though mental space and 
cross-domain mapping theories are essentially complementary; they differ at least in two 
ways. First, meaning projection across domains is basically a theory of meaning 
representation; but Blending theory entertains meaning construction. Second, while the 
theory of meaning projection takes domains as the basic units of analysis, blending theory 
focuses on mental spaces.  
Similarly, Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007) assure that the two frameworks 
address different aspects of metaphorical mapping. According to them (2007:436), the two 
frameworks are largely complementary in that Blending theory “seeks to model the 
dynamic evolution of speakers’ on-line representations”. In contrast, Conceptual Metaphor 
theory entertains “stable knowledge structures represented in long-term memory.”   
One difference between one-way-meaning projection and blending theory which we 
will pay close attention to in the data analysis is that, the first approach argues that the set 
of features of source domains is maintained and projected onto target domains (e.g. Lakoff 
1990:54). In contrast, the second approach holds that the two domains project semantic 
features onto mental spaces to construct conceptual metaphor. A piece of evidence for this 
claim is what Fauconnier and Turner (2007:366-368) refer to as emergent structure. That 
is, according to Fauconnier and Turner (1996, 2002, 2007) and Turner and Fauconnier 
(1995, 2000), a blended space may contain 'emergent' structure not found in any of the 
input spaces (see also Roldán-Riejos and Úbeda Mansilla 2013:109). To illustrate, the 
blended space in the metaphor ‘They dug their own financial grave.’ shows an emergent 
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structure that “does not reside in any of the inputs.”(Fauconnier and Turner 2007:362; 
Turner 2011: 12-16; Coulson 2008:181).  
Furthermore, Fauconnier and Turner (2007:370) argue that this emergent structure 
is the outcome of cognitive activities such as composition, completion, and elaboration (for 
more details on these mental activities, see Fauconnier and Turner 2007:369).  
Cross-domain mapping theory, on the other hand, sustains that metaphorical 
mapping keeps the same conceptual structure of the source domain. Accordingly, Lakoff 
(1990:54) argues that, “…metaphors in general preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the 
image-schematic structure) of the source domain.” (see also, Lakoff 1993:215). 
Blending theory, on the other hand, suggests that the two conceptual inputs are 
projected to the blended space (Fauconnier and Turner 2007; Turner 2011). As shown in 
the previous chapter, within the embodied approach to metaphor, a major focus has been 
put on source domains, especially on its experiential basis. For instance, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980:19) assure that, “[...] no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even 
adequately represented independently of its experiential basis [...]”.  
In this respect, all the information we need to map two phenomena in a conceptual 
metaphor is grounded in source domains. As a result, the experiential basis of metaphor is 
fully attributed to source domains (e.g. Feldman 2006; Szwedek 2011).  
This situation has led to a shallow understanding of target domains; and 
consequently, to a lack of understanding the potential paradigms of different metaphorical 
mapping typologies.  
In the previous chapter, we noticed that the type of the metaphorical mapping which 
may follow different patterns and principles is the typology which draws on bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains. This, in turn, means that target 
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domains do have conceptual structures. They may not merely replicate the conceptual 
structure of source domains; instead, they may interact with them.   
Based on our analysis of the data so far in the thesis, conceptual metaphor is not a 
cognitive phenomenon which can successfully be studied while marginalizing target 
domains. Source domains should not be the sole locus of the embodied approach to 
metaphor. Neither should be the embodied character of conceptual metaphor entirely 
attributed to source domains. In particular, in the mapping typology which engages two 
bodily-experienced phenomena, target domains also contribute to the embodied character 
of conceptual metaphor.  
These findings lead us to question the assumption that metaphorical mapping 
always engages more concrete and more abstract domains as source and target, respectively 
(see chapter I and III). 
2.4. Synaesthetic metaphor  
Rakova (2003:48-54) reports a kind of metaphor that can hardly fit into the 
framework of Embodiment Theory. She claims that this group of metaphors is 
physiologically motivated. On the other hand, based on findings in neurophysiology 
(Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a, b), Rakova conducted a research on polyseme and 
word meanings. She observes that a polysemous adjective does not include one literal 
meaning and all the other meanings are metaphorically derivative (Rakova 2003:139). 
Rather, some polysemous adjectives reveal synaesthetic metaphors, where all the words in 
a semantic field bear information across sensory modalities.  
In close connection with the notion that the meanings of a given polysemous 
adjective are literal, Kittay (1987:113) argues that, “For many, if not most terms, polysemy 
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cannot be reduced by appealing to a distinction between a primary and a derived meaning.” 
(for contrasting views on polysemy, see Barcelona and Valenzuela 2011: 21-22; Gibbs 
1994:9-10). 
Relevant to our discussion here, the experiential character of this metaphorical 
mapping typology is not exclusively grounded in source domains. Instead, this typology 
recruits information from source and target modalities (Rakova 2003:48). For instance, 
synaesthetic metaphor epitomizes a phenomenon that when we experience sensations in 
one modality, a second modality is stimulated giving rise to mapping two sensory 
experiences (Rakova 2003:48).  
Rakova grounds her argument in the fact that in “synaesthetic metaphor” and 
“double function adjectives” there is no transfer of the conceptual structure of source onto 
target domains. Rather, this type of metaphor makes a direct association between different 
sensory modalities (Rakova 2003:40). Accordingly, the conceptual structures of target and 
source domains are literal; hence there is more “literalness” in metaphors than that is being 
suggested in Cognitive Linguistics (Rakova 2003:183). 
As shown in Chapter III, within the embodied approach to metaphor, a major focus 
has been put on source domains, especially on its experiential basis. For instance, Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980:19) assure that, “[...] no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even 
adequately represented independently of its experiential basis [...]”.  
In this respect, all the information that we need to map two phenomena in a 
conceptual metaphor is grounded in source domains; in particular, their bodily-based 
conceptual structure. Accordingly, the tenets of this approach have been elaborated in 
accordance with this theoretical position. As a result, the experiential basis of metaphor is 
fully attributed to source domains.  
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Due to the fact that target domains are also bodily experienced, we propose an 
alternative paradigm for features-transfer to examine the metaphorical mapping typology 
which is based on two bodily-experienced phenomena. We suggest that in this mapping 
typology there is exchange of bodily-based features between source and target domains.  
A particular finding that lends support to our hypothesis is the fact that target 
domains in this metaphorical mapping typology show some of the characteristics of source 
domains (see Chapter III). In this setting, we demonstrated how this mapping typology does 
not follow some of the basic tenets that conceptual metaphor theory stands on. Namely, 
principles and patterns of mapping such as “Uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping”, 
“mapping concrete onto abstract domains” as the only typology characterizing metaphorical 
mapping, and “Meaning transfer based on the experiential character of source domains” are 
not observed (see Chapter III).  
Furthermore, we observed in Chapter I how concrete-onto-abstract mapping is not 
the only pattern that characterizes metaphorical mapping. Another notion which is 
intrinsically related to this principle is meaning projection. Within the embodied approach 
to metaphor, this pattern hinges on the following two premises: (1) a bodily-experienced 
phenomenon which inherently functions as source domain and a non-bodily-experienced 
phenomenon which takes on its default role as target domain. And (2) mapping source and 
target phenomena is based on meaning projection: the phenomenon which takes on the role 
of source is the starting point of the projection process and the one which functions as 
target is the repository of this projection (e.g. Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Szwedek 2011).    
Accordingly, the process of projection is engendered by the bodily-based 
information of source domains. The problem arises when the two phenomena do have 
bodily-based information, which is required to initiate the process of projecting features 
208 
 
from source onto target domains. Particularly, in the metaphorical mapping typology which 
engages two bodily-experienced phenomena both source and target domains are eligible to 
instigate this process because both do have this bodily-based information.  
Being so, we hypothesize that the two phenomena project in metaphorical mapping. 
That is, since the bodily-based information is also observed in target domains in this 
mapping typology, one-way-meaning projection might not be observed. Furthermore, target 
domain does not need to be mapped as a sine-qua-non process to be understood and 
reasoned about. This is due to the fact that these domains are semantically independent (see 
Chapter III for more details).   
Based on these findings, we suggest that this metaphorical mapping typology 
involves interaction between source and target domains. In the previous chapter, we 
demonstrated that the conditions that are presumably inherent to source domains also are 
observed in target domains. Accordingly, they, 
i. are bodily experienced, 
ii. do have conceptual structures prior to metaphorical mapping, 
iii. and are semantically autonomous.  
These findings indicate that source and target domains do not have inherent features 
to legitimize them for fulfilling default roles in metaphorical mappings.  
3. Data analysis 
Meaning projection via metaphorical mapping requires a bodily-experienced 
phenomenon which both includes semantic features to be projected and is the initial point 
of the projection process (e.g. Feldman 2006; Szwedek 2011).  
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Our major hypothesis rests on the fact that since metaphorical mapping in the data 
employs couples of bodily-experienced domains, and given that target domains in this type 
of metaphorical mapping are also bodily experienced, we suggest that both domains project 
bodily-based features onto each other. Because this metaphorical mapping typology is 
different from mapping concrete onto abstract phenomena (see the previous chapter), its 
analysis may need a different approach. In particular, we need to take into account also the 
characteristics of target domains –namely, their experiential basis- which may be specific to 
this type of mapping.  
In order to show that source and target domains share with source domains the 
experiential basis of conceptual metaphor, we need to prove that the constitutive natures of 
source and target domains are essentially identical. In the following section we shall 
analyze target domains paying special attention to their eligibility for projecting meaning 
onto other domains. 
3.1. From projection to interaction 
One of the main principles of one-way-meaning projection is that there is always 
feature transfer from source onto target domains. In addition, according to this approach, 
the operating features in (and leading to) metaphorical mapping are those features which 
inherently belong to source domains.  
Due to the fact that target domains are also bodily experienced, we propose an 
alternative approach for one-way-features transfer to examine the data. We shall argue that 
source and target domains project bodily-based information onto each other in the 
metaphorical mapping typology which is based on bodily-experienced phenomena as 
source and target.  
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To claim for an interaction-based metaphorical mapping, we have to show that 
target domains also project their conceptual structure onto source domains. We suggest that 
in this type of metaphorical mapping there is interaction between source and target 
domains. Namely, we showed that the principles and patterns such as “Uni-directionality of 
metaphorical mapping”, “mapping concrete onto abstract domains” as the only typology 
which characterizes metaphorical mapping, and “Meaning transfer based on the 
experiential character of source domains” are not observed in all the instances of metaphor 
that we have analyzed so far in the data. Accordingly, the main finding in the previous 
chapter is that conceptual metaphors do not show these patterns and principles of mapping 
in some of its instances. 
In addition, the experiential basis of metaphor should not be attributed only to 
source domains in the metaphorical mapping that engages two bodily-experienced 
phenomena. One way to support our claim is to demonstrate that target domains also 
project perceptual knowledge in metaphorical mapping. Because target domains also are 
experienced bodily, our hypothesis is that these domains also project when they are 
engaged in metaphorical mapping. In particular, we propose that target domains do not just 
replicate the conceptual structure of source domains.  
Under these assumptions, the embodied character in metaphorical mapping which 
engages two bodily-experienced phenomena dwells on the (embodied) character of source 
and target domains.  
In the following section, we shall show how this character should be equally 
attributed to source and target domains. In this respect, we shall attempt to demonstrate that 
an interactionist approach to metaphor will attribute an active role to target domains. For 
instance, given that source and target domains in this type of metaphorical mapping are 
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bodily experienced, metaphor here might be based on the interaction between the two 
phenomena rather than meaning transfer from source onto target domains.  
3.1.1. On-line and off-line reasoning and meaning-transfer 
principle 
Since the inception of the embodied approach to metaphor, a major focus has been 
put on source domains in that metaphorical mapping hinges exclusively on the experience 
of the latter. As a result, the experiential basis of metaphor is fully attributed to source 
domains (e.g. Szwedek 2011).  
Meanwhile, target domains are believed to be inherently abstract and inaccessible to 
the sense organ; hence, they are not eligible for projecting meaning. 
On-line and off-line reasoning may not be observed in the metaphorical mapping 
typology we are concerned with in this chapter. Let us examine how source and target 
domains are assumed to be processed within the embodied approach to metaphor and assess 
whether they are identically processed. This will help us assess whether the experiential 
basis of metaphor can be equally attributed to source and target domains. In this respect, we 
need to demonstrate that bodily features from both domains are active in the metaphorical 
mapping.  
One of the direct assumptions of attributing source and target domains inherent 
features, which allow them to carry out their respective roles, is that source and target 
domains are processed differently. Whereas processing source domains (bodily-
experienced phenomena) is claimed to be on-line, that of target domains is assumed to be 
inherently off-line.  
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It is argued within the embodied approach to metaphor (e.g. Lakoff 1987:303) that 
our experience of source domains consists of a direct involvement of the mechanisms of the 
body. To elaborate on this point, let us consider the following metaphor: Love Is Journey 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980:44-45) 
Look how far we’ve come. 
We’re at a crossroads 
We’ll just have to go our separate ways.  
In this metaphor, we map our experience of Journey onto the domain Love. 
According to the embodied approach to metaphor, our reasoning of source and target 
domains is on-line and off-line, respectively. That is, our reasoning of the phenomena 
which are accessible to the sense organ is direct. On the other hand, reasoning about the 
phenomena which are inaccessible to the sense organ is indirect.  
In this setting, the domain Love is processed off-line via the domain Journey. This 
again seems to be based on the notion that all target domains are abstract and indirectly 
meaningful (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:118).  
Our initial step toward showing that one-way-meaning transfer does not 
characterize the mapping which involves two bodily-experienced phenomena, consists of 
assessing whether reasoning of target is identical to that of source domains. A piece of 
evidence which supports this claim is the fact that target domains, which are bodily 
experienced in this mapping typology, have conceptual structure, are directly meaningful, 
and are semantically independent (see page 177). That is, they do not need to be engaged in 
metaphorical mapping to be meaningful (see the previous chapter). This means that our 
reasoning about them is on-line too. Let us consider the following metaphor to illustrate 
this point: 
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Sound Is Touch 
Her voice was always soft—an excellent thing in women. 
In this metaphor, both source and target domains are bodily-experienced phenomena. Since 
we reason about them independently of each other—that is, our understanding of these 
domains takes place outside metaphorical mapping—it is safe to claim that our reasoning 
about them is on-line. It is worth noting here that in Chapter II we outlined the entailments 
which are intrinsically related to one-way-meaning-transfer principle. That is, if our 
reasoning about the target domain Sound pre-exists the metaphorical mapping Sound Is 
Touch, then, following the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor, this mapping 
would not be necessary from a cognitive point of view. More precisely, in order to reason 
about the domain Sound, we do not resort to the cognitive topology of the domain Touch. If 
these domains have their own constituents and inferences before the mapping is built, then 
metaphorical mapping would add nothing to our conceptualization of the target domains.  
Rakova (2003:26-28) anticipates this problem by suggesting that in metaphorical 
mapping, we reason about a phenomenon in a different way. Accordingly, these domains 
exist before their engagement in metaphorical mappings (for a detailed analysis of this 
point, see Chapter III).  
In her analysis of Love Is Journey, she further observes that we do have the concept 
of Love before the two domains are mapped. Nonetheless, with the mapping, we get a new 
‘grasp’ of the concept love (Rakova 2003:26). Therefore, the concepts of the two domains 
are meaningful outside metaphorical mapping. This finding upholds the claim that target 
domains are processed online because these domains are semantically independent as they 
have their own cognitive topology independently of metaphorical mappings.  
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In this respect, the cognitive topology of the target domain Love includes lovers, 
love-relationship, and a (common) purpose. This observation refutes the assumption that 
we cannot understand target domains without our understanding of source domains. Again, 
this would mean that our reasoning of target domains is not always off-line.  
This observation becomes even more obvious when one takes into account 
synaesthetic metaphor (see page 184). That is, when two modalities are mapped (e.g. the 
auditory modality as source domain and the visual modality as target domain), it does not 
mean that our understanding of source modality (audition) precedes our understanding of 
target modality (vision), nor is this target modality semantically dependent on its 
counterpart (see the previous chapter).  
It follows from this that we cannot differentiate source and target domains in terms 
of off-line and on-line reasoning. It is worth noting here that we demonstrated in the 
previous chapter that if target domains are bodily-experienced phenomena, then it means 
that they have literal meaning outside metaphorical mapping. If they have literal meaning, 
then they do have conceptual structure outside metaphorical mapping. Again, this further 
indicates that source and target domains in the metaphorical mapping which engages two 
bodily-experienced phenomena, the reasoning process is on-line.   
In this section we have shown that our processing of source and target domains is 
identical in that it is on-line in both cases. In the following sections we shall focus on the 
cognitive mechanisms which operate when we process bodily-experienced phenomena.  
3.1.2. Categorization process in interaction-based metaphor 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) and Johnson and Lakoff (2002) pursued the 
functioning of metaphor and demonstrated that this cognitive processing is part and parcel 
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of our reasoning system to categorize abstract phenomena. More importantly, this 
categorization process is carried out through embodying abstract phenomena (e.g. Szwedek 
2011). In line with these findings Glucksberg and Keysar (1993:406-12) argue that 
metaphors are “assertions of categorization”.  
However, based on the analysis of the data, conceptual metaphor seems to have a 
deeper function than have previously been postulated. Conceptual metaphor plays a crucial 
role not just in non-bodily-experienced phenomena (see pages 177-184) but also in 
assigning new conceptual categories to bodily-experienced phenomena. An example of this 
includes mapping across sensory modalities (see page 159); mapping across images (see 
page 266), and multi-mapping (see page 222).  
Given that the phenomena which are engaged in this type of metaphorical mapping 
are bodily experienced, it is safe then to assume that they have semantic categories without 
being mapped (see the previous section). Therefore, we postulate that, through 
metaphorical mapping, the categorization process can be looked at in terms of three main 
cognitive functions: categorizing, further-categorizing or re-categorizing target 
phenomena.  
These observations may have at least two related entailments: first, metaphorical 
mapping is not as crucial for our understanding of bodily-experienced phenomena as it is 
for abstract ones. A piece of evidence for this claim is that bodily-experienced phenomena 
can be processed independently of other phenomena. This is also evident in the linguistic 
and cognitive structures of these bodily-experienced phenomena in that our reasoning 
system does not require the linguistic and cognitive topologies of other domains as the only 
way to access such phenomena. 
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Second, the core cognitive function of conceptual metaphor is not only to categorize 
the target domains which lack semantic categories, but also those which are already 
categorized.  
These findings contradict the general assumption that we resort to metaphor so as to 
reason about abstract phenomena. Instead, conceptual metaphor also plays a significant role 
in reasoning about bodily-experienced phenomena (see the previous chapter).  
It is worth noting that when metaphorical mapping is based on two bodily-
experienced phenomena, the categorization process shows a significant difference. We shall 
argue that in this case, using conceptual metaphor, we further-categorize or re-categorize 
bodily-experienced phenomena.  
Therefore, from a functional point of view, the dynamics that operate in the 
metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target 
domains can be captured under three main cognitive tasks:  categorizing, further-
categorizing, and re-categorizing. The classification of these processes highly depends on 
the type of the phenomena which take on the roles of source and target.  
In the case of the metaphorical mapping which is based on two bodily-experienced 
phenomena, we observe three main cognitive activities: categorizing, further-categorizing 
and re-categorizing. In order to show how these cognitive tasks operate differently in 
metaphorical mapping, in the following section we shall explore in which typology each of 
these tasks may be observed.  
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3.1.3. Categorizing abstract phenomena through metaphorical 
mapping 
According to Glucksberg (2008:80), when they are figuratively understood, certain 
phenomena maintain a class-inclusion relationship where “…the vehicle concept is an ideal 
exemplar of the category it represents.” We shall argue in this section that this process 
concerns mostly the metaphorical mapping which involves bodily and non-bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. Recall that in the 
previous section we argued that target domains in this type of metaphorical mapping do not 
have bodily-based semantic categories. In this case, source domains do belong to a category 
whereas target domains acquire a given category via their mappings onto other (bodily-
experienced) phenomena. This seems to be the case in the following metaphor: 
Time Is Money (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:7) 
You are wasting my time. 
This gadget will save you hours.  
While the source domain Money has an established category (commodity), the 
target domain Time—without being mapped onto other phenomena such as Money—goes 
uncategorized (though we do not necessarily claim that the concept of time does not exist 
before the mapping).  
Mapping the domain Time onto different domains may be due to the fact that this 
domain does not have an established cognitive topology. For instance, Time is mapped onto 
(limited) Resource, and onto (valuable) Commodity (see Figure 4). As the two examples 
above indicate, the cognitive topologies of these source domains come to characterize the 
target domain, Time.  
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Other metaphorical mappings that show this pattern include Time Is a Changer 
(Lakoff and Turner 1989:40-43), Time Is a Destroyer (42), and Time Is Pursuer (64).  
Based on this analysis, it becomes clear that unless the domain Time is mapped onto 
other bodily-experienced phenomena, it does not have a semantic category. The mapping, 
then, entails ascribing target domains—such as Time—a given category, which they would 
not acquire otherwise. 
Unlike these examples, mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena involves 
source and target domains that do have semantic categories outside metaphorical mapping 
(see the previous chapter). This means that the categorization process in this case might be 
different. Therefore, we shall argue that in this case, target domains can be further or re-
categorized. 
3.1.4. Further-categorizing 
This process is recurring in the mapping which engages two phenomena which are 
processed within the same modality. An example of such mapping includes, 
My wife…whose waist is an hourglass (Lakoff and Turner 1989:91). 
In this case, source and target domains are perceptual (see the section on image 
metaphor). More importantly, the two domains do have semantic categories independently 
of metaphorical mapping. Then, this mapping leads to further categorize a body-part 
(waist) in terms of the shape of Hourglass. That is, in this metaphorical mapping we focus 
on the visual characteristics (namely, shape) of this body part which—though it is 
categorized independently of metaphorical mapping—now it is further-categorized via 
metaphorical mapping. 
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This means that the two domains have their own categories before the two 
phenomena are engaged in metaphorical mapping (see the previous chapter). A piece of 
evidence is that initially we think of these two domains as different semantic categories. 
And through mapping them, our reasoning gets further in the categorization process 
concerning the target. Thus, when we map this domain onto other bodily-experienced 
phenomena, we get at a further level in the process of categorizing target phenomena.  
Furthermore, this categorizing process might also be observed in the type of 
metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced and non-bodily-experienced 
phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. Let us analyze the following 
metaphor to assess how further-categorization operates in this type of metaphorical 
mapping: 
Give me time 
In this metaphor, Time is viewed in terms of Commodity. Accordingly, it is 
transferable. We argue that initially, this metaphor did not include the property of 
transferability. This means that further-categorization is observed when a given 
phenomenon is categorized in terms of the aspects of the source domains which initially do 
not operate in metaphorical mapping (see page 130). 
3.1.5. Re-categorizing 
As shown in the previous section, target domains could be further-categorized 
within the same semantic category. We argued that this phenomenon is observed when the 
target domain is categorized within the same modality. On the contrary, we suggest that the 
re-categorizing process in metaphorical mapping is observed when the two phenomena are 
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processed initially in different modalities. To illustrate this point, let us consider the 
following examples: 
(1) Sharp taste.  
(2) Heavy smell. 
In (1) and (2) we map modality of Tactile (sharp) onto Gustation (taste) and the 
somatosensory modality (heavy) onto the olfactory modality (smell), respectively. Because 
the target domains in these two metaphors are processed within different modalities, they 
acquire new semantic categories. This process is different from further-categorizing and re-
categorizing processes in that the former is observed when we process an experience in a 
different modality. In contrast, further-categorizing and re-categorizing processes occur 
when target domains are semantically independent (see Table 5). That is, this process is 
observed when a given experience acquires a new category through mapping two 
modalities.  
Rakova (2003:26) anticipates that when we use metaphor to conceptualize a given 
phenomenon, we do not gain a new fact, but a new way to grasp it. As a result, though 
(target) Gustatory and Olfactory modalities do have semantic categories without being 
mapped onto other phenomena, through metaphorical mapping they acquire a new 
‘unconventional’ semantic category; hence, the re-categorizing process. 
Based on the embodied approach to metaphor, we showed that the embodied 
character of source domains dwells on three major principles. First, source domains are 
processed on-line: they require a direct involvement of the sense organ. Second, because 
they are accessible to the sense organ, they include the information which is projected onto 
target domains. These two principles are met by all domains that function as source in 
metaphorical mappings. In this setting, target domains also satisfy these two principles as 
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they are bodily-experienced. It follows then, that target domains—when they are accessed 
by the sense organ and include the categorizing information—could also project meaning 
onto other domains.  
Based on these findings, we propose an interactional approach to metaphor that 
engages bodily-based information from source and target domains. In what follows, we 
shall see how an interaction approach could fit this metaphorical mapping typology. First, 
we shall overview the Interaction theory, how it is opposed by the embodiment theory. 
Later, we shall outline how our proposal differs from Interaction Theory of metaphor 
proposed by Black (1962, 1981, 1993).   
3.2. Interaction Theory  
So far in this chapter we have been outlining the mechanisms that operate in bodily-
experienced phenomena. In this respect, we identified three main cognitive tasks which are 
carried out in the mapping typology which draws on bodily-experienced phenomena as 
source and target domains.  
In this section, we shall review the Interaction theory put forward by Richards 
(1936), Black (1962, 1981, 1993), and further developed by Kittay (1987) and Forceville 
(1996, 2006). Our purpose here is to show how metaphorical mapping is understood within 
this approach and how it is different from one-way-meaning transfer. Later, we shall 
propose two cognitive aspects which might characterize the interaction process between 
source and target domains— bi-directionality based mapping (see page 83) and emergent 
structure (Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Turner 2011). These two aspects could be taken as 
strong evidence that supports the notion that certain mapping typologies are based on 
interaction of source and target domains rather than on one-way-meaning transfer.  
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3.2.1. Bi-directionality of mapping as evidence of interaction 
We demonstrated in the first chapter that uni-directionality is the core principle of 
metaphorical mapping. That is, meaning projection in metaphorical mapping is based on 
uni-directionality (see Chapter I). In Chapter II we explored how this principle is not 
observed in certain metaphorical mapping typologies. Accordingly, we argued that the 
entailments of this principle are not observed in those typologies (see Chapter III). In 
particular, bi-directionality-based metaphor is observed in the metaphorical mapping which 
engages bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains (perhaps further 
research could reveal that this is not always the case). Let us analyze the following example 
to show this point:   
 Man is a wolf (Forceville 1996:11). 
Forceville (1996:11) argues that both source and target domains in this instance of 
metaphor undergo a certain semantic change. First, the two domains should be adapted to 
each other in the sense that some characteristics of Man are adapted to the domain Wolf. 
However, in order to make possible such mapping, there is also an adaptation process of the 
domain Wolf to the domain Man in that the former acquires some human features via this 
metaphorical mapping (1996:11). This means that the locus of this metaphorical mapping, 
as strictly understood by the term, does not fall on Man. Therefore, the metaphorical 
mapping in this case does not concern only projecting meaning from Wolf onto Man. 
Instead, conceptual metaphor in this case also causes semantic changes in the source 
domain Wolf.  
As mentioned before there are two main principles that are met by phenomena to be 
eligible for fulfilling the function of source domain: being accessible to the sense organ (see 
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page 211) and including categorizing information (see pages 214-219). That is, both Wolf 
and Man satisfy the two principles. Consequently, they are eligible for projecting meaning 
in this metaphorical mapping typology. Relevant to this point, in the previous chapter we 
demonstrated that target domains share with source domains characteristics such as being 
bodily experienced and semantically independent.  
Another piece of evidence for the fact that these domains project meaning in this 
mapping typology is that they exchange their roles in different metaphorical mappings. To 
illustrate, let us consider the following examples: 
Building Is Human Being 
(1)My flat looks out on Central Park.  
Human Being Is Building 
(2)Amino acids are the building blocks of the proteins and these building blocks of 
muscles. 
Human Is Machine 
(3)The Labour Party machine is running smoothly. 
Machine Is Human 
(4)These sports utility vehicles are real gas guzzlers. 
Human Is Plant 
(5)The FBI planted informers in the Mafia. 
Plant Is Human 
(6)No one realized that James was a KGB plant.  
As the data shows, the two domains project meaning in metaphorical mapping. The 
fact that the mapping can be reversed is particularly indicative of this point. That is, we 
understand Human being in terms of Building, Building in terms of Human being, Human 
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being in terms of Machine, Machine in terms of Human being, Human being in terms of 
Plant, and Plant in terms of Human being. Similarly, Man is Wolf (Forceville 1996:11) 
could be reversed. It is worth noting here that Building, Human, Machine, and Plant 
function as source and target domains (see Chapter III for how this finding does not fit the 
tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor).  
It is obvious that the inferences that we draw from each metaphorical mapping in 
the examples above are different. For instance, when we map Building onto Human and 
when we map Human onto Building lead to different inferences. That is, mapping Human 
onto Machine in (2) and Machine onto Human in (3) leads to different inferences. 
Moreover, (3) and (4) follow the same pattern of mapping in that the two metaphors are 
two instances of engaging two semantically independent and bodily-experienced 
phenomena.  
Notice that when we map Building onto different domains, the inferences which are 
drawn may be different. For instance, let us compare these two metaphors: 
Human Being Is Building 
Amino acids are the building blocks of the proteins and these building blocks of 
muscles. 
Activity Is Building 
We can’t stop the flooding that way so we have to go back to the drawing board.  
In the two examples, Building interacts with Human and Activity via different constituents. 
In the first, the constituents that trigger the interaction are basic components of Building. 
However, in the second example, Human interacts with Activity via another element 
(drawing board) that is indirectly associated to Building.    
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From this, it becomes clear that a given domain does not interact with different 
domains in the same way. The same domain, when it interacts in different metaphorical 
mappings, the interaction involves different constituents. Consequently, different kinds of 
interaction induce different inferences and entailments (see the following chapter). 
When a given domain is mapped onto various domains, leading to different 
inferences, is strong evidence for its interaction. Put differently, mapping a given domain 
does not consist of transferring the same bodily-based features onto target domains. 
Depending on the target domain, certain bodily-based information is transferred (see also 
Mouton 2012). This means that target domains actively participate in the construction of 
metaphorical mappings. Still, given that these inferences are different indicates that this 
mapping typology is not based on one-way-meaning transfer. Rather, there is an interface 
where target domains fulfill an active role in the construction of metaphorical mapping.   
Based on the data, the interacting elements in a given domain are not the same 
whenever this domain interacts with others, which may explain why metaphorical mapping 
is always partial. That is, this set of elements is not fixed whenever a given domain is 
engaged in metaphorical mapping. The features which are salient are not always the same 
whenever a domain is engaged in metaphorical mapping (see also Giora 2003). For 
instance, when we reason about the domain Love in terms of Drug, Disease, Magic etc. we 
do not only focus on a closed set of inferences that is ready to be mapped onto such 
domains. Rather, the inferences are created in both domains in an interactive process 
between the two phenomena. Hence, the features of a domain are not inherently determined 
before the mappings.  
These findings contradict the embodied approach to metaphor in that the latter is 
based on the fact that the features of a given phenomenon ascribe to the latter an inherent 
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role in metaphorical mapping (see the previous chapter). However, the data shows that this 
is not the case in certain metaphorical mapping typologies.  
We insisted before on the necessity of taking bi-directionality-based metaphor as an 
interactive process where source and target domains interchange the role of source and 
target. In this type of metaphorical mapping, we need to take into account the two instances 
where these pairs interact. The instances (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) should not be dealt 
with as individual, isolated, and different metaphors. Instead, the two instances in each 
example shape our understanding source and target domains in the interaction process that 
engages the two phenomena. Accordingly, mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena 
is more productive from a cognitive point of view than other mapping typologies. Probably 
this may be due to the fact that bodily-experienced phenomena can easily exchange the 
roles they take on in metaphorical mapping (for instance, we map Building onto Human 
and Human onto Building).  
This pattern is not frequent when one takes into account, for example, literary 
metaphor (see page 274). That is, if we map Juliet onto the Sun, we hardly find examples of 
metaphor where the domain Sun is mapped onto Juliet.  
3.2.2. Emergent structure in metaphorical mapping: evidence of 
interaction between source and target domains 
As stated before, Blending theory and Conceptual Metaphor Theory coincide in 
major aspects of the analysis of metaphorical mapping (see pages 202). However, Emergent 
Structure is an aspect where the two approaches differ: whereas meaning projection across 
domains is limited to transferring the inherent conceptual structure of source onto target 
domains (e.g. Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; 
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Szwedek 2011), Blending Theory is not based only on the conceptual structure of source 
domains. Instead, conceptual metaphor engages inputs from both source and target domains 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2007; see also Roldán-Riejos and Úbeda Mansilla 2013:109-110).  
As shown in the pervious chapter, the metaphorical mapping which is based on two 
bodily-experienced phenomena posits a challenge to the tenets of the embodied approach to 
metaphor. In this respect, we argued that when target domain is bodily experienced, it is 
eligible for projecting meaning in metaphorical mapping. These findings are at accordance 
with those reported within the Blending theory in that conceptual metaphor engages inputs 
from both domains (e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 2007). 
Another significant difference which we observed while analyzing the data is that, 
"The projection of the structure to the blend is selective" (Fauconnier and Turner 
2007:366). In contrast, cross-domain mapping theory assures that the mapping is 
unconscious (e.g. Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; 
Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999).  
Moreover, the two theories do not agree on how the inference of a given metaphor 
is built. That is, the Blending theory sustains that the blend is not predictable taking into 
account the inputs from both domains (Fauconnier and Turner 2007:362). However, one-
way-meaning transfer adopts the assumption that the mapping is predictable in some cases 
since some metaphorical mappings are based on resemblance and co-relation (e.g. Grady 
2007).  
To show how these different methodologies arise from theoretical differences taken 
in the two approaches, let us consider the following metaphor, My surgeon was a butcher, 
which is analyzed within the two approaches: first we consider the analysis within the 
Embodied Metaphor theory. 
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(To view how blending theory represents analytically this metaphor, see e.g. Grady, 
Oakley, and Coulson 2007:423). 
Thus, according to cross-domain-mapping approach, the elements of source domain 
systematically correspond to their counterparts in the target domain (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2011; 
Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1990, 1993; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). Correspondingly, meaning representation in this 
metaphor presumably makes use of the inherent features of the source domain Butcher. As 
Figure 9 shows, the features of the source domain Butchery which are mapped onto the 
target domain Surgery include Animal, Commodity, and Cleaver.  
Though the Blending theory explains this metaphor differently, namely in terms of 
blending rather than cross-domain mapping, the inferences which are drawn from this 
metaphor are common to both approaches—incompetence, carelessness, and sloppiness. It 
is worth noting here that these characteristics do not belong to the source domain Butchery 
as inherent features (Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 2007:422).  
More importantly, the ontological correspondence between the two domains does 
not show that the characteristic incompetence is active in the mapping. While this feature 
does not seem to be inherent to the source domain Butchery, cross-domain mapping 
Figure 9 Interaction between two bodily-experienced phenomena 
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approach does not show how this characteristic becomes the focus of the metaphorical 
mapping.  
On the contrary, Blending theory analyzes this metaphor in terms of mental spaces 
suggesting that in this metaphorical mapping there are four mental spaces. Source and 
target spaces, a generic space where the common features of source and target inputs are 
projected, and a mental space where the blend takes place (Fauconnier and Turner 
2007:366).  
However, this theory sustains that incompetence does not belong to either source or 
target domain; rather, it is an emergent structure which is due to the blended space which is 
made up of source and target inputs. On their view, Fauconnier and Turner (2007:366) and 
Turner (2011:15), the blend space may lead to an emergent structure whose content does 
not initially belong to either input. They further assure that this emergent structure is 
evident in the concept, incompetence, which does not necessary belong to either source or 
target input.  
The fact that the Blending theory explains this phenomenon as an emergent 
structure, which incorporates a new way of conceptualizing target domain and which does 
not belong to either source or target domain, is questionable as this characteristic could fit 
perfectly well the two domains in that from a semantic point of view incompetent surgeon 
and incompetent butcher are equally acceptable (see the examples below).  
In the previous chapter, we demonstrated that certain metaphorical mapping 
typologies do not follow the tenets of the embodied approach in that source and target 
domains do not consist of inherent features in terms of the concrete-abstract criterion (see 
the previous chapter). Cross-domain mapping assures that meaning transfer is based on 
mapping elements of the source domain onto their counterparts in the target. To further 
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support the claim that this mapping typology does not fit into the tenets of the embodied 
approach to metaphor, we paid special attention to Surgery Is Butchery and Butchery Is 
Surgery (see on page 149on page 149). 
We observed that this typology does not fit into the cross-domain mapping 
approach mainly for two reasons. First, both Butchery and Surgery function as source and 
target domains in different metaphorical mappings. The feature (in)competence is operating 
in both metaphors. In (1), the focus is the incompetence of the surgeon while in (2), the 
inference concerns the competence of the butcher. This means that the two features are 
perceptual (see the previous chapter for the entailments of this observation). 
In order to handle this theoretical inconsistency between Blending and Cross-
domain mapping approaches, we suggest that source and target domains interact in the type 
of metaphorical mapping such as My surgeon was a butcher. Relevant to our discussion 
here, in the previous chapter, we identified how this metaphor supposes a challenge to the 
tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor. For our purpose now, we need to consider 
the hypothesis that we put forward in this chapter: given that source and target domains are 
bodily experienced, the bodily-based features from both domains may interact in 
metaphorical mapping.  
So far, we tried to examine how Blending and cross-domain mapping theories differ 
regarding their analysis of Surgery Is Butchery. We demonstrated how the origin of the 
feature incompetent has been eluded in the analysis of this metaphor within the two 
approaches. That is, within the cross-domain mapping approach, incompetence is not an 
inherent feature to source domain. Similarly, Blending theory does not explain how 
incompetence becomes the focus of the metaphorical mapping given that this feature does 
not belong to either the source or the target domain. 
231 
 
In this regard, we propose to analyze this metaphor from an interactionist 
perspective. We insisted before on the necessity of analyzing bi-directionality based 
metaphor as an instance of interaction to have a wider perspective of the way this type of 
metaphor functions. We also suggested that this type of metaphor should be taken as two 
instances of the interaction between two phenomena. In this respect, we suggest that it is 
more fruitful to analyze Surgery Is Butchery and Butchery Is Surgery as two instances 
where the interaction between the two phenomena is manifested. In what follows in this 
section, we shall analyze these two metaphorical mappings from an interactionist point of 
view:   
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As figures 10 and 11 indicate, the metaphors Surgery Is Butchery and Butchery Is 
Surgery consist of two strands. The first one, which is the background structure, includes 
the interacting elements of source and target domains (Butcher, Cleaver, Animal, Surgeon, 
Scalpel, and Patient). As noticed here in these two examples, the background structure 
contains an invariable set of features. The second strand, on the other hand, concerns the 
outcome of the interaction between the elements of source and target domains that 
constitute the background structure. In this case, the entailment of the two metaphors falls 
on competence. Our judgment is based on the fact that when this feature (competence) 
interacts with its counterpart in the other domain it acquires positive or negative attributes. 
It is worth noting here that we do not claim that the resulting change from the interaction 
exclusively concerns this element but it entirely affects source and target domains via 
attributing new characteristics to the interacting elements. 
In the two figures above we attempted to show which elements hold the interaction 
between the two domains. As Figure 10 illustrates, the constituents of source and target 
domains can be divided into two groups: inherent constituents, which include surgeon, 
Figure 11 Interaction between Butchery and Surgery for My butcher was a surgeon. 
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scalpel, and patient. In the target domain, these constituents are butcher, cleaver, and 
animal. We shall call the second type of constituents which are separated from the 
Background Structure by a line attributive constituent because they functionally describe 
the inherent features of the source domain (cutting meat) after the interaction takes place. 
Hence, we read + or - competence. In addition, we shall call these attributive constituents 
in both domains interacting elements on which the inference of the metaphor rests.  
Broadly speaking, competence is—by default—neutral in both domains. Butcher is 
not necessarily incompetent, any more than Surgeon is necessarily competent. But through 
the interaction between the two phenomena, this interacting constituent acquires or loses 
some of its characteristics in its respective domain. That is, this feature, outside this 
metaphorical mapping, may be positive or negative. But, when the two phenomena interact, 
competence shows substantial semantic changes. 
Therefore, high or low competence is not inherent to the domains Surgery or 
Butchery. Nonetheless, by means of the interaction between the two domains, competence 
may be positive or negative depending on which domain takes on the role of source and 
which fulfills that of the target. Grady (2007:331) assures that, “...all these cases 
[resemblance, generic-is-specific and image metaphor] involve the projection of subtly 
different conceptual material depending on direction...” 
Similarly, Kövecses (2011:14-15) claims that in the metaphor, This surgeon is a 
butcher (also discussed in the previous chapter) the characteristic of carelessness and 
sloppiness are not inherent to the domain Butchery. Rather, it emerges as a result of 
metaphorical mapping. In addition, Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007:422) argue that 
being careless is an “emergent structure” in metaphorical mapping. This means that a new 
cognitive structure emerges because of the interaction between the two domains.  
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A piece of evidence for this claim is that without engaging these domains in 
metaphorical mapping, they do not inherently have the feature carelessness. This is 
particularly important since it entails that the source domain in this case (but not just the 
target domain) goes through significant changes in the process of mapping. In this respect, 
the inference which we get from the two metaphors is highly determined by how the two 
domains interact and which the interacting constituents of these domains are involved in the 
construction of conceptual metaphor (see Figure 10 and Figure 11).  
3.2.3. Semantic change of source and target domains 
Another way to analyze how these two phenomena interact is to look at their 
respective semantic category after the interaction process. We argued before that the two 
phenomena undergo semantic changes when they interact in metaphorical mapping by 
adapting to each other. Moreover, we observed that in some cases, the inference of a given 
metaphor is not inherent to either source or target domain. In this respect, we argued that 
this inference emerges as a result of the interaction between such domains.  
Another potential way to measure semantic changes is to look at the semantic 
categories of source and target phenomena inside and outside metaphorical mapping. Thus, 
we propose to look at them in terms of continuity vs. discontinuity of semantic categories. 
For instance, while the metaphor Butchery Is Surgery allows the butcher to continue in the 
category of Butcher, the competence (of Surgeon) disqualifies the surgeon as inadequate to 
carry out the profession of surgery—that is, he or she is outside the semantic category of 
surgery. Thus, the interaction between source and target domains through the element 
competence leads the source and target domains to acquire or lose some of their features 
which define them as categories, namely, the quality of competence. 
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This finding is especially supportive for the claim which we put forward in the first 
chapter that metaphorical mappings should not be looked at as a homogeneous cognitive 
process. To illustrate, while the embodied approach to metaphor conceives of metaphor as 
meaning transfer which consists of imposing a new semantic category on the target 
phenomena, the interaction theory which we are proposing in this chapter is based on a 
mutual influence between source and target domains (see also Richards 1936: 93).  
Furthermore, when we conceptualize Love in terms of Journey, we reason about the 
latter via imposing the conceptual structure of the former. In so doing, the domain Love 
acquires a new semantic category. However, our analysis of Surgery Is Butchery and 
Butchery Is Surgery shows that this is not indeed the case. 
Now consider Butchery Is Surgery used to describe the performance of an 
apprentice butcher spending too much time to cut up meat (Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 
2007:424): 
 He’s not a butcher, he is a surgeon. 
According to Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007:424), the mapping between the source 
domain Surgery and the target domain Butchery highlights the negative evaluation of the 
butcher’s competence. It is worth noting here that reversing this mapping does not lead to a 
change of its central inference. That is, the interaction between the source domain Surgery 
with Butchery in (1) above gives rise to a positive evaluation of the performance of 
Butcher. Here again we observe that high competence is not an absolute feature in these 
phenomena (see the previous chapter for a more detailed analysis of this characteristics). In 
this respect, we argue that slowness is not necessarily a negative feature of Surgery. Indeed, 
it might be the opposite in the sense that surging slowly denotes carefulness. One might 
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also look at this metaphor as irony in that a butcher does not need too much carefulness to 
cut up meat.  
To sum up, the existence of emergent structure in the three examples above is a 
piece of evidence for interaction between source and target domains. The inference which 
is obtained in the interaction-based metaphor is the outcome of a mutual influence between 
two bodily-experienced phenomena. Our judgment is based on the fact that emergent 
structure is a characteristic which does not inherently belong to either source or target 
domain. 
As mentioned before, mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena is based on 
pre-existing features from the two domains (see page 226). Accordingly, it is safe to argue 
that (1) incompetence is a perceptual feature that may operates in both phenomena, though 
it does not necessarily mean that its quality inherently belongs to them (Fauconnier and 
Turner 2002; Turner 2011:15); (2) inherent features of source domains do not always 
operate in metaphor Figure 1 and Figure 2.  
So far we have demonstrated that "emergent structure" is the outcome of interaction 
between two bodily-experienced phenomena. This interaction might be held through 
components of source and target domains that are neutral outside metaphorical mapping. 
That is, through the interaction of these phenomena, these components acquire or lose some 
semantic features (see Figure 10 and Figure 11). In this respect, we have shown that 
competence, via its interaction with its counterpart in target domain, gives rise to a 
conceptual structure where this characteristic varies. In particular, competence oscillates 
between positive and negative qualities depending on which phenomenon functions as 
source and which as target domain. This seems to resonate with Grady’s finding (2005) in 
237 
 
that this oscillation may be looked at from two different aspects: discontinuity and 
continuity (see page 234). 
The first case is observed in the sense that the quality regarding how the Surgeon 
carries out his work does not legitimate him or her for holding this profession. The second 
case, continuity, can be documented when the interaction between these domains leads this 
Surgeon to be competent, which means that he or she continues in the same category.  
Based on our analysis so far, it is safe to argue that not the physical structures of 
source domains that are imposed onto the target domains in this metaphorical mapping 
typology. Rather, the two domains interact in metaphorical mapping in the sense that 
metaphor in this case does not consist of meaning transfer. 
3.2.4. One-way-meaning transfer vs. interaction 
To analyze the examples above in terms of one-way-meaning transfer from source 
(Butcher) onto target domain (Surgeon) is to look at how we draw systematic 
correspondences between these domains. As Figure 10 and Figure 11 show, this mapping 
typology does not consist of drawing systematic correspondences between the components 
of Surgery and Butchery. To illustrate, the analysis of this metaphor from the one-way-
meaning-transfer approach could be represented as follows: 
 
 
Figure 12: One-way-meaning transfer for Surgery Is Butchery. 
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This particular metaphorical mapping cannot be accounted for in terms of one-way-
meaning-transfer perspective because being competent or incompetent is not an inherent 
feature to either source or target domain (see the previous section). To illustrate, these 
attributes are determined after the interaction between the elements of source and target 
domains takes place.  
The Interaction approach to this metaphorical mapping typology has the advantage 
of being able to explain how competence in both domains is shaped. For instance, rather 
than assuming that there is a one-way-meaning transfer from Butcher to Surgeon, we argue 
that Butcher interacts with the components of the target (scalpel and patient). Because 
butcher now uses sophisticated tools in his job, we assume he or she is competent. In the 
same way, since surgeon interacts with cleaver, which is inadequate to carry out surgery on 
a human being, now he or she is incompetent. 
The analysis of Surgery Is Butchery and Butchery Is Surgery raise certain 
incongruities within the embodied approach to metaphor. If we take into account the 
principle of partial mapping to account for this particular metaphor, certain theoretical 
problems arise. To start with, this principle is based on the fact that certain aspects of the 
target domains are hidden while others are highlighted. The problem is that competence is 
not an inherent feature of the source domain Surgeon or Butcher in the two metaphors 
above. Instead, it is an emergent structure which arises as a result of the interaction 
between source and target domains. More specifically, as we saw before, this structure 
depends on how Butchery and Surgery interact in Figure 10 and Figure 11.  
As these figures indicate, the inference (+ competence or -competence) of these 
metaphorical mappings does not depend on which domain fulfills the function of source or 
target because being competent or incompetent is not an inherent feature to either domain. 
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To illustrate, let us consider the following conceptual metaphor uttered in a context to 
convey that Butcher is incompetent because he is too slow cutting up meat: 
This butcher is a  surgeon (Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 2007:424). 
Taking into account this metaphorical mapping in this particular context, it becomes 
obvious that this metaphorical mapping typology depends on interaction between source 
and target domains rather than systematic correspondences between them. Therefore, being 
competent or incompetent is not inherent to either source or target domain. Instead, this 
characteristic is dynamic because it is highly shaped by the way the two domains interact.  
Another way the interactionist approach to this particular conceptual metaphor is 
more fruitful than the embodied approach is the fact that it looks at metaphorical mapping 
as a dynamic interaction between two phenomena rather than a static mapping where all the 
elements which are active in the metaphorical mapping are grounded exclusively in source 
domains (see also Mouton 2012).  
To sum up, the embodied approach cannot account for this metaphorical mapping 
because its tenets cannot explain how competence can be positive and negative in the two 
examples above. This is due to the fact that this approach is based on the assumption that 
conceptual metaphor consists of (1) unidirectional meaning-transfer and (2) drawing ‘fixed 
and static’ systematic correspondences between source and target domains (see also 
Mouton 2012; Tejada Caller and Guzmán Guerra 2012; Trim 2011).  
As the data indicates, sticking to the tenets of the embodied approach, we cannot 
explain how Butcher is (in)competent after being mapped onto Surgeon because 
competence is neutral in the two domains. This is due to the fact that these tenets cannot 
explain how Surgeon is incompetent when it is mapped onto Butcher. In contrast, the 
interactionist approach allows us to postulate that being competent or incompetent is highly 
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determined by the interactive process that varies depending on contextual information but 
not on inherent features that the source domain could have.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter we outlined the situational conditions that pave the way to studying a 
certain metaphorical mapping typology from the Interaction perspective. We proposed this 
approach mainly for two reasons:  
First, one-way-meaning transfer cannot account for the metaphorical mapping 
typology which is based on bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains. 
And second, we argued that being bodily experienced, target domains are also eligible for 
projecting semantic features in metaphorical mapping.  
One of the main goals of this chapter has been to show that source and target 
domains are essentially identical in this metaphorical mapping typology in that they are 
bodily-experienced, semantically independent, and therefore, eligible for meaning 
projection.  
From a functional point of view, we also argued that metaphorical mapping—as a 
categorizing tool—carries out three different cognitive tasks: categorizing, further-
categorizing, and re-categorizing. We argued that the first task is particularly noticed in the 
metaphorical mapping typology where target domains do not have bodily-based semantic 
categories. The second cognitive task (further-categorizing) is observed when both source 
and target domains are processed within the same modality. In this case, we argued that 
both source and target domains do have semantic categories. When such domains interact, 
the target domain acquires a more extensive semantic category. And finally, the third task 
(re-categorizing) characterizes the interaction between two bodily-experienced phenomena 
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which are processed in different modalities. This case includes the interaction which leads 
target phenomena to cease to belong to a semantic category and instead acquire another 
one.  
Furthermore, in this chapter we assessed one of the main characteristics that are 
claimed to differentiate source and target domains which concerns how they are processed. 
Because source domains are accessible to the sense organ, they are argued to be processed 
on-line. On the contrary, due to the fact that target domains are not bodily-experienced, 
they are assumed to be processed off-line (e.g. Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989). However, as shown before (page 211), the 
metaphorical mapping typology which engages bodily-experienced phenomena in source 
and target domains does not reveal this differentiation (see for example synaesthesia-based 
mapping). 
In this chapter, our concern also has been to show how conceptual metaphor may be 
analyzed in terms of interaction between source and target domains rather than in terms of 
one-way-meaning transfer. Accordingly, we argued that the metaphorical mapping 
typology which is based on bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains is 
based on recruiting bodily-based information from both source and target domains (see 
page 234). In this respect, we argued that emergent structure is one of the key aspects of 
this interaction. That is, because the emergent structure does not belong to either source or 
target domain (e.g. Turner, 2011), the conceptual metaphor needs to be analyzed in terms of 
interaction. 
To illustrate this point, we analyzed Surgery Is Butchery and Butchery Is Surgery 
(see pages 226-237) and argued that this particular metaphorical mapping does not arise 
from a systematic correspondence between the elements of source and target domains. 
242 
 
Rather, this conceptual metaphor is based on the interaction between the two phenomena 
giving rise to features such as incompetence or competence (see page 222).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that the experiential basis of the metaphorical 
mapping typology which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena should not be fully 
attributed to source domains. This is due to the fact that this mapping typology recruits 
bodily-based features from source and target domains. Consequently, the embodied 
character of conceptual metaphor is based on the bodily-based information of source and 
target domains.  
In the following chapter we shall further explore the interaction process between 
source and target domains to assess its mechanisms and its typologies. 
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Chapter V: Interaction: Its Mechanisms and Typologies 
1. Introduction and Hypothesis 
In the previous chapter, we suggested that the experiential basis of metaphor should 
not be fully attributed to source domains in the metaphorical mapping which engages 
bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains. The data indicates that, given 
the constitutive nature of target domains (namely, being bodily experienced), the 
experiential basis and the 'embodied' character of conceptual metaphor should be equally 
attributed to source and target domains.  
Accordingly, we argued that one-way-meaning projection is not observed in this 
metaphorical mapping typology. This is due to the fact that, within the embodied approach 
to metaphor, this principle is based on the bodily-based information of source and its 
projection onto target domains. Since one-way-meaning transfer does not fit this 
metaphorical mapping typology, we proposed an interactionist approach to analyze it.  
While outlining potential mechanisms and typologies that underlie the metaphorical 
mapping which engages bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains, we 
shall also assess the contribution of target domains to the embodied character of conceptual 
metaphor.  
Our concern in this chapter is to show how source and target domains interact in 
this type of metaphorical mapping. We hypothesize that source and target domains are 
mutually influenced in the mapping typology that engages two bodily-experienced 
phenomena.  
We will need to (1) outline the mechanisms that underlie this interaction by 
examining the linguistic and cognitive structures that manifest them. Given that the two 
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domains are bodily experienced, we hypothesize that interaction originates when three main 
conditions of pair of domains of experience are met: Co-occurrence, Co-relation, and 
Causality-and-Co-activation.  
We shall further examine whether this interaction is homogeneous to all 
metaphorical mapping typologies wherein source and target domains are experienced 
bodily. In this respect, we hypothesize that, given the enormous variety of experience 
which conceptual metaphor is based on (see Chapter I), interaction between source and 
target domains may follow different patterns.  
In order to test this hypothesis, we shall assess whether the aforementioned 
mechanisms are observed in the data. This might mean that even within mapping across 
bodily-experienced phenomena the interaction is different. Correspondently, their analysis 
should be different too.  
Our purpose in this chapter is to assess how the two experiences are interdependent 
and how their interaction in metaphor is marked. We shall argue that the two experiences 
show a sort of co-operation in metaphorical mappings. Still, we do not claim that target 
domains are semantically dependent on source domains.  
To show how source and target domains interact we are going to pay special 
attention to conceptual and cognitive mechanisms9 that lead to the interaction of two 
phenomena in metaphor.  
                                                 
9 According to Ruiz de Mendoza (2005:258-259), though ‘cognitive’ and ‘conceptual’ are 
used in Cognitive Linguistics interchangeably, he suggests that the two might be 
differentiated in that the former may refer to ‘mental processes’ whereas the latter may refer 
to the ‘outcome’ of the former. This differentiation is crucial for our interest here in that we 
need to look at interaction in terms of its cognitive and conceptual mechanisms. Thus, this 
chapter might be divided into two parts: cognitive mechanisms, where we outline the bodily 
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Thus, this chapter will be organized as follows: in section 2, we shall closely look at 
the conceptual organization of metaphor and explain how this organization is fully 
attributed to source domains within the embodied approach to metaphor. In section 3 we 
shall analyze how source and target domains interact. In this respect, we shall outline the 
dynamics of interaction. Later we shall concentrate our analysis of the data on the 
interaction at physiological and cognitive levels. To assess whether interaction is identical 
to the metaphorical mapping that engages bodily-experienced phenomena, we shall also 
outline different typologies of interaction and see how they differ from other mapping 
typologies.  
2. Background 
2.1. Conceptual Organization of Metaphor 
Broadly speaking, conceptual metaphor is claimed to be based on similarity (e.g. 
Grady 2007; Marks, Hammeal and Bornstein 1987; McGlone 2003; Miller 1993; Murphy 
1996), analogy (e.g. Gentner and Bowdle 1999), and embodied simulation (e.g. Gibbs 
2005; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Kintsch 2008). However, all these approaches affirm that 
in metaphorical mapping, while target domains are influenced through highlighting some of 
their features, re-structuring their conceptual organization, source domains are assumed not 
to be influenced at all in metaphorical mapping. For instance, Lakoff and Núñez (2000:46) 
assure that, “...metaphor...introduces elements into the target domain that are not inherent to 
the target domain”. 
                                                                                                                                                    
features operating in interaction; and conceptual mechanisms where the outcome of such 
mechanisms is observed.  
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To show that metaphor does introduce new elements in the target domains, Lakoff 
and Núñez (2000:46-47) analyze Love Is a Partnership metaphor. They argue that before 
these source and target domains are engaged in metaphorical mapping, target domain Love 
did not include elements such as work, hard work, unrewarding, and effort: 
(1)I’m putting all the work into this relationship and you’re getting every thing out 
of it. 
(2)It was hard work, but worth it. 
(3)The relationship was so unrewarding that it wasn’t worth the effort.  
Importantly, the cognitive topologies of the source domains do not undergo any change, 
hence the invariance principle (Lakoff 1990). These observations have led these scholars to 
affirm that metaphorical mapping strictly follows this principle—preserving the inferences 
of source and imposing them onto target domains (Lakoff and Núñez 2000:54). That is, 
source domains—and our understanding of them—are invariable inside and outside 
metaphorical mappings—because they are semantically independent (Lakoff and Turner 
1989:116). On the contrary, target domains are the ones that are accessed and structured in 
the process of the mapping (e.g. Lakoff and Núñez 2000).  
As stated before, these assumptions do not fit the metaphorical mapping which is 
based on bodily-experienced phenomena (see Chapter III). Therefore, within the Interaction 
approach to metaphor, we argued that source and target domains are influenced in the same 
way. Importantly, at least there are two ways to assess how source and target domains 
interact: bi-directionality-based metaphors, emergent structure, and adaptation process 
(see Chapter IV). 
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2.2. The experiential basis of conceptual metaphor 
One of the basic insights of conceptual metaphor is that it is grounded in the bodily-
based information of source domains (e.g. Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Gibbs 1994, 
2011; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, and Ric 2005; Szwedek 2011).  
However, in the previous chapter, we demonstrated that the experiential basis of the 
mapping typology which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target 
domains is based on the bodily-based information of source and target domains. Thereby, 
the embodied character of conceptual metaphor should be equally attributed to source and 
target domains. In this respect, we argued that since target domains meet two basic 
characteristics that are highly associated with meaning projection—namely, being bodily 
experienced and semantically independent (see page 149)—then these domains also project 
meaning in metaphorical mappings. In particular, we have shown that the bodily-based 
information of source and target domains is recruited to construct the metaphorical 
mapping which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains (see 
page 226).  
3. Data Analysis 
3.1. Dynamics of interaction 
3.1.1. Co-occurrence and co-relation of domains of experience 
A certain amount of metaphors is based on co-relation of two phenomena. When 
source and target phenomena co-relate, they end up coupled in metaphorical mapping (e.g. 
Grady 1997, 1999, 2007). Primary metaphor such as More Is Up is a typical example of 
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this kind of metaphor (Grady 1997:41). Grady further outlines the situational conditions 
under which mappings in primary metaphor are constructed. For instance, he argues that 
when two phenomena tend to co-relate they conflate in our reasoning system (Grady 
2007:321; for contrasting views see Rakova 2003:31). Furthermore, Grady assures that, “In 
this case [primary metaphor], the motivation is a straightforward correlation between the 
two concepts…” (Grady 2007:318; see also Valenzuela 2009).  
Nonetheless, there are at least three reasons why co-relation is problematic to be 
applied only to primary metaphor. First, correlation does not characterize only primary 
metaphor. Rather, the data shows that the phenomena which are engaged in metaphorical 
mapping are based on co-relation (see pages 214-219). Second, there might be a previous 
stage to co-relation between source and target phenomena in primary metaphor which is co-
occurrence. Third, though this correlation is the basis of mapping in this type of 
metaphorical mapping, source domains are attributed a more participating role than target 
domains within the embodied approach to metaphor (see Chapter II).  
To illustrate that primary metaphor is not the only type of metaphor that is based on 
co-relation, let us consider the following: 
Arguing/Criticizing Is Hitting/Punching 
He lashed out at the minister for suggesting the legalization of cannabis. 
Here the domains Arguing/Criticizing and Hitting/Punching co-relate in this metaphorical 
mapping in the sense that the two actions are identical in our reasoning system. However, 
this does not necessary mean that they co-occur.  
As this example indicates, while co-relation is observed in metaphorical mapping, 
co-occurrence is not a prerequisite condition for phenomena to be mapped (see also Juliet 
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Is the Sun on page 278). Of particular interest here is that co-relation of domains is not a 
feature that exclusively characterizes primary metaphors.  
As argued before, since source and target domains are bodily experienced, it is safe 
to argue that source and target phenomena in certain examples of primary metaphor co-
occur before they co-relate. Accordingly, these two stages may be the initial conditions 
towards the interaction between the two phenomena in our reasoning system. Identifying 
co-occurrence as a basic mechanism in primary metaphor (e.g. Valenzuela 2009:238) is 
crucial to tracing how the interaction process is carried out between these phenomena. It 
also highlights the bodily character of target domains too. To further illustrate this point, we 
need to deeply look into the bodily-based information of source and target domains. Let us 
analyze the following examples:  
Quantity Is Verticality 
More Is Up 
Less Is Down 
(1) Property prices have probably bottomed out now. 
Quantity Is Length 
More Is Long 
(2) Do you want alcohol or a long drink instead? 
Less Is Short 
(3) Retailers downtown often short change tourists. 
In (1), via this metaphorical mapping we conceptualize Quantity in terms of 
Verticality in the sense that the increase and decrease of Quantity are understood in terms 
of Upward and Downward motions, respectively (see also Lakoff 1990:53).  Similarly, in 
(2) Quantity is understood in terms of Length. While it is hard to differentiate the two 
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domains in terms of the concrete-abstract criterion, we argue that the mapping here follows 
a different pattern. For instance, it might be that metaphorical mappings which are based on 
co-occurrence require two bodily-experienced phenomena and an active participation from 
both source and target domains.  
However, the embodied approach to metaphor assures that, “the experiential 
grounding” in the example (1) is our experience of the source domain Verticality (Johnson 
and Lakoff 2002:246).  Similarly, in (2) the embodied character of this metaphor is fully 
attributed to the domain Length. Though such co-relation leads to neural connections 
between the two phenomena "(Neurons that fire together wire together!" (Lakoff 2008:19) 
(see also Feldman 2006; Feldman and Narayanan 2004), we still need to assume that the 
source has a dominating role in metaphorical mapping. 
 On the other hand, target domains within this approach are viewed as inaccessible 
to the sense organs. Since the target domain More is experienced bodily, it is plausible to 
suggest that there is interaction between the two domains. That is, rather than imposing 
features of source domain (Up) onto target domain (More), we argue that there is 
interaction between bodily-experienced phenomena (Quantity and Verticality; Length and 
Quantity).  
It is worth noting here that we are not claiming that metaphorical mapping is 
reductively constituted by co-occurring phenomena. Rather, there might be other 
mechanisms which operate in the metaphorical mapping that engages bodily-experienced 
phenomena (e.g. see pages 272-274). In the following sections we shall identify them and 
assess how they operate in metaphorical mapping.  
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3.1.2. Causality and Co-activation in Metaphorical mapping 
3.1.2.1. Causality 
In the previous section, we observed that though co-relation is a crucial feature in 
primary metaphor, it is not the initial stage in this type of metaphorical mapping. Instead, 
we identified in the data a previous stage which is co-occurrence of source and target 
domains. We also observed that co-occurrence might characterize other types of 
metaphorical mapping. Furthermore, we demonstrated that primary metaphor (1) is based 
on two bodily-experienced phenomena and (2) is rooted in the interaction between source 
and target domains.  
In this section, we shall see how the co-occurrence and co-relation of phenomena 
lead to a causality-and-co-activation-based metaphorical mapping. For this purpose, we 
shall outline the mechanisms that operate in this type of metaphorical mapping. To do that, 
we suggest reconsidering Quantity Is Verticality and Quantity Is Length, mentioned above. 
As these examples indicate, we conceptualize Quantity in terms of Verticality and 
Length. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) and Lakoff (1990:53), the mapping 
between the two phenomena is rooted in their co-relation in our everyday experience.  For 
instance, we all share the experience of the increase of Quantity of water as being 
accompanied with its moving upwards (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, see also Lakoff 1990).  
Co-occurrence of these phenomena leads to develop a causality-based mapping in 
the sense that target domain (Quantity) causes the activation of source domain (Verticality 
e.g. moving up). The interaction between these phenomena is rooted in a causality-based 
mapping because target phenomena trigger source phenomena through stimulating them—
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which explains why conceptual metaphor is not random in this type of mapping. Notice that 
in this metaphorical mapping typology, source and target domains are bodily experienced.  
Furthermore, the two phenomena co-activate in the neural system (e.g. Gallese and 
Lakoff 2005). For instance, stimulating a given phenomenon leads to the activation of 
another (Lakoff 2008:20-30). Accordingly, when a given conceptual metaphor engages 
Quantity and Verticality, this metaphor leads to activating two different neural structures in 
the brain. That is, the co-occurrence of two bodily-experienced phenomena leads to 
constructing certain neural networks which become active whenever source domains are 
stimulated (Lakoff 2008:19-20). In order for the brain to metaphorically process a given 
phenomenon which functions as target domain and which co-occur with its counterpart in 
the source domain, certain neural networks must be stimulated (Lakoff 2008:18; see also 
the following chapter). 
This causality-based mapping involves interaction between two phenomena in terms 
of the sensorimotor experiences and the linguistic labels that denote these experiences (see 
page 297). More precisely, it is between sensorimotor stimuli and linguistic labels that are 
used to stimulate these neural structures. These linguistic labels—when perceived by the 
brain—the brain areas which are responsible for the execution of the motor actions denoted 
by such labels become active (Lakoff 2008:19). Accordingly, this gives rise to the 
construction of metaphorical mappings and their later activation.  
In this setting, the interaction of Quantity with Verticality is also marked 
cognitively in the sense that the resulting inferences in this metaphorical mapping are 
derived from the two phenomena—but not just from source phenomena. These inferences 
are molded in such a way that those of the target phenomena are also operating in 
metaphorical mapping.  
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This notion is problematic since it cannot be reconciled with the one-way-meaning 
transfer approach. This is due to the fact that this approach draws on two principles: (1) that 
metaphor is embodied because of the bodily-based information of source phenomena; and 
(2) the mapping consists of transferring constituents from source onto target domains.  
3.1.2.1.1. Synaesthesia: a causality-based 
metaphorical mapping 
Following Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001:53), this metaphorical mapping 
typology evokes sensory reaction associated with source modality. Let us consider the 
following table: 
 
Applying this finding to the table above entails that Bright sound activates the same 
sensory reaction in the Visual modality as if it were conventionally processed within the 
visual modality. And Loud color evokes sensory reaction in the auditory modality. 
Similarly, processing the metaphorical expression, Sharp tastes, elicits response in 
somatosensory modality.   
Accordingly, Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001:53) sustain that one modality 
causes the activation of another. In connection with this line of argumentation, Rakova 
Table 7 Interaction between source and target modalities. 
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(2003:40) argues that source and target domains in this type of metaphor are 
physiologically associated.  
In the thesis so far, we have demonstrated that the mapping typology which is based 
on bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains may be based on 
interaction. Given that mapping across sensory modalities involves activating source and 
target domains, approaching this metaphorical mapping typology from the interactionist 
perspective would allow us to understand how causality operates in this typology. 
In syneasthetic metaphor, the mapping takes place not because target domains are 
abstract and being so, there is no other way to have access to them. Rather, target domains 
are mapped onto other domains because they evoke the perception of the experience in the 
source modality—because they are physiologically connected (Ramachandran and Hubbard 
2001; Cacciari 2008). This means that this type of metaphorical mapping is based on 
stimulation. As will be shown in the following chapter, source and target modalities are 
also interconnected via the linguistic system that contributes to the stimulation process (see 
page 295).  
So far, we have argued that in order for the interaction to take place, it is necessary 
that target phenomena are perceptual. The activation of source modality is not completely 
detached from its counterpart in the target domain. In this respect, target modality is the 
first to become active. In this respect, conceptual metaphor is not a purely-imaginative 
structure as it is held within the framework of the embodied approach to metaphor 
(Chomsky 1975; Fodor 1975). In the case of synaesthetic metaphor, the experience of a 
given sensory modality triggers another (Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001).  
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In the table above, “Bright Sound” can be analyzed as an interaction between visual 
and auditory phenomena. Our judgment is based on the fact that the two linguistic terms 
that reveal this synaesthesia-based metaphor belong to two modalities, vision and audition.  
The question which arises here is why this phrase should activate visual modality 
instead of auditory modality or both simultaneously given that the expression bright sound 
draws on linguistic terms that belong to two modalities. In other words, why does the term 
bright stimulate the visual modality, given that it is combined with a term which is 
associated with another sensory modality?  
One possible answer to this question is that the perception of a sound which is 
“bright” is not processed fully within the visual modality. Otherwise, the domain Sound 
would have no contribution to the metaphorical mapping which engages visual and auditory 
modalities as source and target phenomena, respectively. Based on this observation, 
perceiving this particular sound would stimulate the two modalities.  
Accordingly, the term bright, when used metaphorically, includes not only the 
inferences of visual modality which are activated when the concept bright is activated, but 
also the inferences form other modalities. The terms in synaesthetic metaphor –in source, as 
well as in target—are highly sensory (see Table 7). This may support the notion that words 
are not devoid of experience and they are not formal symbols representing concepts (see the 
following chapter for a more elaborated discussion on this point). Accordingly, this term is 
highly sensory in the sense that this phenomenon is originally processed in the auditory 
modality.  
Though in Table 7 we focused on the interaction which concerns individual 
modalities which are mapped in metaphor, Luria (1968) reported a special case where a 
subject in some cases experiences a simultaneous activation of five senses. This seems to 
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be consistent with Barsalou’s (1999) finding that, no experience is processed in a single 
modality.  
What is relevant here to our discussion not only is the fact that sensory modalities 
interact to reason about a given phenomenon, but also source and target phenomena 
influence each other in metaphorical mapping. This is because the stimulus is operating in 
the same way for both modalities (e.g. Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001). Therefore, 
metaphorical mapping is based on causality in that (1) source and target phenomena 
mutually activate each other through neurons which fire as a response to a given stimulus 
(Giora 2008:146). And (2) the target phenomena–being bodily experienced—include words 
that are directly grounded in a given sensory experience. These linguistic labels inherently 
belong to target phenomena because they are also operating in these domains outside 
metaphorical mapping.  
These linguistic expressions are intrinsically related to sensorimotor phenomena not 
just when they function as source but also when they do as target domains. This means that 
a given modality may be stimulated in two ways: (1) by a stimulus which operates 
conventionally within the modality in question; and (2) by a linguistic (or extra-linguistic) 
stimulus. These domains are based on a stimulus-driven process (Giora 2008:146). 
The direction of the mapping is from target to source phenomena in the sense that 
the target is activated first. What we perceive first is the target domain and then the latter 
leads to the activation of source domain.  
The premise that we resort to more concrete (bodily-experienced phenomena) to 
structure more abstract concepts can imply that bodily experience triggers metaphorical 
mappings. Nevertheless, it has not been reported in the literature of the embodied approach 
to metaphor (e.g. Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1992, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 
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1989) that target domains become active first as the general assumption within the theory is 
that all target domains are abstract and inaccessible to the sense organ. But, image 
metaphor is the process of metaphorical mapping which is based on the perception of the 
target image. This, in turn, leads to interaction between source and target images. To 
illustrate, let us consider the following example: 
My wife…whose waist is an hourglass. (Lakoff and Turner 1989:91) 
This metaphorical mapping needs to be analyzed differently because it includes two 
perceptual domains: Hourglass and Human (body) as source and target domain, 
respectively. Since the target domain in this case is accessible to the sense organ, it is the 
first domain to be activated. Notice that this type of metaphorical mapping is different from 
the one which is based on bodily and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source and 
target domain, respectively. In particular, this type of mapping does not fit into the 
Propositionality-Linearity perspective (see chapter III). 
Similarly, in the case of synaesthesia, the first modality which becomes active is the 
first to be processed—that is, the target modality. Source modality becomes active after the 
experience of the target modality has taken place. Let us re-consider the following example 
from the table above: 
Sharp taste. 
 
In this example, the first modality which is perceived and becomes active is the 
gustatory modality. This metaphorical mapping typology is a piece of evidence that 
processing an experience within a modality leads to the activation of another modality 
(Rakova 2003). Again this typology cannot be accounted for by the embodied approach to 
metaphor namely for two reasons. First, this approach does not take into account the fact 
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that conceptual metaphor may be based on different mapping typologies in which target 
domains are not always abstract and inaccessible to the sense organ (Rakova 2003). 
Second, as seen in Chapter III, this approach is highly based on Propositionality-Linearity 
of metaphorical mapping. Since the two domains are bodily experienced, the target domain 
is active first. Then, the experience of the target domain leads to the activation of the source 
domain. It is not that the first (and the only process) which is involved in conceptual 
metaphor is projecting features from source onto target domains as concrete and abstract 
domains, respectively. But, in situations where source and target domains are experienced 
bodily, the first to be active in metaphorical mapping processing is the experience which 
functions as target. 
However, in the previous chapter we argued against Linearity of metaphorical 
mapping (see pages 170-177). Here again, metaphorical mapping is not lineal though its 
activation is lineal in the sense that the activation of the two modalities occurs in a 
chronological order. First, a given phenomenon is perceived within a given modality(ies). 
Then, source modality is activated. The two phenomena interact in our reasoning system 
through shared stimuli. However, it is worth noting that this order characterizes the 
activation of the two modalities but not our experience of these modalities and reasoning 
about them.  
From our discussion above, it becomes clear that the interaction process is not 
random. Rather, it stands on these mechanisms: Co-occurrence, Co-relation, Causality, Co-
activation, and Inferentiality. More importantly, these mechanisms are observed in the 
metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena. It is worth 
noting here that these mechanisms might also be observed in other types of metaphorical 
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mapping (see the following chapter). However, Causality and Co-activation might be the 
main differentiating operating mechanisms in the interaction-based metaphorical mapping. 
An additional question which will be relevant to assess here is whether the 
interaction process is identical to all of metaphorical mapping typologies (see page 259-
261). The metaphorical mapping that characterizes synaesthesia is unconscious and 
automatic. In other words, we do not selectively map one modality onto another in this 
typology. Instead, the interaction is instantiated in the physiological system combining the 
experience of two different modalities. One of the remarkable insights within the 
embodiment theory is that conceptual metaphors “…are used unconsciously, effortlessly, 
and automatically…that is, they are part of the cognitive unconscious.” (Lakoff and Nuñez 
2000:41; see also Valenzuela 2009:238). This type of metaphorical mapping can be 
contrasted to literary metaphor (see pages 274-279) in the sense that the latter is mostly 
deliberate and conscious (Steen 2010, 2011). 
In the following sections, we shall focus our attention on these two mechanisms to 
explore how interaction between source and target phenomena differs. For instance, they 
might not be observed in other types of metaphor. In order to do this, first we need to 
outline the characteristics of these mechanisms. This will allow us to further assess whether 
the interaction is identical to the metaphorical mapping that engages bodily-experienced 
phenomena as source and target domains.  
3.1.2.2.  Co-activation 
Another characteristic which needs to be considered in the interaction between 
bodily-experienced phenomena—namely, synaesthetic metaphor—is co-activation. This 
mechanism is particularly evident in the type of mapping where the two modalities co-
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activate as a response to stimulation (Rakova 2003 41:43). When the two modalities are 
mapped in this typology, this stimulation process does not necessarily occur in the modality 
that is activated. In addition, the stimulating agent in this case does not, by default, operate 
on this target modality (Rakova 2003:41). Rather, the activation of a given modality may 
lead to the activation of another modality and the stimulating agent may be of different 
natures. To illustrate this point, let us consider the following synaesthetic metaphors: 
(1) Bright sound. 
(2) Loud shirt. 
In (1), the interaction takes place between visual and auditory modalities as source 
and target modalities. In (2), the auditory modality takes on the role of source domain; 
whereas the visual modality fulfills the role of target.  
In the first example, the operating stimulus is a sound (auditory stimulus) but in the 
second example it is visual (e.g. an image of a shirt). What is relevant here to our 
discussion from the interactionist approach to metaphor is that a given modality (source 
modality) is stimulated via another modality (target modality). 
Equally interesting, the stimulating agent which operates in this metaphorical 
mapping does not operate on this modality otherwise. On the contrary, outside 
synaesthesia, sensory modalities activate as a response to their corresponding stimuli (e.g. 
Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001).  
More importantly, since these two modalities map onto each other in different ways, 
we argue that they interact at least in two ways. The two examples above show that these 
two modalities may interact when the stimulus is visual or auditory. From a physiological 
point of view, the two modalities are active (Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001). This 
means that synaesthetic metaphor leads to an on-line processing of at least two modalities 
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at the same time (for an in-depth analysis of how certain types of conceptual metaphor are 
access on-line, see Valenzuela and Soriano 2009). Then, it is safe to conclude that the two 
modalities are engaged in an interaction that recruits features form both modalities. 
3.2. Interaction at Physiological and Cognitive Levels 
In the previous section, we showed how the metaphorical mapping which is based 
on interaction is also based on inferences from source and target phenomena. This type of 
mapping is based on the fact that two phenomena constitute somehow a unified semantic 
field that is made up of inferences from source and target phenomena. We also showed how 
the interaction is not random; rather, it is causal in that target domains trigger source 
domains. The mapping is between source and target phenomena which share the same 
stimulus. As shown before, the interaction in metaphorical mapping is based on stimulus-
response pattern (see also Giora 2008).  
3.2.1. Synaesthesia metaphor, inputs from different modalities 
Analyzing the data, we identified synaesthetic metaphor as another mapping 
typology wherein source and target domains are experienced bodily (see page 184). More 
precisely, this type of mapping engages sensory modality in source and target domains. 
Hence, the phenomenon is “…a genuine sensory phenomenon (Ramachandran and 
Hubbard, 2001a, b)”. This is due to the fact that cross-modalities mapping causes a sensory 
effect when it is activated (Ramachandran and Hubbard 2003:54). In their research, the 
focus falls on the number–color synaesthesia. They claim that this metaphorical mapping 
typology is based on cross-domain activation. This activation is unidirectional in that a 
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number evokes a color but a color cannot evoke a number (Ramachandran and Hubbard 
2003:51).   
These findings have been replicated not just with number-color synaesthesia but 
also with smell and taste and other sense-related metaphorical associations such as ‘warm 
hue’, ‘loud shirt’, ‘sharp cheese’, and ‘fruits taste and smell sweat’(Ramachandran and 
Hubbard 2003:52). According to these scholars (2001, 2003), these findings indicate that 
this kind of metaphorical mapping is based on physiological connection between different 
modalities (see also Rakova 2003:58). On the whole, synaesthetic metaphor is a cognitive 
and physiological processing (e.g. Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001; Rakova 2003). 
Consistent with these findings, we demonstrated how this type of metaphorical 
mapping poses a potential challenge to the embodied approach to metaphor in that, since 
source and target modalities are experienced via the sense organ, it is implausible to 
attribute to a given modality an inherent source or target role based on the concrete-abstract 
criterion (see pages 155, 222). Our analysis of the data suggests, instead, that the two 
modalities contribute equally to metaphorical mapping (see the previous chapter).  
Another piece of evidence for this view is the fact that a given modality can 
function as source and target in different metaphorical mappings (see Table 7). Henceforth, 
this kind of metaphorical mapping cannot be covered by the tenets of the embodied 
approach to metaphor without a major refinement of the tenets (see Chapter I).  
In particular, we argued that it is implausible to conceive of target modalities as 
abstract and indirectly meaningful as opposed to their counterparts in source domains. 
There is no reason to differentiate sensory modalities in terms of concreteness-abstractness 
criterion, much less to assign them inherently different roles in metaphorical mappings. As 
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a result, we should not assume that we experience target modality via source modalities 
which are more concrete and directly meaningful.  
Since in this type of metaphorical mapping both domains are bodily experienced, 
we claim that there is an interactive process rather than imposing features of more concrete 
onto more abstract domains.  
In this section, we shall see how the interaction between source and target 
modalities is carried out and identify the underlying mechanisms. Let us consider the 
following table: 
 
 
(1) and (2) show that sensory-modalities are engaged in metaphorical mapping at 
least  in two different ways:  in (1), the visual modality functions as source and the auditory 
as target. On the other hand, in (2), the visual modality takes on the role of target and the 
auditory modality fulfills the role of source.  
More interestingly, (2) indicates that the two modalities can interact in two ways: 
the visual modality interacts with the auditory modality as source and as target. This 
finding seems to contradict Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001, 2003), who claim that uni-
directionality also operate in synaesthetic metaphor (see the section above). In chapters I 
Figure 13 Interaction between source and target modalities.
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and II, we demonstrated that this principle is not absolute. As Table 7 illustrates, this 
pattern holds for some cases of synaesthetic metaphor, but does not characterize all other 
instances of cross-modality mapping. 
These metaphors are based on linguistic terms from two modalities Bright (visual 
modality) and Sound (auditory modality). Similarly, Sharp (somatosensory modality) and 
Taste (Gustatory modality). Examples such as (1) Bright Sound and (2) Loud Color seem to 
support this point. For instance, in the first example, the stimulus Bright is processed within 
the visual modality whereas in (2) the stimulus Loud is processed within the auditory 
modality. This entails that processing the language of a given modality leads to the 
stimulation of another (Cacciari, 2008; Rakova 2003).  Another finding in the data is that 
both bright sound and bright light activates visual modality.  
3.3. Interaction in Cognitive system 
3.3.1. Do mapping typologies follow the same patterns of 
interaction?  
In this section, we shall assess whether the interaction process is identical to all 
metaphorical mappings which engage bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target 
domains. So far in this chapter, we have been outlining the mechanisms operating mapping 
across bodily-experienced phenomena. To show whether the interaction process is identical 
to all metaphorical mapping typologies, we need to consider the following mapping 
typologies: 
i. Love Is Journey  
ii. Human Is Machine 
iii. Juliet Is the Sun 
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iv. Understanding Is Grasping (see the following chapter for an elaborated 
discussion on this type of metaphorical mapping). 
Before we get deeper in the analysis of the examples of such typologies, we propose 
overviewing some preliminary findings reached so far in the thesis. As argued before, the 
first metaphorical mapping manifests itself through a rich systematic use of linguistic 
metaphors. Conceptualizing Love relationship in terms of Journey is conventional, 
unconscious, and automatic (Lakoff 1987, 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; 
Kövecses 1988). In the second case, the two domains can exchange the roles in different 
metaphors. However, in the third metaphor, the metaphorical mapping is selective, 
conscious, and deliberate (see our analysis of this metaphor in the section below). 
According to Gentner and Bowdle (1999:92), another important difference that 
characterizes these metaphorical mappings is that novel metaphor involves sense creation 
whereas conventional metaphor entails sense retrieval. 
Still, synaesthetic metaphor shows another difference in its mapping. We argued 
before that this type of metaphorical mapping, though it is conventional, it does not show 
itself through a rich systematic use of linguistic metaphors. Another difference to be 
reported here is that the metaphorical mapping is held through physiological and cognitive 
systems (Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001). Also, the mapping here is causality-based 
metaphor. 
To sum up, different bodily-experienced phenomena interact differently. This type 
of mapping follows different mechanisms. We shall turn to the last case of metaphorical 
mapping (Understanding Is Grasping) in the following chapter. Now, it suffices to note that 
though this metaphorical mapping typology engages bodily-experienced and non bodily-
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experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively, it might be based on 
interaction too.  
3.4. Typologies of interaction 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002:43-50) argue that analyzing metaphor in terms of 
its typology (this might include issues such as the ontological nature of domains and the 
complexity of metaphoric operation) is a major inroad into understanding its function and 
patterns of mapping. 
In connection with this line of investigation, we shall show in this section that 
analyzing interaction in terms of its typologies might reveal the rich variety of the nature of 
interaction between source and target domains. We argued before against the assumption 
that metaphor is a homogeneous cognitive process. So far in this chapter we have outlined 
the mechanisms which operate in interaction-based metaphorical mappings.  
Now, it is time to take our analysis of the data a step further. This will concern 
assessing how different typologies of mapping may show different modes of interaction. In 
the following sections, we shall consider interaction within one modality and within cross-
modalities.  
3.4.1.  Interaction within one modality  
Metaphorical mapping within the visual modality: 
More Is High 
He ran around the field at high speed. 
Following Lakoff and Turner (1989:89), not all conceptual metaphors follow the 
strict patterns of imposing the conceptual structure of a given domain onto another. Rather, 
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there are “image metaphors” which map images instead of conceptual structures10 (see also 
Lakoff 1990:53). Image metaphor seems to be based on mapping across experiences within 
the visual modality. This means that both source and target images are experienced within 
the visual modality. Let us consider the following example:  
(1)  My wife…whose waist is an hourglass. (Lakoff and Turner 1989:91) 
Here, perceiving the size and shape of the image of the target domain leads to the activation 
of the corresponding image with which it interacts in this example.  
This type of metaphorical mapping is based on mental images: the image of 
Hourglass functions as source domain and the image of Waist as target. Though both 
domains are concrete, we argue that the interaction between these domains is different from 
the one reported in other types of metaphorical mapping (see page 264-266). Therefore, the 
interaction process–in this type of metaphorical mapping–needs different analysis.  
In this respect, we document three main aspects where this difference might be 
noticed: 
First, this type of interaction is not instantiated in a systematic use of linguistic 
metaphors. To illustrate, whereas Love Is Journey is linguistically marked through the use 
of expressions that belong to the same conceptual structure—such as  
 (1) a. We can’t turn back now;  
                                                 
10 “Mental image” and “conceptual structure” –applied to metaphorical mapping—seem to 
be used differently in Cognitive Linguistics (e.g. Lakoff and Turner 1989) and Cognitive 
Science (e.g. Feldman 2006; Feldman and Narayanan 2004). However, there is no clear-cut 
explanation of a potential difference between the two. It is assumed that metaphorical 
mappings may include either images or conceptual structures. The former case is when 
source and target domains include images and the latter is when source domain is based on 
experience rather than images (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 89-91). In the literature, it is not 
clear why an image-based domain could not have a concept, or why a concept (or a 
conceptual structure) could not have an image. 
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      b. We’re at a crossroads; 
      c. We may have to go our separate ways (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:44); 
(2) Juliet is the sun. 
One difference between (1a, b, c) and (2) is that the former belongs to the type of 
metaphorical mapping which does not manifest itself through a group of linguistic 
expressions. A similar observation has been made by Lakoff and Turner (1989:91), who 
refer to this kind of mapping as “one-shot” mapping (see also Lakoff 1990:67-68). 
Second, the interaction between the two domains is not strongly held through the 
neural system as compared to the metaphorical mapping typology which is based on 
synaesthesia. It also differs from the typology which draws on Understanding and Grasping 
(for an in-depth analysis of this type of metaphor, see the following chapter).  
Our judgment is based on the fact that, in the metaphorical mapping typology which 
is based on synaesthesia, the two modalities co-activate. In contrast, it is implausible to 
assume that the same pattern of mapping would occur when we think of Waist in terms of 
Hourglass. In other words, thinking of Waist does not necessarily activate the image of 
Hourglass. Accordingly, the interaction between the two domains lacks the causality-
pattern that characterizes other metaphorical mapping typologies.  
And third, this typology seems to be the result of our creative imagination rather 
than unconscious reasoning that is found in synaesthesia metaphor and in typologies such 
as Understanding Is Grasping. Consistent with this finding, Lakoff and Turner (1989) 
affirms that, “Life Is Journey” is used unconsciously and automatically over and over again 
in reasoning about our lives. But one-shot image-mappings are not involved in daily 
reasoning” (91). 
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3.4.2. Interaction in Cognitive system 
3.4.2.1. Adaptation and Transformation processes in 
metaphorical mapping 
Another way to trace how certain metaphorical mappings are based on interaction 
between source and target domains is to closely look at their cognitive topologies and 
assess whether they undergo semantic changes. In this section, we will consider, as our 
initial example, Man is a wolf (Forceville 1996:11) and see how the cognitive topology of 
source and target domains in this metaphorical mapping are transformed.  
First, based on (Forceville 1996:11), let us sketch out the components of the 
cognitive topology of each domain Man Is Wolf: 
 
 
Based on our analysis of this mapping typology—concrete-onto-concrete mapping—we 
observed that the two phenomena which are engaged in this case are semantically 
independent (see page 177). It has thus been suggested that such domains consist of 
cognitive topologies without being mapped (see page 149).  
Putting these findings together with the fact that this metaphorical mapping can be 
reversed (see page 83), we get the following entailments: 
First, both Wolf and Man consist of components that bear certain semantic features 
that individually characterize each cognitive topology. That is, though source and target 
Table 8 Components of source and target domains.
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domains in this metaphorical mapping partially overlap in their linguistic systems (for 
instance, living being, aggressive, cruel are components of both topologies; see also page 
295), these components belong to different semantic fields. To illustrate, the features living 
being, being aggressive are semantically different when characterizing the cognitive 
topology of Man and when denoting that of Wolf. For example, the component being 
aggressive in the cognitive topology of Man does not denote the same behavior as in that of 
Wolf.  
Second, the cognitive topologies of Man and Wolf, before being mapped, include 
components which are not recruited to construct this metaphorical mapping. For instance, 
four legs, two feet, tail, clothes etc. are not included in the mapping. 
Thereby, source and target domains go through adaptation and transformation 
processes in metaphorical mapping. In particular, both source and target domains in this 
metaphorical mapping undergo significant semantic changes. Findings reported by 
Forceville (1996:11) appears to endorse this scenario when he suggests that in metaphorical 
mapping there is “…a kind of mutual adjustment between properties…” of source and 
target domains. More specifically, these domains adapt to each other in the sense that some 
characteristics of Man are adapted to the domain Wolf. Likewise, the domain Wolf has to 
adapt to the domain Man in that the former acquires some human features via this 
metaphorical mapping (Forceville 1996:11-12). 
Third, as stated before, one of the recurring patterns in the metaphorical mapping 
which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains is the fact that 
the mapping can be reversed. Take, for example, Man Is Wolf. This metaphorical mapping 
can be reversed because we may think of Wolf in terms of Man as well (Foceville 
1996:12), attributing some human features to Animal. Again, in this case, the cognitive 
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topology of the domain Man needs to adapt to the domain Wolf. It is obvious that if we 
reverse the mapping, we get a different metaphor but this means that the two domains 
interact differently and their cognitive topologies are adapted and transformed when the 
two domains interact. That is, Man Is Wolf and Wolf Is Man should not be dealt with as 
two isolated metaphors. Instead, we suggest that the two domains are involved in an 
interaction which is instantiated in different cognitive processes. When we map Wolf onto 
Man, this metaphorical mapping represents an instance of the interaction of the two 
domains, and when we map Wolf onto Man it is another instance of their interaction.  
These observations support our view that the two domains that are engaged in this 
mapping typology do have their own conceptual structures outside metaphorical mapping; 
and thus, they are semantically independent (see pages 177).  
The argument that the cognitive topologies of source and target domains are 
engaged in mutual influence applies with equal force to the mapping typology which 
engages sensory modalities in source and target domains. Let us consider the following 
examples:  
Bright sounds 
Loud colors 
Heavy smells 
Sharp tastes 
 
The interaction between Sound and Bright can be looked at in terms of adaptation 
and transformation processes of the two modalities in the sense that the adjective bright 
loses some of its attributes and acquires others from the concept sound. That is, the term 
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bright, when used with light (that is, its conventional use) is not any more the same when it 
is used to modify the concept sound. 
Similarly, the domain Sound loses some of its features and acquires others which 
originally belong to the domain Light. Forceville (1996:21), in this case, would claim that 
the two domains are engaged in “adaptation” and “transformation” processes.  
One further implication that follows from this situation is that target domains in the 
conceptual metaphors analyzed in this section play a basic conceptual structuring role in 
metaphorical mapping. This means that the assumption that target domains are the only 
domains that are reorganized (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Szwedek 2011) does not seem 
to hold in this metaphorical mapping. In conjunction with the potential participation of 
target domains and the possible semantic changes that source domains may undergo in 
certain metaphorical mappings. Mouton (2012:68) argues that changes in our understanding 
of target domains necessarily lead to significant modifications of the organization of source 
domains.  
3.4.3. Interaction among sensory modalities  
3.4.3.1.  Synaesthesia 
We largely covered synaesthesia as an example of interaction between sensory 
modalities. So far in the data, we have outlined how sensory modalities such as audition, 
vision, olfaction interact. However, based on the fact that these modalities are of different 
natures, we hypothesize that the dynamics of the interaction process vary depending on the 
sensory modalities in question. As a general feature, we argued that synaesthetic metaphor 
is unconscious, physiological, and automatic. The question which arises here is whether the 
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interaction between these modalities is homogeneous. To assess this question, let us 
consider the following metaphors: 
Fear Is Cold 
(1) a. The howling of the wolves made my blood freeze. 
b. The thought of AIDS brought me out in a cold sweat. 
Sight Is Touch 
(2) The dog fastened her eyes on my every movement as soon as she knew I had 
food for her. 
Sound Is Sight 
(3) a. He had a dark bass voice, very suitable for the ghost in Don Giovanni. 
b. The volume fell as the band marched further away.  
Emotion Is High 
(4)  If he flies off the handle once again, I’m going to quit the job. 
Emotion Is Touch/Control 
(5) He never quite seemed to hit it off with his head of department. 
BAD Emotion Is Hurt/Injury 
(6) Your unkind remark really hurt her.  
Listening Is Eating/Understanding Is Eating (for a different analysis of this 
metaphor, see the following chapter) 
(7) He swallowed my story hook line and sinker.  
Emotion /Idea Is Smell 
(8) As they entered the narrow pass the sheriff smelt danger. 
Examples (1)-(8) are instances of mapping across sensory modalities. They indicate 
that metaphorical mapping could be the result of interaction between different modalities 
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without giving rise to the phenomenon of synaesthesia—a phenomenon which is based on 
the fact that the experience within a given modality leads to stimulation of another (e.g. 
Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001).  
While much research has demonstrated that in expression such as sharp taste and 
heavy smell there is co-activation (e.g. Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001; Rakova 2003), 
synaesthesia theory is not mature enough to trace whether this co-activation occurs in (1)-
(8). To illustrate, to our knowledge there has been no experiment to assess whether the 
conceptual metaphor in (7) Listening and Eating co-activate. 
In order to cover this gap, the theory needs to experimentally show that source and 
target modalities in (1)-(8) are based on causality-and-automaticity-based interaction. These 
metaphors might be different from synaesthesia-based metaphor in that they do not draw on 
co-activation and causality. In addition, in these metaphors the mapping process is 
selective. For instance, in these examples we purposely choose to map target onto source 
modalities. Based on the analysis of the data above, it becomes clear that different 
typologies in metaphorical mapping typologies lead to different modes of interaction. 
3.4.3.2. Literary metaphor: how it does not fit the 
interaction approach  
So far in this chapter, we have dealt with metaphorical mappings which are based 
on phenomena that are bodily-experienced and draw on stimulus-response pattern (e.g. 
Synaesthesia). To show how these metaphorical mapping typologies differ from others, we 
propose analyzing literary metaphor. Our task here is to identify the underlying 
mechanisms of literary metaphor and juxtapose them with those which operate in other 
mapping typologies such as synaesthetic metaphor.  
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Literary metaphor is instantiated through a mapping typology which might be based 
on different mechanisms. Within the framework of the Interaction approach to metaphor we 
have proposed that this typology can be juxtaposed with others in the sense that it does not 
follow the same process of mapping. Literary metaphor11, in this respect, substantially 
differs from the typology which is based on bodily-experienced phenomena as source and 
target domains. This difference is mainly observed in four ways: 
3.4.3.2.1. The mapping process is conscious and 
deliberate  
Generally speaking, conceptual metaphor is argued to be unconscious cognitive 
processing (Gibbs 2005: 228). Within the embodied approach to metaphor this 
characteristic has been adopted as an absolute feature of all types of metaphorical mapping 
(e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989). One of the major characteristics 
which have been recurring in metaphor research is that conceptual metaphor is used 
unconsciously. However, we need to constrain this overgeneralization since literary 
metaphor seems to be consciously constructed (see page 278). To illustrate, first let us 
consider the following metaphor Time Is Commodity or Money (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980:7-9) 
I don't have time to give you. 
How do you spend your time these days? 
That flat tire cost me an hour. 
                                                 
11 Here we refer to literary metaphor that (1) is not based on conventional mapping between 
source and target phenomena; and (2) is based on bodily-experienced and non-bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target, respectively. 
276 
 
While it seems that these expressions are the result of an unconscious metaphorical 
mapping, literary metaphor—e.g. Juliet Is the Sun seems to be a deliberate mapping. Our 
judgment is based on the fact that target domains in this type of metaphorical mapping, can 
be purposely mapped onto other domains. This means that in the example Juliet is the sun, 
the speaker could likewise choose to map Juliet onto anther domain to perform the same 
cognitive function which is pursued in using this metaphor. In contrast, other cases of 
metaphorical mapping are not arbitrary (see Figure 13). 
Of particular interest in our discussion here is to consider "affordances" (Gibson 
1966, 1979; Glenberg and Kaschak 2002), a term proposed to describe a myriad of possible 
actions when a subject processes visual information. This phenomenon might also 
characterize metaphorical mapping in the sense that a subject may choose which experience 
to use to conceive of a target phenomenon. For instance, according to (White 2011:97), 
“this is the characteristic headline pattern whereby metaphor motivation does not 
immediately derive from a well-known conceptual metaphor but is triggered by the subject 
matter being dealt with in the ensuing article”. 
This is especially the case of literary metaphor where the mapping between source 
and target phenomena is conscious. This happens, for instance, when we purposely choose 
to understand one domain in terms of another. That is, this metaphorical mapping is 
conscious as compared to other metaphorical mapping typologies such as that involved in 
synaesthetic metaphor.  
However, “affordances” may characterize also metaphorical mapping in non-
literary contexts. For instance, in the first chapter we analyzed the following metaphors and 
argued that they are based on multi-mapping across phenomena (Reversal Mappings): 
Machine Is Animal 
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(1)The murder weapon appears to have been a monkey wrench—shades of the Rue 
Morgue.  
Machine Is Animal 
(2)She’s never at home—she’s a real party animal. 
Animal Is Human 
(3)Property developers in Hong Kong are a bunch of fat cats. 
Machine Is Human 
(4)These sports utility vehicles are real gas guzzlers. 
Human Is Machine 
(5) a. It was a high octane performance that left the audience stunned.  
     b. I could never discover what makes Ann tick. 
These metaphors are also relevant to our analysis here in that they are consciously 
constructed, though their use might not be. For instance, the domain Machine could have 
been mapped onto another domain and carries out the required cognitive function. 
Similarly, the domain Human could be understood in terms of another domain rather than 
Machine.  
This deliberate use of metaphor has also been documented in Steen (2010). 
According to him, (Steen 2010:60), one of the aspects that differentiates deliberate and 
non-deliberate metaphors is the cognitive processing which underlies them. He argues that 
the former is, by-default, a comparison based process. That is, it requires a more conscious 
mapping between source and target domains as opposed to non-deliberate metaphors. 
According to Steen (2010:43),  
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“This [deliberate use of metaphor] typically occurs for all metaphors that are 
expressed directly, such as extended non-literal comparisons and similes. Indirect 
metaphors can also be used deliberately, but this does not occur very frequently”. 
In this respect, Steen (2010:44) identifies two aspects in which metaphorical 
mapping should be looked at in terms of deliberateness: the use of metaphor and the 
metaphorical mapping construction (deliberate vs. non-deliberate).   
The question that arises here is how deliberate and non-deliberate use of metaphor 
would contribute to the interactionist approach to metaphor. If source and target domains 
interact in literary metaphor, at least this interaction is not as obvious as in the case of 
synaesthetic metaphor. Since the latter is causality-and-co-activation-based mapping, we 
argued that it is based on interaction between source and target domains rather than on one-
way-meaning transfer principle (see page 237). 
3.4.3.2.2. Literary metaphor does not normally 
manifest itself in a rich systematic use of linguistic expressions 
Another feature which is worth noting here about literary metaphor12 is that it is not 
manifested conventionally in metaphorical linguistic expressions13. This characteristic does 
not mean that they are not embodied, since they still depend on the bodily-based 
information of source domains (Burke 2011). However, our concern here is to show that 
literary metaphor differs from other types in its linguistic manifestation. To illustrate, Juliet 
                                                 
12 Literary metaphor should not be opposed to conventional metaphors since sometimes the 
former is based on the latter (Lakoff and Turner 1989). In this section we have chosen the 
literary metaphor which is not normally used in everyday language and reasoning. 
13 According to Kövecses (2002:4), conceptual metaphor should be distinguished from 
metaphorical linguistic expressions. Whereas the former refers to conceptual mapping 
between source and target domain, the latter arises exclusively from source domain (for a 
contrasting view on this issue, see the following chapter).  
279 
 
Is the Sun, for instance, is not conventionalized in such a way that the elements of the 
source domains are organized in different ways to highlight different aspects of the target 
domain Juliet.  
In contrast, metaphors such as Purposes Are Destinations, States Are Locations and 
Events Are Actions are expressed linguistically in a systematic use of metaphorical 
linguistic expressions (for an elaborated discussion of this point see Lakoff and Turner 
1989:52-56). On the other hand, literary metaphor such as Juliet is the sun, is not 
instantiated through this systematic use. One possible way to explain such lack is to argue 
that the two phenomena have a “very partial projection” (Grady 2007:319). 
Possibly, the most obvious evidence for this systematic use of metaphor is Reddy's 
(1993) Conduit Metaphor. In particular, the metaphorical mapping between the domains 
Sending and Communication is held through a systematic use of linguistic expressions and 
cognitive structures:  
Try to get your thoughts across better.  
None of Mary's feelings came through to me with clarity.  
You still haven't given me any idea of what you mean (Reddy 1993:166).  
According to Pinker (2007:241) this type of metaphor is “generative” because 
“people easily generate new trops that belong to a family” such as Communicating Is 
Sending. So far, we have shown that the linguistic evidence suggests that if there is 
interaction in literary metaphor between source and target domains, it is not strongly held in 
our linguistic system. 
3.4.3.2.3. There is no co-occurrence or co-activation 
of the two phenomena 
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Metaphorical mapping in the case of literary metaphor which is not used 
conventionally is not based on co-occurrence between two phenomena. In the previous 
section argued that literary metaphor such as Juliet is the sun is consciously built. This is 
due to the fact that the two domains in this conceptual metaphor do not systematically co-
occur in our domain of experience—they are not part of an ongoing co-occurrence of 
domains of experience. This may explain the lack of a possible systematic use in linguistic 
and cognitive systems. In other words, the two domains are not cognitively processed as 
parallel domains of experience (see More Is Up on page 98).  
A similar finding has been reported by Grady (2007:318-319) in that the 
metaphorical mapping in this case is not based on experiencing the two domains as being 
associated. To illustrate this point, Grady considers the metaphor, “[D]eath robbed him of 
his life” (Grady 2007:318; see also, Turner 1991:44). Therefore, according to Grady (318-
319), the phenomena Death and Thief are not associated in our domain of experience. 
Thereby, linguistic evidence suggests that if there is interaction between these phenomena, 
it is not strongly held through our linguistic system. Moreover, there is no evidence as to 
assume that in Juliet is the sun, the domain Juliet activates the domain Sun. The same is 
true for, death robbed him of his life. 
These observations indicate that the interaction approach to metaphor may not be 
applied to this type of metaphorical mapping. Still, if we look at this type of metaphorical 
mapping from the interactionist, we need to assume that the interaction between source and 
target phenomena is not strongly held in our reasoning system. While mapping across 
bodily-experienced phenomena shows converging evidence which indicates that the two 
domains interact (e.g. see synaesthetic metaphor), literary metaphor seems to fit the pattern 
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of features-transfer from source onto target domains (see Chapter II). Therefore, the process 
of metaphorical mapping construction in this type of metaphor is selective. 
Though the inferences of metaphorical mapping are fully grounded in bodily 
experiences, the embodied character of conceptual metaphor should not be exclusively 
attributed to source phenomena as target domains in the mapping typology which concerns 
us in this chapter also are embodied. As pointed out before, target domains in this mapping 
typology are eligible for projecting meaning. Therefore, the embodied character of 
conceptual metaphor which is based on two bodily-experienced phenomena is equally 
rooted in source and target domains. 
To sum up, based on the analysis above, we notice that being bodily-experienced—
as a feature of source and target domains—does not necessarily permeate their interaction. 
That is, we did not observe the mechanisms of interaction such as co-occurrence and co-
activation, which we documented in other cases (e.g. synaesthesia metaphor). Though in 
the metaphor Juliet is the sun, both domains are accessible to the sense organ, we claimed 
that they do not interact in this metaphorical mapping because they do not satisfy co-
occurrence, causality, and co-activation. It might be that interaction is carried out 
differently (see the following chapter).  
It follows, then, the way the mapping is constructed is more decisive on the nature 
of the interaction. Yet we noticed that when those dynamics and mechanisms are observed, 
the mapping is constructed unconsciously (More Is Up). That is, mechanisms such as co-
occurrence and co-activation are not observed when source and target domains are mapped 
consciously (Juliet is the sun). It seems then, constructing consciously or unconsciously 
metaphorical mapping is the differentiating feature between interaction and one-way-
meaning projection. 
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Conclusion 
Our primary concern in the present chapter has been to outline the dynamics, 
mechanisms, and typologies of interaction. One of the core features that characterize the 
domains which interact in metaphorical mapping is that they are processed on-line. In this 
chapter, we have shown that when source and target domains are bodily experienced, they 
interact in metaphorical mapping. Since they are bodily experienced, our reasoning system 
does not necessarily resort to metaphorical mapping to categorize them. However, we claim 
that the case wherein the two domains are bodily experienced, the metaphorical mapping is 
a result of interaction between the two phenomena. 
Second, we aimed at identifying which metaphorical mapping typology is likely to 
show those dynamics and mechanisms. We noticed that they recur in the metaphorical 
mapping which engages bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains. 
Nonetheless, our hypothesis needed to be further formulated since being bodily-
experienced does not necessarily permeate the interaction between source and target 
domains. Accordingly, though the focus should have been put more on whether the 
mapping is carried out consciously or unconsciously, our framework shows that certain 
mechanisms—such as co-occurrence and co-activation—prevail in the mapping typology 
that engages bodily-experienced phenomena.  
In addition, it seems that these mechanisms operate when the mapping is 
constructed unconsciously and when source and target domains are bodily experienced. 
Recall that, in this chapter we focused our attention on the metaphorical mapping that 
engages two bodily-experienced phenomena.  
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The third issue in this chapter has been to assess whether the interaction is identical 
to this metaphorical mapping typology. As expected, within this typology, there are also 
subgroups of metaphorical mapping. Therefore, the interaction process is not homogeneous 
to all metaphorical mappings that engage bodily-experienced phenomena in source and 
target domains. 
In this setting, we have shown that metaphorical mapping reveals different levels 
and modes of interaction by means of which source and target domains are mapped in our 
cognitive system. Importantly, different typologies of mapping follow different patterns of 
interaction.  
To show this point, we focused our attention on the mechanisms that are operating 
in cross-sensory mapping (Synaesthesia), image-based mapping, and bi-directional 
mapping. Then, we juxtaposed these three types of metaphorical mapping with literary 
metaphor to assess whether the latter shows any substantial difference regarding these 
mechanisms. Indeed, the latter differs from the former (see pages 274-279). For instance, 
while synaesthetic metaphor is a causality-based mapping, literary metaphor is 
purposefully constructed. In addition, synaesthetic metaphor is dynamic in the sense that it 
is stimulus-response-based pattern (e.g. Cacciari 2008; Rakova 2003; Ramachandran and 
Hubbard 2001). In this respect, we demonstrated that the interaction process across bodily-
experienced phenomena is not identical. Thus, in some types of interaction, the 
metaphorical mapping is causality and co-activation based. In others, such as literary 
metaphor, these mechanisms are not observed, though the two domains are bodily 
experienced. 
Accordingly, the interaction process follows different patterns and is initiated 
through different typologies. This finding is especially indicative of the rich variety of 
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metaphorical mappings and the wrong theoretical basis to analyze metaphor as 
homogeneous figurative processing. On such a view, analyzing mapping across bodily-
experienced phenomena has revealed that different mechanisms operate in different 
mapping typologies. 
However, our theory addresses only the metaphorical mapping which engages 
bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains. As noted before, due to the 
remarkable variety of metaphorical mapping typologies (see the Chapter I and IV), 
conceptual metaphor should not be treated as a homogeneous cognitive process—namely, 
as mapping concrete onto abstract domains. 
These findings further corroborate our hypothesis that the interaction process is not 
identical in the metaphorical mapping typology which engages bodily-experienced 
phenomena in source and target domains. Accordingly, the interaction substantially varies 
depending on the constitutive nature of source and target domains and also on their 
mapping typology—e.g. Synaesthesia vs. Literary metaphor.  
We hypothesized that this interaction can be traced mainly at three levels: linguistic, 
physiological, and cognitive. Of particular interest at this point was to assess how the 
bodily-based information from source and target domains is recruited to carry out the 
interaction process. For this purpose, we proceeded to analyze this type of metaphor in 
terms of its typologies. Having done this, we were able to show that different typologies 
show different modes of interaction.  
On the whole, the interaction process in metaphor seems to be operating when the 
two domains are bodily- experienced phenomena. Because target domains in this 
metaphorical mapping typology are processed first, we argue that this interaction is 
initiated by target domains, which in turn, leads to the stimulation of source domains.  
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So far in the thesis we have shown that the interactionist approach to metaphor is 
applicable to the metaphorical mapping that engages bodily-experienced phenomena. The 
question which arises here is whether being bodily-experienced is a prerequisite condition 
for target domains to initiate the process of interaction. We claim that interaction is based 
on the features which those phenomena have independently of metaphorical mapping. In 
the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena, the two 
domains interact based on bodily-based information. One core feature in the interaction 
between these phenomena is Causality. Possibly, Causality is the main operating 
mechanism in the interaction-based metaphorical mapping.  
In the following chapter, we shall assess whether being bodily-experienced is a 
prerequisite condition for source and target domains to interact. In other words, should 
source and target phenomena be of the same nature—namely, embodied—to interact? 
In this respect, we shall see whether this characteristic is observed in other types of 
metaphorical mapping and whether it is intrinsically limited to the typology which is based 
on bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains. Recall that, source and 
target domains in certain mapping typologies interact because they are interconnected via 
three main strands: cognition, neural system, and language. 
The question which still needs deep consideration is whether the mechanisms of 
interaction can operate in the metaphorical mapping which does not engage two bodily-
experienced phenomena. Such case might include the metaphorical mapping which engages 
physical activities (as source domains) and mental activities (as target domains). Pursuing 
this question will be our task in the next chapter.  
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Chapter VI: A Bio-cognitive Model for Metaphorical 
Mapping: Bringing Cognitive and Biological Systems together in 
the Framework of Interaction 
1. Introduction and Hypothesis 
So far, we have demonstrated that the interaction process in metaphor operates 
when source and target domains are bodily experienced. This interaction is initiated by 
target domains which stimulate the sensorimotor experience of source domains (see chapter 
IV and V). In this respect, causality, co-activation, automaticity and systematicity are core 
features of the interaction process.  
In the present chapter, we hypothesize that if these mechanisms work in other types 
of metaphorical mapping such as concrete-abstract typology, then this will mean that the 
interaction process may characterize this case as well. The main focus in this chapter is 
whether being bodily-experienced is a prerequisite condition for target phenomena to 
interact in metaphorical mapping.  
Our hypothesis in the previous chapter predicts that being bodily experienced is a 
fundamental feature that allows source and target domains to interact. In this respect, we 
outlined the mechanisms which underpin the interaction process in metaphorical mapping 
and argued that such mechanisms are observed when target domains are bodily 
experienced.  
Therefore, certain typologies—such as cross-modality mapping e.g. Somatosensery 
onto Gustation (Sharp onto Taste)—fit perfectly well into the theoretical and empirical 
frameworks of Interaction. For instance, we observed that stimulation is important as it 
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brings source and target modalities to interact in our cognitive and physiological systems 
(see chapter V). This entails four main characteristics of interaction: (1) recruiting features 
from both source and target domains (Coulson 2008:181); (2) this type of metaphorical 
mapping is not “random” but it is physiologically and cognitively motivated; (3) source and 
target modalities are activated regardless of whether the stimulating agent is conventional 
within a given modality or not. To illustrate, synaesthetic metaphor is based on cognitive 
and physiological processes through which the brain maps the phenomena that share a 
given stimulus (Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001; see also Chapter V); and (4) 
metaphorical mappings are not limited to the sensorimotor experiences of the source 
domains.  
In addition, the data indicates that the interaction process between source and target 
domains is not homogeneous to all metaphorical mapping typologies insomuch that 
different typologies show different mechanisms of mapping (see chapter IV). Furthermore, 
we have observed that, even within a specific typology of mapping—let us say the one that 
engages two bodily-experienced phenomena—the interaction process follows different 
patterns and principles (see Chapter V).  
These findings lead us to the following step, which will focus on how cognitive and 
sensorimotor systems interact in metaphorical mapping typologies given that in concrete-
abstract typology, the target domain is not bodily experienced. However, we have shown 
that the interaction process markedly varies depending on how the metaphorical mapping is 
built between source and target domains (see chapter III, IV, and V). For instance, we have 
noticed that the interaction between sensory modalities in synaesthetic metaphor is different 
from multi-mapping-based metaphor, though, on the whole, those properties reveal 
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interaction between source and target domains at different levels: cognition, language, and 
physiology.  
These findings stand in opposition to the foundational assumption adopted within 
the embodied approach in that metaphorical mapping is based on a unidirectional features-
transfer.   
Our theoretical framework, which we suggested to be applicable to the metaphorical 
mapping which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena, may also account for the 
metaphorical mapping which engages physical actions (e.g., grasping) and mental 
processes (e.g., thinking) as source and target domains, respectively. Our hypothesis is 
based on the fact that source and target domains in this type of mapping share the same 
linguistic system (e.g. She grasps a pen and She grasps the concept). 
Our task in this chapter is to identify the potential situational conditions of this type 
of mapping and assess whether they lead to the interaction between physical and mental 
activities.  
In this chapter, we postulate that the motor and cognitive systems interact in the 
metaphorical mapping typology which engages motor actions and mental activities as 
source and target domain, respectively. We shall argue that this mapping typology dwells 
on features from both domains. That is, there is a set of conditions that instigates a motor-
cognitive interaction between source and target domains. One such condition is that the 
stimulation process leads to cognitively map physical and mental actions. Instead, our 
cognition has to fit into the potential sensorimotor experiences which function as source 
domains. For instance, Lakoff (2008:18-19) assures that, “…if you cannot imagine 
someone picking up a glass, you cannot understand someone picking up a glass”. 
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In this respect, understanding a mental activity is motorically derivative (Boroditsky 
and Ramscar 2002; Talmy 2000). The question that we are concerned with in this chapter is 
whether certain terms which are associated with motor actions can initiate the interaction 
process with mental activities. It is worth noting here, that one of the basic conditions 
which have to be met by source and target domains for their interaction is that they have to 
be bodily experienced (see Chapter IV and V).  
To show whether this mapping typology is based on interaction, we need to be able 
to show that mental processes trigger motor actions. Our task here is to assess whether the 
mechanisms of interaction among bodily-experienced phenomena operate in the mapping 
typology which engages physical actions and mental activities as source and target domains 
respectively.  
Our hypothesis predicts that motor and cognitive systems interact: they may 
combine features from both cognitive and sensorimotor systems in the construction of this 
typology. If this hypothesis holds up, we shall be able to show how this interaction is 
marked and then outline its mechanisms.  
Importantly, we observed that mapping action domains onto mental activities such 
as Understand is another kind of metaphor that does not fit into the embodiment theory in 
the sense that not all the tenets of this theory are observed in this mapping typology. It is 
important to look at this type of metaphorical mapping in terms of interaction between 
motor and cognitive systems because this type of mapping follows certain patterns and 
principles of interaction such as automaticity (see Chapter V).  
However, in order for the Embodiment Theory to account for this type of mapping, 
it needs (1) incorporating major insights found in the studies of the brain, mainly, in Neuro-
290 
 
imaging experiments (e.g. Mahon and Caramazza 2008). And (2) re-interpreting the data 
combining findings within the two frameworks.  
In line with these two assumptions, in this chapter, we propose a bio-cognitive 
model approach to metaphorical mapping which engages physical actions and mental 
activities as source and target domains, respectively. 
2. Background 
2.1. Uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping 
In the previous chapter, our concern had been to pursue the mechanisms that operate 
in mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena (see pages 247-264). Based on these 
mechanisms, we have shown that the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-
experienced phenomena substantially differ from other types of mapping such as mapping 
concrete onto abstract phenomena (see the previous chapter for more details). In what 
follows we shall highlight those findings: 
i. the experiential basis of the embodied metaphor should not be fully 
attributed to source domains; 
ii. rather than imposing features from one domain onto another, we have shown 
that in the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced 
phenomena, there is an interactive process between source and target 
domains; 
iii. mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena (in source and target 
domains) is an interaction between two semantically independent domains. 
This means that the two domains do have conceptual structures 
independently of metaphorical mapping; 
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iv. the conceptual metaphor which is based on bodily-experienced phenomena 
as source and target domains involves bodily features from both; 
v. the interaction process in metaphorical mapping can be articulated mainly at 
three levels of complexity: cognitive, linguistic, and neurally; 
vi. the interaction between source and target domains is based mainly on four 
mechanisms: co-activation, causality, automation, and systematicity; 
vii. and, finally, the interaction process between source and target phenomena is 
instantiated through different typologies. 
2.2. Motor modalities and conceptual frames 
In the following two sections, we shall discuss the pattern of activity in motor 
modalities and conceptual frames which may pave the way for the analysis of the 
metaphorical mapping which engages physical actions and mental activities from an 
interactionist point of view. 
2.2.1. Patterns of activity within motor modality 
A motor action consists of a definite topology where an agent exerts force to 
interact with an object. This is known within Cognitive Science as x-Schemas (Feldman and 
Narayanan 2004) and as causative structures within Linguistics (Talmy 1988:49-50). 
Importantly these schemas are neurally instantiated in that they automatically get active 
whenever their corresponding motor actions are active (Coulson 2008; Feldman 2006; 
Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008).  
Furthermore, Talmy (1988:50) further demonstrates that the linguistic system which 
captures motor actions shows the same patterns of those motor actions.  
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In line with these findings, recent experiments have addressed the issue of whether 
the neural structures of x-Schemas are active when such schemas are used to reason about 
abstract phenomena such as Understanding, Thinking etc. (e.g. Feldman 2006; Feldman 
and Narayanan 2004). 
Interestingly, these studies point out that the patterns of activity within motor 
modalities are highly automatized in that the execution, observation, and imagination of 
physical actions follow identical patterns of activation in certain brain areas (e.g. Gallese 
and Lakoff 2005; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, and Rizzolatti 1996). This characteristic is 
possible mainly because the brain is gifted with mirror neurons which “...respond to either 
self-produced or observed actions (Urgesi, Moro, Candidi, and Aglioti 2006: 7948)”. 
2.2.2. Patterns of activity within conceptual frames 
According to Fillmore (1982, 1985), information regarding our ongoing experience 
is captured in terms of conceptual frames. What is relevant here in this chapter is that the 
set of features that constitutes a given conceptual frame becomes active whenever a given 
feature is processed. To illustrate, conceptual frames fulfill a primary role in organizing 
knowledge regarding our interaction with the physical world Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999:358).  
Furthermore, Lakoff and Gallese (2005) state that these conceptual frames are 
captured in brain structures that fire whenever they are stimulated, giving rise to the 
activation of the corresponding frames.  
One way to stimulate these brain structures, which is extremely important for our 
purpose to address in the present chapter, is via the linguistic system. Therefore, there is a 
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certain amount of automaticity to patterns of activity in conceptual frames. In this setting, 
the patterns of activity within motor actions show close parallels with cognitive processing.  
In line with these findings, research in Psychology (e.g. Barsalou 2005, 2007), 
Physiology (e.g. Gallese 2003), Neuroscience (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998; Rizzolatti, 
Fadiga, Fogassi and Gallese 2002) have addressed the issue of whether motor modality and 
cognitive processing work in parallel.  
Consequently, they demonstrated that processing metaphorical mapping of abstract 
concepts using source domains that are directly grounded in motor actions leads to the 
activation of the neural and semantic substrates of such actions (e.g. Coulson 2008; Gallese 
and Lakoff 2005; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Lakoff 2008). These studies reveal that 
cognitive processing such as that involved in understanding activates motor modalities 
such as grasping. The question here is whether the automaticity observed within motor 
modalities and within conceptual frames could lead to their interaction when these 
modalities and frames are mapped.  
To sum up, our findings in the previous chapters—taken together with the above 
mentioned experiments provide practical assistance for approaching the metaphorical 
mapping which engages motor actions and mental activities as source and target domains, 
respectively from the interactionist framework.  
3. Data Analysis 
In the previous chapter, we argued that the interaction between phenomena in 
metaphorical mapping is based mainly on four mechanisms: co-activation, causality, 
automaticity, and systematicity. We observed that these mechanisms chiefly operate in the 
metaphorical mapping which is based on two bodily-experienced phenomena.  
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Broadly speaking, interaction-based metaphorical mappings are those which engage 
two bodily-experienced phenomena. Because bodily-experienced phenomena are 
semantically independent, they include bodily features that are potentially projected in 
metaphorical mapping (see Chapter V). 
 Our hypothesis is that, if the mechanisms of interaction also operate in the 
metaphorical mapping which involves bodily and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as 
source and target domains, respectively, then this type of mapping also is based on 
interaction. In this respect, the scope of the Interaction approach to metaphor which we 
propose in this thesis can be extended to account for the type of metaphorical mapping 
which engages physical actions and mental activities as source and target domains, 
respectively. 
In this respect, the interaction process may characterize not only the metaphorical 
mapping which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena but also the mapping typology 
which involves bodily-experienced phenomena and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as 
source and target domains, respectively.  
A vast body of research within Neuroscience concerns how physical actions and 
their respective metaphorical use are represented neurally (e.g. Feldman 2006; Feldman and 
Narayanan 2004; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008). Interestingly, Neuro-imaging 
experiments have demonstrated that processing both literal and metaphorical meaning of 
certain physical actions can be tracked in the same brain area (Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, 
Rizzolatti, and Iacoboni 2006; Gallese and Lakoff 2005). In particular, studies within this 
field agree that certain properties of physical actions are activated whether they are used 
literally or metaphorically (Coulson 2008; Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Gallese and 
Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008).  
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Based on these findings, in this chapter we shall assess this type of metaphorical 
mapping from the interactionist point of view. To do so, we need to gauge the mechanisms 
of interaction against the data to assess whether they operate in this type of metaphorical 
mapping. In this setting, we shall focus on how mental processes which function as target 
domains may actively participate in the construction and processing of metaphorical 
mapping. 
3.1. The situational conditions observed in this metaphorical 
mapping typology 
In the following sections, we shall assess whether physical actions and cognitive 
processes—when they are engaged in this mapping typology—show common features in 
their patterns of activity. In this section, we shall identify the situational conditions in 
metaphorical mapping which might lead to the interaction between physical actions and 
mental processes.  
3.1.1. Source and target domains share the same lexical 
repertoire  
Conceptual metaphor is a primary source of polysemy (Gibbs 1994; Lakoff 1978; 
Lehrer 1990; Miller 1993; Nunberg 1979; Sweetser 1990; Tendahl and Gibbs 2008). This 
characteristic is mostly salient in the conceptual metaphor which maps motor actions onto 
mental activities because we tend to conceptualize mental activities as motor actions (e.g. 
Talmy 1988, 2000).  
Importantly, the two phenomena come to share the same linguistic repertoire 
insomuch that the linguistic system of the motor action in the source domain comes to 
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underlie our reasoning about the mental activities in the target domain. For instance, 
Richards (1936:93) assures that, “…when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of 
different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase…” 
Relevant to this point, in Chapter III, we showed how the notion of polysemy within 
the embodied approach to metaphor is based on Propositionality in the sense that the 
bodily-based meaning of a word is extended to other abstract phenomena. In this respect, 
Gibbs (1994:9-10) argues that “…the meanings of many polysemous words can be 
explained in terms of basic metaphors that motivate […] the transfer of English vocabulary 
from the domain of physical motion and object manipulation and location […] to various 
social and mental domains […].” 
Importantly, we also observed in Chapter IV that the metaphorical mapping which 
engages two bodily-experienced phenomena, polysemous terms combines bodily-based 
information from source and target domains. We argued that since source and target 
domains are bodily experienced, they have independent conceptual structures which are 
recruited to construct and process this mapping typology. Additionally, we observed that 
when these phenomena are mapped, they are engaged in a mutual influence contributing 
their respective bodily-based features to the construction of metaphorical mapping through 
using a shared linguistic system. Consider the following metaphor:  
Understand Is Grasp/Hold 
(1)I am given to understand that there will be no pay cuts this year. 
(2)She finds even the easy concepts difficult to get hold of.  
(3)Half the class got hold of the wrong end of the stick and put the metal in the acid. 
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In this set of metaphorical expressions, both the mental activity Understand and the 
motor action Grasp are represented in the following terms: grasp and get hold of. Both 
source and target domains in these examples share the terms which inherently belong to the 
motor action in the source domain, Grasping.  
It is worth noticing here that the mental activity which is involved in Understanding 
is reasoned about without resorting to metaphorical mapping (e.g. She understands your 
argument). Still, this mental activity is not grounded in a bodily-experienced phenomenon. 
Therefore, it is safe to argue that this mental process is semantically independent.  
However, in the metaphorical mapping above, this mental process is represented via 
linguistic terms, which are grounded in the sensorimotor information of the domain 
Grasping. According to Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002), the brain has access to abstract 
phenomena through using perceptual structure of bodily-experienced phenomena. As the 
examples above are meant to indicate, this access is linguistically manifested via the 
expressions that inherently label sensorimotor experiences. Accordingly, these terms 
represent sensorimotor actions and (metaphorically) mental activities. This entails that 
target domains are embodied through the use of linguistic terms, which make direct 
reference to motor experience. This has major entailments for the interaction approach to 
metaphor (see page 308). 
3.1.2. Certain source and target domains share the same neural 
network 
Perhaps the most irrefutable aspect of the embodiment theory is its neural basis. 
According to Raichle (2008:118), using functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) and positron 
emission tomography (ERP), Roy and Sherrington (1890) were the first to document an 
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intrinsic relationship between brain function and blood flow in the brain, in that cognitive 
processes parallel blood flow to certain brain areas. Though these techniques need further 
applications in the realm of the embodiment theory to explore potential neural function 
during metaphorical mapping construction and processing, they have opened new avenues 
for the research on how to empirically test the tenets of such theory (Coulson 2008:191). 
For instance, studies within Neuroscience aim to identify the neural representation of action 
verbs such as grasp, kick, hold etc. (e.g. Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, and Rizzolatti 1996; 
Urgesi, Moro, Candidi, and Aglioti, 2006) and explore whether these areas of the brain are 
active as well when we process the motor semantic of linguistic expressions which are used 
literally and figuratively (e.g. Rapp, Mutschler, and Erb 2012). These experiments detected 
neural activities in the motor cortex which are associated with the hands and which are 
active either when the literal or figurative meaning of such motor words is processed (see 
also Gallese and Lakoff 2005).  
Similar observations have been made by Feldman (2006:38) that, “…mental 
structure parallels active neural structure—connected concepts are neurally connected.” In 
the same way, other scholars, for instance, Chang, Feldman and Narayanan (2005:4) argue 
that, "Neurobiological evidence centers on experiments showing that areas of motor and 
pre-motor cortex associated with specific body parts are activated in response to motor 
language referring to those body parts." 
Therefore, one of the major findings of such studies which strongly suggests that 
cognition is embodied, is that the execution, perception, and imagination of a given motor 
action are neurally processed by much of the same neural network(s) (Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, and Rizzolatti 1996; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, and 
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Rizzolatti 1996; Pulvermuller, Hauk, Nikulin, and Ilmoniemi, 2005; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, 
and Gallese 2001).  
Accordingly, these areas activate both when a subject actually carries out a given 
physical action and when this subject perceives an image or a word referring to the same 
action (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, and Iacoboni, 2006; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; 
Phillips, Humphreys, Noppeney and Price 2002).  
Relevant to our discussion here, in the previous section, we observed that certain 
motor actions and mental activities which are potentially engaged in metaphorical 
mappings such as grasping and understanding are largely represented by the same 
linguistic system.  
(1)She grasps a paper.  
(2)She grasps the idea. 
Based on the findings discussed above, along with the imaging results reported by 
di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, and Rizzolatti (1992), understanding the statement 
(1) would involve activating the neural structure which is responsible for the execution of 
the action Grasping. Moreover, processing the figurative meaning of the verb grasp in (2) 
would also engage both the topological properties of the action grasping and its neural 
instantiation (see page 317 , for more details).  
In this respect, these studies show that linguistic expressions which can be used 
both literally and metaphorically elicit the same response from the brain. When a given 
action word, such as grasp, is used figuratively, it activates the very neural network that is 
responsible for motor experience (see also Lakoff 2008). It follows, then, that words such 
as grasp, hold, kick, touch activate the brain area which is directly responsible for the 
corresponding motor actions even when these expressions are used metaphorically (e.g. di 
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Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, and Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese and Lakoff 2005). This 
means that processing mental activities such as Understanding also recruits neural 
structures that go active when the motor action of the source domain is actually carried out. 
Simulation theory has another significant entailment. At least, linguistic expressions 
activate the same brain areas independently whether the meaning in question is 
metaphorical or literal. This notion is particularly indicative of the fact that both 
sensorimotor and cognitive systems function in parallel at least in the case of the 
metaphorical mapping which engages motor actions and mental activities as source and 
target domains, respectively. This type of mapping is neurally instantiated (e.g. Feldman 
2006; Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008).  
Obviously, these entailments do not necessarily characterize all the instances of the 
typology which is based on motor actions and mental activities as source and target 
domains, respectively. Instead, we have focused our attention on one particular 
metaphorical mapping—Understanding Is Grasping. 
To sum up, then, it is safe to claim that both cognitive and motor systems work in 
parallel when mental activities are processed metaphorically via the motor topology of 
source domain such as Grasping.  
3.1.3. Different stimulus formats leading to identical response 
In the previous section, we explained how motor actions and mental activities which 
are mapped come to share the same neural network. One of the major findings within the 
field of Neuro-imaging is that a given brain area is active when either the literal or 
metaphorical meaning of an action is processed.  
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In this section, we shall argue that it is important to notice that a given brain area 
fires as a response to different kinds of stimulus. This characteristic is known in 
Neuroscience as the 'plasticity' of the brain (Damasio 1994).  
We postulate that the link between the two phenomena is made through shared 
stimuli. Source and target domains share a stimulus that unifies the two phenomena at a 
bio-cognitive level. A piece of evidence for this claim is the fact that the linguistic term 
grasp links both the conceptual frame of Understanding and the motor action of grasp. We 
claim that the biological aspect of the brain prevails in cognition too—namely in 
metaphorical mappings.  
Accordingly, not only does the sensorimotor system need a sensorimotor stimulus 
to categorize phenomena, but also the cognitive system requires stimulation to activate 
conceptual frames. Therefore, this stimulus-response pattern is common to both 
sensorimotor and cognitive systems leading to the construction and activation of motor and 
cognitive topologies. In the sensorimotor system, the motor topology such as the one 
involved in grasp, responds to a sensory motor stimulus (Coulson 2008; Gallese and Lakoff 
2005; Lakoff 2008).  
In parallel, in the cognitive system there are conceptual frames that are retrieved 
through a stimulation process (e.g. Feldman 2006). The brain responds to different types of 
stimulus in the same way: neurons fire when a stimulus is perceived. This occurs whether 
the stimulation is ignited by (1) the observation of a phenomenon; (2) by the actual 
execution of the motor action in the source domain; or (3) by the mere imagination of a 
given motor action (Feldman 2006; Gallese and Lakoff 2005).  
As these studies indicate, the stimulus does not need to be sensorimotor in order to 
activate motoric information. In particular, the third case shows that a stimulus could be 
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cognitive because the brain is gifted with cells that are sensitive to linguistic and extra 
linguistic stimuli (see page 317). Accordingly, this type of stimulus is inferred from the 
target domains that are able to evoke the sensorimotor information of the source domain.  
Metaphorical mappings, thus, draw on different kinds of stimulus: linguistic and 
extra-linguistic. The metaphorical mapping typology such as the one that engages motor 
actions and mental activities—as source and target domains, respectively—draws on 
different kinds of stimulus. This means that this mapping typology recruits information 
from the sensorimotor and cognitive systems through shared stimuli. We suggest that this 
type of mapping, for its construction and activation, requires a given motor modality and its 
corresponding conceptual frame.  
In the set of metaphorical expressions above, the stimuli are linguistic. Accordingly, 
source and target phenomena are biologically hard-wired and cognitively interconnected 
through shared linguistic stimuli. Accordingly, metaphorical meaning is motorically 
derivative in that the target domain in this type of mapping—though being abstract—it 
draws on motoric information in the source domain. Notice that in this case, the stimulation 
is carried out via the linguistic systems (Caballero 2009; Forceville 1996, 2006). Similarly, 
conceptual frames are represented neurally in the brain and linguistic expressions function 
as stimuli of these conceptual frames (Feldman 2006; Fillmore 1982; Lakoff 1987). This 
explains how target phenomena evoke the perception of sensorimotor activities. This means 
that mental processes such as Understand lead to the activation of the same neural area 
which is responsible for the physical action it is mapped onto (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, 
Rizzolatti, and Iacoboni, 2006).  
Accordingly, action words stimulate the neural network which is responsible for the 
execution of a given action (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, and Rizzolatti, 1996). Because the 
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stimulus which operates in a given motor modality (e.g. Grasping) also activates the 
conceptual frame of a given mental activity (e.g. Understanding), we claim that the 
sensorimotor and cognitive systems work in parallel. In this case, the metaphorical mapping 
is triggered by the same stimulus, which operates in a given motor modality and in target 
domains. On this view, the perceptual properties that stimulate the sensorimotor system in 
source domain (Grasping) also stimulate the conceptual frame in the target domain 
(Understanding) leading to their interaction. This means that metaphorical mapping 
between physical actions and mental activities is the result of their interaction.  
This also means that cognitive system responds to stimulation in the metaphorical 
mapping which engages physical actions and mental processes as source and target 
domains, respectively. In this mapping typology, we cognate in terms of conceptual frames 
which draw on a linguistic system that potentially stimulates sensorimotor experiences. The 
interaction between source and target domains resides in the fact that linguistic and extra-
linguistic stimuli can similarly activate the motor topology of source domains and the 
cognitive topology of the target domains. Apparently, the metaphorical mapping which 
engages motor actions and mental activities fits the tenets of the embodied approach to 
metaphor. However, a deep analysis of this type of mapping reveals a substantial difference 
from other types of mapping. Namely, it shows a more participating role of target domains. 
Analyzing this type of mapping as based on interaction between two phenomena 
differs from the way metaphorical mapping is analyzed within both Blending and 
Embodied theories of metaphor. As we saw in the previous chapter, in the first case, 
metaphorical is based on systematic correspondence between source and target domains 
(e.g. Glucksberg and Keysar 1993; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Valenzuela, 2009). Within 
Blending theory, metaphorical mapping is based on the integration of elements from source 
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and target inputs (for a more detailed analysis of the difference between the two theories, 
see the previous chapter and Ruiz de Mendoza and Peña 2005). In this respect, this finding 
contradicts the metaphor approach which claims for a symbol-manipulation based mapping 
(Chomsky 1975; Fodor 1975; Searle 1975). Similarly, this finding does not fit the metaphor 
approach that analyzes metaphor as propositions (see chapter II), as similarity-based 
(Marks, Hammeal, and Bornstein 1987; McGlone 2003; Miller 1993; Ortony 1993) or as 
analogy based (e.g. Gentner and Bowdle 1999).  
Conceptual mapping has been argued to be propositional in Cognitive Linguistics 
(see Chapter II)—transferring bodily-based features from more concrete onto more abstract 
domains. The metaphorical mapping which engages physical actions and mental processes 
is bio-cognitively motivated. We do not pretend to reduce metaphorical mappings to a 
biological task Chapter 0), since other factors such as culture (e.g. Bernárdez 2005, 2013; 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Peña 2005; Geeraerts, Kristiansen, and Peirsman 2010) can 
significantly shape the patterns and principles of interaction.  
These three situational conditions are crucial to understanding the process of 
interaction between physical actions and mental processes as source and target domains, 
respectively. In this setting, causality and co-activation might lead motor actions and 
mental activities to interact in metaphorical mapping. However, before we deal with this 
issue, we need to further outline certain aspects which, added to the above mentioned 
situational conditions, could give rise to interaction.  
To sum up, in the metaphorical mapping which engages motor actions and mental 
activities as source and target domains, respectively, both motor and cognitive systems 
work in parallel. Metaphorical mappings which include physical actions such as grasp, 
kick, and hit are processed cognitively and motorically in the sense that this type of 
305 
 
metaphorical mapping recruits the motoric information of the source domains (e.g. 
Grasping) and the cognitive topology of the target domains (e.g. Understanding). 
Furthermore, the neural network which is responsible for a given motor action is active also 
when a term referring to that action is processed either metaphorically or literally.  
3.1.4. Conceptual frames and motor modalities: cognitive 
topology vs. motor topology 
To analyze the metaphorical mapping which engages physical actions and cognitive 
processes from the interactionist approach, first we need to differentiate between primitive 
structure (motor modality) and complex structure (conceptual frame). To identify this 
difference and how it is crucial to our understanding of this type of metaphorical mapping, 
let us analyze a motor action when it is used literally, as in (a) and metaphorically, as in (b): 
(a) She grasps a pen. 
(b) She grasps the concept. 
In (a), the physical action includes a motor topology where an agent carries out the 
action of grasping an object. This action is primitive as compared to its counterpart in (b). 
The latter encompasses a more complex topology where the corresponding inferential 
elements are added to the primitive action of the source domain Grasping. For instance, 
since the term grasp, apart from its default motor topology, it also acquires the cognitive 
topology of the target domain Understanding. In this respect, the inferential features of the 
physical action and cognitive topology are retrieved. It is not only the motor inferences of 
grasp which operate in the mapping in (b). 
Notice that we do not reduce the physical topology to a meaningless motor 
modality, since certain inferences are drawn from (a)—for instance, the subject is going to 
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use the pen to write a letter etc. Still, these inferences are not metaphorically retrieved. The 
main point which we need to focus on here is how the motor topology of a given action 
within a given modality changes from a primitive structure to a more complex one when it 
is used metaphorically.  
Perhaps, one way to handle this issue is to assume that the motor action in (a) is 
processed by the brain via responding to the operating stimulus in this motor modality 
(Feldman 2006). Consequently, the inference of this mapping is molded in such a way that 
it fits into the motor topology of the source domain. For instance, if the mental activity 
(understanding) is paired with the motor modality (grasping), then the stimulus arguably 
activates the properties of such modality. This means that the way the mapping is 
constructed is maximally governed by the mechanisms of such modality. To illustrate, if 
this modality draws on physical actions, then the mental activities which fulfill the function 
of target are categorized in terms of the motor topology of the physical action of the source 
domain. 
On the other hand, metaphorical mappings consist of mapping the motor 
information of the source domain onto the conceptual frame of the target domain. Even 
when the literal meaning is the case, we do not process meaning in terms of individual 
words but in terms of conceptual frames (Feldman 2006; Fillmore 1982, 1985). This type 
of metaphorical mapping recruits information from sensorimotor and cognitive systems. It 
needs sensorimotor phenomena and conceptual frames to construct metaphorical mappings 
such as she grasps a pen and she grasps the concept. Accordingly, conceptual frames and 
sensorimotor features are activated thanks to the stimulation of certain brain areas which 
are highly associated with motor actions. In this respect, source and target phenomena are 
hard-wired biologically and cognitively. Cognitive processes in the case of metaphorical 
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mappings are not based on computational processes isolated from sensorimotor system. 
Rather, they are grounded in the sensorimotor experience that fulfills the function of source 
domains (e.g. Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002). However, this does not mean that mapping 
physical actions onto mental activities is a one-way-meaning transfer. Instead, it is based on 
the interaction between the two phenomena where target domains also project their 
semantic features. 
To sum up, literal and metaphorical meanings activate sensorimotor information 
and conceptual frames. This situation entails that linguistic expressions, which draw on 
motor actions, could function as a stimulus to motor modalities and conceptual frames in 
certain metaphorical mappings. Accordingly, processing this mapping typology requires 
retrieving and activating the information of the corresponding motor modality of the source 
domain and the cognitive topology of the target domain. Mental activities which function as 
target domains in this mapping typology are not devoid of sensorimotor information. When 
we understand one domain in terms of another, the cognitive process is not mapping 
between the two domains at an abstract level. Rather, these source domains are directly 
grounded in sensorimotor experience. 
However, this characteristic is not circumscribed to source domains (see the 
sections above). It follows from this that the process of understanding one phenomenon in 
terms of another is neither propositional nor lineal. Instead, it is interactional (see Chapter 
III). In this case, source and target domains are deeply connected to each other, first, 
through mapping the motor topology of the source domains onto the cognitive topology of 
the target. Second, this connection is also triggered by linguistic and extra-linguistic 
stimuli, which equally activate the two topologies. The type of interaction between source 
and target domains on which we are focusing on in this chapter is an example of the 
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metaphorical mapping where we experience sensorimotor phenomena through cognitive 
activities.  
As argued before, there must be a stimulus from the target domain in order for the 
brain to use sensorimotor information to map the two phenomena. The problem which we 
need to deal with at this point is that target domains in this mapping typology are not 
accessible to the sense organ. Because the latter is abstract, the challenge that we face here 
is to show how a target domain such as Understanding evokes the sensorimotor experience 
(Grasp) in metaphorical mapping. This entails that these domains are not eligible to activate 
the motor topology of source domains. In the following section, we shall assess whether 
processing metaphorically certain mental actions in this mapping typology will lead to the 
activation of the motor topology of source domains.  
3.1.5. Conceptual frames and Linguistic Stimuli 
Feldman (e.g. 2006) argues that a word activates a conceptual frame. This means 
that a linguistic expression could function as a stimulus too (White 2004:78). Hence, the 
functionality of conceptual frames and motor topologies depends on stimulation. In this 
section, we shall discuss how this characteristic might also be inherent to cognitive system 
in that conceptual frames are activated via stimulation. This step is a major inroad into 
understanding how the activation of source and target domains in this type of mapping 
leads to their interaction.  
Since the brain areas that respond to a given sensorimotor stimulus become active 
also when a subject is exposed to a word, then we could conclude that source domain is a 
stimulus-driven domain (Caballero 2009). Therefore, if we take the example of grasp a 
paper and grasp an idea, the same brain area in both cases is activated. This entails that the 
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tie-in between linguistic expressions and the sensorimotor experiences they denote is 
instantiated in neural networks. It is important to note here that, this activation occurs 
whether we are processing the literal or the metaphorical meaning of grasp. Again, this 
means that the brain responds to linguistic and extra linguistic stimuli in the same way 
when linguistic expressions convey literal and metaphorical meanings. Accordingly, the 
same neural network becomes active as a response to sensorimotor stimuli and when the 
brain processes linguistic expressions which denote sensorimotor phenomena (e.g. Aziz-
Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, and Iacoboni 2006; Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, and Rizzolatti, 
1996). As pointed out before, linguistic expressions potentially activate conceptual frames. 
Therefore, it is safe to argue that the linguistic terms which draw on sensorimotor 
experience can stimulate both sensorimotor and cognitive systems. For instance, target 
domains in this mapping typology—namely, because they draw on sensorimotor 
phenomena (Grasp, hold, etc.)—potentially evoke the motor topology of such phenomena.  
Possibly, these linguistic expressions become conventional stimuli to the neural 
networks that are inherently responsible for sensorimotor experience because their 
processing requires activating the motor topology they are associated with.  
Thus, when we reason about a mental activity (e.g. Understanding) using a 
linguistic term (e.g. grasp), the neural network which is responsible for the execution of the 
motor action (Grasping) becomes active. 
As argued before, processing sensorimotor phenomena can be captured under a 
stimulus-response pattern (Caballero 2009). Based on our discussion so far, this pattern 
also prevails when such phenomena are mapped onto others. For instance, synaesthesia 
metaphor is based on stimulus-response pattern to the extent that the experience of a given 
modality stimulates another (Caballero 2009; Cacciari 2008; see also Chapter III for how 
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these findings led us to approach conceptual metaphor from a different perspective). 
Importantly, in this chapter, we demonstrated that the mapping which engages physical 
actions and mental activities as source and target domains, respectively, are also based on 
stimulation.  
In chapter III, we argued that target domains also stimulate the brain when they are 
bodily experienced. Therefore, in order for a mapping to take place, there must be 
stimulation from the target domain. In addition, in this type of metaphor, it is the stimulus 
that helps the brain constrain which domains should be mapped onto which ones.  
In the metaphorical mapping which dwells on physical actions and mental activities, 
the stimulus could be of two natures: sensory, as in the case of motor actions such as grasp 
and hold when these terms are used literally; or cognitive as in the case of mental activities 
such as understand when used metaphorically.  
Stimulating the neural network which is responsible for the action grasp occurs 
when this domain shares certain features with another one. This might mean that the 
cognitive topology of a given mental activity evokes the perception of the motor topology 
of the source domain. In this case, when the sensorimotor stimuli are associated with 
linguistic expressions, they become stimuli to the cognitive topology of the target domain. 
These (sensorimotor and linguistic) stimuli, expose an internal structure that consists of a 
set of features that form a domain. 
In cognitive Linguistics, the suggestion is made that cognition is highly structured 
in terms of conceptual frames, which are activated by linguistic terms (e.g. Feldman 2006). 
The fact that motor verbs such as grasp, when are used metaphorically, activate 
sensorimotor information is particularly suggestive that the metaphorical mapping which 
engages physical actions and mental processes is bio-cognitively motivated (e.g. Feldman 
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2006). In this setting, linguistic expressions function as stimulus because perceiving action 
words activates the corresponding motor areas (Pulvermuller, Hauk, Nikulin, and 
Ilmoniemi 2005:1).  
Accordingly, the conceptual mapping depends on a stimulating agent that is 
associated with a given sensorimotor experience. As argued before, the same stimulus may 
operate taking different forms; yet the outcome of such stimulation is identical (Gallese, 
Fadiga, Fogassi, and Rizzolatti, 1996).  
In line with these findings, Lakoff (2008:11-15) argues that cognitive system is 
structured in terms of conceptual frames in that when the corresponding linguistic terms are 
processed, those frames become active. These frames are instantiated neurally in the brain 
(e.g. Feldman 2006; Lakoff 2008). This can mean that in order for a conceptual frame to 
activate, it needs stimulation and a neural response. In this respect, action words—when 
they metaphorically—they activate both the corresponding conceptual frame and the brain 
area which is responsible for such motor modality. Accordingly, in the metaphorical 
mapping which engages physical actions and mental activities, as source and target 
domains, linguistic terms can acquire the role of stimulus to cognitive and motor systems. 
When a given metaphorical mapping engages a sensorimotor experience as source domain, 
the neural network which is responsible for such experience becomes active (Aziz-Zadeh, 
Wilson, Rizzolatti, and Iacoboni 2006). 
To sum up, so far we have outlined the situational conditions that may pave the way 
for approaching the mapping typology which draws on motor actions and mental activities 
as source and target domains from an interactionist point of view. We focused our attention 
on Understanding Is Grasping and observed that in this mapping typology, source and 
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target domains share the same lexical repertoire in that the action word grasp also denotes 
the corresponding mental activity.  
Furthermore, neurophysiological studies sustain the idea that action words stimulate 
the neural network which is responsible for the execution of the corresponding actions. 
Therefore, we postulate that processing metaphorically mental activities such as 
Understanding by using action words such as Grasp activate the same neural network(s). 
Accordingly, different stimulus formats elicit identical response in the brain. Later, we 
addressed the question of how conceptual frames and motor modalities follow identical 
patterns of activation. In particular, studies within Cognitive Linguistics support the idea 
that our cognition is organized in terms of conceptual frames which go active through 
linguistic stimulation (e.g. Feldman 2006; Lakoff 1987).  
In the following sections, we will assess how these situational conditions may lead 
to interaction between motor and cognitive topologies in the metaphorical mapping 
typology which engages motor actions and mental activities as source and target domains, 
respectively. 
3.2. Interaction 
So far, we have been explaining how motor actions and mental activities, such as 
grasping and understanding respectively, respond to a common linguistic stimulus and are 
represented in the same brain area. It follows from this that those physical actions and 
mental activities work in parallel when they are mapped. As seen before, neurobiological 
findings support the notion that perceptual and motor systems are activated during 
processing action words (e.g. Pulvermuller, Hauk, Nikulin, and Ilmoniemi 2005). 
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3.2.1. Semantic features exchange between motor and cognitive 
topologies 
Based on evidence from Neuro-imaging experiments, we argued in the previous 
section that the cognitive and motor systems work in parallel when we process the mapping 
typology which draws on motor actions and mental activities as source and target domains, 
respectively. Our main task now is to show whether they interact in metaphorical mapping 
or they fit the one-way-meaning-transfer approach. It might be the case that though these 
systems work in parallel in processing this mapping typology, they do not interact—there 
might be no semantic features exchange between the two systems.  
Nevertheless, the aforementioned situational conditions (see pages 295-308) hint at 
a potentially interactive process between cognitive and motor systems in this mapping 
typology. The fact that the two phenomena share neurological and linguistic systems paves 
the way for approaching this type of metaphorical mapping from an interactionist point of 
view.  
Importantly, the fact that neurophysiological studies (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, 
Rizzolatti, and Iacoboni 2006;  Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, and Rizzolatti 1996; Rizzolatti, 
Fogassi, and Gallese, 2001) when physical actions and cognitive processes are mapped, the 
two phenomena are interfunctional (sharing the same brain area, same linguistic terms, and 
same stimulus). However, to sketch out how this type of metaphorical mapping is based on 
interaction, we need to further analyze the aforementioned metaphorical expressions to 
assess whether they show the mechanisms of interaction which have been outlined in the 
previous chapter. In this case, the interaction between the two phenomena might be shaped 
314 
 
by the motor topology of the physical action (in the source domain) and the cognitive 
topology of the conceptual frame (in the target domain).  
Claiming for an interaction-based approach to metaphorical mapping between 
motor action and cognitive processes requires exploring how the cognitive topology and the 
motor topology of source and target domains, respectively, are engaged in a mutual 
influence. 
We shall argue that this interaction proceeds in two major stages—through 
recruiting semantic features from source and target domains and allowing them to adapt to 
each other. Importantly, these two mechanisms were observed in the mapping typology 
which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena (see page 226-234).  
The key fact here is that since source and target phenomena are semantically 
independent—having a conceptual structure independently of metaphorical mapping, their 
respective bodily-experienced features are active in such mapping typology. As seen 
before, a crucial feature, which is recurrent in this type of metaphorical mapping, is that the 
interaction between semantically independent phenomena gives rise to emergent structure 
(see page 234). 
The problem which we are faced with in analyzing the metaphorical mapping which 
engages physical actions and mental activities, is that the latter is not bodily experienced 
(e.g. Lakoff and Nuñez 2000). Recall that we proposed an interactionist approach of 
conceptual metaphor based on the fact that source and target domains in certain metaphors 
are bodily experienced. Accordingly, in Chapter IV we claimed for a more embodied 
approach to metaphor since target domains also project their semantic features in 
metaphorical mapping. Nonetheless, this argument supposes a theoretical problem to 
account for the metaphorical mapping which engages physical actions and mental actions 
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as source and target domains, respectively. The domain Understanding is not bodily 
experienced, yet we do not necessarily resort to conceptual metaphor to reason about it. 
That is, expressions such as She understands the concept/theory etc., shows that 
Understanding—though it is abstract—it is semantically independent. 
This finding seems to fit into our fundamental assumption that conceptual metaphor 
is not governed by a single core cognitive process. Instead, given the hybrid nature of the 
bodily-experienced phenomena and the different typologies of metaphorical mapping, the 
interaction process may vary significantly. Then, analyzing the metaphorical mapping 
which engages motor actions and mental actions, might suppose another variety of 
interaction-based mapping typology. 
We map motor actions onto mental activities using a linguistic system which is 
grounded in motor experience (e.g. Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002). The lexical items of 
such system, when used to reason about abstract phenomena, lead to the stimulation of both 
sensorimotor and cognitive systems. As pointed out before, based on neurological studies 
(e.g. Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, and Rizzolatti, 1996), processing information concerning 
motor modality requires the activation of the corresponding neural network. 
Importantly, in Cognitive Linguistics our cognition is made up of conceptual frames 
and one way to activate such frames is via linguistic word or expressions (e.g. Feldman 
2006; Fillmore 1982, 1985; Lakoff 2008). In this respect, a conceptual frame is delineated 
and its linguistic components function as stimulus to their respective conceptual frames.  
Since these (linguistic) stimuli (action words) are directly grounded in a given 
motor modality and mapped onto the cognitive topology of a target domain, we argue that 
both cognitive topology and motor topology interact via these linguistic expressions. Given 
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that a stimulus operates on source (physical action) and target domains (mental activities), 
then the two phenomena include features from both domains. 
The interaction between motor action (as source domains) and mental activity (as 
target domains) is evoked by motoric stimuli. Target domains, though, in some types of 
metaphorical mapping are abstract; metaphor is an instance of interaction between our 
cognitive and sensorimotor systems. This type of metaphorical mapping does not consist of 
drawing stable systematic correspondences between features of source and target domains. 
Instead, it is dynamic because it draws on the sensorimotor system and its patterns of 
activation (see pages 291, 297).  
In other words, within this framework, target domains are dynamic in that they take 
on a more active role than has been argued within Cognitive Linguistics (for contrasting 
views see Szwedek 2011). Since the cognitive function of metaphorical mapping is to 
categorize phenomena, then it does not matter whether the latter is more concrete or more 
abstract (see Chapter I). A piece of evidence for this claim is the fact that there are different 
mapping typologies (see pages 73). As demonstrated before, target domains also contribute 
actively in constructing the concrete-abstract typology. Abstract and sensorimotor 
phenomena which come to form a conceptual metaphor share the same stimulus. The brain 
area which is responsible for both topologies fires whether the stimulus is biological or 
linguistic (Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008; Pulvermuller, Hauk, Nikulin, and 
Ilmoniemi 2005).  
To sum up, constructing conceptual metaphor is not fully rooted in the source 
domain because target domains in this mapping typology also are active. Though the latter 
are abstract in this case, the two domains interact through sharing common mechanisms 
(see pages 295, 297). Therefore, the embodied approach to conceptual metaphor needs to 
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account for the motor topology and the cognitive topology of source and target domains, 
respectively.  
3.2.2. Mirror Neurons and the interaction theory 
3.2.2.1. Automaticity in metaphorical mapping 
So far we have seen how the motor topology of the source domain and the cognitive 
topology of the target domains become active in metaphorical mapping. In the following 
two sections we shall address the mechanisms of the activation of these topologies. We 
shall focus our attention on two main mechanisms: implied motor topology and implied 
stimulus. These two mechanisms help experience the cognitive topology of the target 
domains as if it were a sensorimotor experience.  
3.2.2.1.1. Implied motor and cognitive topologies in 
conceptual mapping 
In the previous sections, we looked at conceptual metaphor as mapping the motor 
topology of a given motor action onto the cognitive topology of a mental activity. We 
argued that though the target domain is abstract in this type of mapping, it is semantically 
independent (e.g. she understands the concept.). From these observations, we can now look 
at metaphorical mapping as a cognitive process that merges two different topologies. 
Within the embodied approach, conceptual metaphor is shaped by the embodied 
character of the source domain (see Chapter II and for how a certain type of mapping is at 
variance with the embodied theory of metaphor, see Chapter III). However, the 
metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced and abstract phenomena as 
source and target domains, respectively, seems to fit into the tenets of the embodied 
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approach because presumably the target domain in this case is not bodily experienced (e.g. 
Gibbs 1994, 2011; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 
2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Szwedek 2011).  
We argued that this type of mapping is based on interaction between cognitive and 
sensorimotor systems. Recall that in order to account for conceptual metaphor from the 
interactionist point of view, we need to outline how features from two different phenomena 
interact to shape meaning in this mapping typology.  
In this section, we shall argue that this interaction is carried out through Mirror 
Neurons, which according to Rizzolatti (1998); Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese (1996a); 
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, Gallese (2001); and Craighero (2004), activate sensorimotor 
information when a given phenomenon evokes the perception of these sensorimotor 
experiences. It carries out this task through stimulating the brain area which is responsible 
for motor action (e.g. Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008; Rizzolatti 1998; Rizzolatti, 
Craighero 2004; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese 1996a; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, Gallese 2001). In 
addition, it is noteworthy here, that these neurons “...respond to either self-produced or 
observed actions” (Urgesi, Moro, Candidi, and Aglioti 2006: 7948). 
This stimulation can also be done by using linguistic expressions. We hypothesize 
that mirror neurons carry out this task using two main mechanisms: implied motor topology 
and implied stimulus. 
Let us consider the motor and cognitive topologies in the following examples: 
a. She understands the concept. 
b. She grasps a paper. 
c. She grasps the concept. 
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As example a. indicates, though the mental activity which is involved in 
Understanding is abstract, it is semantically independent. Accordingly, the cognitive 
topology which underlies this activity is as follows: 
An agent (= thinking being); a mental model (= an idea/concept); a mental activity 
(= understanding). It is important to notice here that though the phenomenon understanding 
is not bodily experienced, it still has an independent cognitive topology.  
Utterance b. shows a motor topology which includes: 
An agent (= capable of grasping); an object (=graspable); and a physical action 
(=grasping). 
However, in c. the cognitive topology of a. and the motor topology of b. interact in 
that both the construction and processing of the metaphorical mapping involved in she 
grasps the concept dwells on the two topologies. Features from both topologies are 
recruited to reason about the phenomenon Understanding. Notice that one-way-feature 
transfer cannot account for this conceptual metaphor in the sense that the cognitive 
topology in this mapping is also active. More precisely, though Neuro-imaging experiments 
(e.g. Coulson 2008; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Lakoff 2008) demonstrate that when the term 
grasp is used metaphorically, it activates the brain area which is responsible for the 
corresponding brain area, these experiments yet need to explore the neural structure of the 
cognitive topology of the target domain. We suggest that the term concept in she grasps the 
concept projects onto the metaphorical mapping the semantic attributes of the conceptual 
frame to which it belongs.  
Though the motor modality of the action Grasping determines how the mapping is 
carried out, the cognitive topology of Understanding is still active in this metaphorical 
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mapping. A piece of evidence for this claim is the fact that the conceptual metaphor she 
grasps the concept is semantically identical to she understands the concept.   
Another aspect of this metaphor which needs a deep analysis here is how the 
implied motor topology and implied cognitive topology of the source and target domain, 
respectively, operate in metaphorical mapping.  
To assess this issue, we shall briefly review some of the key findings regarding the 
functional features of Mirror Neurons (e.g. di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, and 
Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti 1996b) and then identify their relevance to the interaction 
theory of conceptual mapping.   
So far in this section, we have outlined the features of the motor topology of 
Grasping and argued that this motor action consists of an agent; a (graspable) object; and 
the action of grasping. However, mirror neurons do not fire when a subject is exposed to 
the elements of the motor topology as being isolated. For instance, the mirror neurons 
which are responsible for the action of grasping would not fire if a subject is exposed to a 
graspable object and an agent as separate elements of this motor topology (Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, and Rizzolatti, 1996:595-596). That is, she or he needs to be exposed to those 
elements as constituting a unified topology so as to (1) infer a cognitive model from such 
motor topology and (2) stimulate the mirror neurons which are responsible for the motor 
action of grasping.  
Accordingly, the cognitive topology of a target domain plays a major role in 
metaphorical mapping by imposing semantic features onto the motor topology of the source 
domain. Now, let us examine how the motor topology of the source domain contributes to 
the construction and processing of a conceptual metaphor. Because much research has been 
devoted to explore how bodily-experienced domains 'embody' abstract ones (e.g. Gibbs 
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1994, 2011; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 
2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 
1989; Szwedek 2011), we shall limit ourselves to those features which operate in the 
interaction process between motor actions and mental activities in metaphorical mapping. 
As seen before, the phenomenon understanding in she understands the concept is 
semantically independent. This entails that it consists of a cognitive topology without being 
engaged in metaphorical mapping (for a contrasting view on this issue see e.g. Lakoff 1993; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989). To illustrate, the cognitive topology of 
this phenomenon is constituted by a thinking being; a mental activity; and a cognitive 
model (a concept). Again, this topology signifies that target domains, though in some cases 
they are abstract, they do have conceptual structures.  
This finding does not comply with the tenets of the embodied approach, which are 
grounded in the assumption that conceptual metaphor is based on drawing a systematic 
correspondence between directly and indirectly meaningful domains.  
Importantly, when this domain is mapped onto the motor action grasping, it 
becomes parameterized through the filter of this motor action. For instance, both the 
entailment and the nature of the mapping are shaped by the mechanisms of such modality. 
To illustrate, if this modality includes the physical action of grasping such as in this case, 
then the abstract knowledge is categorized in terms of the parameters of this action. This 
includes mainly three components: an agent exerting power on an object. 
3.2.2.1.2. Implied stimulus 
Previously, we argued that one pattern of activation within cognition is virtually 
identical to that which operates within motor modality insomuch as linguistic terms 
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function as stimuli to conceptual frames. In the data, one common feature to the 
metaphorical mapping which engages motor actions and mental activities is that the same 
lexical terms are used to convey both literal and metaphorical meanings. By literal, not only 
do we refer to the motor topology of the source domain but also to the cognitive topology 
of the target (see for example, she understands the concept). Words which are derived from 
the motor topology of the source domain are highly grounded in sensorimotor experiences 
(e.g. grasp, hold, touch). Neuro-imaging experiments have demonstrated that these verbs 
activate the neural network which is responsible for their respective motor actions whether 
the meaning is literal or metaphorical (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, and Rizzolatti 1996).  
In this setting, the same stimulus operates in both domains; in the source domain it 
is sensory and in the target it is cognitive. The linguistic term grasp, when used 
metaphorically, includes features from both motor and cognitive topologies. In this respect, 
the metaphorical mapping does not consist of transferring inferences from one domain onto 
another, but it does consist of mapping the motor topology (and its semantic features) of the 
source domain and the cognitive topology of the target. More precisely, action verbs such 
as grasp—when used in metaphorical mapping—not only do they bear the motor topology 
of the source domain; but also features of the cognitive topology of the target domain. 
Therefore, the way the cognitive topology is processed determines the stimulus together 
with its features which are involved in the metaphorical mappings. For instance, if the 
cognitive topology is processed in terms of a given sensorimotor modality, then the 
linguistic stimulus should deploy the properties of this modality. Accordingly, the 
entailments and the nature of the mapping are governed by the mechanisms of such 
modality. To illustrate, if this modality draws on a given motor action, then the cognitive 
topology of the target domain is categorized in terms of this particular action. This means 
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that the basis of conceptual mapping is not transferring inherent inferences of the source 
domain. Instead, the metaphorical mapping which engages motor actions and mental 
activities as source and target domains, respectively, is based on semantic and motoric 
features.  
In this type of metaphorical mapping, we use a linguistic system which directly 
draws on sensorimotor experience to reason about mental activities such as Understanding. 
The lexical terms of this system, when used metaphorically to conceptualize mental 
activities, become stimuli to both sensorimotor and cognitive systems through activating 
the motor topology of the source domain and the cognitive topology of the target domain. 
These findings can also be a piece of evidence of how target domains evoke the 
perception of sensorimotor activities. Particularly, in metaphorical mappings, this activation 
is based on simulating a stimulus together with its inference(s) in the target domain. The 
linguistic metaphors which underlie conceptual mapping reveal this simulation (Feldman 
2006: 214-17). The cognitive topology of the target domain Understanding, when it draws 
on the linguistic system of the source domain Grasping, leads to the stimulation of the 
motor topology of this motor action. This observation runs counter to the tenets of the 
embodied approach to metaphor in that target domains are the repository of the bodily-
based information of source domains. In other words, expressions which are inherently 
associated with a stimulus in the source domain, they lead to the stimulation of the 
cognitive topology of the target. In this respect, the linguistic system which captures the 
motor topology of the source domain is used in metaphorical mapping to simulate this 
topology in the target domain. It is important to bear in mind that the same neural network 
which is responsible for a given sensorimotor task becomes active when we process both 
cognitive and sensorimotor topologies. On this view, neural networks, before firing, there 
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might be a prior stimulation from the target domain. This observation seems to be in 
accordance with the idea that choosing a given linguistic expression to convey a conceptual 
metaphor is not arbitrary; but it is determined, though this is not always the case (see page 
275).  
Accordingly, the mapping between motor topology and cognitive topology is held 
through “implied simulation”. In this respect, the categorization process that characterizes 
motor actions is mirrored in the target domain.  
To sum up, the metaphorical mapping which engages motor actions and mental 
activities as source and target domains, respectively, does not consist of transferring only 
the inferences that are claimed to be inherent to source domains. Rather, these inferences 
are created after the mapping is built based on the interaction between the motor topology 
of the source domain and the cognitive topology of the target. In this respect, this mapping 
typology is not based on one-way-meaning transfer.  
3.2.3. Co-activation in mapping motor actions onto mental 
activities 
In the previous chapter, we demonstrated that co-activation is a mechanism that 
characterizes the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-experienced phenomena as 
source and target domains. This seems to be based on two main factors: both source and 
target domains need to be bodily experienced and be connected in our physiological, 
cognitive, and linguistic systems (e.g. see synaesthetic metaphor on page 272). 
Interestingly, the interaction process may differ in certain metaphorical mapping typologies 
(see Chapter V). Because target domains in the mapping typology which we are concerned 
with in this chapter is abstract, it is safe to rule out the possibility of its interaction with the 
325 
 
source domain via the physiological system, this being the main factor responsible for 
mechanisms the of interaction such as causality (see pages 251, 253) and co-activation  
(see page 259). It is worth noting here, that the interaction approach that we proposed in 
Chapter IV is basically observed when the metaphorical mapping engages two bodily-
experienced phenomena. Nonetheless, we hypothesize that if certain mechanisms of 
interaction such as causality and automaticity are observed in the mapping typology which 
draws on motor actions and mental activities as source and target domains, respectively, 
then this typology is based on interaction too. Let us consider the following examples: 
Understand/Know Is See 
I could never figure out why he left his first wife. 
I can’t make out why he wants to go to Spain.   
“We talked for an hour, but couldn’t make her see reason.” 
Do you see what I mean? 
Influence Is Pressure/Hold 
He brought pressure on the minister to resign. 
He pushed me into applying for the job. 
Don’t think you can push me around; I have my own opinions! 
Since he once loved her passionately, she still has a hold on him.  
Continue (IDEA) Is Go on 
Uganda will have to push ahead with destructive World Bank policies. 
Solution Is Way Round/Over/Through 
The election result will enable the Prime Minister to push through tough policies. 
Purposeless Is Directionless  
Career-wise studying Latin at university might be a road to nowhere.  
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Arguing/Criticizing Is Wounding/Cutting 
 “‘Don’t contradict your father,’ was the sharp reprimand” 
Arguing/Criticizing Is Shooting/throwing 
I’m not inviting questions: if you have any just shoot. 
The proposal to build a swimming pool was shot down.  
Make Known Is Show/Draw 
The latest reports show that man-made global warming is a reality.  
Conflicting Purpose Is Opposite Direction. 
The movie explored the tension between public duty and personal loyalty. 
Verbal Communication IS (Ball) Game 
Could I just bounce a couple of ideas off you about the department’s strategic plan? 
As the above examples indicate, the mental activity Understanding is represented 
metaphorically via the following physical actions: grasp, fall out, hold, go, shoot, throw, 
and control. According to (Mahon and Caramazza 2008: 60),  
“…the motor system is automatically activated when participants (a) observe 
manipulable objects; (b) process linguistic stimuli (e.g., action verbs) the meanings 
of which imply bodily action; and (c) observe the actions of another individual.” 
A potential co-activation between motor actions and mental activities may occur when a 
subject is exposed to lexical terms which are grounded in motor modality such as grasping.  
The question which arises here is whether concrete and abstract phenomena interact 
via the other two systems (cognitive and linguistic). That is, could source and target 
domains in this mapping typology exchange semantic and motoric features without meeting 
the situational conditions that lead to co-activation and co-occurrence in synaesthetic 
metaphor? 
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In the previous chapter, we observed that one of the recurring features that 
characterize the metaphorical mapping which is based on interaction is that source and 
target domains are semantically independent. To approach the metaphorical mapping which 
engages mental processes and physical actions from an interactionist point of view, we 
need to prove that target domains are semantically independent. Though being semantically 
independent does not assure that metaphorical mapping is based on interaction, this 
characteristic raises the possibility to look at target domains as independent cognitive 
topologies. This is crucial to approaching this mapping typology from an interactionist 
point of view in that (1) target domains—though they are abstract—they include semantic 
features; and (2) they are eligible to project meaning in metaphorical mapping. Let us 
consider the following metaphor: 
Understand Is Grasp/Hold 
I am given to understand that there will be no pay cuts this year. 
She finds even the easy concepts difficult to get hold of.  
Half the class got hold of the wrong end of the stick and put the metal in the acid. 
I managed to grasp the main points of the lecture. 
Mental activities such as Understanding are reasoned about in two ways: 
metaphorically and literally. The first case is evident in the metaphorical expressions above 
insomuch that this mental activity is understood via other phenomena, Grasping and 
Holding. According to Feldman and Narayanan (2004:1),  
“...the meaning of the word grasp involves the motor action of grasping in some 
way.” They further assure that, “...the complex synergy that supports grasping is the 
core semantics of the word.” 
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Taken together with image schema (Grady 2005a; Lakoff 1990; Lakoff and Turner 
1989), these components shape the experiential basis of the motor action involved in 
grasping and its cognitive topology. For instance, Feldman and Narayanan (2004:1-2) 
assure that,  
“The action of grasping has both a motor component (what you do in grasping) and 
various perceptual components (what it looks like for someone to grasp and what a 
graspable object looks like) and somato-sensory component (what it feels like to 
grasp something and to be grasped yourself).” (See also Gallese and Lakoff 2005). 
On the other hand, as seen before, the phenomenon understanding—though being 
abstract—it consists of an independent14 cognitive topology which allows us to reason 
about this phenomenon without resorting to metaphorical mapping. Importantly, this 
cognitive topology can also be reasoned about using a conceptual mapping (see the 
examples above).  
Strictly speaking, however, co-activation may not be applied to explain the 
interaction between these two phenomena. That is, while neural experiments (e.g. Gallese 
and Lakoff 2005; Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998; Rizolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, and Gallese 2002) 
show that the term grasp activates the brain area which is responsible for the actual 
execution of the action, it does not necessarily activate the target. In particular, we do not 
conceptualize Grasping in terms of Understanding. Hence, the domain, Grasping does not 
activate the domain, Understanding. Thereby, co-activation is not fully met by this 
metaphorical mapping.  
                                                 
14 Though the term "literal" is widely used within the embodied approach to metaphor to 
denote that a given phenomenon inherently functions as source domain, here we resort to 
the expression semantically independent since the former may give the impression that the 
phenomenon Understanding has a literal meaning, and being so, it is bodily experienced. 
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3.2.4. Causality in mapping motor actions onto mental activities 
In the previous chapter, we saw that target domains have a more participating role 
in the metaphorical mapping which is based on bodily-experienced phenomena as source 
and target domains. In this mapping typology, the interaction between source and target 
domains includes mapping bodily-based features from both phenomena. We also traced the 
mechanisms and typologies of this interaction and observed that they substantially differ in 
the data. Therefore, we argued that the interaction process—because it draws on different 
mechanisms—is not homogeneous to the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains.  
Nonetheless, one of the most important characteristics which characterize 
interaction is causality. On this view, causality-based mapping such as synaesthetic 
metaphor proves to be automatic and unconscious (for more details see e.g. Hubbard and 
Ramachandran 2001). In addition, in this type of metaphor, the target domain causes the 
activation of the source (see Chapter III).  
Furthermore, we have demonstrated in the section above that the mental activity 
which is involved in the concept Understanding as target domain fulfills at least one of the 
mechanisms that endows target domains with a more participating role in metaphorical 
mapping—projecting semantic features into the mapping. 
Being semantically independent, a sentence such as she understands the lesson 
supports the claim that the domain Understanding can be reasoned about without resorting 
to other phenomena. This finding is important in two ways: first, being bodily experienced 
is not a prerequisite condition for a given phenomenon to be meaningful. Second, the 
process of embodying target domains is not an indispensable process in metaphorical 
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mapping to project meaning onto (meaningless) phenomena. Importantly, the embodied 
approach to metaphor advocates meaning to phenomena, provided they are bodily 
experienced (Gibbs 1994, 2011; Feldman 2006; Feldman and Narayanan 2004; Johnson 
1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; 
Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Ruiz de 
Mendoza 2005; Szwedek 2011).  
In the two sections above, the data indicates that even abstract phenomena can be 
directly meaningful. Though this finding corroborates our finding in the previous chapter, 
in that conceptual metaphor does not only operate on abstract phenomena (to endow them 
with bodily-based features, thereby give them meaning) the embodied approach to 
metaphor stands in strong opposition to both findings. To illustrate, the framework of the 
embodied approach is based on a straightforward assumption that only bodily-experienced 
phenomena are directly meaningful (see the previous chapter). However, as the data shows, 
abstract phenomena –such as know, think, make known, obey, understand are meaningful 
without being engaged in metaphorical mapping. The following examples support this 
claim: 
Thinking/Believing Is Walking/Traveling 
My mind was racing after the news of my promotion.  
“I don’t think GM food crops will solve food shortages anyway, whether they are 
safe or not” 
It’s difficult to keep track of who’s playing who and when. 
Make Known Is Open 
Mary found that people were willing to open out to her.  
Opinion/Fashion Is Current 
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Godard was a new wave director.  
Obey/Imitate Is Follow 
Apple led the way with Windows on computer screen design.  
Understanding Is Penetration/Sharpness 
He writes on Shakespeare with great penetration. 
“He’s quite handsome, but with a sharp mind too.” 
It is worth noting here that the motor actions such as open, wave, race, and follow in 
these examples, should not be treated from an interactionist point of view as grasp. This is 
due to the fact that the motor action grasping is delimited both cognitively and neurally. In 
the first case, our judgment is based on the fact that this motor topology, by default, 
includes definite components—namely, the action of an agent grasping an object. In the 
second case, the neural network which is responsible for this motor action fires both when 
the action is executed and when it is used metaphorically to reason about the mental 
activity understanding (e.g. Gallese and Lakoff 2005). This finding entails that, this motor 
action is also neurally delimited in that the neural network which fires when this action is 
executed also fires when the motor action grasping is used in metaphorical mappings. 
Nevertheless, the motor topologies of other motor actions such as opening, waving, racing, 
and following cannot be treated as grasping as they lack a closed set of  motor topologies. 
In addition, these motor topologies also lack a delimited neural representation which 
becomes active both when these actions are executed and when they are used 
metaphorically. Possibly, this lack may be due to the fact that these motor actions allow 
‘affordances’ (see the previous chapter).  
Another piece of evidence for the fact that these motor actions should not be treated 
as grasping is the fact that these motor actions are not represented neurally in the same way 
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across all their uses. For instance, open the book, open your mouth, open the door might 
reveal different motor topologies in that in each case there might be a specific motor 
topology that operates. That is, open your mouth and open the door might engage different 
neural networks.  
The question which arises here is which motor topology is active when the action 
word open is used metaphorically such as Mary found that people were willing to open out 
to her. For the same token, action verbs such as follow, race, keep track of etc. cannot be 
treated as grasp. Again, we postulate that these motor actions are not held via a certain 
neural network when the action is carried out and when they are used metaphorically.  
Accordingly, we rule out that using such terms literally and metaphorically would 
trigger identical neural networks. However, to look at metaphorical mapping between 
motor actions and mental activities as a causality-based mapping is to assess how these 
motor actions and mental activities such as understanding are engaged in mutual causation.  
As seen before, the linguistic terms which are grounded in the motor topology of the 
source domain are causal in that they activate the corresponding neural network which also 
becomes active when the corresponding motor action is executed.  
Therefore, this type of metaphorical mapping is based on causality which is 
triggered by the motor topology. The linguistic terms which refer to a given motor action 
stimulate the cognitive topology of the target domain; hence, this type of metaphorical 
mapping is causal and inferential. It is causal because in this type of metaphorical mapping, 
one domain causes the activation of the other. Moreover, it is inferential because we infer 
the motor topology and its corresponding conceptual frame from the cognitive topology of 
the target domain.  
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Furthermore, the target domain is causal too because it activates the same brain 
areas responsible for the execution of a given sensory motor activity. This means that 
metaphorical mappings are causal and inferential. This means that the metaphorical 
mapping which engages motor actions and mental activities as source and target domains 
respectively is based on recruiting information from the motor topology of the source 
domain and from the cognitive topology of the target. Importantly, these phenomena 
interact through a mutual transfer of features. In this respect, the cognitive topology of the 
target domains acquires certain features of the motor actions of the source domain. 
Similarly, the motor topology of a sensorimotor of the source domain in this type of 
metaphorical mapping too acquires certain features from the cognitive topology of the 
target.   
As argued before, even cognitive processes are triggered by stimuli which activate 
both the corresponding conceptual frames and the neural network which is responsible for 
the corresponding motor action. These are biological dynamics that hold together motor 
phenomena and cognitive processes in causality-based metaphorical mappings. These 
biological dynamics make possible the interaction between sensorimotor and cognitive 
systems.  
Within the embodied approach to metaphor, linguistic expressions have been the 
objective of the investigation and then the metaphor type Love Is Journey is deduced (e.g. 
Gibbs 1994; Grady 1998; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Reddy 1993). A more embodied approach to 
metaphor, which we claim for in this thesis, includes a mutual transfer of motor and 
semantic features between two phenomena. Within this framework, the focus equally falls 
on source and target domains. The linguistic system which evokes a conceptual mapping 
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between source and target domains (within the embodied approach to metaphor) comes to 
take on a transcendental role in metaphor—namely, engaging the two phenomena in a 
stimulus-response pattern. In this setting, this system triggers the interaction between 
source and target domains. In the following sections, we shall assess other aspects of 
interaction between motor actions and mental activities when they are engaged in 
metaphorical mapping.  
3.2.5. Adaptation of cognitive and motor topologies in 
metaphorical mapping 
3.2.5.1. Abstracting source domains and embodying target 
domains 
Much research has been devoted to the embodying process of target domains (e.g. 
Gibbs 1994, 2011; Gibbs and Matlock 2008; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 
2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Szwedek 2011). This process has been 
advocated the ultimate goal of conceptual metaphor for making abstract phenomena 
accessible to our reasoning system. For this reason, in this section, we shall concern 
ourselves only with the abstracting process. 
The embodying process has been claimed to be the main goal of conceptual 
metaphor to allow our cognitive system to reason about target domains. Accordingly, the 
bodily-experienced phenomenon of a given source domain is necessary to categorize 
abstract phenomena. However, we demonstrated in Chapter III that the conceptual 
metaphor which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena posits a theoretical problem 
to the theory of embodiment. Given that, in this type of metaphorical mapping, target 
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domains are bodily experienced, we argued that the embodying process in this case does 
not seem to operate. More importantly, the embodying process is not the only process 
which is involved in this type of conceptual metaphor. Instead, we suggest that this 
metaphorical mapping includes mapping phenomena in a different way—namely, recruiting 
bodily-based features from source and target domains (see Chapter III).   
In this section we hypothesize that the conceptual metaphor which engages a motor 
action and a mental activity draws on abstracting the motor activity. It follows from this 
that embodying and abstracting processes are two core mechanisms which characterize the 
interaction between source and target phenomena in this mapping typology. Because there 
are different ways and mechanisms of interaction, co-activation might not be observed in 
certain types of metaphorical mapping. Recall that co-activation may necessary imply that 
the source domain activates the cognitive topology of the target. Also, the latter is assumed 
to activate the motor topology of the source domain. The problem with this assumption is 
that the cognitive topology of the mental activity Understanding does not necessarily 
trigger the motor modality which is involved in grasping. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the mental activities and physical 
actions do not interact. Instead, we shall see in the following sections that the process of 
interaction in this type of metaphorical mapping can be pursued by assessing how the two 
domains are engaged in embodying and abstracting process in metaphorical mapping.  
In line with this finding, Indurkhya argues that, 
“There is little ‘oscillation’ between the two domains, the mutual adaptations 
between the (domains of the) two subjects necessary for the metaphor to work 
posing little difficulty…” (Indurkhya 1991:11-16). For more details see also 
Forceville (1996: 24).  
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We propose that one way to gauge the process of adaptation is to look at the motor 
topology of the source domain and the cognitive topology of the target inside and outside 
conceptual mappings. This adaptation process is carried out via two mechanisms: 
embodying process of target domains and abstracting source domains. Abstracting process 
concerns source domains whereas embodying process concerns target domains. In this 
respect, source and target domains adapt to each other through interaction in metaphorical 
mapping.  
3.2.5.2. Abstraction of the motor topology of source 
domains 
In order to assess how the physical topologies of source domains adapt to the 
cognitive topologies of the target, let us analyze the following examples:  
Activity Is Board Game 
(1) A game of chess is being played out by Saddam Hussein and G. W. Bush. 
Development Of Idea/Emotion Is Growth 
(2) Economic growth will likely slow this fall. 
In these examples, the source domains (Growth and Board Game) can be juxtaposed 
with their target domains (Activity and Idea) in the sense that source phenomena are taken 
to a higher level of abstractness in metaphorical mapping (for a similar analysis of this type 
of metaphorical mapping, see Barsalou 1999; Pinker 2007:338). For instance, when we 
compare this mapping typology to the one that involves the action of grasping and the 
mental activity understanding as source and target domains, respectively, we observe the 
following differences:  
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First, whereas in Understanding Is Grasping, the motor topology of the source domain is 
still active, in Activity Is Board Game, the physical topology of the source domain is not 
active. Our judgment is based on the fact that in the first case, the source domain is 
grounded in a delimited physical action which goes active even when the term grasp is used 
metaphorically. In the second case, we suggest that the linguistic expression a game of 
chess board may not activate any determined physical topology which could be highly 
associated with this game in the same way that the physical topology which is associated 
with grasping. This situation is due to the fact that, unlike grasping, a game of chess board 
does not stand on a specific motor topology.  
Second, experiments within neuroscience have discovered that there is a neural area 
which is responsible for the action grasping (e.g. di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, 
and Rizzolatti, 1992) and which goes active when this motor topology is used to reason 
about abstract phenomena such as Understanding (e.g. Gallese and Lakoff 2005). However, 
it would be hard to identify a specific neural area which becomes active when a given 
subject plays a game of chess, much less to trace such neural activity when such game is 
used metaphorically to reason about other phenomena.  
In the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced domains, the 
two modalities interact with each other incorporating features from both modalities. From a 
cognitive point of view, when we understand a modality in terms of another, each modality 
is abstracted by assigning to it a conceptual frame (Barsalou 1999, 2003). Metaphorical 
mapping does not influence only target domains in the sense that they are embodied 
through acquiring the physical topologies of source domains but source domains also 
acquire some features from the cognitive topologies target domains.  
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Following the embodied approach to metaphor, mapping one domain onto another 
entails that the concept in the target domain is embodied (e.g. Johnson1987; Boroditsky and 
Ramscar 2002).  However, other studies (Barsalou 2003; Tejada Caller and Guzmán Guerra 
2012:29,38) suggest that in metaphorical mapping the sensorimotor experience which 
functions as source domain is abstracted or taken to a higher level of abstraction. 
Accordingly, the mapping typology which we are concerned with in this chapter involves 
embodying process in that these mental activities are embodied via their combination with 
physical actions. Also, constructing this mapping typology consists of abstracting physical 
actions of source domains. 
Importantly, as seen before, linguistic labels which are grounded in motor 
modalities come to function as stimuli to motor modalities and to mental activities as well. 
That is, both abstracting and embodying processes are necessary to reason about mental 
activities.  
Here we need to follow two lines of investigation: (1) what is mapped onto the 
mental activity is not the sensorimotor experience per se (for an opposing view, see 
Embodied Simulation). Or (2), the same stimulus functions in both domains in the same 
way but in different formats. To illustrate, the stimulus which operates in motor modality 
also operates in mental actions, though in the second case, the stimulation is achieved via a 
different mechanism. In this respect, conceptual metaphor does not dwell only on the 
embodying process of target domains (for more details on this issue, see chapter I).  
This process is based on a stimulus-response pattern that equally characterizes the 
cognitive and sensorimotor systems. Obviously we do not intend to claim that this pattern 
governs all metaphorical mappings but at least this type of mapping obeys this pattern. 
Accordingly, these mental activities are embodied via coupling them with physical actions. 
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However, it is not a-one-way-transfer of features because there must be an abstraction of 
sensorimotor experiences. Particularly, the abstraction concerns sensorimotor experiences. 
More precisely, the abstraction process affects the sensorimotor stimuli and their 
inferences. 
As a result, not only do conceptual metaphors consist of embodying the cognitive 
topology of the target domain, but they also consist of abstracting the motor topology of the 
source domain. Cognitive processes, at least, in the metaphorical mapping, draw on 
abstracting the physical action in source domains. Cognition is embodied in the abstract 
phenomena, but in order for the latter to be embodied there must equally be abstraction of 
sensorimotor format information. This is evident when we take into consideration the way 
we use a linguistic expression that denotes figurative meaning. For instance, we argued that 
linguistic expressions function as stimuli to both cognitive and sensorimotor systems. At 
this stage, these terms function as a stimulus of certain conceptual frames. Then, these 
linguistic expressions evoke the simulation of the motor modality of grasping in the target 
domain Understanding. If the abstract knowledge of the target phenomenon is embodied, 
then there must be a process of abstraction in order to make the mapping possible. We 
argued that the motor topology of the source domain has to adapt to the cognitive topology 
of the target domain. A piece of evidence for this claim is the fact that we do not think of 
the literal meaning of a metaphor (Caballero 2009; Gentner and Bowdle 2008:116). 
To sum up, in this type of metaphorical mapping, the mental activity which 
functions as target domain evokes the motor topology of the source domain through the 
linguistic system. In this respect, the cognitive topology (conceptual frame) is stimulated by 
the linguistic system which represents such cognitive topology (see for example Lakoff 
1987). This is evident when we take into consideration the way we use a linguistic 
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expression that denotes figurative meaning. Neurological experiments demonstrated how 
the linguistic expressions such as grasp activate the motor information also when they are 
used to categorize cognitive processes such as understand (Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, 
and Iacoboni 2006).  
As argued before, the two systems show common features in their pattern of 
activation—namely, they are stimulus-response based phenomena when they are engaged 
in this type of metaphorical mapping. On this view, target domains actively participate in 
this type of metaphor because they trigger the interaction between physical actions and 
mental actions. Accordingly, conceptual mapping is not just about embodying concepts but 
also about abstracting the sensorimotor experiences of the source domain. Transforming 
sensorimotor information includes abstracting this information through abstracting the 
stimulus (Barsalou 2003a). 
Therefore, the data indicates that not all instances of metaphor show this abstraction 
of source domains. Furthermore, these two metaphorical mappings can be juxtaposed with 
the ones analyzed before in terms of concreteness-abstractness criterion.  
Conclusion 
To assess whether other types of mapping dwell on the interaction between source 
and target domains, we focused our attention in this chapter on the metaphorical mapping 
which engages physical actions and mental activities as source and target domains, 
respectively. In chapter V, we outlined the mechanisms and parameters of interaction and 
argued that the interaction substantially varies in the metaphorical mapping which engages 
bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains. Therefore, in this chapter we 
hypothesized that if the mapping typology which is based on motor actions and mental 
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activities as source and target domains respectively follows the patterns and mechanisms of 
interaction such as co-activation and causality, then meaning construction in this type of 
metaphor is based on the interaction between source and target domains rather than one-
way-meaning transfer. 
It is worth noting here that the data indicates that metaphorical mapping cannot be 
studied as a homogeneous cognitive process given the remarkable variety of the bodily-
experienced phenomena (see chapter I). In line with this claim, the interaction process 
should not be studied as a homogeneous process either. This hybridity is also observed in 
the metaphorical mapping which is based on interaction between source and target domains 
in that this interaction proves to be different depending on the typology of the mapping, the 
mechanisms of the interaction, the constitutive natures of source and target domains, and 
the system which is exploited (cognitive vs. physiological, for instance).  
On the whole, those mechanisms reveal that the interaction in metaphorical 
mapping can be articulated at different, but interconnected, levels: cognition, language, and 
physiology. Our findings, in this respect, point out that this mapping typology is based on 
interaction too. Though not all the mechanisms of interaction are observed in this typology, 
we have shown that this type of metaphor is based on mutual influence between the motor 
topologies of source domains and the cognitive topologies of target. For instance, we 
disregard co-occurrence as a mechanism of interaction because target domains are not 
experienced bodily. Yet, other mechanisms of interaction-such as co-activation-are 
observed in this type of metaphor.  
These findings have significant entailments for the research on conceptual 
metaphor. For instance, we argued that the mapping typology which concerns us in this 
chapter is not based on a one-way-meaning transfer from source onto target domains, but 
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the latter also actively participate in metaphorical mapping. Furthermore, analyzing the data 
shows that our cognitive and motor systems interact in processing mental activities such as 
understanding. In particular, the metaphorical mapping which engages physical actions and 
mental actions as source and target domains, respectively, fits into the interactionist 
proposal in that certain types of metaphorical mapping are based on interaction rather than 
on a one-way-features transfer.  
In particular, this finding corroborates the major hypothesis that we put forward in 
this chapter which pursues whether being bodily experienced is a prerequisite condition for 
target phenomena to interact with their counterparts in the source domains. The data 
suggests that this condition is not necessary since the stimulus-response pattern operates in 
certain mapping typologies which draw on physical actions and mental actions as source 
and target domains, respectively. It is worth noting here that this typology can be included 
within the one which we covered in Chapter II to demonstrate that certain mapping 
typologies are based on Propositionality-linearity of mapping.  
Based on our findings in this chapter, it is safe to argue that not all metaphorical 
mappings which engage bodily-experienced and abstract phenomena as source and target 
domains are based on Propositionality-linearity. As shown in this chapter, certain mapping 
typology which engages physical actions (source domains) and mental actions (target 
domains) are based on interaction.  
Additionally, we argued in Chapter III that target domains in the mapping typology 
which is based on interaction actively participate in the construction and activation of 
metaphorical mapping. In conjunction with this finding, the mapping typology which we 
analyzed in this chapter shows that target phenomena evoke the perception of sensorimotor 
experiences of the source domains through the linguistic and sensorimotor system.  
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The data shows that the interaction between source and target domains is also 
observed when target domains draw on mental activities. This again suggests that the 
interaction process between source and target domains may arise from different conditions, 
and follow different patterns.  
Equally important, while the embodied approach focuses on the embodying process 
as the only process underlying metaphorical mapping, we have shown in this chapter that 
abstracting is as important as the embodying process. Therefore, this type of metaphorical 
mapping should be looked at in terms of interaction between physical actions and mental 
activities rather than a uni-directional meaning transfer. In this respect, the interaction 
approach to this type of metaphorical mapping substantially differs from the embodied 
approach to metaphor in that the sensory motor information which is processed and 
clustered in the source phenomena is not the only one that is active in the metaphorical 
mapping. This type of metaphorical mapping recruits semantic features from both motor 
actions and mental activities. Metaphorical mappings show that in the case of using 
metaphorically action words, cognitive and sensorimotor systems are not encapsulated in 
carrying out their respective tasks. In this respect, cognitive and sensorimotor systems 
contribute to the construction and processing of this type of mapping.  
We have shown in this chapter that sensorimotor experiences are inferred from 
mental activities via activating the motor topology of source domains. Both the processes of 
inferring meaning and activating the motor topology occur in this mapping typology 
because the sensorimotor stimuli are inferred from mental activities such understanding. 
Similar to the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena, 
target domains in this type of metaphorical mapping are not the only domains which are 
influenced. Instead, the motor topology of the source domain has to adapt to the cognitive 
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topology of the target domain. In this respect, the two domains interact in this type of 
metaphorical mapping.  
It is important here to notice that even though the target domains are not bodily-
experienced phenomena, they potentially interact with source domains. Though it is not 
bodily-experienced, it is semantically autonomous. Being autonomous is the feature which 
legitimates the mental activities to interact with physical actions. 
In the data we saw that this type of mapping engages two semantically and 
cognitively independent domains. For instance, we argued that the phenomenon 
Understanding is both cognitively and semantically independent. In the first case, we mean 
that we do not resort to other phenomena to reason about the phenomenon it. In the second 
case, we mainly refer to the fact that though this phenomenon is abstract, it includes 
semantic features that are potentially projected onto the metaphorical mapping. 
In the previous chapter, we demonstrated that the interaction between source and 
target domains recruit bodily-based features from source and target domains. In this 
chapter, the interaction process is different. Given that the mental activities which function 
as target domain are not bodily experienced, we assumed that one bodily-experienced 
phenomenon operates in source and target domains. We argued that in order to instigate the 
interaction process, source domains need to be bodily experienced.  
In this chapter, we have shown that target domains in this type of mapping share 
with source domains the embodied character of source domains via including a common 
linguistic system, common stimuli, and common neural networks. Reasoning about mental 
actions requires retrieving the motor topology of source domains. This retrieval is carried 
out via linguistic and extra-linguistic stimuli.  
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In this setting, it has been important to assess how the target domains in this type of 
mapping interact with the source domains and to identify which features of the target 
domains are used to contribute to the construction of this type of mapping. In this setting, 
we argued that though the target domain in this type of mapping is abstract, they are 
semantically independent. Therefore, the question was how the semantic features of these 
domains help construct the metaphorical mapping.  
In this chapter we demonstrated that the  interaction between source and target 
domains is not limited to the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced 
phenomena. In Chapter IV, we observed that the mechanisms and typologies of interaction 
particularly operate in this typology. Importantly, in this chapter we demonstrated that 
target domains which include mental activities, , in some cases, interact with the physical 
actions as source domains. It might be important to see whether other types of abstract 
phenomena interact with physical actions.  
Therefore, mapping certain physical actions onto mental actions is based on 
interaction which can be analyzed in terms of causality, co-activation, and automaticity. In 
this chapter we focused on the mapping typology which draws on motor actions and mental 
activities as source and target domains, respectively, to show that the interaction process 
could also cover the mapping typology which is based on abstract phenomena as target 
domains. Notice that we do not claim that all instances of this typology are based on 
interaction.  
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Chapter VII: Summary and Conclusions 
1. Summary and General Conclusions 
The inception of Embodied Metaphor Approach laid down the foundations of a 
theory which accounts for metaphor not merely as a linguistic phenomenon but as a 
conceptual tool that manifests itself cognitively through engaging directly and indirectly 
meaningful phenomena—source and target domains, respectively. Being directly and 
indirectly meaningful are intrinsically related to whether a given phenomenon is bodily-
experienced or abstract. Given that source domains are bodily experienced (therefore, they 
are directly meaningful), the experiential character of conceptual metaphor is fully 
attributed to source domains whose structures emerge as a result of the interaction of our 
body, mind, and environment. That is, the foundational assumption within this approach is 
that the constitutive nature of source domains plays a dominating role in conceptual 
metaphor insomuch that their topology is imposed on the target.  
The fact that it is widely accepted within the embodiment theory that metaphorical 
mapping is a homogeneous cognitive process—namely, it is based on one-way-meaning 
transfer—has yielded two overarching principles. First, conceptual metaphor is instantiated 
through one mapping typology—concrete-onto-abstract phenomena. Second, this typology 
is governed by the following set of tenets: uni-directionality, invariance principle, and 
partial mapping.   
Based on these assumptions, we formulated the following hypotheses: because our 
interaction with the environment is carried out via different modalities (vision, audition, 
motor, tactile etc.) and conceptual metaphor exploits this heterogeneous bodily-based 
information to reason about target domains, the embodiment theory may have obscured 
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potential patterns and principles that operate in different mapping typologies.  First, we 
expected that the source domains which are grounded in different modalities would lead to 
significant variations regarding the mechanisms that underpin in metaphorical mapping. 
We further expected that looking at the constitutive natures of target domains would reveal 
that conceptual metaphor is instantiated through different mapping typologies. Taken 
together, these two hypotheses predicted that (1) different mapping typologies are 
underpinned by distinct cognitive operations and patterns of mapping. And, with a view to 
showing that examining conceptual metaphor in terms of its typologies is not merely a 
classificatory approach, (2) certain mapping typologies would posit a challenge to the 
tenets of the embodiment theory.  
To test these hypotheses, first we needed to explore the constitutive natures of 
source and target domains to identify potentially different mapping typologies (see Chapter 
I). Then, it was necessarily to assess whether these typologies draw on different cognitive 
operations and patterns of mapping.  
The main goal of this thesis was to bridge this gap by claiming for a more complex 
classification of these typologies and their respective cognitive operations. We argued that 
the tenets of the embodiment particularly fit the mapping typology which engages bodily-
experienced and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains, 
respectively (see Chapter II).  
Based on the data from Metalude, we gauged those tenets in different metaphorical 
mapping typologies to get a better understanding of the hybrid constitutive nature of the 
latter paying special attention to their underlying cognitive operations. Moreover, in order 
to assess how different metaphorical mapping typologies may elicit different analyses, we 
introduced two additional perspectives: Propositionality-Linearity (Chapter II) and 
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Interaction (Chapter IV). Our primary concern at this point was to demonstrate that the 
tenets of the embodiment theory may not be generalizable to metaphorical mapping 
typologies that do not draw on bodily-experienced phenomena and abstract phenomena as 
source and target domains, respectively.  
In this respect, we demonstrated how certain metaphorical mapping typologies fit 
into the proposed approaches and how others—such as the one which engages bodily-
experienced phenomena in source and target domains—posit a challenge to the tenets of the 
embodiment theory. In pursuing our goal to show that metaphorical mapping draws on a 
hybrid cognitive process, we postulated that this mapping typology is better looked at from 
an interactionist perspective. As expected, this work potentially provides a solid setting for 
the claim that conceptual metaphor draws on different mapping typologies. In this respect, 
we proposed how a major refinement process is required within the embodiment theory to 
account for such typologies.   
The main goal of this thesis was to test the hypothesis that because we interact with 
the environment via different modes (vision, audition, motor, sensory, etc.) and conceptual 
metaphor exploits bodily-based information to reason about physically inaccessible 
domains, mapping certain phenomena which are processed in different modes may be 
underpinned by different cognitive operations. Therefore, it was important to (1) check 
whether metaphorical mapping is instantiated in different typologies and (2) scrutinize 
these typologies to assess whether they reveal different cognitive operations. That is, we 
expected a larger variety of these operations depending on the typology in question (e.g. 
concrete-onto-concrete vs. concrete-onto-abstract). Conceptual metaphor, then, would not 
draw on one type of cognitive process—one way meaning transfer from more concrete onto 
more abstract domains.  
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We further expected that certain metaphorical mapping typologies such as mapping 
across sensory phenomena would posit a serious challenge to the tenets of the embodiment 
theory in that its tenets (uni-directionality, invariance principle, partial mapping, and 
embodied simulation)  have been developed according to the foundational assumption that 
conceptual metaphor is based on a single mapping typology—mapping concrete onto 
abstract phenomena. Henceforth, the tenets of this theory have been laid down paying full 
attention to the cognitive operations that are observed in such typology. The main 
conclusion from the analysis of the data is that the foundational assumption that the tenets 
of the embodiment theory are generalizable to all conceptual metaphors is false. As 
expected, while these tenets cover a particular mapping typology (concrete-onto-abstract 
phenomena), they could not account for other typologies found in the data.  
The theoretical framework of this thesis has been based on a general hypothesis that 
it is misleading to analyze conceptual metaphor as a homogeneous cognitive process (see 
chapter I). It follows from this that studying different typologies of mapping would give 
substantial support to our theoretical framework insomuch that if those typologies do not fit 
the tenets of the embodied approach, then research within this theory needs to take into 
account the variability of metaphorical mapping typologies. 
Therefore, we started Chapter I by asking how a generalization over conceptual 
metaphor can be made within Embodiment Theory, given that metaphorical mapping draws 
on different kinds of bodily-experienced phenomena and is instantiated through a rich 
variety of typologies. To explore this theoretical problem, first, we outlined various kinds 
of experience on which conceptual metaphor dwells in the data (e.g. motor, sensory, state, 
location, orientation, etc). Later, we sketched out different mapping typologies that may not 
be captured by the tenets of Embodied Theory and hence need a different analysis. In 
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particular, the data indicates that though these source domains are grounded in bodily-
experienced phenomena, metaphorical mapping may not be captured under a homogeneous 
cognitive process. Accordingly, we further postulated that these findings are of deep 
interest for Cognitive Linguistics because they could reveal a greater variability and 
complexity of conceptual metaphor. 
In this respect, we showed how certain mapping typologies cannot be accounted for 
by either Embodied metaphor or Embodied Simulation. Furthermore, major theoretical 
problems arise when certain mapping typologies are analyzed taking into consideration the 
tenets of the two enterprises (see Chapter III). To solve these theoretical problems, we 
postulated a broad classification of the experiential character of source domains, on the one 
hand, and proposed a deeper analysis of the mapping typologies that characterize 
metaphorical mappings. To illustrate, in our attempt to apply the tenets of the two 
approaches to the data, we observed that though the experiential character of conceptual 
metaphor can be traced back to sensorimotor experience, it is misleading to classify all 
metaphor types in one group in terms of the patterns and principles of mapping. For 
instance, the data indicates that partial mapping and uni-directionality operate on certain 
types of mapping but not on others (see pages 90, 96). In this respect, we demonstrated that 
(1) the Concrete-Abstract criterion, while it is viable to account for one specific typology—
namely mapping bodily-experienced onto non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source 
and target domains, respectively—it fails to explain other mapping typologies (see page 
80).  
And (2), Embodied Simulation theory is at odds with Embodied metaphor insomuch 
that we cannot reconcile the partial mapping principle and one of the core tenets of 
351 
 
Embodied Simulation—entirely simulating the motor action of certain source domains in 
target domains (see page 90).  
We have further shown that certain types of metaphorical mapping engage two 
primitive phenomena such as More Is Up and Up Is More where neither partial mapping 
nor uni-directionality is applicable (see page 96). This entails that these two criteria are not 
absolute features to all metaphorical mappings. 
These findings present a challenge to the tenets of Embodied Theory—namely, 
there is no core process which potentially governs all the typologies of metaphorical 
mapping. Consequently, this theory needs further exploration for a more complex 
classification of metaphor typologies in terms of their patterns and principles of mapping. 
To further support our hypothesis that the framework of Embodied Theory needs to 
avoid the widely-held assumption that metaphorical mapping is essentially a homogeneous 
cognitive process, it was necessary to juxtapose different metaphorical mapping typologies 
to examine how this overgeneralization might obscure patterns and mechanisms of 
mapping that might operate in certain types of mapping. 
Therefore, in Chapter II, we focused our attention on the metaphorical mapping 
typology which engages bodily and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source and 
target domains, respectively. To test whether the tenets of this approach may characterize 
only this typology (concrete-onto-abstract mapping), we proposed a new perspective, 
Propositionality and Linearity of Meaning Projection, to closely look at partial mapping, 
meaning transfer across domains, and uni-directionality. In this respect, we hypothesized 
that analyzing the data from this perspective would raise potential incongruities within 
Embodied Theory. In particular, in its attempt to address all conceptual metaphors as 
essentially homogeneous cognitive process, this theory obscures the enormous variety of 
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metaphorical mapping typologies and their various patterns and principles of mapping 
which (see page 113). 
In line with this hypothesis, we observed in the data that the tenets of Embodied 
Theory fit perfectly well Propositionality-Linearity perspective because both approaches 
rest on the assumption that meaning construction via metaphorical mapping always consists 
of transferring semantic features from more concrete onto more abstract domains. In 
particular, “meaning transfer being based on the experiential character of source domain”, 
“uni-directionality of metaphorical mapping”, and “mapping bodily-experienced 
phenomena onto abstract phenomena” seem to also fit our perspective because both 
approaches assume that meaning construction via metaphorical mapping is propositional 
(see page 113) and lineal (see page 126).  
In the first case, we have shown how the principle one-way-meaning transfer 
particularly sustains the notion that conceptual metaphor is propositional—namely, we 
understand a given phenomenon in terms of another without any significant participation 
from the target domain. That is, the inference of a given conceptual metaphor is fully 
attributed to the bodily-experienced phenomena which function as source domains. 
Because target domains import the cognitive and motor topologies of source domains, 
metaphorical mapping is argued to be based on one-way-meaning transfer. 
In the second case, Linearity of metaphorical mapping is instantiated in the fact that 
meaning construction through metaphorical mapping proceeds in two phases: 
 (1) Linearity in time:  
Meaning construction requires that source and target domains be processed in a 
chronological order where the bodily-experienced phenomena of source domains always 
precede their counterparts in the target. 
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(2) Linearity of meaning-transfer process:  
This is evident in the fact that, within Embodiment Theory, without the cognitive 
and motor topologies of source domains, most abstract phenomena go uncategorized. In 
this respect, this type of phenomena is not endowed with meaning unless it is mapped onto 
other bodily-experienced phenomena (e.g. Lakoff and Turner 1989). 
While the two perspectives seem to fit the data where metaphorical mapping dwells 
on bodily-experienced phenomena and abstract phenomena as source and target domains, 
respectively, the issue which we needed to handle at this point was whether the two 
perspectives could also fit the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-
experienced phenomena. 
Accordingly, in chapter III we further took the Propositionality-Linearity 
perspective together with the tenets of Embodied Theory to assess whether these 
approaches can address other mapping typologies. For this purpose, we focused our 
attention on the typology where bodily-experienced phenomena are involved in source and 
target domains.  
Since not all instances of metaphor engage abstract phenomena as target domains, 
we hypothesized that this type of metaphorical mapping would show some incongruity 
within the theory. Namely, the mapping typology which involves bodily-experienced 
phenomena in its source and target domains cannot be addressed sticking to the tenets of 
Embodied Theory. This situation is due to the fact that this theoretical framework is based 
on the general assumption that source and target domains are inherently bodily-experienced 
and abstract, respectively. While this perspective can be applied to a certain type of 
metaphorical mapping (see Chapter II), it falls short when it comes to mapping across 
bodily-experienced phenomena.  
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To illustrate, the data suggests that source and target domains do not prove to have 
inherent features that legitimate them to carry out a by-default role in metaphorical 
mappings. Interestingly, we have found that target domains in certain typologies are not 
devoid of bodily properties, which are held within Embodied Theory to be circumscribed to 
source domains and which are believed to independently construct metaphorical mappings. 
Therefore, the widely held assumption within Embodied Metaphor that there is always one-
way-projection of features seems to be inapplicable to this typology (see page 144). 
Another aspect where the data conflicts with Embodied Theory is that the 
experiential character of metaphor has been exclusively attributed to source domains. Since 
in this type of conceptual metaphor, target domains are also experienced through the 
sensorimotor system, it becomes difficult to uphold the notion that (1) the experiential basis 
of metaphorical mapping is exclusively attributed to source domains; and (2) meaning 
construction via this mapping typology is also based on one-way-meaning transfer. 
These findings corroborate our hypothesis which we put forward in Chapter I. 
Namely, metaphorical mapping might not be underpinned by a homogeneous cognitive 
process. In this respect, we showed that the metaphorical mapping which engages two 
bodily-experienced phenomena substantially differentiates from the typology which 
engages bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains. Consequently, we 
argued that the experiential basis of this type of metaphorical mapping can be also traced in 
target domains. 
Later in this chapter, we focused our attention on the bodily-based characteristics of 
target domains such as—being concrete and primitive, consisting of image schemas, and 
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being bodily-experienced15—and on a potential contribution of target domains to the 
“experiential basis” of metaphorical mapping. In this respect, these characteristics, which 
have been believed to be common to only source domains, seem to be operating also on 
target domains.  
Of particular interest, therefore, was to show how the concrete-abstract criterion is 
not reliable to distinguish source from target domains (see page 164). Relevant to this 
point, the data shows that this situation is due to the fact that (1) source and target domains 
in this type of metaphorical mapping are grounded in bodily-experienced phenomena; and 
(2) certain phenomena function both as source and target in different metaphorical 
mappings (see page 151). Because a given phenomenon can fulfill the role of either target 
or source in different metaphorical mappings is particularly indicative of the looseness of 
the concrete-abstract criterion (see page 149).  
Given that target domains also include the bodily-based information that legitimates 
source domains to project meaning, we argued that they may well play wider roles in 
metaphorical mapping than have been previously believed. Therefore, the experiential basis 
of the conceptual metaphor should not be fully attributed to source domains if target 
domains are bodily experienced. 
The following step was to trace the contribution of target domains to the 
experiential character of conceptual metaphor. Therefore, in Chapter IV, we hypothesized 
that since target domains in this type of conceptual metaphor are also bodily experienced, 
they potentially project their bodily-based features. Our initial step in testing this 
hypothesis concerned highlighting the features of target domains which might offset the 
                                                 
15 It is worth noting here that these characteristics, following the embodied approach to metaphor (e.g. Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980; Szwedek 2011), are indespensible for a given phenomena to be semantically independent 
(see also Chapter I and for contrasting views, see Chapter VI).  
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absolute dominance of source domains in metaphorical mapping. In particular one of the 
features which presumably differentiate source and target domains in other metaphorical 
mapping typologies such as mapping bodily-experienced phenomena onto abstract 
phenomena is that source domains are processed on-line, but target domains are processed 
off-line (Lakoff and Johnson 1989). However, we demonstrated in this chapter that when 
source and target domains are bodily-experienced, they are processed online (see page 
211). A major entailment of this finding is that target domains in this type of mapping are 
semantically independent which means that they both include and project bodily-based 
features in metaphorical mapping. 
The following step was to assess whether target domains carry out the same role as 
source domains in that they also carry out a participating role in metaphorical mapping. In 
this respect, we hypothesized that this might mean that target phenomena are not ‘passive’ 
as is held within Cognitive Linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Szwedek 2011) 
and Cognitive Science (Feldman 2006; Feldman and Narayanan, 2004).  
In this chapter we demonstrated how the metaphorical mapping typology which is 
based on two bodily-experienced phenomena posits a challenge to Embodied Theory—
namely, the one-way-meaning-transfer criterion does not apply to this typology (see page 
237). Accordingly, we argued that this approach needs to take into account also the 
characteristics of target domains which may be specific to certain metaphorical mapping 
typologies. 
Once source and target domains are proved to be identical in terms of their bodily-
based characteristics and their functional entailments (namely, target domains project their 
semantic features to construct metaphorical mapping (see page 234), we hypothesized that 
this particular typology could be looked at in terms of exchange of semantic features 
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between source and target domains. In this setting we proposed to examine this mapping 
typology from an interactionist perspective. Our concern, at this point, was to show how 
conceptual metaphor may be analyzed in terms of interaction between source and target 
domains rather than one-way-meaning transfer. 
For this purpose, we outlined the situational conditions that pave the way for 
studying this type of mapping in terms of interaction. One particular feature that lends a 
significant support to our hypothesis is the fact that target domains in this type of mapping 
consist of the same characteristics which are circumscribed to source domains. 
Based on these findings, we argued that target domains have a more participating 
role in this mapping typology (see page 177). Since target domains in this case have an 
active participation, we hypothesized that source and target domains project their bodily-
based features in metaphorical mapping. Therefore, we claimed for an interactionist 
approach to this typology instead of one-way-meaning-transfer approach.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that the experiential basis of conceptual 
metaphor should be equally attributed to source and target domains. Importantly, these 
findings conflict with Embodiment Theory insomuch that source domains have been 
claimed to play a dominating role in metaphorical mappings—because only their features 
shape the experiential character of conceptual metaphor. 
Crucial to the interaction model also has been the notion of emergent structure. 
Because the emergent structure of this metaphorical mapping typology does not belong to 
either source or target domain, we argued that this cognitive topology is brought about as a 
result of an ongoing interaction process between source and target domains. More 
specifically, this metaphorical mapping does not arise from a systematic correspondence 
between elements that are inherently found in source or target domains. We took the 
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metaphorical mapping typology which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena as a 
metaphor type that supports our hypothesis that certain metaphorical mappings are based on 
interaction between features form source and target domains. To illustrate, we observed in 
the metaphorical mapping Butchery Is Surgery that being incompetent or competent does 
not inherently belong to either source or target domain. Rather, these characteristics arise 
from the interaction between the elements of the domains Butchery and Surgery (see page 
226). 
To show how our model differs from Richards’ (1936) and Black’s (1962, 1981, 
1993), we further pursued the interaction process between source and target domains. 
Therefore, in chapter V, our primary concern was to outline the mechanisms, parameters, 
and typologies of interaction with a view to identifying which type of metaphorical 
mapping is likely to draw on interaction between source and target domains. We noticed 
that these mechanisms recur in the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-
experienced phenomena in source and target domains. As pointed out before, one of the 
core features which characterize the phenomena which interact in metaphorical mapping is 
that they are processed on-line. Recall that being processed on-line is intrinsically related to 
being semantically independent—they are meaningful without being mapped onto other 
phenomena. Since they are bodily experienced, our reasoning system, in principle, 
categorizes them without resorting to metaphorical mapping. Accordingly, we argued that 
the categorization process in this mapping typology shows major differences which can be 
captured in three different cognitive processes: categorizing (see pages 214-217), further-
categorizing (see page 218), and re-categorizing (see pages 219-221). 
Therefore, we further hypothesized that this interaction can be traced mainly at 
linguistic, physiological, neural, and cognitive levels. Target domains, in this respect, 
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interact because they are interconnected via these strands (see page 261). Of particular 
interest at this point was to assess whether these levels manifest a homogeneous interaction 
in metaphorical mapping that engages two bodily-experienced phenomena. For this 
purpose, we suggested to analyze this type of metaphor paying special attention to its 
typologies.  
We observed that the interaction process substantially varies in the metaphorical 
mapping which engages bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains. In 
this respect, we observed that there are different metaphorical typologies within the 
typology which is based on bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains 
(see page 266).  
Therefore, the interaction process is not homogeneous to all metaphorical mappings 
that engage bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains. To illustrate this 
point, we focused our attention on the mechanisms that operate in cross-sensory-modality 
mapping (Synaesthesia), image-based mapping, and bi-directional mapping. Then, we 
contrasted these three types of metaphorical mapping to literary metaphor to see whether 
the latter shows any substantial difference regarding these mechanisms. Indeed, the latter 
differs substantially from the former. For instance, while synasthetic metaphor is a 
causality-based metaphorical mapping, literary metaphor16 is deliberately constructed. In 
addition, synasthetic metaphor is dynamic in the sense that it is a stimulus-response based 
pattern. Importantly, this interaction is initiated by target domains, which in turn, leads to 
the stimulation of source domains. 
In this respect, we demonstrated that the interaction process between bodily 
experienced-phenomena is not identical. Thus, in some types of interaction the 
                                                 
16 For an opposing view, see Lakoff and Turner (1989). 
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metaphorical mapping is causality-and-co-activation based (see page 251-259). However, 
these mechanisms do not operate in other types such as literary metaphor. In this setting, 
we have shown that metaphorical mapping reveals different levels and modes of interaction 
by means of which source and target are involved in a mutual influence. One core feature 
of this interaction is Causality. Possibly, this mechanism chiefly operates in interaction-
based metaphorical mapping.  
These finding are especially indicative of the systematic variety of metaphorical 
mappings and the wrong theoretical basis to analyze metaphor as homogeneous figurative 
processing. On such a view, analyzing mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena has 
exposed to view that interaction is carried out through different mechanisms and principles. 
Nonetheless, our hypothesis needed to be further formulated since being bodily-
experienced does not necessarily permeate the interaction between source and target 
domains. Accordingly, though the focus should have been put more on whether the 
mapping is carried out consciously or unconsciously, our framework shows that certain 
mechanisms—such as co-occurrence and co-activation—prevail in certain metaphorical 
mapping typologies that engage bodily-experienced phenomena. In addition, it seems that 
these mechanisms operate when the mapping is unconsciously constructed and when source 
and target domains are bodily experienced (see page 275). 
These findings further demonstrate that the interaction varies largely depending on 
the relationship that source and target domains maintain in metaphorical mapping—e.g. 
synesthetic metaphor vs. literary metaphor. We argued that interaction is based on bodily 
features which source and target phenomena have independently of metaphorical mapping. 
In the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena, the two 
domains interact through bodily-based features. In this chapter we have shown that when 
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source and target domains are bodily-experienced, they interact by projecting their 
respective bodily-based semantic features in metaphorical mapping. 
In this chapter, we have shown that the interactionist model is applicable to the 
metaphorical mapping that engages bodily-experienced phenomena. Yet, the question 
which needed a deep consideration is whether the above mentioned mechanisms of 
interaction can operate in metaphorical mappings that do not engage two bodily-
experienced phenomena. We hypothesized that such case might include the metaphorical 
mapping which engages physical activities (as source domains) and mental activities (as 
target domains). The question which arose here is whether being bodily-experienced is a 
prerequisite condition for target domains to initiate the process of interaction. In other 
words, should source and target phenomena be bodily experienced to interact? 
To show whether this pattern is observed in other types of metaphorical mapping 
and whether it is intrinsically limited to metaphorical mappings which are based on bodily-
experienced phenomena in source and target domains, in Chapter VI, we proposed to 
closely look at the metaphorical mapping typology which engages motor actions such as 
grasp and hold and mental actions such as think and understand as source and target 
domains, respectively.  
Recall that in the previous two chapters, we have demonstrated that (1) the 
mechanisms of interaction operate in the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-
experienced phenomena; and (2) this interaction is manifested in different typologies. 
Accordingly, in this chapter we hypothesized that if the mechanisms of interaction-such as 
co-activation, causality, and automaticity-operate in other metaphorical typologies, then it 
is possible to analyze them from an interactionis perspective. 
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To assess whether other types of mapping dwell on interaction between source and 
target domains, we focused our attention in this chapter on the metaphorical mapping which 
engages motor actions and mental activities as source and target domains, respectively. Our 
findings, in this respect, point out that this type of mapping is based on interaction too. 
Though not all the mechanisms of interaction are observed in this type of metaphorical 
mapping, we have shown that it is still based on mutual influence between the motor 
topology of the source and the cognitive topology of the target domains (see page 295). For 
instance, we disregard co-occurrence as a mechanism of interaction in this case due to the 
fact that target domains are not experienced bodily. Yet, other mechanisms and 
characteristics that lead to interaction -such as the fact that target domains are semantically 
independent, co-activation between source and target domains,and Automaticity of 
mapping-are observed in this type of mapping typology (see page 317). 
Therefore, meaning construction in this type of metaphor, when certain conditions 
are met (see page 295) is also based on interaction between source and target domains 
rather than one-way-meaning transfer. We further hypothesized that these mechanisms may 
operate differently in different mapping typologies (see page 324). 
Furthermore, analyzing the data shows that our cognitive and motor systems interact 
in the metaphorical processing of mental activities such as understanding. In particular, the 
metaphorical mapping which engages motor actions and mental actions as source and target 
domains, respectively, fits into the interactionist perspective in that there is exchange of 
semantic features between source and target domains. 
In this chapter we demonstrated that the interaction process between source and 
target domains is not limited to the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-
experienced phenomena.  
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These findings corroborate the major hypothesis that we put forward in this chapter 
which pursued whether being bodily experienced is a prerequisite condition for target 
phenomena to interact with their counterparts in the source domains. Analyzing the data 
shows that this condition is not necessary for the target domain to project its semantic 
features in metaphorical mapping. 
One way to track how interaction is optimal in this typology was to analyze how the 
stimulus-response pattern operates in this type of mapping. In this respect, we argued that 
the cognitive topology of the target phenomena evokes the topology of the sensorimotor 
experience of the source domain. To illustrate, the interaction in this type of mapping is 
triggered via a shared linguistic system between the motor and cognitive system (see page 
295). In particular, based on neurological experiments (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, 
and Iacoboni 2006), the physical topologies of action words such as grasp can be traced 
neurally. Together with other studies (e.g. Coulson, 2008; Gallese and Lakoff 2005), it has 
been argued that such physical topologies also become active when action words, which are 
inherently associated with the motor topology of the source domain (e.g. Grasping), are 
used metaphorically. These findings have been crucial to our study of the mapping 
typology which draws on physical actions and mental actions as source and target domains, 
respectively. That is, we argued that there is cooperation between the sensorimotor and 
cognitive systems to give rise to such mapping typology. Specifically, we suggest that there 
is semantic exchange between the motor topology of source domains and the cognitive 
topology of target domains.  
Similarly, the metaphorical mapping which engages two bodily-experienced 
phenomena, the target domains in this type of metaphorical mapping are not the only 
domains which are influenced. Instead, the motor topology of the source domain has to 
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adapt to the cognitive topology of the target domain (see page 334). This particular finding 
indicates that the interaction process differs too. Recall that in chapter V, we showed how 
the interaction substantially varies in the metaphorical mapping which engages bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains. The hybridity of the constitutive 
nature of source and target domains and the way these domains are mapped are also 
observed in the metaphorical mapping which is based on interaction in that this process 
varies depending on the mapping typology in question, the mechanisms of the interaction, 
the constitutive nature of source and target domains, and the system which is exploited 
(cognitive vs. physiological, for instance). On the whole, those mechanisms reveal that the 
interaction in metaphorical mapping can be articulated at different, but interconnected, 
levels: cognition, language, and physiology. Accordingly, the process of interaction should 
not be studied as a homogeneous process either. 
This finding again indicates that the interaction process between source and target 
domains may arise from different conditions and follow different patterns. In chapter IV, 
we demonstrated that the interaction between source and target domains recruits bodily-
based features from source and target domains. In this chapter, the interaction is manifested 
differently. That is, given that the mental activities, which function as target domains are 
not bodily experienced, the interaction process cannot be based on recruiting bodily-
features from both phenomena. Notice that even though the target domains in these 
metaphorical mapping typologies are not grounded in bodily-experienced phenomena, they 
potentially interact with source domains insomuch that the interaction process recruits 
bodily-based features from the motor topologies of source domains and semantic features 
from the cognitive topology of the target. 
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In this setting, it has been important to assess how the interaction process recruits 
this information to highlight which features (of the target domains) contribute to the 
construction and processing of this type of mapping. In particular, the data shows that when 
action words such as grasp are mapped onto mental activities such as understand, the 
cognitive and sensorimotor systems are not encapsulated in constructing metaphorical 
meaning. In contrast, the cognitive and sensorimotor systems contribute to the construction 
and processing of this type of mapping. We have shown in this chapter that sensorimotor 
experiences are inferred from mental activities via activating the motor topology of source 
domains. This activation is carried out via the sensorimotor stimuli which are inferred from 
mental activities such understanding. 
As the data indicates, cognitive processes are not devoid of sensorimotor 
information. Therefore, when we understand a mental activity in terms of a motor action, 
this cognitive process is not mapping between the two domains at an abstract level. Rather, 
this mapping typology still makes allusion to the motor topology of source domains. 
However, this does not entails imposing the motor topology on target domains without any 
considerable participation from target domains (see page 234). So, both constructing and 
processing this type of mapping engage the topologies of source and target domains. A 
piece of evidence for this assumption is that we noticed that this type of mapping engages 
two semantically independent domains. For instance, we argued that Understanding is both 
cognitively and semantically independent. In the first case, we mean that we do not resort 
to other phenomena to reason about the phenomenon of Understanding. In the second case, 
we mainly refer to the fact that though this phenomenon is abstract, it includes semantic 
features that are potentially projected into the metaphorical mapping. 
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Taken together, the findings in this chapter indicate that target domains in this type 
of mapping also contribute to the embodied character of conceptual metaphor via sharing 
common linguistic system, common stimuli, and common neural networks with the motor 
topology of source domains (see page 297).  
2. Summary of Contributions 
2.1.  Overgeneralization within Embodied Metaphor Theory and the 
need for a more complex classification of metaphorical mapping typologies 
The tenets of Embodiment Theory address a broad aspect of metaphorical mapping. 
However, the assumption that metaphor is based on one mapping typology has given rise to 
significant incongruities within the theory. As the thesis has demonstrated, adopting the 
view that all metaphorical mappings engage bodily-experienced phenomena (as source 
domains) and non-bodily-experienced phenomena (as target domains) raises major 
theoretical problems that can be addressed avoiding overarching metaphorical mapping 
typologies using a closed set of tenets. Therefore, conceptual metaphor cannot be studied as 
a homogeneous cognitive processing because, 
i. conceptual metaphor is instantiated through different mapping typologies; 
ii. target domains in certain types of mapping are bodily-experienced, 
semantically independent, and have their own conceptual structures; 
iii. the concrete-abstract criterion fails to explain the metaphorical mapping 
which engages  two bodily-experienced phenomena; 
iv. the experiential basis of the embodied metaphor should not be fully 
attributed to source domains; 
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v. this metaphorical mapping typology involves bodily-based semantic features 
from source and target domains; 
vi. metaphorical mapping in this case is based on interaction rather than one-
way-meaning transfer; 
vii. target domains are not passive because they influence source domains; 
therefore, they actively participate in the construction of metaphorical 
mapping; 
viii. the Uni-directionality criterion does not characterize this metaphorical 
mapping typology;  
ix. the Partial Mapping criterion is not in line with Embodied Simulation 
Theory; 
x. the interaction process in metaphorical mapping can be articulated mainly at 
different levels of complexity: cognitive, linguistic, and neural; 
xi. the interaction between source and target domains is based mainly on co-
activation, causality, automation, and systematicity; 
xii. the interaction process between source and target phenomena follows 
different typologies. 
Taken together, these findings indicate that, while the tenets of Embodied Metaphor 
Theory can fit into a certain type of metaphor—namely, the mapping typology which is 
draws on bodily-experienced phenomena and abstract phenomena as source and target 
domains, respectively—the task becomes difficult when one tries to apply these tenets to 
different metaphorical mapping typologies. In this respect, the theory needs to be refined to 
be applied to, let us say, the mapping which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena. 
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2.2. The Embodied Approach vs. the Interactist Model 
These aforementioned findings lead us to call for a more complex classification of 
conceptual metaphor in terms of its typologies and their respective cognitive operations. In 
this respect, throughout the thesis, our concern has been to urge this necessity since certain 
metaphorical mapping typologies posit theoretical problems to the embodied approach to 
metaphor. This situation is due to the fact that mapping across bodily-experienced 
phenomena cannot be covered either by the tenets of Embodied Simulation Theory or by 
those of the Embodied Approach to metaphor (see Chapter I). Accordingly, we claimed that 
different types of metaphorical mapping require different analyses. In particular, we 
demonstrated that certain metaphorical mapping typologies follow a system of their own 
(see for example mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena, multimodal-based 
mapping, and synesthesia based mapping).  
Based on these findings, we argued that (1) metaphorical mapping typologies are far 
too complex to be captured in a single type of cognitive processing; and (2) the tenets of the 
Embodied Approach to metaphor fit certain metaphorical mapping typologies which 
engage bodily-experienced and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target 
domains, respectively.  
For the same token, the interactionist appraoch covers the metaphorical mapping 
typology which engages bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains and 
certain metaphorical mapping typologies which engage motor actions and mental activities 
as source and target domains, respectively. In this respect, our model also differs from the 
Embodied Approach to metaphor in that the latter is based on the assumption that in 
metaphorical mapping there is always one-way-meaning transfer and the only operating 
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information in metaphorical mapping is rooted in source domains. In contrast, our model 
accounts for conceptual metaphor as a two-way-input transfer. The sensory motor 
information which is processed and clustered in the source phenomena is not the only one 
that is active in constructing and processing the metaphorical mapping which is based on 
interaction. Instead, this metaphorical mapping typology recruits features from both motor 
actions and mental activities (see Chapter VI). As a consequence, the inference of this 
particular metaphorical mapping typology is not shaped only through the filter of source 
domains. Rather it is the result of an ongoing interaction process between two phenomena. 
In this setting, mapping motor actions and mental activities is based on interaction 
which can be analyzed in terms of causality, co-activation, and automaticity. Furthermore, 
while the embodied approach to metaphor focuses on the embodying process as the only 
process in metaphorical mapping construction (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 2011; Gibbs and Matlock 
2008; Johnson 1981, 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 2002; Kövecses 1988, 2000, 2002, 2005, 
2010, 2011; Lakoff 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff and Turner 1989; 
Szwedek 2011), the data shows that abstracting is as important as the embodying process in 
certain types of metaphorical mapping.  
These particular findings seem to support our model in that due to the rich variety of 
experience and the different metaphorical mapping typologies outlined in the thesis (see 
Chapter I), it is necessary to deal with each metaphorical mapping typology as a different 
cognitive processing.  
2.3. Black’s Interaction Model (1962, 1981, 1993) vs. Ours 
Though the two models coincide in the fact that (1) the construction and processing 
of conceptual metaphor recruit features from source and target domains; and (2) source and 
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target domains are engaged in mutual influence, the two models differ in the following 
aspects: 
First, Black’s approach aims to cover all metaphorical mapping typologies making 
no difference between, let us say, the metaphorical mapping which is based on two bodily-
experienced phenomena and the mapping which is based on bodily and non bodily-
experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. Our model particularly 
characterizes the conceptual metaphor typology which is based on two bodily-experienced 
phenomena (see Chapter III) and certain metaphorical mapping typologies which engage 
motor actions and mental activities as source and target domains, respectively (see chapter 
VI). 
Second, whereas the interaction process within Black's approach is identical to all 
conceptual metaphors, our model outlines different patterns and mechanisms of interaction 
which substantially vary depending on the metaphorical mapping typology (e.g. deliberate 
vs. unconscious mapping; and co-activation-based mapping. Indeed, this variation is not 
accounted for by scholars who support the Interaction Model (Black 1962, 1981, 1993; 
Forceville 1996; Kittay 1987; McGlone 2001, 2003). 
Third, whereas Black's model claims that the inference of conceptual metaphor is 
limited to the features which inherently exist in source and target domains, our model takes 
emergent structure (Coulson 2008; Fauconnier and Turner 2007) as a crucial characteristic 
to the interaction process in certain metaphorical mapping typologies. 
To sum up, our model endorses the hypothesis that we put forward in Chapter I that 
conceptual metaphor cannot be studied as a homogeneous cognitive processing. Instead, as 
the data indicates, different metaphorical mapping typologies show different patterns and 
principles.  
371 
 
3. Future Research 
Embodiment Theory is still under refinement process in the sense that it is taking 
successive approximations towards a more accurate understanding of the cognitive 
operations underlying the conceptual metaphor construction and processing. It still needs to 
take further steps in this direction.  
Possibly, our thesis has established the first step toward establishing a more 
complex classification of metaphorical mapping typologies and their respective patterns 
and principles. Yet, we still need, for instance, further experimental testing to show to what 
degree co-activation and automaticity operate in the metaphorical mapping which is based 
on interaction. Recall that, in some of the instances of Building Is Human, the mapping 
occurs within the same modality, namely, vision. This might need further studies to 
determine whether there is a difference in terms of causality, co-activation, and 
automaticity between metaphorical mapping which is based on one modality and the one 
which is based on different modalities. 
Similarly, further studies in this direction could focus on other kinds of source 
domains (e.g. state, orientation, spatial, and location) to see whether their interaction with 
target domains show different patterns others than co-activation and automaticity. 
In the thesis (Chapter VI), we outlined the mechanisms and typologies of interaction 
and demonstrated that target domains which include mental activities interact with the 
phenomena which include physical actions. In this respect, it might be important to see 
whether other types of abstract phenomena interact with physical actions as source domains 
in different ways.  
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Another factor that can be considered in future research regarding metaphorical 
mapping typologies and their respective patterns and principles is the cultural construal of 
conceptual metaphor that may influence the interaction process between source and target 
domains. For instance, it might be important to address the question whether the fact that 
certain source and target domains are experienced differently across cultures could lead to 
different mechanisms and patterns of interaction. 
To sum up, the assumption that conceptual metaphor is based on a homogeneous 
cognitive process—one-way-meaning transfer from more concrete onto more abstract 
domains is false. Therefore metaphorical mapping has a wider scope that cannot be 
captured under one core cognitive process. Accordingly, we suggest that the embodied 
metaphor approach requires a refinement process which accounts for conceptual metaphor 
as a heterogeneous cognitive process which is instantiated in different mapping typologies 
that dwell on various cognitive operations and patterns and mechanisms.  
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